MI6 - Revision history

EvanBaldonado: Replace hyphens with en-dashes.

2024-11-09T10:00:47Z

Replace hyphens with en-dashes.

← Previous revision		Revision as of 10:00, 9 November 2024
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	In May 1940, MI6 set up [[British Security Co-ordination]] (BSC), on the authorisation of Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] over the objections of Stewart Menzies.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.winstonchurchill.org/component/content/article/53-finest-hour-67/691-great-contemporaries-sir-william-stephenson-qintrepidq \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110625161022/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/component/content/article/53-finest-hour-67/691-great-contemporaries-sir-william-stephenson-qintrepidq \|url-status=dead \|archive-date=25 June 2011 \|title=Great Contemporaries: Sir William Stephenson, "Intrepid" \|last=Cynewulf Robbins \|first=Ron \|date=1990 \|website=Sir Winston Churchill \|publisher=The International Churchill Society \|access-date=24 March 2017 \|quote=Churchill launched Stephenson on his spymaster career by appointing him to head the British Security Co-ordination Service in New York before the United States had entered the Second World War. }}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/the-intrepid-life-of-sir-william-stephenson.html \|title=The Intrepid Life of Sir William Stephenson \|author=<!--Not stated--> \|date=2015 \|website=CIA News & Information \|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency \|access-date=24 March 2017 \|archive-date=15 July 2019 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190715014244/https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/the-intrepid-life-of-sir-william-stephenson.html \|url-status=dead }}</ref> This was a covert organisation based in New York City, headed by [[William Stephenson]] intended to investigate enemy activities, prevent sabotage against British interests in the Americas, and mobilise pro-British opinion in the Americas.<ref>{{citation \|last=William Boyd\|title=The Secret Persuaders\|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/19/military.secondworldwar\|work=[[The Guardian]]\|access-date=30 November 2013\|date=19 August 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CP-NR/release_e.asp?bgid=1790&andor1=bg \|title=Secret Intelligence Activities at Camp X \|author=<!--Not stated--> \|date=1 May 2015 \|website=Canada \|publisher=Government of Canada \|access-date=23 March 2017 \|url-status=dead \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924065713/http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CP-NR/release_e.asp?bgid=1790&andor1=bg \|archive-date=24 September 2015 }}</ref> BSC also founded [[Camp X]] in Canada to train clandestine operators and to establish (in 1942) a telecommunications relay station, code name Hydra, operated by engineer [[Benjamin deForest Bayly]].<ref>{{cite book \|title=Camp X \|first=Eric \|last=Walters \|year=2002 \|publisher=Puffin Canada \|location=Toronto \|isbn=978-0-14-131328-3 \|page=[https://archive.org/details/campx0000walt/page/229 229] \|url=https://archive.org/details/campx0000walt/page/229 }}</ref>		In May 1940, MI6 set up [[British Security Co-ordination]] (BSC), on the authorisation of Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] over the objections of Stewart Menzies.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.winstonchurchill.org/component/content/article/53-finest-hour-67/691-great-contemporaries-sir-william-stephenson-qintrepidq \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110625161022/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/component/content/article/53-finest-hour-67/691-great-contemporaries-sir-william-stephenson-qintrepidq \|url-status=dead \|archive-date=25 June 2011 \|title=Great Contemporaries: Sir William Stephenson, "Intrepid" \|last=Cynewulf Robbins \|first=Ron \|date=1990 \|website=Sir Winston Churchill \|publisher=The International Churchill Society \|access-date=24 March 2017 \|quote=Churchill launched Stephenson on his spymaster career by appointing him to head the British Security Co-ordination Service in New York before the United States had entered the Second World War. }}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/the-intrepid-life-of-sir-william-stephenson.html \|title=The Intrepid Life of Sir William Stephenson \|author=<!--Not stated--> \|date=2015 \|website=CIA News & Information \|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency \|access-date=24 March 2017 \|archive-date=15 July 2019 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190715014244/https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/the-intrepid-life-of-sir-william-stephenson.html \|url-status=dead }}</ref> This was a covert organisation based in New York City, headed by [[William Stephenson]] intended to investigate enemy activities, prevent sabotage against British interests in the Americas, and mobilise pro-British opinion in the Americas.<ref>{{citation \|last=William Boyd\|title=The Secret Persuaders\|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/19/military.secondworldwar\|work=[[The Guardian]]\|access-date=30 November 2013\|date=19 August 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CP-NR/release_e.asp?bgid=1790&andor1=bg \|title=Secret Intelligence Activities at Camp X \|author=<!--Not stated--> \|date=1 May 2015 \|website=Canada \|publisher=Government of Canada \|access-date=23 March 2017 \|url-status=dead \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924065713/http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CP-NR/release_e.asp?bgid=1790&andor1=bg \|archive-date=24 September 2015 }}</ref> BSC also founded [[Camp X]] in Canada to train clandestine operators and to establish (in 1942) a telecommunications relay station, code name Hydra, operated by engineer [[Benjamin deForest Bayly]].<ref>{{cite book \|title=Camp X \|first=Eric \|last=Walters \|year=2002 \|publisher=Puffin Canada \|location=Toronto \|isbn=978-0-14-131328-3 \|page=[https://archive.org/details/campx0000walt/page/229 229] \|url=https://archive.org/details/campx0000walt/page/229 }}</ref>

	SIS operations in Asia were hindered by the fact that Europeans tended to stick out in Asia along with an inability to recruit Asian agents.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=215}} The SOE had more success in both recruiting agents in Asia and in sending agents into the Japanese-occupied areas in China and southeast Asia, which caused tensions with MI6 who were jealous of the ability of the upstart SOE to do what they could not.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=215}} SOE was more open to recruiting from within the Commonwealth, recruiting Chinese-Canadians and Australian-Chinese, to operate behind the Japanese lines under the grounds Asian agents would less likely to be arrested by the ''[[Kempeitai]]'', the much feared Japanese military police. In 1944, about 90% of the human intelligence in Burma came from the SOE while 70% of the human intelligence in Malaya, Thailand and French Indochina came from the SOE.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=227}} General [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim\|William Slim]], the GOC of the 14th Army, complained about the low quality of SIS intelligence in late 1943 as he stated that the intelligence he received from MI6 was "far from being complete or accurate".{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=220}} In late 1944-early 1945, Slim attempted to have the 14th Army take over all intelligence operations in Burma with both SIS and SOE agents to be subordinate to the 14th Army under the grounds the Army was more capable of running intelligence operations in southeast Asia than MI6.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=~~221-222~~}} Menzies who fiercely defended the prerogatives of MI6 was able to block this proposal despite the way it was universally accepted by officers serving in the China-Burma-India theater that SIS was unsuitable to operating in that part of the world.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=~~222-223~~}} MI6 was able to keep operating in Asia by making the argument that the SOE was only a temporary organisation that was to be disbanded after the war ended while MI6 was the permanent intelligence service that would continue after the war, and that to exclude MI6 from Asia would weaken British intelligence in the post-war world.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=228}}		SIS operations in Asia were hindered by the fact that Europeans tended to stick out in Asia along with an inability to recruit Asian agents.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=215}} The SOE had more success in both recruiting agents in Asia and in sending agents into the Japanese-occupied areas in China and southeast Asia, which caused tensions with MI6 who were jealous of the ability of the upstart SOE to do what they could not.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=215}} SOE was more open to recruiting from within the Commonwealth, recruiting Chinese-Canadians and Australian-Chinese, to operate behind the Japanese lines under the grounds Asian agents would less likely to be arrested by the ''[[Kempeitai]]'', the much feared Japanese military police. In 1944, about 90% of the human intelligence in Burma came from the SOE while 70% of the human intelligence in Malaya, Thailand and French Indochina came from the SOE.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=227}} General [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim\|William Slim]], the GOC of the 14th Army, complained about the low quality of SIS intelligence in late 1943 as he stated that the intelligence he received from MI6 was "far from being complete or accurate".{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=220}} In late 1944-early 1945, Slim attempted to have the 14th Army take over all intelligence operations in Burma with both SIS and SOE agents to be subordinate to the 14th Army under the grounds the Army was more capable of running intelligence operations in southeast Asia than MI6.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=221–222}} Menzies who fiercely defended the prerogatives of MI6 was able to block this proposal despite the way it was universally accepted by officers serving in the China-Burma-India theater that SIS was unsuitable to operating in that part of the world.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=222–223}} MI6 was able to keep operating in Asia by making the argument that the SOE was only a temporary organisation that was to be disbanded after the war ended while MI6 was the permanent intelligence service that would continue after the war, and that to exclude MI6 from Asia would weaken British intelligence in the post-war world.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=228}}

	In early 1944, MI6 re-established Section IX, its prewar anti-Soviet section, and Philby took a position there. He was able to alert the [[NKVD]] about all British intelligence on the Soviets—including what the American [[Office of Strategic Services\|OSS]] had shared with the British about the Soviets.<ref name=god>{{cite web\|url=http://www.inatoday.com/philbyspygod20101221.htm\|title=Kim Philby – new Russian god?\|publisher=International News Analysis Today\|date=20 December 2010\|access-date=1 July 2012}}</ref>		In early 1944, MI6 re-established Section IX, its prewar anti-Soviet section, and Philby took a position there. He was able to alert the [[NKVD]] about all British intelligence on the Soviets—including what the American [[Office of Strategic Services\|OSS]] had shared with the British about the Soviets.<ref name=god>{{cite web\|url=http://www.inatoday.com/philbyspygod20101221.htm\|title=Kim Philby – new Russian god?\|publisher=International News Analysis Today\|date=20 December 2010\|access-date=1 July 2012}}</ref>

EvanBaldonado: Replace hyphens with en-dashes.

2024-11-09T10:00:34Z

Replace hyphens with en-dashes.

