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'''Mujahideen'''<ref>Also spelt '''Mujahedin''' in a minority of articles</ref> were Islamic volunteers which came in [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia]] during the 1992-1995 [[Bosnian war]] after the [[Wiktionary:massacre|massacres]] committed by the [[Serb]] forces on [[Bosnian Muslim]] ([[Bosniaks|Bosniak]]) [[civilian]]s. They intended to wage a ''holy war'' against the ''perpetrators''. The number of volunteers is estimated by some newspaper reports to have been about 4,000,<ref>[http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0110/msg00060.html Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists]</ref> but some recent research discards such claims estimating 400 foreign volunteers.<ref>[http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/specials/al_kaida/index.htm Radio Free Europe (2007)- Vlado Azinović: Al-Kai'da u Bosni i Hercegovini - mit ili stvarna opasnost?]</ref> They came from countries such as [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Pakistan]], [[Afghanistan]], [[Egypt]] and [[Algeria]], to quote summary of the ICTY judgement:<ref>ICTY: Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura - [http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm]</ref>
'''Bosnian Mujahideen''' (also referred to as '''El Mujaheed''' or '''El Mujahid''') is the term often used for the [[Muslim]] volunteers to fight on the Bosnian government side during the 1992-1995 [[Bosnian War]]. It is estimated that the number of volunteers numbered about 4,000<ref>,[http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0110/msg00060.html LA Times], Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001</ref> with the majority coming from countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the Mujahideen volunteers, there were also several hundred [[Iranian Revolutionary Guards]] supporting the Bosnian government during the war. <ref>[http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/dayton_imp/train_equip.html United States Institute of Peace], Dayton Implementation: The Train and Equip Program, September 1997 | Special Report No. 25</ref> Many of the Bosnian Mujahideen were supported financially from Saudi Arabia.

{{quote|The evidence shows that foreign volunteers arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their [[Muslim]] [[brother]]s against the [[Serbian]] [[aggressor]]s. Mostly they came from [[North Africa]], the Near East and the Middle East. The foreign volunteers differed considerably from the local population, not only because of their physical appearance and the language they spoke, but also because of their fighting methods.}}


==Bosnian War==
==Bosnian War==
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{{main|Bosnian War}}
{{main|Bosnian War}}


⚫
Foreign mujahideen arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their Bosnian [[Muslim]] ([[Bosniak]]) coreligionists in the war against Bosnian [[Serb]] and Bosnian [[Croat]] forces. Mostly they came from [[North Africa]], the [[Near East]] and the [[Middle East]]. On 13 August 1993, the Bosnian government officially organized foreign volunteers into the detachment known as ''El Mudžahid'' in order to impose control and order.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
Secret discussions between [[Franjo Tuđman]] and [[Slobodan Milošević]] on the division of [[Bosnia and Herzegovina]] between [[Serbia]] and [[Croatia]] were held as early as March 1991 known as [[Karađorđevo agreement]]. Following the declaration of [[independence]] of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs attacked different parts of the country. The state administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively ceased to function having lost control over the entire territory. The Serbs wanted all lands where Serbs had a majority, eastern and western Bosnia. The Croats and their leader [[Franjo Tuđman]] also aimed at securing parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Croatian. Bosnian Muslims, the only ethnic group loyal to the Bosnian government, were an easy target, because the Bosnian government forces were poorly equipped and unprepared for the war.<ref name="ICTY: Naletilić and Martinović verdict - A. Historical background">{{cite web|url=http://www.un.org/icty/naletilic/trialc/judgement/nal-tj030331-1.htm#IIA|title=ICTY: Naletilić and Martinović verdict - A. Historical background|}}</ref> On [[September 25]], [[1991]] the [[United Nations Security Council]] passed UNSC Resolution 713 imposing an arms embargo on all of former Yugoslavia. The embargo hurt the Bosnian Army the most because [[Serbia]] inherited the lion's share of the former [[Yugoslav People's Army]] arsenal and the Croatian army could smuggle weapons through its coast.

