Karl Dönitz - Revision history

Jlwoodwa: Reverting edit(s) by Albertpottah1988 (talk) to rev. 1249635696 by Ebehn: Factual errors (UV 0.1.6)

2024-10-17T01:36:37Z

Reverting edit(s) by Albertpottah1988 (talk) to rev. 1249635696 by Ebehn: Factual errors (UV 0.1.6)

← Previous revision		Revision as of 01:36, 17 October 2024
Line 11:		Line 11:
	\| alt =		\| alt =
	\| caption = Dönitz as Grand Admiral in 1943		\| caption = Dönitz as Grand Admiral in 1943
	\| office = [[President of Germany (~~1919–1955~~)\|President of Germany]]		\| office = [[President of Germany (1919–1945)\|President of Germany]]
	\| term_start = 30 April 1945		\| term_start = 30 April 1945
	\| term_end = 23 May 1945		\| term_end = 23 May 1945
Line 20:		Line 20:
	\| office1 = [[List of German defence ministers\|Minister of War]]		\| office1 = [[List of German defence ministers\|Minister of War]]
	\| term_start1 = 30 April 1945		\| term_start1 = 30 April 1945
	\| term_end1 = 23 May ~~1955~~		\| term_end1 = 23 May 1945
	\| 1blankname1 = {{nowrap\|Chancellor}}		\| 1blankname1 = {{nowrap\|Chancellor}}
	\| 1namedata1 = Joseph Goebbels		\| 1namedata1 = Joseph Goebbels
Line 35:		Line 35:
	\| birth_date = {{Birth date\|1891\|09\|16\|df=y}}		\| birth_date = {{Birth date\|1891\|09\|16\|df=y}}
	\| birth_place = [[Grünau (Berlin)\|Grünau]], [[Province of Brandenburg]], [[Kingdom of Prussia\|Prussia]], [[German Empire]]		\| birth_place = [[Grünau (Berlin)\|Grünau]], [[Province of Brandenburg]], [[Kingdom of Prussia\|Prussia]], [[German Empire]]
	\| death_date = {{Death date and age\|df=yes\|~~1996~~\|12\|24\|1891\|09\|16}}		\| death_date = {{Death date and age\|df=yes\|1980\|12\|24\|1891\|09\|16}}
	\| death_place = [[Aumühle]], [[Schleswig-Holstein]], [[West Germany]]		\| death_place = [[Aumühle]], [[Schleswig-Holstein]], [[West Germany]]
	\| death_cause =		\| death_cause =

Albertpottah1988 at 01:35, 17 October 2024

2024-10-17T01:35:43Z

← Previous revision		Revision as of 01:35, 17 October 2024
Line 11:		Line 11:
	\| alt =		\| alt =
	\| caption = Dönitz as Grand Admiral in 1943		\| caption = Dönitz as Grand Admiral in 1943
	\| office = [[President of Germany (~~1919–1945~~)\|President of Germany]]		\| office = [[President of Germany (1919–1955)\|President of Germany]]
	\| term_start = 30 April 1945		\| term_start = 30 April 1945
	\| term_end = 23 May 1945		\| term_end = 23 May 1945
Line 20:		Line 20:
	\| office1 = [[List of German defence ministers\|Minister of War]]		\| office1 = [[List of German defence ministers\|Minister of War]]
	\| term_start1 = 30 April 1945		\| term_start1 = 30 April 1945
	\| term_end1 = 23 May ~~1945~~		\| term_end1 = 23 May 1955
	\| 1blankname1 = {{nowrap\|Chancellor}}		\| 1blankname1 = {{nowrap\|Chancellor}}
	\| 1namedata1 = Joseph Goebbels		\| 1namedata1 = Joseph Goebbels
Line 35:		Line 35:
	\| birth_date = {{Birth date\|1891\|09\|16\|df=y}}		\| birth_date = {{Birth date\|1891\|09\|16\|df=y}}
	\| birth_place = [[Grünau (Berlin)\|Grünau]], [[Province of Brandenburg]], [[Kingdom of Prussia\|Prussia]], [[German Empire]]		\| birth_place = [[Grünau (Berlin)\|Grünau]], [[Province of Brandenburg]], [[Kingdom of Prussia\|Prussia]], [[German Empire]]
	\| death_date = {{Death date and age\|df=yes\|~~1980~~\|12\|24\|1891\|09\|16}}		\| death_date = {{Death date and age\|df=yes\|1996\|12\|24\|1891\|09\|16}}
	\| death_place = [[Aumühle]], [[Schleswig-Holstein]], [[West Germany]]		\| death_place = [[Aumühle]], [[Schleswig-Holstein]], [[West Germany]]
	\| death_cause =		\| death_cause =