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	MI6 assisted the [[Gestapo]], the Nazi secret police, with "the exchange of information about communism" as late as October 1937, well into the Nazi era; the head of the British agency's Berlin station, [[Frank Foley]], was still able to describe his relationship with the Gestapo's so-called communism expert as "cordial".<ref>{{Harvnb\|Jeffery\|2010\|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_bZZIVf5YxAC&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref> In 1936, in a sign that he lacked confidence in his own agents, Sinclair founded the semi-autonomous Z section under [[Claude Dansey]] for economic intelligence about Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Working alongside the Z section was the British Industrial Secret Service headed by a Canadian businessman living in London, [[William Stephenson]] that recruited British businessmen active in Germany for intelligence about German industrial production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} For intelligence on German military plans, MI6 largely depended upon Czechoslovak military intelligence from 1937 onward as [[Paul Thümmel]], aka "Agent A-54", a senior officer in the German intelligence service, the ''[[Abwehr]]'', had been bribed into working for Czechoslovakia.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Thus most of what MI6 knew about German plans during both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis came from the Czechoslovak military intelligence, which continued to run Thümmel even after the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and a government-in-exile was set up.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], the British ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, was actively hostile towards MI6 running agents out of the British embassy in Berlin as he made it clear his belief that espionage against Germany would hamper the "general settlement" he was seeking with the ''Reich''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} The focus on collecting intelligence on German aircraft production led MI6 to be confused about the wider strategic question of what were the aims of German foreign policy. On 18 September 1938, a memo entitled "What Shall We Do?" written by Malcolm Woollcombe, the chief of the Political Intelligence, declared that the best way of resolving the Sudetenland crisis was for the Sudetenland to be peacefully annexed to Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The report concluded that allowing the Sudetenland to be annexed would allow Britain to finally discover "what ''really legitimate'' grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to recify them".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}}		MI6 assisted the [[Gestapo]], the Nazi secret police, with "the exchange of information about communism" as late as October 1937, well into the Nazi era; the head of the British agency's Berlin station, [[Frank Foley]], was still able to describe his relationship with the Gestapo's so-called communism expert as "cordial".<ref>{{Harvnb\|Jeffery\|2010\|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_bZZIVf5YxAC&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref> In 1936, in a sign that he lacked confidence in his own agents, Sinclair founded the semi-autonomous Z section under [[Claude Dansey]] for economic intelligence about Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Working alongside the Z section was the British Industrial Secret Service headed by a Canadian businessman living in London, [[William Stephenson]] that recruited British businessmen active in Germany for intelligence about German industrial production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} For intelligence on German military plans, MI6 largely depended upon Czechoslovak military intelligence from 1937 onward as [[Paul Thümmel]], aka "Agent A-54", a senior officer in the German intelligence service, the ''[[Abwehr]]'', had been bribed into working for Czechoslovakia.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Thus most of what MI6 knew about German plans during both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis came from the Czechoslovak military intelligence, which continued to run Thümmel even after the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and a government-in-exile was set up.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], the British ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, was actively hostile towards MI6 running agents out of the British embassy in Berlin as he made it clear his belief that espionage against Germany would hamper the "general settlement" he was seeking with the ''Reich''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} The focus on collecting intelligence on German aircraft production led MI6 to be confused about the wider strategic question of what were the aims of German foreign policy. On 18 September 1938, a memo entitled "What Shall We Do?" written by Malcolm Woollcombe, the chief of the Political Intelligence, declared that the best way of resolving the Sudetenland crisis was for the Sudetenland to be peacefully annexed to Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The report concluded that allowing the Sudetenland to be annexed would allow Britain to finally discover "what ''really legitimate'' grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to recify them".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}}

	In January 1939, MI6 played a major role in the "Dutch War Scare" when it reported to London that Germany was about to invade the Netherlands with the aim of using the Dutch airfields to launch a strategic bombing campaign that would achieve a "knock out blow" by destroying London along with the rest of Britain's cities.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The intelligence behind the "Dutch War Scare" was false, intended to achieve a change in British foreign policy and had its desired effect on the Chamberlain government.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=~~214-215~~}} The ''Deuxième Bureau'' had manufactured the story as a way to force Britain to make a stronger commitment to defend France.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=~~253-254~~}} The "limited liability" rearmament policy pursued by the Chamberlain government had intentionally starved the British Army of funds to rule out the "continental commitment" (i.e. Britain sending a large expeditionary force) from ever being made again, with the majority of military spending being devoted the RAF and the Royal Navy. As such, Britain simply did not possess the military force to save the Netherlands, leading to urgent requests being made to Paris to ask if France would be willing to assist with the defence of the Netherlands.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=253}} In response, the French replied that Britain would need to do more for France if the British wanted the French to do something for them.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=~~253-254~~}} On 6 February 1939 in a beginning of a shift in British foreign policy, Prime Minister Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that "any threat to the vital interest of France" would lead to a British declaration of war.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=254}} One of MI6’s most successful operations before the war started in April 1939 when an Australian businessman living in London, [[Sidney Cotton]], who was already engaged in aerial photographic espionage for the ''[[Deuxième Bureau]]'' was recruited to fly missions over Germany.{{sfn\|Polmar\|Allen\|1998\|p=138}} Under the cover story that he was a sales agent for a dummy corporation, the Aeronautical Research and Sales Corporation, Cotton flew over Germany, Italy and the Italian colony of Libya in his Lockheed 12A aircraft, taking numerous high-quality aerial photographs of German and Italian military bases that proved immensely useful for Britain during the war.{{sfn\|Polmar\|Allen\|1998\|p=138}}		In January 1939, MI6 played a major role in the "Dutch War Scare" when it reported to London that Germany was about to invade the Netherlands with the aim of using the Dutch airfields to launch a strategic bombing campaign that would achieve a "knock out blow" by destroying London along with the rest of Britain's cities.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The intelligence behind the "Dutch War Scare" was false, intended to achieve a change in British foreign policy and had its desired effect on the Chamberlain government.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214–215}} The ''Deuxième Bureau'' had manufactured the story as a way to force Britain to make a stronger commitment to defend France.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=253–254}} The "limited liability" rearmament policy pursued by the Chamberlain government had intentionally starved the British Army of funds to rule out the "continental commitment" (i.e. Britain sending a large expeditionary force) from ever being made again, with the majority of military spending being devoted the RAF and the Royal Navy. As such, Britain simply did not possess the military force to save the Netherlands, leading to urgent requests being made to Paris to ask if France would be willing to assist with the defence of the Netherlands.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=253}} In response, the French replied that Britain would need to do more for France if the British wanted the French to do something for them.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=253–254}} On 6 February 1939 in a beginning of a shift in British foreign policy, Prime Minister Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that "any threat to the vital interest of France" would lead to a British declaration of war.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=254}} One of MI6’s most successful operations before the war started in April 1939 when an Australian businessman living in London, [[Sidney Cotton]], who was already engaged in aerial photographic espionage for the ''[[Deuxième Bureau]]'' was recruited to fly missions over Germany.{{sfn\|Polmar\|Allen\|1998\|p=138}} Under the cover story that he was a sales agent for a dummy corporation, the Aeronautical Research and Sales Corporation, Cotton flew over Germany, Italy and the Italian colony of Libya in his Lockheed 12A aircraft, taking numerous high-quality aerial photographs of German and Italian military bases that proved immensely useful for Britain during the war.{{sfn\|Polmar\|Allen\|1998\|p=138}}

	[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 135-S-06-07-32, Tibetexpedition, Junger Engländer.jpg\|thumb\|A young Englishman, member of the Secret Intelligence Service, in [[Yatung]], Tibet, photographed by [[Ernst Schäfer]] in 1939]]		[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 135-S-06-07-32, Tibetexpedition, Junger Engländer.jpg\|thumb\|A young Englishman, member of the Secret Intelligence Service, in [[Yatung]], Tibet, photographed by [[Ernst Schäfer]] in 1939]]

EvanBaldonado: Replace hyphens with en-dashes.

2024-11-09T10:00:16Z

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	In 1924, MI6 intervened in the general election of that year by leaking the so-called [[Zinoviev letter]] to the ''Daily Mail'', which published it on its front page on 25 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} The letter, which was a forgery, was supposedly from [[Grigory Zinoviev]], the chief of the Comintern, ordering British Communists to take over the Labour Party. The Zinoviv letter, which was written in English, came into possession of the MI6 resident at the British Embassy in Riga on 9 October 1924 who forwarded it to London.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=1}} The Zinoviev letter played a key role in the defeat of the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin in the general election of 29 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} It has been established the MI6 leaked the Zinoviev letter to the ''Daily Mail'', but it remains unclear if MI6 was aware that the letter was a forgery at the time.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=223}}		In 1924, MI6 intervened in the general election of that year by leaking the so-called [[Zinoviev letter]] to the ''Daily Mail'', which published it on its front page on 25 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} The letter, which was a forgery, was supposedly from [[Grigory Zinoviev]], the chief of the Comintern, ordering British Communists to take over the Labour Party. The Zinoviv letter, which was written in English, came into possession of the MI6 resident at the British Embassy in Riga on 9 October 1924 who forwarded it to London.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=1}} The Zinoviev letter played a key role in the defeat of the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin in the general election of 29 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} It has been established the MI6 leaked the Zinoviev letter to the ''Daily Mail'', but it remains unclear if MI6 was aware that the letter was a forgery at the time.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=223}}

	With the emergence of [[Nazi Germany\|Germany]] as a threat following the ascendence of the [[Nazis]], in the early 1930s attention was shifted in that direction.<ref name="Sinclair" /> In 1934, a defense requirements commitment that consisted of Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury, General Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee for Imperial Defense, and the three service chiefs produced an influential memo that labelled Germany the "ultimate potential enemy".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} The memo noted that Germany had the world's second largest economy (being exceeded only by the economy of the United States), was a world leader in science and technology, and was capable of moblising millions of men for war. However, it was generally believed in the United Kingdom at the time that the arms race before 1914 had caused the Great War, and consequently there was a belief that British rearmament would increase international tensions and would make a war more likely than less likely.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} On the converse, there was the possibility if Germany rearmed while Britain did not, it would leave the ''Reich'' in a strong position to launch a war. It was decided that British rearmament would be linked to the extent of German rearmament with British rearmament to be reactive rather than preemptive.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=~~211-212~~}} The primary request from decision-makers in the government regarding Germany was for MI6 to collect intelligence about German rearmament in order to establish the level of British rearmament that was be pursued in response.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=~~211-212~~}} British decision-makers were especially concerned about the prospect of German strategic bombing of British cities as contemporary experts vastly exaggerated the power of strategic bombing to kill millions within a few days.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=~~211-212~~}} [[Harold Macmillan]] later recalled: "We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} As a result, MI6's number one priority with regard to Germany was collect intelligence on the Luftwaffe, the branch of the Wehrmacht that British decision-makers feared the most.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} To assist with studying German industrial production, the Industrial Intelligence Center under [[Desmond Morton (civil servant)\|Desmond Morton]] was founded in 1934 with a special mandate to study German aircraft production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} However, Admiral Sinclair complained in 1935 that MI6's annual budget for operations around the world was equal to the cost of maintaining one destroyer in home waters, and that the demands placed upon his service exceeded its budget.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The focus on the Luftwaffe along with MI6's relatively small budget led to constant complaints from both the War Office and the Admiralty that MI6 was neglecting both the German Army and the ''Kriegsmarine''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The Asian branch of the SIS was known as the "Cinderella branch" owing to its neglect by London.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=214}}		With the emergence of [[Nazi Germany\|Germany]] as a threat following the ascendence of the [[Nazis]], in the early 1930s attention was shifted in that direction.<ref name="Sinclair" /> In 1934, a defense requirements commitment that consisted of Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury, General Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee for Imperial Defense, and the three service chiefs produced an influential memo that labelled Germany the "ultimate potential enemy".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} The memo noted that Germany had the world's second largest economy (being exceeded only by the economy of the United States), was a world leader in science and technology, and was capable of moblising millions of men for war. However, it was generally believed in the United Kingdom at the time that the arms race before 1914 had caused the Great War, and consequently there was a belief that British rearmament would increase international tensions and would make a war more likely than less likely.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} On the converse, there was the possibility if Germany rearmed while Britain did not, it would leave the ''Reich'' in a strong position to launch a war. It was decided that British rearmament would be linked to the extent of German rearmament with British rearmament to be reactive rather than preemptive.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211–212}} The primary request from decision-makers in the government regarding Germany was for MI6 to collect intelligence about German rearmament in order to establish the level of British rearmament that was be pursued in response.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211–212}} British decision-makers were especially concerned about the prospect of German strategic bombing of British cities as contemporary experts vastly exaggerated the power of strategic bombing to kill millions within a few days.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211–212}} [[Harold Macmillan]] later recalled: "We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} As a result, MI6's number one priority with regard to Germany was collect intelligence on the Luftwaffe, the branch of the Wehrmacht that British decision-makers feared the most.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} To assist with studying German industrial production, the Industrial Intelligence Center under [[Desmond Morton (civil servant)\|Desmond Morton]] was founded in 1934 with a special mandate to study German aircraft production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} However, Admiral Sinclair complained in 1935 that MI6's annual budget for operations around the world was equal to the cost of maintaining one destroyer in home waters, and that the demands placed upon his service exceeded its budget.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The focus on the Luftwaffe along with MI6's relatively small budget led to constant complaints from both the War Office and the Admiralty that MI6 was neglecting both the German Army and the ''Kriegsmarine''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The Asian branch of the SIS was known as the "Cinderella branch" owing to its neglect by London.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=214}}