At the outset of the Bosnian War the Serb forces attacked the Bosnian Muslim civilian population in Eastern Bosnia. Once towns and villages were securely in their hands, the Serb forces - military, police, the paramilitaries and, sometimes, even Serb villagers – applied the same pattern: Bosniak houses and apartments were systematically ransacked or burnt down, Bosniak civilians were rounded up or captured, and sometimes beaten or killed in the process. Men and women were separated, with many of the men detained in the camps. The women were kept in various detention centres where they had to live in intolerably unhygienic conditions, where they were mistreated in many ways including being raped repeatedly. Serb soldiers or policemen would come to these detention centres, select one or more women, take them out and rape them.<ref name="ICTY: Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković judgement - Foča">{{cite web|url=http://www.un.org/icty/kunarac/trialc2/judgement/kun-tj010222e-5.htm#VC|title=ICTY: The attack against the civilian population and related requirements|}}</ref> Meanwhile, Croat forces started their first attacks on Bosniaks in [[Gornji Vakuf]] and [[Novi Travnik]], towns in Central Bosnia on [[June 20]], [[1992]], but the attacks failed. The [[Graz agreement]] caused deep division inside the Croat community and strengthened the separation group, which led to the [[Lašva Valley ethnic cleansing]] campaign against Bosniak civilians. The campaign planned by the self-proclaimed [[Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia]]'s [[political]] and [[military]] [[leadership]] from May 1992 to March 1993 and erupting the following April, was meant to implement objectives set forth by Croat [[nationalist]]s in November of 1991.<ref name="ICTY: Blaškić verdict - A. The Lasva Valley: May 1992 – January 1993">{{cite web|url=http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialc1/judgement/bla-tj000303e-3.htm#IIIA|title=ICTY: Blaškić verdict - A. The Lasva Valley: May 1992 – January 1993|}}</ref> The Lašva Valley's Bosniaks were subjected to persecution on political, [[Race (classification of human beings)|racial]] and [[religious]] grounds<ref name="ICTY: Initial indictment for the ethnic cleansing of the Lasva Valley area - Part II">{{cite web|url=http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/indictments/Kordic2.html|title=ICTY (1995): Initial indictment for the ethnic cleansing of the Lasva Valley area - Part II|}}</ref>, deliberately discriminated against in the context of a widespread attack on the region's civilian population<ref name="ICTY: Summary of sentencing judgement for Miroslav Bralo">{{cite web|url=http://www.un.org/icty/bralo/bra-sum051207-e.htm|title=ICTY: Summary of sentencing judgement for Miroslav Bralo|}}</ref> and suffered [[mass murder]], [[rape]], [[imprisonment]] in [[camp]]s, as well as the destruction of cultural sites and private property. This was often followed by anti-Bosniak [[propaganda]], particularly in the municipalities of [[Vitez]], [[Busovača]], [[Novi Travnik]] and [[Kiseljak]].

⚫
Foreign mujahideen arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their Bosnian [[Muslim]] ([[Bosniak]]) coreligionists to defend themselves from the [[Serb]] and [[Croat]] forces. Mostly they came from [[North Africa]], the [[Near East]] and the [[Middle East]]. On 13 August 1993, the Bosnian government officially organized foreign volunteers into the detachment known as ''El Mudžahid'' in order to impose control and order.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
Initially, the foreign Mujahideen gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population, deprived many necessities by the Serb forces. Once hostilities broke out between the Bosnian government (ABiH) and the Croat forces (HVO), the Mujahideen also participated in battles against the HVO alongside ABiH units.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>
Initially, the foreign Mujahideen gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population, deprived many necessities by the Serb forces. Once hostilities broke out between the Bosnian government (ABiH) and the Croat forces (HVO), the Mujahideen also participated in battles against the HVO alongside ABiH units.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref>


The foreign mujahideen actively recruited young local men, offering them military training, uniforms and weapons. As a result, some local Bosniaks joined the foreign mujahideen and in the process became local Mujahideen.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref> They imitated the foreigners in both the way they dressed and behaved, to such an extent that it was sometimes, according to the ICTY documentation in subsequent war crimes trials, "difficult to distinguish between the two groups. For that reason, the ICTY has used the term "Mujahideen" (which they spell Mujahedin) to designate foreigners from [[Arab]] countries, but also local Muslims (ie [[Bosniaks]]) who joined the Mujahideen units.<ref name=ICTY-Antonetti>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, [[15 March]] 2006. See section "VI. The Mujahedin"</ref>
The foreign mujahideen actively recruited young local men, offering them military training, uniforms and weapons. As a result, some local Bosniaks joined the foreign mujahideen and in the process became local Mujahideen.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref> They imitated the foreigners in both the way they dressed and behaved, to such an extent that it was sometimes, according to the ICTY documentation in subsequent war crimes trials, "difficult to distinguish between the two groups. For that reason, the ICTY has used the term "Mujahideen" (which they spell Mujahedin) to designate foreigners from [[Arab]] countries, but also local Muslims (ie [[Bosniaks]]) who joined the Mujahideen units.<ref name=ICTY-Antonetti>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, [[15 March]] 2006. See section "VI. The Mujahedin"</ref>