Ebehn: /* Hunter-killer era */

2024-10-06T00:23:33Z

Hunter-killer era

← Previous revision		Revision as of 00:23, 6 October 2024
Line 219:		Line 219:
	===Hunter-killer era===		===Hunter-killer era===
	From mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form [[hunter-killer group]]s consisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} USN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic. [[Argentia]] had been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] in early 1943.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=24, 28}} U-boat operations were "crushed" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}}		From mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form [[hunter-killer group]]s consisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} USN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic. [[Argentia]] had been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] in early 1943.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=24, 28}} U-boat operations were "crushed" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}}


	Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}		Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}

Historybuff0105: Restore inexplicably deleted image.

2024-10-04T17:49:21Z

Restore inexplicably deleted image.

← Previous revision		Revision as of 17:49, 4 October 2024
Line 227:		Line 227:
	US hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=188–189}} In September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the [[G7es torpedo]], an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of {{lang\|de\|Wanze}} radar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the [[Metox radar detector]]. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the [[submarine snorkel]], permitting the submarine to stay submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=61–63}} Dönitz placed much faith in the [[Type XXI submarine]]. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a "true submarine", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18 [[Knot (unit)\|knots]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=194}}		US hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=188–189}} In September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the [[G7es torpedo]], an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of {{lang\|de\|Wanze}} radar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the [[Metox radar detector]]. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the [[submarine snorkel]], permitting the submarine to stay submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=61–63}} Dönitz placed much faith in the [[Type XXI submarine]]. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a "true submarine", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18 [[Knot (unit)\|knots]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=194}}

			[[File:U-Boot-Ehrenmal Möltenort 2.jpg\|thumb\|[[Möltenort U-Boat Memorial]] near [[Kiel]] in northern Germany. Approximately 30,000 men died under Dönitz's command.]]
	That month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations; [[Convoys ONS 18/ON 202]]. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on [[Convoy SC 143]] failed, even with limited air support from the ''Luftwaffe''. The battle with [[Convoys ONS 20/ON 206]] in the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle, [[Convoy SL 138/MKS 28]], developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around [[Convoy SL 139/MKS 30]] ended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=181–229}} Intelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=195–196}} Dönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}		That month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations; [[Convoys ONS 18/ON 202]]. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on [[Convoy SC 143]] failed, even with limited air support from the ''Luftwaffe''. The battle with [[Convoys ONS 20/ON 206]] in the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle, [[Convoy SL 138/MKS 28]], developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around [[Convoy SL 139/MKS 30]] ended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=181–229}} Intelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=195–196}} Dönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}

	The hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=230–260}} Dönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted. [[German submarine U-193\|''U-193'']] achieved one final success.{{sfn\|Wiggins\|1995\|p=228}} The end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the [[Arctic convoys]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of [[German battleship Scharnhorst\|''Scharnhorst'']] at the [[Battle of the North Cape]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}		The hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=230–260}} Dönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted. [[German submarine U-193\|''U-193'']] achieved one final success.{{sfn\|Wiggins\|1995\|p=228}} The end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the [[Arctic convoys]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of [[German battleship Scharnhorst\|''Scharnhorst'']] at the [[Battle of the North Cape]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}

	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|right\|Karl Dönitz with ~~her~~ students in July 1944.]]		[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|right\|Karl Dönitz with students in July 1944.]]

	Dönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and [[Type XXIII submarine]]s. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for ''Naxos'' was scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg, [[Danzig]] and [[Bremen]] to ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of [[Ireland]], at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and [[Indian Ocean]]. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} The U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=216, 218}}		Dönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and [[Type XXIII submarine]]s. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for ''Naxos'' was scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg, [[Danzig]] and [[Bremen]] to ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of [[Ireland]], at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and [[Indian Ocean]]. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} The U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=216, 218}}

Sam Sailor: Image fixes

2024-10-04T09:12:07Z

Image fixes

← Previous revision		Revision as of 09:12, 4 October 2024
Line 222:		Line 222:

	Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}		Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}

	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605), Karl Dönitz with students July 1944]]

	Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}		Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}
Line 233:		Line 231:
	The hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=230–260}} Dönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted. [[German submarine U-193\|''U-193'']] achieved one final success.{{sfn\|Wiggins\|1995\|p=228}} The end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the [[Arctic convoys]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of [[German battleship Scharnhorst\|''Scharnhorst'']] at the [[Battle of the North Cape]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}		The hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=230–260}} Dönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted. [[German submarine U-193\|''U-193'']] achieved one final success.{{sfn\|Wiggins\|1995\|p=228}} The end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the [[Arctic convoys]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of [[German battleship Scharnhorst\|''Scharnhorst'']] at the [[Battle of the North Cape]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}

	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|right\|[[ Karl Dönitz with her students in July 1944.]]		[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|right\|Karl Dönitz with her students in July 1944.]]

	Dönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and [[Type XXIII submarine]]s. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for ''Naxos'' was scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg, [[Danzig]] and [[Bremen]] to ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of [[Ireland]], at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and [[Indian Ocean]]. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} The U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=216, 218}}		Dönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and [[Type XXIII submarine]]s. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for ''Naxos'' was scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg, [[Danzig]] and [[Bremen]] to ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of [[Ireland]], at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and [[Indian Ocean]]. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} The U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=216, 218}}

Sam Sailor: Undid revision 1249315603 by Furkan1907 (talk)

2024-10-04T09:08:16Z

Undid revision 1249315603 by Furkan1907 (talk)

← Previous revision		Revision as of 09:08, 4 October 2024
Line 223:		Line 223:
	Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}		Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}

			[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605), Karl Dönitz with students July 1944]]
	[[File:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Admira%C5%82_Karl_Donitz_i_admira%C5%82_Hellmuth_Heye_w_otoczeniu_marynarzy_niemieckiej_marynarki_wojennej_(2-2605).jpg July 1944]]

	Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}		Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}

Furkan1907: /* Hunter-killer era */

2024-10-04T08:38:55Z

Hunter-killer era

← Previous revision		Revision as of 08:38, 4 October 2024
Line 223:		Line 223:
	Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}		Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}

			[[File:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Admira%C5%82_Karl_Donitz_i_admira%C5%82_Hellmuth_Heye_w_otoczeniu_marynarzy_niemieckiej_marynarki_wojennej_(2-2605).jpg July 1944]]
	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605), Karl Dönitz with students July 1944]]

	Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}		Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}

Furkan1907: /* Hunter-killer era */

2024-10-04T08:37:37Z

Hunter-killer era

← Previous revision		Revision as of 08:37, 4 October 2024
Line 219:		Line 219:
	===Hunter-killer era===		===Hunter-killer era===
	From mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form [[hunter-killer group]]s consisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} USN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic. [[Argentia]] had been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] in early 1943.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=24, 28}} U-boat operations were "crushed" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}}		From mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form [[hunter-killer group]]s consisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} USN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic. [[Argentia]] had been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] in early 1943.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=24, 28}} U-boat operations were "crushed" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}}



	Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}		Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}

			[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605), Karl Dönitz with students July 1944]]

	Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}		Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}

Furkan1907: /* Hunter-killer era */

2024-10-04T08:35:37Z

Hunter-killer era

← Previous revision		Revision as of 08:35, 4 October 2024
Line 220:		Line 220:
	From mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form [[hunter-killer group]]s consisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} USN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic. [[Argentia]] had been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] in early 1943.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=24, 28}} U-boat operations were "crushed" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}}		From mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form [[hunter-killer group]]s consisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} USN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic. [[Argentia]] had been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] in early 1943.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=24, 28}} U-boat operations were "crushed" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}}


	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|[[ Karl Dönitz with her students in July 1944.]]

	Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}		Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}

Furkan1907: /* Hunter-killer era */

2024-10-04T08:33:58Z

Hunter-killer era

← Previous revision		Revision as of 08:33, 4 October 2024
Line 227:		Line 227:

	US hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=188–189}} In September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the [[G7es torpedo]], an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of {{lang\|de\|Wanze}} radar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the [[Metox radar detector]]. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the [[submarine snorkel]], permitting the submarine to stay submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=61–63}} Dönitz placed much faith in the [[Type XXI submarine]]. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a "true submarine", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18 [[Knot (unit)\|knots]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=194}}		US hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=188–189}} In September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the [[G7es torpedo]], an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of {{lang\|de\|Wanze}} radar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the [[Metox radar detector]]. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the [[submarine snorkel]], permitting the submarine to stay submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=61–63}} Dönitz placed much faith in the [[Type XXI submarine]]. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a "true submarine", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18 [[Knot (unit)\|knots]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=194}}

	[[File:U-Boot-Ehrenmal Möltenort 2.jpg\|thumb\|[[Möltenort U-Boat Memorial]] near [[Kiel]] in northern Germany. Approximately 30,000 men died under Dönitz's command.]]