	MI6 assisted the [[Gestapo]], the Nazi secret police, with "the exchange of information about communism" as late as October 1937, well into the Nazi era; the head of the British agency's Berlin station, [[Frank Foley]], was still able to describe his relationship with the Gestapo's so-called communism expert as "cordial".<ref>{{Harvnb\|Jeffery\|2010\|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_bZZIVf5YxAC&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref> In 1936, in a sign that he lacked confidence in his own agents, Sinclair founded the semi-autonomous Z section under [[Claude Dansey]] for economic intelligence about Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Working alongside the Z section was the British Industrial Secret Service headed by a Canadian businessman living in London, [[William Stephenson]] that recruited British businessmen active in Germany for intelligence about German industrial production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} For intelligence on German military plans, MI6 largely depended upon Czechoslovak military intelligence from 1937 onward as [[Paul Thümmel]], aka "Agent A-54", a senior officer in the German intelligence service, the ''[[Abwehr]]'', had been bribed into working for Czechoslovakia.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Thus most of what MI6 knew about German plans during both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis came from the Czechoslovak military intelligence, which continued to run Thümmel even after the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and a government-in-exile was set up.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], the British ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, was actively hostile towards MI6 running agents out of the British embassy in Berlin as he made it clear his belief that espionage against Germany would hamper the "general settlement" he was seeking with the ''Reich''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} The focus on collecting intelligence on German aircraft production led MI6 to be confused about the wider strategic question of what were the aims of German foreign policy. On 18 September 1938, a memo entitled "What Shall We Do?" written by Malcolm Woollcombe, the chief of the Political Intelligence, declared that the best way of resolving the Sudetenland crisis was for the Sudetenland to be peacefully annexed to Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The report concluded that allowing the Sudetenland to be annexed would allow Britain to finally discover "what ''really legitimate'' grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to recify them".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}}		MI6 assisted the [[Gestapo]], the Nazi secret police, with "the exchange of information about communism" as late as October 1937, well into the Nazi era; the head of the British agency's Berlin station, [[Frank Foley]], was still able to describe his relationship with the Gestapo's so-called communism expert as "cordial".<ref>{{Harvnb\|Jeffery\|2010\|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_bZZIVf5YxAC&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref> In 1936, in a sign that he lacked confidence in his own agents, Sinclair founded the semi-autonomous Z section under [[Claude Dansey]] for economic intelligence about Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Working alongside the Z section was the British Industrial Secret Service headed by a Canadian businessman living in London, [[William Stephenson]] that recruited British businessmen active in Germany for intelligence about German industrial production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} For intelligence on German military plans, MI6 largely depended upon Czechoslovak military intelligence from 1937 onward as [[Paul Thümmel]], aka "Agent A-54", a senior officer in the German intelligence service, the ''[[Abwehr]]'', had been bribed into working for Czechoslovakia.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Thus most of what MI6 knew about German plans during both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis came from the Czechoslovak military intelligence, which continued to run Thümmel even after the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and a government-in-exile was set up.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], the British ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, was actively hostile towards MI6 running agents out of the British embassy in Berlin as he made it clear his belief that espionage against Germany would hamper the "general settlement" he was seeking with the ''Reich''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} The focus on collecting intelligence on German aircraft production led MI6 to be confused about the wider strategic question of what were the aims of German foreign policy. On 18 September 1938, a memo entitled "What Shall We Do?" written by Malcolm Woollcombe, the chief of the Political Intelligence, declared that the best way of resolving the Sudetenland crisis was for the Sudetenland to be peacefully annexed to Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The report concluded that allowing the Sudetenland to be annexed would allow Britain to finally discover "what ''really legitimate'' grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to recify them".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}}

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	===First World War===		===First World War===
	The service's performance during the [[First World War]] was mixed, because it was unable to establish a network in Germany itself. Most of its results came from military and commercial intelligence collected through networks in neutral countries, occupied territories, and Russia.<ref>[http://www.espionageinfo.com/Lo-Mo/MI6-British-Secret-Intelligence-Service.html ''MI6 (British Secret Intelligence Service)'', K. Lee Lerner and Hudson Knight in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security] {{Webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100530092138/http://www.espionageinfo.com/Lo-Mo/MI6-British-Secret-Intelligence-Service.html \|date=30 May 2010 }}. Accessed:2007-09-02.</ref> During the war, MI6 had its main European office in [[Rotterdam]] from where it coordinated espionage in Germany and occupied Belgium.<ref>Ruis, Edwin. ''Spynest. British and German Espionage from Neutral Holland 1914–1918''. Brimscombe: The History Press, 2016.</ref> A crucial element in the war effort from the British perspective was the involvement of Russia, which kept millions of German soldiers that would otherwise be deployed on the Western Front, engaged on the Eastern Front. On 7 November 1917 the Bolsheviks under Vladimir Lenin overthrew the Provisional government in Petrograd and signed an armistice with Germany.{{sfn\|Morris\|2022\|p=50}} The main objective for the British was to keep Russia in the war, and MI6's two chosen instruments for doing so were [[Sidney Reilly]], who despite his Irish name was a Russian-Jewish adventurer, and [[George Alexander Hill]], a British pilot and businessman.{{sfn\|Morris\|2022\|p=~~50-51~~}} Officially, Reilly's mandate was to collect intelligence about the new regime in Russia and find a way to keep Russia in the war, but Reilly soon became involved in a plot to overthrow the Bolsheviks.{{sfn\|Morris\|2022\|p=~~58-59~~}}		The service's performance during the [[First World War]] was mixed, because it was unable to establish a network in Germany itself. Most of its results came from military and commercial intelligence collected through networks in neutral countries, occupied territories, and Russia.<ref>[http://www.espionageinfo.com/Lo-Mo/MI6-British-Secret-Intelligence-Service.html ''MI6 (British Secret Intelligence Service)'', K. Lee Lerner and Hudson Knight in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security] {{Webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100530092138/http://www.espionageinfo.com/Lo-Mo/MI6-British-Secret-Intelligence-Service.html \|date=30 May 2010 }}. Accessed:2007-09-02.</ref> During the war, MI6 had its main European office in [[Rotterdam]] from where it coordinated espionage in Germany and occupied Belgium.<ref>Ruis, Edwin. ''Spynest. British and German Espionage from Neutral Holland 1914–1918''. Brimscombe: The History Press, 2016.</ref> A crucial element in the war effort from the British perspective was the involvement of Russia, which kept millions of German soldiers that would otherwise be deployed on the Western Front, engaged on the Eastern Front. On 7 November 1917 the Bolsheviks under Vladimir Lenin overthrew the Provisional government in Petrograd and signed an armistice with Germany.{{sfn\|Morris\|2022\|p=50}} The main objective for the British was to keep Russia in the war, and MI6's two chosen instruments for doing so were [[Sidney Reilly]], who despite his Irish name was a Russian-Jewish adventurer, and [[George Alexander Hill]], a British pilot and businessman.{{sfn\|Morris\|2022\|p=50–51}} Officially, Reilly's mandate was to collect intelligence about the new regime in Russia and find a way to keep Russia in the war, but Reilly soon became involved in a plot to overthrow the Bolsheviks.{{sfn\|Morris\|2022\|p=58–59}}

	===Inter-war period===		===Inter-war period===

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	Due to security concerns, the Government does not publish these financial statements which are audited by the [[Comptroller and Auditor General (United Kingdom)\|Comptroller and Auditor General]] and then shown to the chair of the [[Public Accounts Committee]] in accordance with the [[Intelligence Services Act 1994]].<ref name="auto3"/>		Due to security concerns, the Government does not publish these financial statements which are audited by the [[Comptroller and Auditor General (United Kingdom)\|Comptroller and Auditor General]] and then shown to the chair of the [[Public Accounts Committee]] in accordance with the [[Intelligence Services Act 1994]].<ref name="auto3"/>

	The annual Parliamentary financial statements for ~~2021-2022~~ indicated that the combined British intelligence services spending was £3.44 billion, with some $1.09 billion being further allocated to staff pay and agents and a further £636 million allocated to capital spending.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=MI5 vs MI6 - What is the difference - What Does MI6 Do? \|url=https://www.politics.co.uk/reference/mi6/ \|access-date=20 April 2024 \|website=Politics.co.uk \|language=en-US}}</ref>		The annual Parliamentary financial statements for 2021–2022 indicated that the combined British intelligence services spending was £3.44 billion, with some $1.09 billion being further allocated to staff pay and agents and a further £636 million allocated to capital spending.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=MI5 vs MI6 - What is the difference - What Does MI6 Do? \|url=https://www.politics.co.uk/reference/mi6/ \|access-date=20 April 2024 \|website=Politics.co.uk \|language=en-US}}</ref>

	=== Legislation ===		=== Legislation ===

BD2412: Clean up spacing around commas and other punctuation fixes, replaced: ,b → , b, ,t → , t, , → , (9), inline, title → inline,title

2024-11-06T19:47:59Z

Clean up spacing around commas and other punctuation fixes, replaced: ,b → , b, ,t → , t, , → , (9), inline, title → inline,title