The first mujahideen training camp was located in Poljanice next to the village of Mehurici, in the Bila valley, in [[Travnik]] municipality. The mujahideen group established there included mujahideen from Arab countries as well as some Bosniaks. The Mujahideen from Poljanice camp were also established in the towns of [[Zenica]] and Travnik and, from the second half of 1993 onwards, in the village of [[Orasac]], also located in the Bila valley.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref><ref>[http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=6540 Spero News], Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders, Adrian Morgan, 13 November 2006</ref>
The first mujahideen training camp was located in [[Poljanice]] next to the village of Mehurici, in the Bila valley, in [[Travnik]] municipality. The mujahideen group established there included mujahideen from Arab countries as well as some Bosniaks. The Mujahideen from Poljanice camp were also established in the towns of [[Zenica]] and Travnik and, from the second half of 1993 onwards, in the village of [[Orasac]], also located in the Bila valley.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref><ref>[http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=6540 Spero News], Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders, Adrian Morgan, 13 November 2006</ref>


The military effectiveness of the mujahideen is disputed. However, former US Balkans peace negotiator [[Richard Holbrooke]] said in an interview that "I think the Muslims wouldn't have survived without this" help. At the time a U.N. arms embargo diminished the Bosnian government's fighting capabilities. Holbrooke called the arrival of the mujahideen "a pact with the devil" from which Bosnia still is recovering.<ref>,[http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0110/msg00060.html LA Times], Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001</ref>
The military effectiveness of the mujahideen is disputed. However, former US Balkans peace negotiator [[Richard Holbrooke]] said in an interview that "I think the Muslims wouldn't have survived without this" help. At the time a U.N. arms embargo diminished the Bosnian government's fighting capabilities. Holbrooke called the arrival of the mujahideen "a pact with the devil" from which Bosnia still is recovering.<ref>,[http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0110/msg00060.html LA Times], Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001</ref>

===Mujahideen units===

Although it is alleged that there were a number of mujahideen units in the Bosnian government army (mostly by the Serb and Croat propaganda including some Anti-Islamic Western authors)<ref>[http://members.tripod.com/Balkania/resources/geostrategy/bodansky_peace/bp_part1.html#b03 Some Call It Peace: Waiting for the War In the Balkans] by Yossef Bodansky, 1996. Part 1, Chapter 3</ref>, the ICTY found that there was just one unit, called El Mujahid established on August 13, 1993, by the Bosnian Army which decided to form a unit of foreign fighters in order to impose control over them when the number of the foreign volunteers started to increase.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2008/pr1240e.htm ICTY - APPEALS CHAMBER - Hadzihasanović and Kubura case]</ref>

===Propaganda===

According to [[Predrag Matvejević]], a notable Italian and Croatian modern prosaist who analyzed the situation, the number of Arab volunteers who came to help the Bosnian Muslims, ''was much smaller than the number presented by Serb and Croat propaganda''.<ref name="Islam, Bosna, Sloveni:Evropska izgubljena bitka ">{{cite web |url=http://www.islam.co.ba/razmisljanja/index.php?subaction=ostalo&id=1070747643|title=Predrag Matvejević analysis}}</ref>

