Military career of L. Ron Hubbard: Difference between revisions

L. Ron Hubbard
Service / branch	United States Navy
Years of service	1941-1945 active resigned reserve 1950
Rank	Lieutenant
Commands	USS YP-422 and USS PC-815
Battles / wars	none, one claimed
Awards	Navy Pistol Marksmanship Ribbon Navy Rifle Marksmanship Ribbon American Defense Service Medal Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal American Campaign Medal World War II Victory Medal.
Other work	Wrote Dianetics, Battlefield Earth, and founded Scientology

L. Ron Hubbard, creator of Dianetics and founder of Scientology, served in at least two branches of the United States Armed Forces. As with many aspects of Hubbard's life, Hubbard and his supporters would later claim his service to be more extensive and positive than the records would support. Later, his interest in the military would be reflected by his formation of the paramilitary Sea Org and his nickname of "the Commodore".

Marine Corps Reserve

Hubbard's first military service was with the 20th Marine Corps Reserve, which he joined in May of 1930 before his enrollment at George Washington University. After only two months, Hubbard was promoted to First Sergeant, a leap of six ranks. Hubbard himself explained this unusually rapid promotion by saying that his superiors "couldn't find anyone else who could drill." Hubbard received a honorable discharge from the Marine Reserve on October 22, 1931; two unexplained notations on his service record (written in different handwriting) read "Excellent" and "Not to be re-enlisted". The Church of Scientology's account of this service states that Hubbard joined "the 20th Regiment, Company G of the US Marines" with no mention of this being a Reserve unit and credits him with "turning out a prize-winning company" with no mention of what prize was won.

World War II

During the Summer of 1941, Hubbard was commissioned as a Lieutenant, Junior Grade in the United States Navy. One of his professors had recommended him for service in intelligence, and after a successful interview with the Office of Naval Intelligence he was accepted. This elite division's sole mission was to "seek out and report" on the advancements in other nations' navies. The position offered Hubbard the chance at a distinguished career, as intelligence officers were badly needed. It also allowed him to skip the initial officer rank of Ensign. After Pearl Harbor he received orders of deployment to the Philippines, specifically Manila.

While embarked on the SS President Polk Japanese forces cut off the sea route to the Philippines, diverting the ship to Brisbane, Australia. Upon arrival Hubbard asked the Naval Attaché if he could leave the Polk in order to secure faster transport to the Philippines. He was unsuccessful in attempting to locate other transport, and instead began working as a sort of self-appointed liaison for a deployed Army unit. This duty had not been ordered and made somewhat of a nuisance by working outside the established chain of command. After using his assumed authority to re-route a transport around Australia by a Southern course, the Attaché was forced to act. Hubbard was then sent back to the United States, with a note stating: "This officer is not satisfactory for independent duty assignment. ... and will require close supervision for satisfactory performance of any intelligence duty." Scientology does not agree with these facts, and maintains that Hubbard's account is more accurate; Describing his position in Australia as "Senior Officer Present Ashore", which is not the type of duty an officer with the ONI would have been tasked with. Nevertheless some sources from Church of Scientolgy maintain he was actually wounded in action on the Island of Java, and returned on the Secretary of the Navy's airplane to the US as the first "returned" casualty from the Pacific. Other church sources state that during this time he was leading a squadron of corvettes in the North Atlantic.

From the O.N.I. to USS YP-422

USS YP-422 prior to final conversion

Dissatisfaction with the results, or lack thereof, in Australia cost him an opportunity to work as a Naval Intelligence officer. He was allowed to keep his Lieutenant Junior Grade rank, but was returned to the Navy's Bureau of Personnel for reassignment. Hubbard was subsequently made prospective Commanding Officer of USS YP-422. A fishing trawler undergoing conversion into a shipyard patrol vessel at the Boston Naval Shipyard, it had been called Mist by its civilian owners. Shortly after arrival a personality dispute evolved into a situation which Lt. Hubbard did not feel was handled properly by the Commandant of the shipyard. Ignoring the chain of command, he then spoke with the Commandant's C.O. the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Subsequently the Commandant requested Hubbard be relieved of command noting he is: "...not temperamentally fitted for independent command." He then repeated his mistake, and asked again for the intervention of the Vice Chief's office. The second request was not acted upon either, and Hubbard was relieved of command.These statements are in stark contrast with official Scientologist literature, which often portrays Hubbard as a role model sailor during the war.

PC-815's possible submarine contact

USS PC-815 on trials.

His next destination was once again the Bureau of Personnel for reassignment, where he decided to request training in the operation and command of PC class submarine chasers. The request was approved and he reported to class in Clearwater, Florida. There he was trained in anti-submarine warfare, and graduated in the bottom half of his class. He was then assigned as prospective Commanding Officer of the USS PC-815. The 175 foot vessel was in the last stages of construction near Astoria, Oregon. His first duties were supervising her fitting out, training of the crew, and finally deployment to San Diego, California, her assigned port.