Show changes

Danners430: Grammar

2024-11-05T14:51:37Z

Grammar

← Previous revision		Revision as of 14:51, 5 November 2024
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	{{anchor\|Section D}}* Section D to conduct political covert actions and paramilitary operations in time of war. Section D would organise the Home Defence Scheme resistance organisation in the UK and come to be the foundation of the [[Special Operations Executive]] (SOE) during the Second World War.<ref name="Sinclair" /><ref>{{Cite book\|title = Fighting Nazi Occupation: British Resistance 1939 – 1945\|last = Atkin\|first = Malcolm\|publisher = Pen and Sword\|year = 2015\|isbn = 978-1-47383-377-7\|location = Barnsley\|pages = Chapter 4}}</ref>		{{anchor\|Section D}}* Section D to conduct political covert actions and paramilitary operations in time of war. Section D would organise the Home Defence Scheme resistance organisation in the UK and come to be the foundation of the [[Special Operations Executive]] (SOE) during the Second World War.<ref name="Sinclair" /><ref>{{Cite book\|title = Fighting Nazi Occupation: British Resistance 1939 – 1945\|last = Atkin\|first = Malcolm\|publisher = Pen and Sword\|year = 2015\|isbn = 978-1-47383-377-7\|location = Barnsley\|pages = Chapter 4}}</ref>

	In 1924, MI6 intervened in the general election of that year by leaking the so-called [[Zinoviev letter]] to the ''Daily Mail'', which published it on its front page on 25 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} The letter-which was a forgery-was supposedly from [[Grigory Zinoviev]], the chief of the Comintern, ordering British Communists to take over the Labour Party. The Zinoviv letter, which was written in English, came into possession of the MI6 resident at the British Embassy in Riga on 9 October 1924 who forwarded it to London.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=1}} The Zinoviev letter played a key role in the defeat of the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin in the general election of 29 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} It has been established the MI6 leaked the Zinoviev letter to the ''Daily Mail'', but it remains unclear if MI6 was aware that the letter was a forgery at the time.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=223}}		In 1924, MI6 intervened in the general election of that year by leaking the so-called [[Zinoviev letter]] to the ''Daily Mail'', which published it on its front page on 25 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} The letter, which was a forgery, was supposedly from [[Grigory Zinoviev]], the chief of the Comintern, ordering British Communists to take over the Labour Party. The Zinoviv letter, which was written in English, came into possession of the MI6 resident at the British Embassy in Riga on 9 October 1924 who forwarded it to London.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=1}} The Zinoviev letter played a key role in the defeat of the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin in the general election of 29 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} It has been established the MI6 leaked the Zinoviev letter to the ''Daily Mail'', but it remains unclear if MI6 was aware that the letter was a forgery at the time.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=223}}

	With the emergence of [[Nazi Germany\|Germany]] as a threat following the ascendence of the [[Nazis]], in the early 1930s attention was shifted in that direction.<ref name="Sinclair" /> In 1934, a defense requirements commitment that consisted of Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury, General Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee for Imperial Defense, and the three service chiefs produced an influential memo that labelled Germany the "ultimate potential enemy".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} The memo noted that Germany had the world's second largest economy (being exceeded only by the economy of the United States), was a world leader in science and technology, and was capable of moblising millions of men for war. However, it was generally believed in the United Kingdom at the time that the arms race before 1914 had caused the Great War, and consequently there was a belief that British rearmament would increase international tensions and would make a war more likely than less likely.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} On the converse, there was the possibility if Germany rearmed while Britain did not, it would leave the ''Reich'' in a strong position to launch a war. It was decided that British rearmament would be linked to the extent of German rearmament with British rearmament to be reactive rather than preemptive.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} The primary request from decision-makers in the government regarding Germany was for MI6 to collect intelligence about German rearmament in order to establish the level of British rearmament that was be pursued in response.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} British decision-makers were especially concerned about the prospect of German strategic bombing of British cities as contemporary experts vastly exaggerated the power of strategic bombing to kill millions within a few days.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} [[Harold Macmillan]] later recalled: "We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} As a result, MI6's number one priority with regard to Germany was collect intelligence on the Luftwaffe, the branch of the Wehrmacht that British decision-makers feared the most.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} To assist with studying German industrial production, the Industrial Intelligence Center under [[Desmond Morton (civil servant)\|Desmond Morton]] was founded in 1934 with a special mandate to study German aircraft production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} However, Admiral Sinclair complained in 1935 that MI6's annual budget for operations around the world was equal to the cost of maintaining one destroyer in home waters, and that the demands placed upon his service exceeded its budget.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The focus on the Luftwaffe along with MI6's relatively small budget led to constant complaints from both the War Office and the Admiralty that MI6 was neglecting both the German Army and the ''Kriegsmarine''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The Asian branch of the SIS was known as the "Cinderella branch" owing to its neglect by London.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=214}}		With the emergence of [[Nazi Germany\|Germany]] as a threat following the ascendence of the [[Nazis]], in the early 1930s attention was shifted in that direction.<ref name="Sinclair" /> In 1934, a defense requirements commitment that consisted of Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury, General Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee for Imperial Defense, and the three service chiefs produced an influential memo that labelled Germany the "ultimate potential enemy".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} The memo noted that Germany had the world's second largest economy (being exceeded only by the economy of the United States), was a world leader in science and technology, and was capable of moblising millions of men for war. However, it was generally believed in the United Kingdom at the time that the arms race before 1914 had caused the Great War, and consequently there was a belief that British rearmament would increase international tensions and would make a war more likely than less likely.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} On the converse, there was the possibility if Germany rearmed while Britain did not, it would leave the ''Reich'' in a strong position to launch a war. It was decided that British rearmament would be linked to the extent of German rearmament with British rearmament to be reactive rather than preemptive.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} The primary request from decision-makers in the government regarding Germany was for MI6 to collect intelligence about German rearmament in order to establish the level of British rearmament that was be pursued in response.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} British decision-makers were especially concerned about the prospect of German strategic bombing of British cities as contemporary experts vastly exaggerated the power of strategic bombing to kill millions within a few days.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} [[Harold Macmillan]] later recalled: "We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} As a result, MI6's number one priority with regard to Germany was collect intelligence on the Luftwaffe, the branch of the Wehrmacht that British decision-makers feared the most.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} To assist with studying German industrial production, the Industrial Intelligence Center under [[Desmond Morton (civil servant)\|Desmond Morton]] was founded in 1934 with a special mandate to study German aircraft production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} However, Admiral Sinclair complained in 1935 that MI6's annual budget for operations around the world was equal to the cost of maintaining one destroyer in home waters, and that the demands placed upon his service exceeded its budget.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The focus on the Luftwaffe along with MI6's relatively small budget led to constant complaints from both the War Office and the Admiralty that MI6 was neglecting both the German Army and the ''Kriegsmarine''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The Asian branch of the SIS was known as the "Cinderella branch" owing to its neglect by London.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=214}}

IACOBVS: /* Structure and mission */

2024-10-21T03:03:06Z

Structure and mission

← Previous revision		Revision as of 03:03, 21 October 2024
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	The main mission of SIS is to collect Britain's [[foreign intelligence]]. It provides the British government with vital intelligence regarding foreign events and informs concerning global covert capabilities to uphold national interests, security and protect the country's economic well-being. SIS works with the [[Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office]] and therefore falls under the supervision of the [[Foreign Secretary]].<ref name=about>{{Cite web \|title=SIS {{!}} About Us \|url=https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us.html \|access-date=14 April 2024 \|website=www.sis.gov.uk}}</ref>		The main mission of SIS is to collect Britain's [[foreign intelligence]]. It provides the British government with vital intelligence regarding foreign events and informs concerning global covert capabilities to uphold national interests, security and protect the country's economic well-being. SIS works with the [[Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office]] and therefore falls under the supervision of the [[Foreign Secretary]].<ref name=about>{{Cite web \|title=SIS {{!}} About Us \|url=https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us.html \|access-date=14 April 2024 \|website=www.sis.gov.uk}}</ref>

	SIS officers and agents engage in operations and missions all around the world. The SIS regularly cooperates and ~~work~~ with [[MI5]] and [[GCHQ]] regarding domestic and cyber intelligence.<ref>{{Cite web \|date=13 October 2015 \|title=Secret Intelligence Service \|url=https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/secret-intelligence-service \|access-date=14 April 2024 \|website=GOV.UK \|language=en}}</ref> SIS has three primary tasks:<ref name="about" />		SIS officers and agents engage in operations and missions all around the world. The SIS regularly cooperates and works with [[MI5]] and [[GCHQ]] regarding domestic and cyber intelligence.<ref>{{Cite web \|date=13 October 2015 \|title=Secret Intelligence Service \|url=https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/secret-intelligence-service \|access-date=14 April 2024 \|website=GOV.UK \|language=en}}</ref> SIS has three primary tasks:<ref name="about" />
	* [[Counter Terrorism]] – preventing terrorism and extremism in the UK, against national interests within the realm or overseas, and supporting the UK's allies		* [[Counter Terrorism]] – preventing terrorism and extremism in the UK, against national interests within the realm or overseas, and supporting the UK's allies
	* [[Espionage]] – protecting the national security		* [[Espionage]] – protecting the national security

GreenC bot: Rescued 1 archive link. Wayback Medic 2.5 per WP:URLREQ#timesonline.co.uk

2024-09-27T01:33:43Z

Rescued 1 archive link. Wayback Medic 2.5 per WP:URLREQ#timesonline.co.uk

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	On 15 November 2006, SIS allowed an interview with current operations officers for the first time. The interview was on the [[Colin Murray]] Show on [[BBC Radio 1]]. The two officers (one male and one female) had their voices disguised for security reasons. The officers compared their real experience with the fictional portrayal of SIS in the [[James Bond films]]. While denying that there ever existed a "[[licence to kill (concept)\|licence to kill]]" and reiterating that SIS operated under British law, the officers confirmed that there is a '[[Q (James Bond)\|Q]]'-like figure who is head of the technology department, and that their director is referred to as 'C'. The officers described the lifestyle as quite glamorous and very varied, with plenty of overseas travel and adventure, and described their role primarily as intelligence gatherers, developing relationships with potential sources.<ref>{{cite news\|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1534306/MI6-licensed-to-thrill-listeners-to-Radio-1.html \|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1534306/MI6-licensed-to-thrill-listeners-to-Radio-1.html \|archive-date=10 January 2022 \|url-access=subscription \|url-status=live\|title=MI6 licensed to thrill listeners to Radio 1\|date=16 November 2006\|access-date=1 July 2012\|location=London\|work=The Daily Telegraph\|first=Philip\|last=Johnston}}{{cbignore}}</ref>		On 15 November 2006, SIS allowed an interview with current operations officers for the first time. The interview was on the [[Colin Murray]] Show on [[BBC Radio 1]]. The two officers (one male and one female) had their voices disguised for security reasons. The officers compared their real experience with the fictional portrayal of SIS in the [[James Bond films]]. While denying that there ever existed a "[[licence to kill (concept)\|licence to kill]]" and reiterating that SIS operated under British law, the officers confirmed that there is a '[[Q (James Bond)\|Q]]'-like figure who is head of the technology department, and that their director is referred to as 'C'. The officers described the lifestyle as quite glamorous and very varied, with plenty of overseas travel and adventure, and described their role primarily as intelligence gatherers, developing relationships with potential sources.<ref>{{cite news\|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1534306/MI6-licensed-to-thrill-listeners-to-Radio-1.html \|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1534306/MI6-licensed-to-thrill-listeners-to-Radio-1.html \|archive-date=10 January 2022 \|url-access=subscription \|url-status=live\|title=MI6 licensed to thrill listeners to Radio 1\|date=16 November 2006\|access-date=1 July 2012\|location=London\|work=The Daily Telegraph\|first=Philip\|last=Johnston}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