According to the ICTY verdicts, Serb as well as Croat propaganda was very active, constantly propagated false information about the foreign fighters in order to inflame [[anti-muslim]] hatred among Serbs. After the takeover of Prijedor by Serb forces in 1992, Radio Prijedor propagated Serb nationalistic ideas characterising prominent non-Serbs as [[criminal]]s and [[extremist]]s who should be punished for their behaviour. One example of such propaganda was the derogatory language used for referring to non-Serbs such as '''[[mujahedin]], [[Ustasa]] or [[Green Berets]]''', although at the time there were no foreign volunteers in Bosnia.<ref name="ICTY: Milomir Stakić judgement - The media">{{cite web|url=http://www.un.org/icty/stakic/trialc/judgement/sta-tj030731e.htm#ID2di|title=ICTY: Milomir Stakić judgement - The media|}}</ref> <ref name="ICTY: Duško Tadić judgement - Greater Serbia">{{cite web|url=http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/tad-tj970507e.htm#_Toc387417236|title=ICTY: Duško Tadić judgement - Greater Serbia|}}</ref>Another example of propaganda about ''Islamic holy warriors'' is presented in the ICTY ''Kordić and Čerkez verdict'' for [[war crimes]] and [[crimes against humanity]] committed by [[Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia]] leadership on Bosniak civilians. [[Gornji Vakuf]] was attacked by [[Croatian Army]] (HV) and [[Croatian Defence Forces]] (HVO) in January 1993 followed by heavy shelling of the town by Croat artillery. During [[cease-fire]] [[negotiation]]s at the Britbat HQ in Gornji Vakuf, [[colonel]] Andrić, representing the HVO, demanded that the Bosnian forces lay down their arms and accept HVO control of the town, threatening that if they did not agree he would flatten Gornji Vakuf to the ground. <ref name="ICTY: Kordić and Čerkez verdict - IV. Attacks on towns and villages: killings - 2. The Conflict in Gornji Vakuf">{{cite web|url=
http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/judgement/kor-tj010226e-5.htm#IVA2
|title=ICTY: Kordić and Čerkez verdict - IV. Attacks on towns and villages: killings - 2. The Conflict in Gornji Vakuf|}}</ref> <ref name="SENSE Tribunal: Poziv na predaju">{{cite web|url=
http://www.sense-agency.com/ba/stream.php?sta=3&pid=8670&kat=6
|title=SENSE Tribunal: Poziv na predaju|}}</ref> The HVO demands were not accepted by the [[Bosnian Army]] and the attack continued, followed by massacres on Bosnian Muslim civilians in the neighbouring villages of Bistrica, Uzričje, Duša, Ždrimci and Hrasnica.<ref name="SENSE Tribunal: Ko je počeo rat u Gornjem Vakufu?">{{cite web|url=
http://www.sense-agency.com/ba/stream.php?sta=3&pid=8652&kat=6
|title=SENSE Tribunal: Ko je počeo rat u Gornjem Vakufu|}}</ref> <ref name="SENSE Tribunal: ">{{cite web|url=
http://www.sense-agency.com/ba/stream.php?sta=3&pid=8662&kat=6
|title=SENSE Tribunal: "James Dean" u Gornjem Vakufu|}}</ref>The shelling campaign and the attackes during the war resulted in hundreds of injured and killed, mostly Bosnian Muslim civilians. Although Croats often cited it as a major reason for the attack on Gornji Vakuf in order to justify attacks and massacres on civilians, the commander of the British Britbat company claimed that there were no Muslim ''holy warriors'' in Gornji Vakuf and that his soldiers did not see any. <ref name="ICTY: Kordić and Čerkez verdict - IV. Attacks on towns and villages: killings - 2. The Conflict in Gornji Vakuf">{{cite web|url=
http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/judgement/kor-tj010226e-5.htm#IVA2
|title=ICTY: Kordić and Čerkez verdict - IV. Attacks on towns and villages: killings - 2. The Conflict in Gornji Vakuf|}}</ref>


===Relationship to the Bosnian government army (ABiH) ===
===Relationship to the Bosnian government army (ABiH) ===


The extent to which the Bosnian Mujahideen were part of the regular Bosnian government army (ABiH) is contentious. The issue has formed part of two [[ICTY]] [[war crimes]] trials.
The extent to which the mujahideen were controlled by the Bosnian government is contentious. According to the ICTY indictment of Rasim Delic, Commander of Main Staff of the Bosnian army (ABiH), after the formation of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade of the Bosnian Army 3rd Corps on 19 November 1992, the El Mujahid were subordinated within its structure. According to a UN communiqué of 1995, the El Mujahid battalion was "directly dependent on BiH staff for supplies" and for "directions" during combat with the Serb forces.<ref>[http://www.amconmag.com/2007/2007_07_16/feature.html The American Conservative], The Bosnian Connection, by Brendan O’Neill, 16 July 2007</ref> The issue has formed part of two [[ICTY]] [[war crimes]] trials. In its judgement in the case of ICTY v. [[Enver Hadzihasanovic]] (commander of the 3rd Corps of the army of the Sarajevo-based government (ABiH), he was later made part of the joint command of the ABiH and was the Chief of the Supreme Command Staff) and Amir Kubura (commander of the [[7th Muslim Brigade]] of the 3rd Corps of the ABiH) the Trial Chamber found that <blockquote>"that the foreign Mujahedin established at Poljanice camp were not officially part of the 3rd Corps or the 7th Brigade of the ABiH. Accordingly, the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the foreign Mujahedin officially joined the ABiH and that they we de jure subordinated to the Accused Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref></blockquote>It also found that<blockquote>"there are significant indicia of a subordinate relationship between the Mujahedin and the Accused ''prior'' to 13 August 1993. Testimony heard by the Trial Chamber and, in the main, documents tendered into evidence demonstrate that the ABiH maintained a close relationship with the foreign Mujahedin as soon as these arrived in central Bosnia in 1992. Joint combat operations are one illustration of that. In Karaula and Visoko in 1992, at Mount Zmajevac around mid-April 1993 and in the Bila valley in June 1993, the Mujahedin fought alongside AbiH units against Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces." <ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref></blockquote>