In the early hours of May 19, 1943, the crew of the PC-815 detected what Hubbard believed to be first one then later two Imperial Japanese Navy submarines approximately 10 miles from the shore of Cape Lookout. The SONAR operator, Hubbard, and his Executive Officer, Lt. Moulton, evaluated the echo of an active sonar ping, combined with what they perceived as propeller noises ("screws") heard through the ship's hydrophone indicated contact with a submarine.

Over the next two and a half days, the ship expended 37 depth charges and saw no telltale signs of a sunken submarine. Hubbard did identify orange oil "erupting" to the surface at one point, however the color and lack of other debris consistent with a pressure hull compromised submarine were not seen. The US Navy blimps K-39 and K-33 arrived on the scene to search the area with magnetic anomaly detectors, resulting in detection of an indeterminate magnetic reading. The US Coast Guard patrol boats Bonham, 78302 as well as other Navy subchasers USS SC-536 and USS SC-537, also responded to Hubbard's report of enemy submarine activity as reinforcements. According to his report, these vessels were placed under his command for the duration of the "battle". On May 21, with depth charges exhausted and the presence of a submarine still unconfirmed by any other ship, PC-815 was ordered back to Astoria.

In his eighteen page after-action report, Hubbard claimed to have "definitely sunk, beyond doubt" one submarine and critically damaged another though he wished no credit for his ship However, reports from other units involved as well as the subsequent investigation by the Commander NW Sea Frontier, directly contradict Hubbard's claims. The investigation's summary memorandum to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, stated:

• It is noted that the report of PC 815 is not in accordance with "Anti-Submarine Action by Surface Ship" (ASW-1) which should be submitted to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
  
• An analysis of all reports convinces me that there was no submarine in the area. Lieutenant Commander Sullivan states that he was unable to obtain any evidence of a submarine except one bubble of air which is unexplained except by turbulence of water due to a depth charge explosion. The Commanding Officers of all ships except the PC-815 state they had no evidence of a submarine and do not think a submarine was in the area.
  — Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher

Size comparison of the USS PC-815 to a a Gato class submarine (IJN submarines of the KD7 class were 46 feet/14 meters longer.)

Fletcher added that "there is a known magnetic deposit in the area in which depth charges were dropped", which explained the readings obtained by the blimps. It should be noted that the Imperial Japanese Navy did not operate its submarines near the West Coast on a regular basis. They were criticized by their German allies for not pursuing a policy of commerce raiding, which would target cargo ships and oil tankers, rather than adhering to their practice of fleet warfare which targeted only large warships and aircraft carriers. Japanese submarines were in fact so dedicated to attacking warships instead of merchant vessels, that the shipping lanes in the Pacific did not use the convoy system necessitated in the Atlantic caused by u-boats. Final confirmation that no submarines had been present came after the war, British and American analysis of captured Japanese Navy records further confirmed that no Japanese submarines had been lost off the Oregon coast. Hubbard, however, continued to claim that he had engaged the enemy, as did his Executive Office, Lt. Moulton, in later testimony. Years later, Hubbard told Scientologists:

I dropped the I-76 or the Imperial Japanese Navy Trans-Pacific Submarine down into the mouth of the Columbia River, dead duck. And it went down with a resounding furor. And that was that. I never thought about it again particularly except to get mad at all the admirals I had to make reports to because of this thing, see? This was one out of seventy-nine separate actions that I had to do with. And it had no significance, see? But the other day I was kind of tired, and my dad suddenly sprung on me the fact that my submarine had been causing a tremendous amount of difficulty in the mouth of the Columbia River. Hadn't thought about this thing for years. Of course, it's all shot to ribbons, this thing. It's got jagged steel sticking out at all ends and angles, and it's a big submarine! It's a -- I don't know, about the size of the first Narwhal that we built. And the fishermen coming in there and fishing are dragging their nets around in that area, and it's just tearing their nets to ribbons -- they've even hired a civilian contractor to try to blow the thing up and get it the devil out of there -- and has evidently been raising bob with postwar fishing here for more years than I'd care to count.

— Hubbard, "Auditing Techniques - Games Conditions", lecture of 1 February 1957

Although it isn't clear what he meant when referring to the Imperial Japanese Navy Trans-Pacific Submarine, it is known that the I-76 could not have been sunk near the Columbia River during 1943. In 1942 the submarine called I-76 was renamed I-176, and later sunk in 1944 nowhere near Oregon.

It's also worth noting that the only actual attacks by IJN submarines on the US West Coast occurred between summer and autumn 1942:

See also: Attacks on North America during World War II

Coronado Islands incident

A month later, the PC-815 was assigned to guard the new escort aircraft carrier USS Croatan (CVE-25) as it proceeded to San Diego, which would also become home port for PC-815. She arrived there on June 2, 1943 and at the end of the month was ordered to participate in an anti-submarine training exercise. Held on June 28, the exercise ended early and Hubbard took the apparent opportunity to order an impromptu gunnery exercise. Compounding what would later be revealed a huge blunder, was his choice to do this while anchored just off the Mexican territory of South Coronado Island. He would come to regret this decision as his orders included no mention of gunnery practice, staying at sea, or anchoring in Mexican waters. PC-815 was expected that evening in San Diego, according to his orders. The Mexican government also sent an official protest to the US Navy, as no gunnery operations had been authorized. Evidently Hubbard had seen two USMC F4F fighters bombing a set up practice target and assumed he would also be allowed to make use of it as well, which was incorrect.