	Sir [[John Sawers]] became head of the SIS in November 2009, the first outsider to head SIS in more than 40 years. Sawers came from the Diplomatic Service, previously having been the [[Permanent Representatives from the United Kingdom to the United Nations\|British Permanent Representative to the United Nations]].<ref name=times-20090616>{{cite news \|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6511372.ece \|title=Outsider Sir John Sawers appointed new head of MI6 \|author=Michael Evans \|date=16 June 2009 \|work=The Times \|access-date=16 June 2009}}</ref>		Sir [[John Sawers]] became head of the SIS in November 2009, the first outsider to head SIS in more than 40 years. Sawers came from the Diplomatic Service, previously having been the [[Permanent Representatives from the United Kingdom to the United Nations\|British Permanent Representative to the United Nations]].<ref name=times-20090616>{{cite news \|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6511372.ece \|title=Outsider Sir John Sawers appointed new head of MI6 \|author=Michael Evans \|date=16 June 2009 \|work=The Times \|access-date=16 June 2009}}{{dead link\|date=September 2024\|bot=medic}}{{cbignore\|bot=medic}}</ref>

	On 7 June 2011, John Sawers received Romania's President [[Traian Băsescu]] and George-Cristian Malor, the head of the Serviciul Roman de Informatii (SRI) at SIS headquarters.<ref>{{cite news\|url=http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-258530473/romanian-president-meet-british.html\|title=Romanian president meet with British MI6 head in London\|publisher=BBC Monitoring International Reports \|date=9 June 2011\|access-date=1 July 2012}}</ref>		On 7 June 2011, John Sawers received Romania's President [[Traian Băsescu]] and George-Cristian Malor, the head of the Serviciul Roman de Informatii (SRI) at SIS headquarters.<ref>{{cite news\|url=http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-258530473/romanian-president-meet-british.html\|title=Romanian president meet with British MI6 head in London\|publisher=BBC Monitoring International Reports \|date=9 June 2011\|access-date=1 July 2012}}</ref>

Biogeographist: added wikilink

2024-09-23T16:28:49Z

added wikilink

← Previous revision		Revision as of 16:28, 23 September 2024
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	==Personnel==		==Personnel==
	=== Selection and training ===		=== Selection and training ===
	SIS agents are often chosen based on merit and skill by authorities at elite universities and military academies. The chosen recruit then must make a his or hers application within the [[United Kingdom]], must be a [[British citizen]] or have been a resident of the UK for at least ten years.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Get a job in the intelligence services in 2024 {{!}} Take a look at available careers {{!}} Prospects.ac.uk \|url=https://www.prospects.ac.uk/jobs-and-work-experience/job-sectors/law-enforcement-and-security/intelligence-services-careers-for-graduates \|access-date=17 April 2024 \|website=www.prospects.ac.uk}}</ref> First, all recruits must pass the basic civil service entry exam before being introduced to a panel of SIS officers during an in-depth competency-based interview. If the interviewee passes, then finally, a detailed background and security check is provided for each candidate.<ref name="auto1">{{Cite web \|title=The Secret Intelligence Service {{!}} SIS \|url=https://www.eliteukforces.info/mi6/ \|access-date=17 April 2024 \|website=www.eliteukforces.info}}</ref>		SIS agents are often chosen based on merit and skill by authorities at elite universities and military academies. The chosen recruit then must make a his or hers application within the [[United Kingdom]], must be a [[British citizen]] or have been a resident of the UK for at least ten years.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=Get a job in the intelligence services in 2024 {{!}} Take a look at available careers {{!}} Prospects.ac.uk \|url=https://www.prospects.ac.uk/jobs-and-work-experience/job-sectors/law-enforcement-and-security/intelligence-services-careers-for-graduates \|access-date=17 April 2024 \|website=www.prospects.ac.uk}}</ref> First, all recruits must pass the basic civil service entry exam before being introduced to a panel of SIS officers during an in-depth [[competency-based interview]]. If the interviewee passes, then finally, a detailed background and security check is provided for each candidate.<ref name="auto1">{{Cite web \|title=The Secret Intelligence Service {{!}} SIS \|url=https://www.eliteukforces.info/mi6/ \|access-date=17 April 2024 \|website=www.eliteukforces.info}}</ref>

	Training for recruits takes place at [[Fort Monckton]], [[Portsmouth]]. The chosen candidates must go through an intense six-month training programme known as the Intelligence Officer's New Entry Course (IONEC). IONEC recruits must learn how to select and handle agents, to operate undercover identity and use tradecraft skills such as dead drops, surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques, secret writing and code writing. These skills would enable the incoming agents to successfully use these techniques during complex missions and operations.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=SIS {{!}} Intelligence Officers \|url=https://www.sis.gov.uk/intelligence-officers.html \|access-date=17 April 2024 \|website=www.sis.gov.uk}}</ref><ref name="auto1"/>		Training for recruits takes place at [[Fort Monckton]], [[Portsmouth]]. The chosen candidates must go through an intense six-month training programme known as the Intelligence Officer's New Entry Course (IONEC). IONEC recruits must learn how to select and handle agents, to operate undercover identity and use tradecraft skills such as dead drops, surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques, secret writing and code writing. These skills would enable the incoming agents to successfully use these techniques during complex missions and operations.<ref>{{Cite web \|title=SIS {{!}} Intelligence Officers \|url=https://www.sis.gov.uk/intelligence-officers.html \|access-date=17 April 2024 \|website=www.sis.gov.uk}}</ref><ref name="auto1"/>

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	In May 1940, MI6 set up [[British Security Co-ordination]] (BSC), on the authorisation of Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] over the objections of Stewart Menzies.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.winstonchurchill.org/component/content/article/53-finest-hour-67/691-great-contemporaries-sir-william-stephenson-qintrepidq \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110625161022/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/component/content/article/53-finest-hour-67/691-great-contemporaries-sir-william-stephenson-qintrepidq \|url-status=dead \|archive-date=25 June 2011 \|title=Great Contemporaries: Sir William Stephenson, "Intrepid" \|last=Cynewulf Robbins \|first=Ron \|date=1990 \|website=Sir Winston Churchill \|publisher=The International Churchill Society \|access-date=24 March 2017 \|quote=Churchill launched Stephenson on his spymaster career by appointing him to head the British Security Co-ordination Service in New York before the United States had entered the Second World War. }}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/the-intrepid-life-of-sir-william-stephenson.html \|title=The Intrepid Life of Sir William Stephenson \|author=<!--Not stated--> \|date=2015 \|website=CIA News & Information \|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency \|access-date=24 March 2017 \|archive-date=15 July 2019 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190715014244/https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/the-intrepid-life-of-sir-william-stephenson.html \|url-status=dead }}</ref> This was a covert organisation based in New York City, headed by [[William Stephenson]] intended to investigate enemy activities, prevent sabotage against British interests in the Americas, and mobilise pro-British opinion in the Americas.<ref>{{citation \|last=William Boyd\|title=The Secret Persuaders\|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/19/military.secondworldwar\|work=[[The Guardian]]\|access-date=30 November 2013\|date=19 August 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CP-NR/release_e.asp?bgid=1790&andor1=bg \|title=Secret Intelligence Activities at Camp X \|author=<!--Not stated--> \|date=1 May 2015 \|website=Canada \|publisher=Government of Canada \|access-date=23 March 2017 \|url-status=dead \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924065713/http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CP-NR/release_e.asp?bgid=1790&andor1=bg \|archive-date=24 September 2015 }}</ref> BSC also founded [[Camp X]] in Canada to train clandestine operators and to establish (in 1942) a telecommunications relay station, code name Hydra, operated by engineer [[Benjamin deForest Bayly]].<ref>{{cite book \|title=Camp X \|first=Eric \|last=Walters \|year=2002 \|publisher=Puffin Canada \|location=Toronto \|isbn=978-0-14-131328-3 \|page=[https://archive.org/details/campx0000walt/page/229 229] \|url=https://archive.org/details/campx0000walt/page/229 }}</ref>		In May 1940, MI6 set up [[British Security Co-ordination]] (BSC), on the authorisation of Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] over the objections of Stewart Menzies.<ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.winstonchurchill.org/component/content/article/53-finest-hour-67/691-great-contemporaries-sir-william-stephenson-qintrepidq \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110625161022/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/component/content/article/53-finest-hour-67/691-great-contemporaries-sir-william-stephenson-qintrepidq \|url-status=dead \|archive-date=25 June 2011 \|title=Great Contemporaries: Sir William Stephenson, "Intrepid" \|last=Cynewulf Robbins \|first=Ron \|date=1990 \|website=Sir Winston Churchill \|publisher=The International Churchill Society \|access-date=24 March 2017 \|quote=Churchill launched Stephenson on his spymaster career by appointing him to head the British Security Co-ordination Service in New York before the United States had entered the Second World War. }}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/the-intrepid-life-of-sir-william-stephenson.html \|title=The Intrepid Life of Sir William Stephenson \|author=<!--Not stated--> \|date=2015 \|website=CIA News & Information \|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency \|access-date=24 March 2017 \|archive-date=15 July 2019 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190715014244/https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2015-featured-story-archive/the-intrepid-life-of-sir-william-stephenson.html \|url-status=dead }}</ref> This was a covert organisation based in New York City, headed by [[William Stephenson]] intended to investigate enemy activities, prevent sabotage against British interests in the Americas, and mobilise pro-British opinion in the Americas.<ref>{{citation \|last=William Boyd\|title=The Secret Persuaders\|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/19/military.secondworldwar\|work=[[The Guardian]]\|access-date=30 November 2013\|date=19 August 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite web \|url=http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CP-NR/release_e.asp?bgid=1790&andor1=bg \|title=Secret Intelligence Activities at Camp X \|author=<!--Not stated--> \|date=1 May 2015 \|website=Canada \|publisher=Government of Canada \|access-date=23 March 2017 \|url-status=dead \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924065713/http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CP-NR/release_e.asp?bgid=1790&andor1=bg \|archive-date=24 September 2015 }}</ref> BSC also founded [[Camp X]] in Canada to train clandestine operators and to establish (in 1942) a telecommunications relay station, code name Hydra, operated by engineer [[Benjamin deForest Bayly]].<ref>{{cite book \|title=Camp X \|first=Eric \|last=Walters \|year=2002 \|publisher=Puffin Canada \|location=Toronto \|isbn=978-0-14-131328-3 \|page=[https://archive.org/details/campx0000walt/page/229 229] \|url=https://archive.org/details/campx0000walt/page/229 }}</ref>