In its judgement in the case of ICTY v. [[Enver Hadzihasanovic]] and [[Amir Kubura]] the ICTY found that <blockquote>"there are significant indicia of a subordinate relationship between the Mujahedin and the Accused prior to 13 August 1993. Testimony heard by the Trial Chamber and, in the main, documents tendered into evidence demonstrate that the ABiH maintained a close relationship with the foreign Mujahedin as soon as these arrived in central Bosnia in 1992. Joint combat operations are one illustration of that. In Karaula and Visoko in 1992, at Mount Zmajevac around mid-April 1993 and in the Bila valley in June 1993, the Mujahedin fought alongside AbiH units against Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces." <ref>http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006</ref></blockquote>
However, the Appeals Chamber later noted that the relationship between the 3rd Corps of the Bosnian Army headed by Hadžihasanović and the El Mujahedin detachment was not one of subordination but was instead close to overt hostility since the only way to control the detachment was to attack them as if they were a distinct enemy force.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2008/pr1240e.htm ICTY - APPEALS CHAMBER - Hadzihasanović and Kubura case]</ref>


According to testimony and evidence presented at the [[ICTY]] trial of Bosnian government General [[Rasim Delic]], which began in July 2007, the Bosnian Mujahideen operated under the control of the Bosnian army (ABiH) though with their own commanders. <ref>[http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyid=2007-09-07T164805Z_01_L07470729_RTRUKOC_0_US-BOSNIA-WARCRIMES-TRIAL.xml Reuters], Muslim fighter begins testimony in Bosnia trial, 7 September 2007</ref> <ref>[http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL14581486 Reuters], Tape suggests Bosnian general lied about mujahideen, 14 September 2007</ref>
===War crimes investigation===


===ICTY indictment of Bosnian general Rasim Delic===
It is alleged that mujahideen participated in some incidents considered to be [[war crimes]] according to the international law. However no indictment was issued by the [[ICTY]] against them, but a few Bosnian Army officers were indicted on the basis of superior criminal responsibility. Both Amir Kubura and Enver Hadzihasanovic were found not guilty on all counts related to the incidents involving mujahideen.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2008/pr1240e.htm ICTY - APPEALS CHAMBER - Hadzihasanović and Kubura case]</ref>