On June 30 a Board of Investigation was convened concerning PC-815 which concluded that Hubbard had disregarded orders, by conducting gunnery practice, failing to return when expected, and by anchoring in Mexican territorial waters without proper authority. His orders stated that the PC-815 was to return after completing that days training exercises, regardless of how early they ended. Hubbard argued that his crew was inexperienced, it was foggy, and he was tired so he was unable to follow his orders and return that evening. A month earlier in his after action report concerning the submarine fiasco off Cape Lookout, he had described the same men as "experienced" and "highly skilled" Vice Admiral Fletcher, who both chaired the board and was familiar with the previous month's "action", rated Hubbard "below average". The fitness report by Admiral Braisted, Hubbard's immediate CO, read:

Consider this officer lacking in the essential qualities of judgment, leadership and cooperation. He acts without forethought as to probable results. He is believed to have been sincere in his efforts to make his ship efficient and ready. Not considered qualified for command or promotion at this time. Recommend duty on a large vessel where he can be properly supervised.

Hubbard was relieved of command effective July 7, 1943 and given a letter of admonition. This is essentially the opposite of a letter of commendation, something he would later claim among other honors in a forged release form years later.

USS Algol (AKA-54) circa 1944

USS Algol

Hubbard's next post appears to have been decided after taking into account the advice of Admiral Fletcher as well as the previous officers, by placing him as a subordinate rather than commanding officer. His final ship was the attack transport USS Algol (AKA-54), where he served as the Navigation, Training officer, and Ship's censor until a bizarre security incident caused yet another transfer. Lt. Hubbard said he had found a firebomb he believed a saboteur had placed in one of the ship's holds, consisting of a coke bottle filled with gasoline and topped with a cloth wick. The circumstances surrounding the apparent discovery of this sabotage attempt, by the ship's navigation officer aroused suspicion enough that he was removed soon after. This was an unfortunate turn for Lt. Hubbard, as his C.O. had given him a mostly positive fitness report with the only issue being a tendency to be temperamental and easily offended. Hubbard would later claim that the film Mr. Roberts was based on his experience aboard the Algol, with Hubbard being the model for Roberts and the Lieutenant Commander who had given Hubbard his favorable fitness report the model for Captain Morton, who "bullied, harassed and threatened [his] junior leaders and [his crew]." Mr. Roberts is generally regarded as based on author Tom Heggen's own wartime experiences aboard the USS Virgo (AKA-20), with Heggen characterizing the character of Roberts himself as "too good to be true ... a pure invention."

War's end

The remainder of Hubbard's wartime service was spent ashore in the continental United States. Hubbard attended a course in civil governing which was run by the Navy on campus at Princeton. The purpose being to prepare for the eventual occupation of Japan and the various civil administration duties that would be necessitated. He was unable to pass the course, and as such didn't get assigned to duty with the occupation force. He continued to draw disability pay for arthritis, his ulcer, and conjunctivitis for years afterwards, long after he claimed to have discovered the secret of how to cure these ailments. About the time of his discharge, Hubbard was petitioning the Veterans Administration for psychiatric care to treat "long periods of moroseness and suicidal inclinations." He was also arrested for petty theft in connection with checks. When he wrote to the FBI that communist spies were after him, an agent attached a note to one of his letters: "Make 'appears mental' card."

Claimed vs actual awards

Hubbard's claimed awards per fake DD-214 distributed by Scientology and based on his claims. Note that he refers to the Oak Leaf Cluster of his supposed Purple Heart as a "palm". Also several claimed Service stars for his campaign awards.

Hubbard's authorized awards per his DD-214.

In later years, Hubbard made a number of claims about his military record that do not reconcile with the government's documentation of his service years. For example, Hubbard claimed he had sustained wounds "in combat on the island of Java", but his service record offers no indication he came closer to Java than Australia, and places him in New York on the day (7 December, 1941, the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor) he was supposedly landed on Java by a naval destroyer.

He also claimed to have received 21 medals and awards, including a Purple Heart and a "Unit Citation". The Church of Scientology has circulated a US Navy notice of separation (a form numbered DD214, completed on leaving active duty) as evidence of Hubbard's wartime service. However, the US Navy's copy of Hubbard's DD214 is very different, listing a much more modest record.

The Scientology version, signed by a nonexistent Lt. Cmdr. Howard D. Thompson, shows Hubbard being awarded medals that do not exist, boasts academic qualifications Hubbard did not earn, and places Hubbard in command of vessels not in the service of the US Navy. The Navy has noted "several inconsistencies exist between Mr. Hubbard's DD214 [the Scientology version] and the available facts".

References

Further reading

• L. Ron Hubbard: Messiah or Madman? by Bent Corydon and L. Ron Hubbard Jr.
• A Piece of Blue Sky by Jon Atack
• Bare Faced Messiah by Russell Miller