	SIS operations in Asia were hindered by the fact that Europeans tended to stick out in Asia along with an inability to recruit Asian agents.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=215}} The SOE had more success in both recruiting agents in Asia and in sending agents into the Japanese-occupied areas in China and southeast Asia, which caused tensions with MI6 who were jealous of the ability of the upstart SOE to do what they could not.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=215}} SOE was more open to recruiting from within the Commonwealth, recruiting Chinese-Canadians and Australian-Chinese, to operate behind the Japanese lines under the grounds Asian agents would less likely to be arrested by the ''[[Kempeitai]]'', the much feared Japanese military police. In 1944, about 90% of the human intelligence in Burma came from the SOE while 70% of the human intelligence in Malaya, Thailand and French Indochina came from the SOE.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=227}} General [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim\|William Slim]], the GOC of the 14th Army, complained about the low quality of SIS intelligence in late 1943 as he stated that the intelligence he received from MI6 was "far from being complete or accurate".{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=220}} In late 1944-early 1945, Slim attempted to have the 14th Army take over all intelligence operations in Burma with both SIS and SOE agents to be subordinate to the 14th Army under the grounds the Army was more capable of running intelligence operations in southeast Asia than MI6.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=~~221-222~~}} Menzies who fiercely defended the prerogatives of MI6 was able to block this proposal despite the way it was universally accepted by officers serving in the China-Burma-India theater that SIS was unsuitable to operating in that part of the world.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=~~222-223~~}} MI6 was able to keep operating in Asia by making the argument that the SOE was only a temporary organisation that was to be disbanded after the war ended while MI6 was the permanent intelligence service that would continue after the war, and that to exclude MI6 from Asia would weaken British intelligence in the post-war world.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=228}}		SIS operations in Asia were hindered by the fact that Europeans tended to stick out in Asia along with an inability to recruit Asian agents.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=215}} The SOE had more success in both recruiting agents in Asia and in sending agents into the Japanese-occupied areas in China and southeast Asia, which caused tensions with MI6 who were jealous of the ability of the upstart SOE to do what they could not.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=215}} SOE was more open to recruiting from within the Commonwealth, recruiting Chinese-Canadians and Australian-Chinese, to operate behind the Japanese lines under the grounds Asian agents would less likely to be arrested by the ''[[Kempeitai]]'', the much feared Japanese military police. In 1944, about 90% of the human intelligence in Burma came from the SOE while 70% of the human intelligence in Malaya, Thailand and French Indochina came from the SOE.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=227}} General [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim\|William Slim]], the GOC of the 14th Army, complained about the low quality of SIS intelligence in late 1943 as he stated that the intelligence he received from MI6 was "far from being complete or accurate".{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=220}} In late 1944-early 1945, Slim attempted to have the 14th Army take over all intelligence operations in Burma with both SIS and SOE agents to be subordinate to the 14th Army under the grounds the Army was more capable of running intelligence operations in southeast Asia than MI6.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=221–222}} Menzies who fiercely defended the prerogatives of MI6 was able to block this proposal despite the way it was universally accepted by officers serving in the China-Burma-India theater that SIS was unsuitable to operating in that part of the world.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=222–223}} MI6 was able to keep operating in Asia by making the argument that the SOE was only a temporary organisation that was to be disbanded after the war ended while MI6 was the permanent intelligence service that would continue after the war, and that to exclude MI6 from Asia would weaken British intelligence in the post-war world.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=228}}

	In early 1944, MI6 re-established Section IX, its prewar anti-Soviet section, and Philby took a position there. He was able to alert the [[NKVD]] about all British intelligence on the Soviets—including what the American [[Office of Strategic Services\|OSS]] had shared with the British about the Soviets.<ref name=god>{{cite web\|url=http://www.inatoday.com/philbyspygod20101221.htm\|title=Kim Philby – new Russian god?\|publisher=International News Analysis Today\|date=20 December 2010\|access-date=1 July 2012}}</ref>		In early 1944, MI6 re-established Section IX, its prewar anti-Soviet section, and Philby took a position there. He was able to alert the [[NKVD]] about all British intelligence on the Soviets—including what the American [[Office of Strategic Services\|OSS]] had shared with the British about the Soviets.<ref name=god>{{cite web\|url=http://www.inatoday.com/philbyspygod20101221.htm\|title=Kim Philby – new Russian god?\|publisher=International News Analysis Today\|date=20 December 2010\|access-date=1 July 2012}}</ref>

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	MI6 assisted the [[Gestapo]], the Nazi secret police, with "the exchange of information about communism" as late as October 1937, well into the Nazi era; the head of the British agency's Berlin station, [[Frank Foley]], was still able to describe his relationship with the Gestapo's so-called communism expert as "cordial".<ref>{{Harvnb\|Jeffery\|2010\|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_bZZIVf5YxAC&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref> In 1936, in a sign that he lacked confidence in his own agents, Sinclair founded the semi-autonomous Z section under [[Claude Dansey]] for economic intelligence about Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Working alongside the Z section was the British Industrial Secret Service headed by a Canadian businessman living in London, [[William Stephenson]] that recruited British businessmen active in Germany for intelligence about German industrial production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} For intelligence on German military plans, MI6 largely depended upon Czechoslovak military intelligence from 1937 onward as [[Paul Thümmel]], aka "Agent A-54", a senior officer in the German intelligence service, the ''[[Abwehr]]'', had been bribed into working for Czechoslovakia.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Thus most of what MI6 knew about German plans during both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis came from the Czechoslovak military intelligence, which continued to run Thümmel even after the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and a government-in-exile was set up.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], the British ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, was actively hostile towards MI6 running agents out of the British embassy in Berlin as he made it clear his belief that espionage against Germany would hamper the "general settlement" he was seeking with the ''Reich''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} The focus on collecting intelligence on German aircraft production led MI6 to be confused about the wider strategic question of what were the aims of German foreign policy. On 18 September 1938, a memo entitled "What Shall We Do?" written by Malcolm Woollcombe, the chief of the Political Intelligence, declared that the best way of resolving the Sudetenland crisis was for the Sudetenland to be peacefully annexed to Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The report concluded that allowing the Sudetenland to be annexed would allow Britain to finally discover "what ''really legitimate'' grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to recify them".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}}		MI6 assisted the [[Gestapo]], the Nazi secret police, with "the exchange of information about communism" as late as October 1937, well into the Nazi era; the head of the British agency's Berlin station, [[Frank Foley]], was still able to describe his relationship with the Gestapo's so-called communism expert as "cordial".<ref>{{Harvnb\|Jeffery\|2010\|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_bZZIVf5YxAC&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref> In 1936, in a sign that he lacked confidence in his own agents, Sinclair founded the semi-autonomous Z section under [[Claude Dansey]] for economic intelligence about Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Working alongside the Z section was the British Industrial Secret Service headed by a Canadian businessman living in London, [[William Stephenson]] that recruited British businessmen active in Germany for intelligence about German industrial production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} For intelligence on German military plans, MI6 largely depended upon Czechoslovak military intelligence from 1937 onward as [[Paul Thümmel]], aka "Agent A-54", a senior officer in the German intelligence service, the ''[[Abwehr]]'', had been bribed into working for Czechoslovakia.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Thus most of what MI6 knew about German plans during both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis came from the Czechoslovak military intelligence, which continued to run Thümmel even after the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and a government-in-exile was set up.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], the British ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, was actively hostile towards MI6 running agents out of the British embassy in Berlin as he made it clear his belief that espionage against Germany would hamper the "general settlement" he was seeking with the ''Reich''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} The focus on collecting intelligence on German aircraft production led MI6 to be confused about the wider strategic question of what were the aims of German foreign policy. On 18 September 1938, a memo entitled "What Shall We Do?" written by Malcolm Woollcombe, the chief of the Political Intelligence, declared that the best way of resolving the Sudetenland crisis was for the Sudetenland to be peacefully annexed to Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The report concluded that allowing the Sudetenland to be annexed would allow Britain to finally discover "what ''really legitimate'' grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to recify them".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}}

	In January 1939, MI6 played a major role in the "Dutch War Scare" when it reported to London that Germany was about to invade the Netherlands with the aim of using the Dutch airfields to launch a strategic bombing campaign that would achieve a "knock out blow" by destroying London along with the rest of Britain's cities.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The intelligence behind the "Dutch War Scare" was false, intended to achieve a change in British foreign policy and had its desired effect on the Chamberlain government.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=~~214-215~~}} The ''Deuxième Bureau'' had manufactured the story as a way to force Britain to make a stronger commitment to defend France.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=~~253-254~~}} The "limited liability" rearmament policy pursued by the Chamberlain government had intentionally starved the British Army of funds to rule out the "continental commitment" (i.e. Britain sending a large expeditionary force) from ever being made again, with the majority of military spending being devoted the RAF and the Royal Navy. As such, Britain simply did not possess the military force to save the Netherlands, leading to urgent requests being made to Paris to ask if France would be willing to assist with the defence of the Netherlands.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=253}} In response, the French replied that Britain would need to do more for France if the British wanted the French to do something for them.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=~~253-254~~}} On 6 February 1939 in a beginning of a shift in British foreign policy, Prime Minister Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that "any threat to the vital interest of France" would lead to a British declaration of war.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=254}} One of MI6’s most successful operations before the war started in April 1939 when an Australian businessman living in London, [[Sidney Cotton]], who was already engaged in aerial photographic espionage for the ''[[Deuxième Bureau]]'' was recruited to fly missions over Germany.{{sfn\|Polmar\|Allen\|1998\|p=138}} Under the cover story that he was a sales agent for a dummy corporation, the Aeronautical Research and Sales Corporation, Cotton flew over Germany, Italy and the Italian colony of Libya in his Lockheed 12A aircraft, taking numerous high-quality aerial photographs of German and Italian military bases that proved immensely useful for Britain during the war.{{sfn\|Polmar\|Allen\|1998\|p=138}}		In January 1939, MI6 played a major role in the "Dutch War Scare" when it reported to London that Germany was about to invade the Netherlands with the aim of using the Dutch airfields to launch a strategic bombing campaign that would achieve a "knock out blow" by destroying London along with the rest of Britain's cities.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The intelligence behind the "Dutch War Scare" was false, intended to achieve a change in British foreign policy and had its desired effect on the Chamberlain government.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214–215}} The ''Deuxième Bureau'' had manufactured the story as a way to force Britain to make a stronger commitment to defend France.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=253–254}} The "limited liability" rearmament policy pursued by the Chamberlain government had intentionally starved the British Army of funds to rule out the "continental commitment" (i.e. Britain sending a large expeditionary force) from ever being made again, with the majority of military spending being devoted the RAF and the Royal Navy. As such, Britain simply did not possess the military force to save the Netherlands, leading to urgent requests being made to Paris to ask if France would be willing to assist with the defence of the Netherlands.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=253}} In response, the French replied that Britain would need to do more for France if the British wanted the French to do something for them.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=253–254}} On 6 February 1939 in a beginning of a shift in British foreign policy, Prime Minister Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that "any threat to the vital interest of France" would lead to a British declaration of war.{{sfn\|Young\|2011\|p=254}} One of MI6’s most successful operations before the war started in April 1939 when an Australian businessman living in London, [[Sidney Cotton]], who was already engaged in aerial photographic espionage for the ''[[Deuxième Bureau]]'' was recruited to fly missions over Germany.{{sfn\|Polmar\|Allen\|1998\|p=138}} Under the cover story that he was a sales agent for a dummy corporation, the Aeronautical Research and Sales Corporation, Cotton flew over Germany, Italy and the Italian colony of Libya in his Lockheed 12A aircraft, taking numerous high-quality aerial photographs of German and Italian military bases that proved immensely useful for Britain during the war.{{sfn\|Polmar\|Allen\|1998\|p=138}}