At the trial of [[Rasim Delic]] witnesses for the ICTY have described how Bosnian mujahideen fighters, under Bosnian government army control, committed war crimes against captured Bosnian Serb soldiers and civilians. According to the indictment, on 21 June 1995, two soldiers from the Bosnian Serb forces (VRS) were captured and subsequently beheaded by members of the Bosnian army and Mujahideen fighers. Other soldiers, taken prisoner on the same day, were said to have been severely beaten over several days and then taken to the Kamenica camp. A third soldier was reported to have been decapitated there on 24 July 1995. The other prisoners were said to have been given the order to kiss the head, which was then put on display in the room where they were being held. The prisoners in the Kamenica camp were reportedly beaten and tortured, on occasion by means of electroshocks. According to the indictment, on 11 September 1995, around 60 soldiers from the VRS were taken prisoner by the Bosnian army, at the same time as several civilians amongst which were three women. This group was transferred to the camp in Kamenica.<ref>[http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/rasim_delic_273.html Trial Watch: Rasim Delic]</ref> The 60 soldiers taken prisoner disappeared thereafter and are presumed to be dead. As for the three women the indictment states that they were subjected to acts of violence, in particular to rape. They were released on 15 November 1995. Another group of 10 soldiers from the VRS was also taken to the Kamenica camp on 10 September 1995. They were all subjected to cruel treatment during a period of about 12 days.<ref>[http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/rasim_delic_273.html Trial Watch: Rasim Delic]</ref>
The judgements of [[Enver Hadzihasanovic]] and Amir Kabura concerned a number of events involving Mujahideen. On [[June 8]], 1993, [[Bosnian Army]] attacked Croat forces in the area of Maline village as a reaction to the massacres committed by Croats in nearby villages of Velika Bukovica and Bandol on [[June 4]]. After the village of Maline was taken, a military police unit of the 306th Brigade of Bosnian Army arrived in Maline. These [[policemen]] were to evacuate and protect the civilians in the villages taken by the Bosnian Army. The wounded were left on-site and around 200 people, including civilians and Croat soldiers, were taken by the police officers towards Mehurici. The commander of the 306th Brigade authorised the wounded be put onto a truck and transported to Mehurici. Suddenly, a number of mujahideen stormed the village of Maline. Even though the commander of the Bosnian Army 306th Brigade forbade them to approach, they didn't submit. The 200 villagers who were being escorted to Mehurici by the 306th Brigade military police were intercepted by the mujahideen in Poljanice. They took 20 military-aged Croats and a young woman wearing a Red-Cross armband. The prisoners were taken to Bikoci, between Maline and Mehurici. 23 Croatian soldiers and one young woman were executed in Bikoci while they were being held prisoner.<ref>Judgement Summary - Kubura and Hadzihasanovic [http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm]</ref>


According to the indictment, Rasim Delic was aware that the Mujahideen members of the Bosnian army had a distinct tendency to commit crimes especially against captured enemy combatants and civilians and that the Kamenica camp was being used as a place in which these crimes could be perpetrated. Reportedly, however, he took no measures whatsoever to stop these acts taking place.<ref>[http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/rasim_delic_273.html Trial Watch: Rasim Delic]</ref>
The ICTY indictment of [[Rasim Delic]], also treats incidents related to mujahideen during the summer of 1995, such as the murder of two Serb soldiers on July 21, 1995, the murder of a Serb POW at the Kamenica prison camp on July 24, 1995, and events related to 60 Serb soldiers captured during the Vozuća battle that are missing and presumed to have been killed by foreign volunteers.
.<ref>[http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/del-ii050317e.pdf ICTY indictment] against Rasim Delic</ref>


== After the war ==
== After the war ==

Revision as of 18:58, 31 August 2008

Bosnian Mujahideen (also referred to as El Mujaheed or El Mujahid) is the term often used for the Muslim volunteers to fight on the Bosnian government side during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. It is estimated that the number of volunteers numbered about 4,000[1] with the majority coming from countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the Mujahideen volunteers, there were also several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guards supporting the Bosnian government during the war. [2] Many of the Bosnian Mujahideen were supported financially from Saudi Arabia.

Bosnian War

Main article: Bosnian War

Foreign mujahideen arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) coreligionists in the war against Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces. Mostly they came from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East. On 13 August 1993, the Bosnian government officially organized foreign volunteers into the detachment known as El Mudžahid in order to impose control and order.[3] Initially, the foreign Mujahideen gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population, deprived many necessities by the Serb forces. Once hostilities broke out between the Bosnian government (ABiH) and the Croat forces (HVO), the Mujahideen also participated in battles against the HVO alongside ABiH units.[4]

The foreign mujahideen actively recruited young local men, offering them military training, uniforms and weapons. As a result, some local Bosniaks joined the foreign mujahideen and in the process became local Mujahideen.[5] They imitated the foreigners in both the way they dressed and behaved, to such an extent that it was sometimes, according to the ICTY documentation in subsequent war crimes trials, "difficult to distinguish between the two groups. For that reason, the ICTY has used the term "Mujahideen" (which they spell Mujahedin) to designate foreigners from Arab countries, but also local Muslims (ie Bosniaks) who joined the Mujahideen units.[6]

The first mujahideen training camp was located in Poljanice next to the village of Mehurici, in the Bila valley, in Travnik municipality. The mujahideen group established there included mujahideen from Arab countries as well as some Bosniaks. The Mujahideen from Poljanice camp were also established in the towns of Zenica and Travnik and, from the second half of 1993 onwards, in the village of Orasac, also located in the Bila valley.[7][8]