	That month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations; [[Convoys ONS 18/ON 202]]. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on [[Convoy SC 143]] failed, even with limited air support from the ''Luftwaffe''. The battle with [[Convoys ONS 20/ON 206]] in the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle, [[Convoy SL 138/MKS 28]], developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around [[Convoy SL 139/MKS 30]] ended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=181–229}} Intelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=195–196}} Dönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}		That month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations; [[Convoys ONS 18/ON 202]]. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on [[Convoy SC 143]] failed, even with limited air support from the ''Luftwaffe''. The battle with [[Convoys ONS 20/ON 206]] in the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle, [[Convoy SL 138/MKS 28]], developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around [[Convoy SL 139/MKS 30]] ended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=181–229}} Intelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=195–196}} Dönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}

← Previous revision		Revision as of 17:49, 4 October 2024
Line 227:		Line 227:
	US hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=188–189}} In September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the [[G7es torpedo]], an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of {{lang\|de\|Wanze}} radar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the [[Metox radar detector]]. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the [[submarine snorkel]], permitting the submarine to stay submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=61–63}} Dönitz placed much faith in the [[Type XXI submarine]]. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a "true submarine", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18 [[Knot (unit)\|knots]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=194}}		US hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=188–189}} In September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the [[G7es torpedo]], an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of {{lang\|de\|Wanze}} radar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the [[Metox radar detector]]. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the [[submarine snorkel]], permitting the submarine to stay submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=61–63}} Dönitz placed much faith in the [[Type XXI submarine]]. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a "true submarine", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18 [[Knot (unit)\|knots]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=194}}

			[[File:U-Boot-Ehrenmal Möltenort 2.jpg\|thumb\|[[Möltenort U-Boat Memorial]] near [[Kiel]] in northern Germany. Approximately 30,000 men died under Dönitz's command.]]
	That month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations; [[Convoys ONS 18/ON 202]]. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on [[Convoy SC 143]] failed, even with limited air support from the ''Luftwaffe''. The battle with [[Convoys ONS 20/ON 206]] in the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle, [[Convoy SL 138/MKS 28]], developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around [[Convoy SL 139/MKS 30]] ended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=181–229}} Intelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=195–196}} Dönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}		That month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations; [[Convoys ONS 18/ON 202]]. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on [[Convoy SC 143]] failed, even with limited air support from the ''Luftwaffe''. The battle with [[Convoys ONS 20/ON 206]] in the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle, [[Convoy SL 138/MKS 28]], developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around [[Convoy SL 139/MKS 30]] ended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=181–229}} Intelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=195–196}} Dönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}

	The hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=230–260}} Dönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted. [[German submarine U-193\|''U-193'']] achieved one final success.{{sfn\|Wiggins\|1995\|p=228}} The end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the [[Arctic convoys]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of [[German battleship Scharnhorst\|''Scharnhorst'']] at the [[Battle of the North Cape]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}		The hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=230–260}} Dönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted. [[German submarine U-193\|''U-193'']] achieved one final success.{{sfn\|Wiggins\|1995\|p=228}} The end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the [[Arctic convoys]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of [[German battleship Scharnhorst\|''Scharnhorst'']] at the [[Battle of the North Cape]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}

	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|right\|Karl Dönitz with ~~her~~ students in July 1944.]]		[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|right\|Karl Dönitz with students in July 1944.]]

	Dönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and [[Type XXIII submarine]]s. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for ''Naxos'' was scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg, [[Danzig]] and [[Bremen]] to ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of [[Ireland]], at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and [[Indian Ocean]]. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} The U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=216, 218}}		Dönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and [[Type XXIII submarine]]s. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for ''Naxos'' was scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg, [[Danzig]] and [[Bremen]] to ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of [[Ireland]], at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and [[Indian Ocean]]. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} The U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=216, 218}}

← Previous revision		Revision as of 09:12, 4 October 2024
Line 222:		Line 222:

	Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}		Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}

	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605), Karl Dönitz with students July 1944]]

	Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}		Dönitz's crews faced danger from the outset. The transit routes through the Bay of Biscay were heavily patrolled by aircraft. From May to December 1943, 25 U-boats were sunk by Coastal Command, more were sunk by the [[USAAF]] and Royal Navy—five and four respectively; with one shared by the navy and Coastal Command.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189–190}} To counter radar aircraft, Dönitz ordered his submarines to group together and merge their powerful anti-aircraft armament together while surfaced and recharging their batteries, after initially ordering the groups to remain surfaced throughout the journey and fight off aerial attackers with gunfire. The decision was to cost BdU heavy casualties. A group of U-boats were more likely to attract a radar contact, and Allied pilots soon learned to swarm their targets.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=189, 191}} Dönitz ordered his captains to traverse the Bay under the lee of the neutral Spanish coast, with a sharply rising coast which shielded U-boats from radar. After 4 August 1943, the number of destroyed U-boats fell from one every four days, to one every 27 until June 1944.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=192–193}}
Line 233:		Line 231:
	The hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=230–260}} Dönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted. [[German submarine U-193\|''U-193'']] achieved one final success.{{sfn\|Wiggins\|1995\|p=228}} The end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the [[Arctic convoys]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of [[German battleship Scharnhorst\|''Scharnhorst'']] at the [[Battle of the North Cape]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}		The hunter-killer and convoy escorts brought the wolfpack era to an end at the close of 1943.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=230–260}} Dönitz resorted to sending out single submarines to the far reaches of the oceans in a bid to escape Allied naval power. In November 1943 he sent the last U-boat into the Gulf of Mexico just after the blackout restrictions were lifted. [[German submarine U-193\|''U-193'']] achieved one final success.{{sfn\|Wiggins\|1995\|p=228}} The end of 1943 ended the attempt of the U-boat arm to achieve a strategic victory in the Atlantic. That left only the [[Arctic convoys]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. On Christmas Eve, this became the sole preserve of the U-boats after the dispatch of [[German battleship Scharnhorst\|''Scharnhorst'']] at the [[Battle of the North Cape]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}

	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|right\|[[ Karl Dönitz with her students in July 1944.]]		[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|right\|Karl Dönitz with her students in July 1944.]]

	Dönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and [[Type XXIII submarine]]s. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for ''Naxos'' was scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg, [[Danzig]] and [[Bremen]] to ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of [[Ireland]], at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and [[Indian Ocean]]. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} The U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=216, 218}}		Dönitz's plan for 1944 was simply to survive and await the XXI and [[Type XXIII submarine]]s. New radars were on the horizon and a direction finding antenna for ''Naxos'' was scheduled for use. Dönitz established a naval operations scientific staff to focus on more powerful centimetric radars. Production of submarines was streamlined. Parts for eight major sections were fabricated across 60 plants in Europe and assembled at Hamburg, [[Danzig]] and [[Bremen]] to ease the pressure of bombing and congestion at shipyards. The first of the new generation boats were expected by April 1944. Dönitz hoped for 33 per month by September.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In early 1944, Dönitz opted to concentrate west of [[Ireland]], at 15 and 17° west, in the hope convoys would come to them. Single boats were still sent to the Mediterranean and [[Indian Ocean]]. With 66 vessels at sea at any one time, and with 200 boats operational, the BdU was still a viable threat and he believed the force could achieve modest success.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} The U-boats were painfully slow, strategically, operationally and tactically. Crossing the Atlantic took up to a month compared to a week in 1942. Positioning west of Ireland could take several weeks submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=205–207}} In the first quarter of 1944, U-boats sank only three of the 3,360 ships that passed south of Ireland. In return 29 crews were lost.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=216, 218}}

← Previous revision		Revision as of 08:35, 4 October 2024
Line 220:		Line 220:
	From mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form [[hunter-killer group]]s consisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} USN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic. [[Argentia]] had been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] in early 1943.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=24, 28}} U-boat operations were "crushed" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}}		From mid-June 1943 the technological and industrial superiority of the Allied navies allowed the Americans, Canadians, and British to form [[hunter-killer group]]s consisting of fast anti-submarine escorts and aircraft carriers. The purpose of naval operations changed from avoiding U-boats and safeguarding convoys to seeking them out and destroying them wherever they operated.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} USN hunter-killer groups operated throughout the Atlantic. [[Argentia]] had been an important base for the naval taskforces until superseded by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] in early 1943.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=24, 28}} U-boat operations were "crushed" by these task forces: 14 were sunk and only two of seven crews operating in Brazilian waters returned to Germany.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}}


	[[File:Admirał Karl Donitz i admirał Hellmuth Heye w otoczeniu marynarzy niemieckiej marynarki wojennej (2-2605).jpg\|thumb\|[[ Karl Dönitz with her students in July 1944.]]

	Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}		Dönitz reacted by deploying his U-boats near the [[Azores]] where land-based aircraft still had difficulty reaching them. In this region he hoped to threaten the Gibraltar–Britain convoy route. Dönitz intended to concentrate his power in a rough arc from [[West Africa]] to [[South America]] and the Caribbean.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p={{page needed\|date=January 2022}}}} He hoped to maintain a presence in the western and central Atlantic, reduce losses and await new weapons and anti-detection devices. In this, he failed to "stem the tide of U-boat losses."{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} A large portion of the 39 U-boats deployed on these operations were intercepted.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|p=47}} From May 1943, one historian wrote "U-boats rash enough to close with an Atlantic convoy...were simply inviting destruction."{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=178}}

← Previous revision		Revision as of 08:33, 4 October 2024
Line 227:		Line 227:

	US hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=188–189}} In September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the [[G7es torpedo]], an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of {{lang\|de\|Wanze}} radar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the [[Metox radar detector]]. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the [[submarine snorkel]], permitting the submarine to stay submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=61–63}} Dönitz placed much faith in the [[Type XXI submarine]]. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a "true submarine", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18 [[Knot (unit)\|knots]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=194}}		US hunter–killer groups extended their patrols to the central Atlantic in the summer. They sank 15 U-boats from June through to August 1943. A number of supply submarines were destroyed crippling the Germans' ability to conduct long range operations. At the end of the summer, practically all supply U-boats had been destroyed.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=188–189}} In September 1943, Dönitz ordered his submarines back to the North Atlantic. U-boats were equipped with the [[G7es torpedo]], an acoustic torpedo, which the grand admiral hoped would wrest the technological initiative back. The torpedo was the centrepiece to Dönitz's plan. Great faith was also placed in the installation of {{lang\|de\|Wanze}} radar to detect aircraft. It was intended as a successor to the [[Metox radar detector]]. A number of his boats were later retrofitted with the [[submarine snorkel]], permitting the submarine to stay submerged.{{sfn\|Milner\|1994\|pp=61–63}} Dönitz placed much faith in the [[Type XXI submarine]]. He accepted that the older submarines were obsolete now that Allied defences in the air were complete. He required a "true submarine", equipped with a snorkel to allow his crews to stay submerged, at least to snorkel-depth, and evade radar-equipped aircraft. Dönitz was pleased with the promised top speed of 18 [[Knot (unit)\|knots]].{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=194}}

	[[File:U-Boot-Ehrenmal Möltenort 2.jpg\|thumb\|[[Möltenort U-Boat Memorial]] near [[Kiel]] in northern Germany. Approximately 30,000 men died under Dönitz's command.]]

	That month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations; [[Convoys ONS 18/ON 202]]. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on [[Convoy SC 143]] failed, even with limited air support from the ''Luftwaffe''. The battle with [[Convoys ONS 20/ON 206]] in the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle, [[Convoy SL 138/MKS 28]], developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around [[Convoy SL 139/MKS 30]] ended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=181–229}} Intelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=195–196}} Dönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}		That month, 21 boats fought a battle with two formations; [[Convoys ONS 18/ON 202]]. The battle was a failure. In October an attack on [[Convoy SC 143]] failed, even with limited air support from the ''Luftwaffe''. The battle with [[Convoys ONS 20/ON 206]] in the same month was a comprehensive defeat. A fourth major battle, [[Convoy SL 138/MKS 28]], developed in the last days of October and ended in another failure for Dönitz. The November battle around [[Convoy SL 139/MKS 30]] ended in the repulse of 29 U-boats with the loss of only a single ship.{{sfn\|Syrett\|1994\|pp=181–229}} Intelligence proved its worth. During the battles of convoys ONS 18/ON 202, Dönitz's admonitions to his commanders allowed the Allied intelligence services to uncover German tactical intentions.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|pp=195–196}} Dönitz had tried and failed to push his forces through lethal convoy defences. The hunter-killer groups were called in to hunt the remaining members of the wolfpacks, with predictable results. In mid-December 1943, Dönitz finally conceded not only the Atlantic, but the Gibraltar routes as well.{{sfn\|Milner\|2011\|p=204}}