	[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 135-S-06-07-32, Tibetexpedition, Junger Engländer.jpg\|thumb\|A young Englishman, member of the Secret Intelligence Service, in [[Yatung]], Tibet, photographed by [[Ernst Schäfer]] in 1939]]		[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 135-S-06-07-32, Tibetexpedition, Junger Engländer.jpg\|thumb\|A young Englishman, member of the Secret Intelligence Service, in [[Yatung]], Tibet, photographed by [[Ernst Schäfer]] in 1939]]

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	In 1924, MI6 intervened in the general election of that year by leaking the so-called [[Zinoviev letter]] to the ''Daily Mail'', which published it on its front page on 25 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} The letter, which was a forgery, was supposedly from [[Grigory Zinoviev]], the chief of the Comintern, ordering British Communists to take over the Labour Party. The Zinoviv letter, which was written in English, came into possession of the MI6 resident at the British Embassy in Riga on 9 October 1924 who forwarded it to London.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=1}} The Zinoviev letter played a key role in the defeat of the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin in the general election of 29 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} It has been established the MI6 leaked the Zinoviev letter to the ''Daily Mail'', but it remains unclear if MI6 was aware that the letter was a forgery at the time.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=223}}		In 1924, MI6 intervened in the general election of that year by leaking the so-called [[Zinoviev letter]] to the ''Daily Mail'', which published it on its front page on 25 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} The letter, which was a forgery, was supposedly from [[Grigory Zinoviev]], the chief of the Comintern, ordering British Communists to take over the Labour Party. The Zinoviv letter, which was written in English, came into possession of the MI6 resident at the British Embassy in Riga on 9 October 1924 who forwarded it to London.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=1}} The Zinoviev letter played a key role in the defeat of the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin in the general election of 29 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} It has been established the MI6 leaked the Zinoviev letter to the ''Daily Mail'', but it remains unclear if MI6 was aware that the letter was a forgery at the time.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=223}}

	With the emergence of [[Nazi Germany\|Germany]] as a threat following the ascendence of the [[Nazis]], in the early 1930s attention was shifted in that direction.<ref name="Sinclair" /> In 1934, a defense requirements commitment that consisted of Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury, General Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee for Imperial Defense, and the three service chiefs produced an influential memo that labelled Germany the "ultimate potential enemy".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} The memo noted that Germany had the world's second largest economy (being exceeded only by the economy of the United States), was a world leader in science and technology, and was capable of moblising millions of men for war. However, it was generally believed in the United Kingdom at the time that the arms race before 1914 had caused the Great War, and consequently there was a belief that British rearmament would increase international tensions and would make a war more likely than less likely.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} On the converse, there was the possibility if Germany rearmed while Britain did not, it would leave the ''Reich'' in a strong position to launch a war. It was decided that British rearmament would be linked to the extent of German rearmament with British rearmament to be reactive rather than preemptive.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=~~211-212~~}} The primary request from decision-makers in the government regarding Germany was for MI6 to collect intelligence about German rearmament in order to establish the level of British rearmament that was be pursued in response.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=~~211-212~~}} British decision-makers were especially concerned about the prospect of German strategic bombing of British cities as contemporary experts vastly exaggerated the power of strategic bombing to kill millions within a few days.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=~~211-212~~}} [[Harold Macmillan]] later recalled: "We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} As a result, MI6's number one priority with regard to Germany was collect intelligence on the Luftwaffe, the branch of the Wehrmacht that British decision-makers feared the most.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} To assist with studying German industrial production, the Industrial Intelligence Center under [[Desmond Morton (civil servant)\|Desmond Morton]] was founded in 1934 with a special mandate to study German aircraft production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} However, Admiral Sinclair complained in 1935 that MI6's annual budget for operations around the world was equal to the cost of maintaining one destroyer in home waters, and that the demands placed upon his service exceeded its budget.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The focus on the Luftwaffe along with MI6's relatively small budget led to constant complaints from both the War Office and the Admiralty that MI6 was neglecting both the German Army and the ''Kriegsmarine''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The Asian branch of the SIS was known as the "Cinderella branch" owing to its neglect by London.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=214}}		With the emergence of [[Nazi Germany\|Germany]] as a threat following the ascendence of the [[Nazis]], in the early 1930s attention was shifted in that direction.<ref name="Sinclair" /> In 1934, a defense requirements commitment that consisted of Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury, General Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee for Imperial Defense, and the three service chiefs produced an influential memo that labelled Germany the "ultimate potential enemy".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} The memo noted that Germany had the world's second largest economy (being exceeded only by the economy of the United States), was a world leader in science and technology, and was capable of moblising millions of men for war. However, it was generally believed in the United Kingdom at the time that the arms race before 1914 had caused the Great War, and consequently there was a belief that British rearmament would increase international tensions and would make a war more likely than less likely.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} On the converse, there was the possibility if Germany rearmed while Britain did not, it would leave the ''Reich'' in a strong position to launch a war. It was decided that British rearmament would be linked to the extent of German rearmament with British rearmament to be reactive rather than preemptive.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211–212}} The primary request from decision-makers in the government regarding Germany was for MI6 to collect intelligence about German rearmament in order to establish the level of British rearmament that was be pursued in response.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211–212}} British decision-makers were especially concerned about the prospect of German strategic bombing of British cities as contemporary experts vastly exaggerated the power of strategic bombing to kill millions within a few days.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211–212}} [[Harold Macmillan]] later recalled: "We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} As a result, MI6's number one priority with regard to Germany was collect intelligence on the Luftwaffe, the branch of the Wehrmacht that British decision-makers feared the most.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} To assist with studying German industrial production, the Industrial Intelligence Center under [[Desmond Morton (civil servant)\|Desmond Morton]] was founded in 1934 with a special mandate to study German aircraft production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} However, Admiral Sinclair complained in 1935 that MI6's annual budget for operations around the world was equal to the cost of maintaining one destroyer in home waters, and that the demands placed upon his service exceeded its budget.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The focus on the Luftwaffe along with MI6's relatively small budget led to constant complaints from both the War Office and the Admiralty that MI6 was neglecting both the German Army and the ''Kriegsmarine''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The Asian branch of the SIS was known as the "Cinderella branch" owing to its neglect by London.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=214}}

	MI6 assisted the [[Gestapo]], the Nazi secret police, with "the exchange of information about communism" as late as October 1937, well into the Nazi era; the head of the British agency's Berlin station, [[Frank Foley]], was still able to describe his relationship with the Gestapo's so-called communism expert as "cordial".<ref>{{Harvnb\|Jeffery\|2010\|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_bZZIVf5YxAC&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref> In 1936, in a sign that he lacked confidence in his own agents, Sinclair founded the semi-autonomous Z section under [[Claude Dansey]] for economic intelligence about Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Working alongside the Z section was the British Industrial Secret Service headed by a Canadian businessman living in London, [[William Stephenson]] that recruited British businessmen active in Germany for intelligence about German industrial production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} For intelligence on German military plans, MI6 largely depended upon Czechoslovak military intelligence from 1937 onward as [[Paul Thümmel]], aka "Agent A-54", a senior officer in the German intelligence service, the ''[[Abwehr]]'', had been bribed into working for Czechoslovakia.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Thus most of what MI6 knew about German plans during both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis came from the Czechoslovak military intelligence, which continued to run Thümmel even after the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and a government-in-exile was set up.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], the British ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, was actively hostile towards MI6 running agents out of the British embassy in Berlin as he made it clear his belief that espionage against Germany would hamper the "general settlement" he was seeking with the ''Reich''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} The focus on collecting intelligence on German aircraft production led MI6 to be confused about the wider strategic question of what were the aims of German foreign policy. On 18 September 1938, a memo entitled "What Shall We Do?" written by Malcolm Woollcombe, the chief of the Political Intelligence, declared that the best way of resolving the Sudetenland crisis was for the Sudetenland to be peacefully annexed to Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The report concluded that allowing the Sudetenland to be annexed would allow Britain to finally discover "what ''really legitimate'' grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to recify them".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}}		MI6 assisted the [[Gestapo]], the Nazi secret police, with "the exchange of information about communism" as late as October 1937, well into the Nazi era; the head of the British agency's Berlin station, [[Frank Foley]], was still able to describe his relationship with the Gestapo's so-called communism expert as "cordial".<ref>{{Harvnb\|Jeffery\|2010\|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_bZZIVf5YxAC&pg=PA302 302]}}</ref> In 1936, in a sign that he lacked confidence in his own agents, Sinclair founded the semi-autonomous Z section under [[Claude Dansey]] for economic intelligence about Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Working alongside the Z section was the British Industrial Secret Service headed by a Canadian businessman living in London, [[William Stephenson]] that recruited British businessmen active in Germany for intelligence about German industrial production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} For intelligence on German military plans, MI6 largely depended upon Czechoslovak military intelligence from 1937 onward as [[Paul Thümmel]], aka "Agent A-54", a senior officer in the German intelligence service, the ''[[Abwehr]]'', had been bribed into working for Czechoslovakia.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Thus most of what MI6 knew about German plans during both the Sudetenland crisis and the Danzig crisis came from the Czechoslovak military intelligence, which continued to run Thümmel even after the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939 and a government-in-exile was set up.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} Sir [[Nevile Henderson]], the British ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, was actively hostile towards MI6 running agents out of the British embassy in Berlin as he made it clear his belief that espionage against Germany would hamper the "general settlement" he was seeking with the ''Reich''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=213}} The focus on collecting intelligence on German aircraft production led MI6 to be confused about the wider strategic question of what were the aims of German foreign policy. On 18 September 1938, a memo entitled "What Shall We Do?" written by Malcolm Woollcombe, the chief of the Political Intelligence, declared that the best way of resolving the Sudetenland crisis was for the Sudetenland to be peacefully annexed to Germany.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}} The report concluded that allowing the Sudetenland to be annexed would allow Britain to finally discover "what ''really legitimate'' grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to recify them".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=214}}

← Previous revision		Revision as of 14:51, 5 November 2024
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	{{anchor\|Section D}}* Section D to conduct political covert actions and paramilitary operations in time of war. Section D would organise the Home Defence Scheme resistance organisation in the UK and come to be the foundation of the [[Special Operations Executive]] (SOE) during the Second World War.<ref name="Sinclair" /><ref>{{Cite book\|title = Fighting Nazi Occupation: British Resistance 1939 – 1945\|last = Atkin\|first = Malcolm\|publisher = Pen and Sword\|year = 2015\|isbn = 978-1-47383-377-7\|location = Barnsley\|pages = Chapter 4}}</ref>		{{anchor\|Section D}}* Section D to conduct political covert actions and paramilitary operations in time of war. Section D would organise the Home Defence Scheme resistance organisation in the UK and come to be the foundation of the [[Special Operations Executive]] (SOE) during the Second World War.<ref name="Sinclair" /><ref>{{Cite book\|title = Fighting Nazi Occupation: British Resistance 1939 – 1945\|last = Atkin\|first = Malcolm\|publisher = Pen and Sword\|year = 2015\|isbn = 978-1-47383-377-7\|location = Barnsley\|pages = Chapter 4}}</ref>

	In 1924, MI6 intervened in the general election of that year by leaking the so-called [[Zinoviev letter]] to the ''Daily Mail'', which published it on its front page on 25 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} The letter-which was a forgery-was supposedly from [[Grigory Zinoviev]], the chief of the Comintern, ordering British Communists to take over the Labour Party. The Zinoviv letter, which was written in English, came into possession of the MI6 resident at the British Embassy in Riga on 9 October 1924 who forwarded it to London.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=1}} The Zinoviev letter played a key role in the defeat of the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin in the general election of 29 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} It has been established the MI6 leaked the Zinoviev letter to the ''Daily Mail'', but it remains unclear if MI6 was aware that the letter was a forgery at the time.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=223}}		In 1924, MI6 intervened in the general election of that year by leaking the so-called [[Zinoviev letter]] to the ''Daily Mail'', which published it on its front page on 25 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} The letter, which was a forgery, was supposedly from [[Grigory Zinoviev]], the chief of the Comintern, ordering British Communists to take over the Labour Party. The Zinoviv letter, which was written in English, came into possession of the MI6 resident at the British Embassy in Riga on 9 October 1924 who forwarded it to London.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=1}} The Zinoviev letter played a key role in the defeat of the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the victory of the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin in the general election of 29 October 1924.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=4}} It has been established the MI6 leaked the Zinoviev letter to the ''Daily Mail'', but it remains unclear if MI6 was aware that the letter was a forgery at the time.{{sfn\|Bennett\|2018\|p=223}}

	With the emergence of [[Nazi Germany\|Germany]] as a threat following the ascendence of the [[Nazis]], in the early 1930s attention was shifted in that direction.<ref name="Sinclair" /> In 1934, a defense requirements commitment that consisted of Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury, General Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee for Imperial Defense, and the three service chiefs produced an influential memo that labelled Germany the "ultimate potential enemy".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} The memo noted that Germany had the world's second largest economy (being exceeded only by the economy of the United States), was a world leader in science and technology, and was capable of moblising millions of men for war. However, it was generally believed in the United Kingdom at the time that the arms race before 1914 had caused the Great War, and consequently there was a belief that British rearmament would increase international tensions and would make a war more likely than less likely.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} On the converse, there was the possibility if Germany rearmed while Britain did not, it would leave the ''Reich'' in a strong position to launch a war. It was decided that British rearmament would be linked to the extent of German rearmament with British rearmament to be reactive rather than preemptive.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} The primary request from decision-makers in the government regarding Germany was for MI6 to collect intelligence about German rearmament in order to establish the level of British rearmament that was be pursued in response.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} British decision-makers were especially concerned about the prospect of German strategic bombing of British cities as contemporary experts vastly exaggerated the power of strategic bombing to kill millions within a few days.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} [[Harold Macmillan]] later recalled: "We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} As a result, MI6's number one priority with regard to Germany was collect intelligence on the Luftwaffe, the branch of the Wehrmacht that British decision-makers feared the most.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} To assist with studying German industrial production, the Industrial Intelligence Center under [[Desmond Morton (civil servant)\|Desmond Morton]] was founded in 1934 with a special mandate to study German aircraft production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} However, Admiral Sinclair complained in 1935 that MI6's annual budget for operations around the world was equal to the cost of maintaining one destroyer in home waters, and that the demands placed upon his service exceeded its budget.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The focus on the Luftwaffe along with MI6's relatively small budget led to constant complaints from both the War Office and the Admiralty that MI6 was neglecting both the German Army and the ''Kriegsmarine''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The Asian branch of the SIS was known as the "Cinderella branch" owing to its neglect by London.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=214}}		With the emergence of [[Nazi Germany\|Germany]] as a threat following the ascendence of the [[Nazis]], in the early 1930s attention was shifted in that direction.<ref name="Sinclair" /> In 1934, a defense requirements commitment that consisted of Sir Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury, General Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee for Imperial Defense, and the three service chiefs produced an influential memo that labelled Germany the "ultimate potential enemy".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} The memo noted that Germany had the world's second largest economy (being exceeded only by the economy of the United States), was a world leader in science and technology, and was capable of moblising millions of men for war. However, it was generally believed in the United Kingdom at the time that the arms race before 1914 had caused the Great War, and consequently there was a belief that British rearmament would increase international tensions and would make a war more likely than less likely.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211}} On the converse, there was the possibility if Germany rearmed while Britain did not, it would leave the ''Reich'' in a strong position to launch a war. It was decided that British rearmament would be linked to the extent of German rearmament with British rearmament to be reactive rather than preemptive.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} The primary request from decision-makers in the government regarding Germany was for MI6 to collect intelligence about German rearmament in order to establish the level of British rearmament that was be pursued in response.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} British decision-makers were especially concerned about the prospect of German strategic bombing of British cities as contemporary experts vastly exaggerated the power of strategic bombing to kill millions within a few days.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=211-212}} [[Harold Macmillan]] later recalled: "We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today".{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} As a result, MI6's number one priority with regard to Germany was collect intelligence on the Luftwaffe, the branch of the Wehrmacht that British decision-makers feared the most.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} To assist with studying German industrial production, the Industrial Intelligence Center under [[Desmond Morton (civil servant)\|Desmond Morton]] was founded in 1934 with a special mandate to study German aircraft production.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} However, Admiral Sinclair complained in 1935 that MI6's annual budget for operations around the world was equal to the cost of maintaining one destroyer in home waters, and that the demands placed upon his service exceeded its budget.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The focus on the Luftwaffe along with MI6's relatively small budget led to constant complaints from both the War Office and the Admiralty that MI6 was neglecting both the German Army and the ''Kriegsmarine''.{{sfn\|Quinlan\|Walton\|2011\|p=212}} The Asian branch of the SIS was known as the "Cinderella branch" owing to its neglect by London.{{sfn\|Aldrich \|2000\|p=214}}

← Previous revision		Revision as of 01:33, 27 September 2024
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	On 15 November 2006, SIS allowed an interview with current operations officers for the first time. The interview was on the [[Colin Murray]] Show on [[BBC Radio 1]]. The two officers (one male and one female) had their voices disguised for security reasons. The officers compared their real experience with the fictional portrayal of SIS in the [[James Bond films]]. While denying that there ever existed a "[[licence to kill (concept)\|licence to kill]]" and reiterating that SIS operated under British law, the officers confirmed that there is a '[[Q (James Bond)\|Q]]'-like figure who is head of the technology department, and that their director is referred to as 'C'. The officers described the lifestyle as quite glamorous and very varied, with plenty of overseas travel and adventure, and described their role primarily as intelligence gatherers, developing relationships with potential sources.<ref>{{cite news\|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1534306/MI6-licensed-to-thrill-listeners-to-Radio-1.html \|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1534306/MI6-licensed-to-thrill-listeners-to-Radio-1.html \|archive-date=10 January 2022 \|url-access=subscription \|url-status=live\|title=MI6 licensed to thrill listeners to Radio 1\|date=16 November 2006\|access-date=1 July 2012\|location=London\|work=The Daily Telegraph\|first=Philip\|last=Johnston}}{{cbignore}}</ref>		On 15 November 2006, SIS allowed an interview with current operations officers for the first time. The interview was on the [[Colin Murray]] Show on [[BBC Radio 1]]. The two officers (one male and one female) had their voices disguised for security reasons. The officers compared their real experience with the fictional portrayal of SIS in the [[James Bond films]]. While denying that there ever existed a "[[licence to kill (concept)\|licence to kill]]" and reiterating that SIS operated under British law, the officers confirmed that there is a '[[Q (James Bond)\|Q]]'-like figure who is head of the technology department, and that their director is referred to as 'C'. The officers described the lifestyle as quite glamorous and very varied, with plenty of overseas travel and adventure, and described their role primarily as intelligence gatherers, developing relationships with potential sources.<ref>{{cite news\|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1534306/MI6-licensed-to-thrill-listeners-to-Radio-1.html \|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1534306/MI6-licensed-to-thrill-listeners-to-Radio-1.html \|archive-date=10 January 2022 \|url-access=subscription \|url-status=live\|title=MI6 licensed to thrill listeners to Radio 1\|date=16 November 2006\|access-date=1 July 2012\|location=London\|work=The Daily Telegraph\|first=Philip\|last=Johnston}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

	Sir [[John Sawers]] became head of the SIS in November 2009, the first outsider to head SIS in more than 40 years. Sawers came from the Diplomatic Service, previously having been the [[Permanent Representatives from the United Kingdom to the United Nations\|British Permanent Representative to the United Nations]].<ref name=times-20090616>{{cite news \|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6511372.ece \|title=Outsider Sir John Sawers appointed new head of MI6 \|author=Michael Evans \|date=16 June 2009 \|work=The Times \|access-date=16 June 2009}}</ref>		Sir [[John Sawers]] became head of the SIS in November 2009, the first outsider to head SIS in more than 40 years. Sawers came from the Diplomatic Service, previously having been the [[Permanent Representatives from the United Kingdom to the United Nations\|British Permanent Representative to the United Nations]].<ref name=times-20090616>{{cite news \|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6511372.ece \|title=Outsider Sir John Sawers appointed new head of MI6 \|author=Michael Evans \|date=16 June 2009 \|work=The Times \|access-date=16 June 2009}}{{dead link\|date=September 2024\|bot=medic}}{{cbignore\|bot=medic}}</ref>

	On 7 June 2011, John Sawers received Romania's President [[Traian Băsescu]] and George-Cristian Malor, the head of the Serviciul Roman de Informatii (SRI) at SIS headquarters.<ref>{{cite news\|url=http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-258530473/romanian-president-meet-british.html\|title=Romanian president meet with British MI6 head in London\|publisher=BBC Monitoring International Reports \|date=9 June 2011\|access-date=1 July 2012}}</ref>		On 7 June 2011, John Sawers received Romania's President [[Traian Băsescu]] and George-Cristian Malor, the head of the Serviciul Roman de Informatii (SRI) at SIS headquarters.<ref>{{cite news\|url=http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-258530473/romanian-president-meet-british.html\|title=Romanian president meet with British MI6 head in London\|publisher=BBC Monitoring International Reports \|date=9 June 2011\|access-date=1 July 2012}}</ref>