The military effectiveness of the mujahideen is disputed. However, former US Balkans peace negotiator Richard Holbrooke said in an interview that "I think the Muslims wouldn't have survived without this" help. At the time a U.N. arms embargo diminished the Bosnian government's fighting capabilities. Holbrooke called the arrival of the mujahideen "a pact with the devil" from which Bosnia still is recovering.[9]

Relationship to the Bosnian government army (ABiH)

The extent to which the Bosnian Mujahideen were part of the regular Bosnian government army (ABiH) is contentious. The issue has formed part of two ICTY war crimes trials.

In its judgement in the case of ICTY v. Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura the ICTY found that

"there are significant indicia of a subordinate relationship between the Mujahedin and the Accused prior to 13 August 1993. Testimony heard by the Trial Chamber and, in the main, documents tendered into evidence demonstrate that the ABiH maintained a close relationship with the foreign Mujahedin as soon as these arrived in central Bosnia in 1992. Joint combat operations are one illustration of that. In Karaula and Visoko in 1992, at Mount Zmajevac around mid-April 1993 and in the Bila valley in June 1993, the Mujahedin fought alongside AbiH units against Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces." [10]

According to testimony and evidence presented at the ICTY trial of Bosnian government General Rasim Delic, which began in July 2007, the Bosnian Mujahideen operated under the control of the Bosnian army (ABiH) though with their own commanders. [11] [12]

ICTY indictment of Bosnian general Rasim Delic

At the trial of Rasim Delic witnesses for the ICTY have described how Bosnian mujahideen fighters, under Bosnian government army control, committed war crimes against captured Bosnian Serb soldiers and civilians. According to the indictment, on 21 June 1995, two soldiers from the Bosnian Serb forces (VRS) were captured and subsequently beheaded by members of the Bosnian army and Mujahideen fighers. Other soldiers, taken prisoner on the same day, were said to have been severely beaten over several days and then taken to the Kamenica camp. A third soldier was reported to have been decapitated there on 24 July 1995. The other prisoners were said to have been given the order to kiss the head, which was then put on display in the room where they were being held. The prisoners in the Kamenica camp were reportedly beaten and tortured, on occasion by means of electroshocks. According to the indictment, on 11 September 1995, around 60 soldiers from the VRS were taken prisoner by the Bosnian army, at the same time as several civilians amongst which were three women. This group was transferred to the camp in Kamenica.[13] The 60 soldiers taken prisoner disappeared thereafter and are presumed to be dead. As for the three women the indictment states that they were subjected to acts of violence, in particular to rape. They were released on 15 November 1995. Another group of 10 soldiers from the VRS was also taken to the Kamenica camp on 10 September 1995. They were all subjected to cruel treatment during a period of about 12 days.[14]

According to the indictment, Rasim Delic was aware that the Mujahideen members of the Bosnian army had a distinct tendency to commit crimes especially against captured enemy combatants and civilians and that the Kamenica camp was being used as a place in which these crimes could be perpetrated. Reportedly, however, he took no measures whatsoever to stop these acts taking place.[15]

After the war

The foreign mujahideen units were supposed to be disbanded and required to leave the Balkans under the terms of the 1995 Dayton peace accord, but many stayed. Although the US State Department report suggested that the number could be higher, a senior SFOR official said allied military intelligence estimated that no more than 200 foreign-born militants actually live in Bosnia, of which closer to 30 represent a hard-core group with direct links to terrorism.[16][17] In September 2007, 50 of these individuals had their citizenship status revoked. Since then 100 more individuals have been prevented from claiming citizenship rights. 250 more were under investigation, while the body which is charged to reconsider the citizenship status of the foreign volunteers in the Bosnian war, including Christian fighters from Russia and Western Europe, states that 1,500 cases will eventually be examined.

Following the end of the Bosnian War and, especially, after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center, the links between the Bosnian Mujahideen, Al Qaeda and the radicalization of some European Muslims has become more widely discussed. In an interview with US journalist Jim Lehrer former US peace envoy to Bosnia Richard Holbrooke states:

There were over 1,000 people in the country who belonged to what we then called Mujahideen freedom fighters. We now know that that was al-Qaida. I'd never heard the word before, but we knew who they were. And if you look at the 9/11 hijackers, several of those hijackers were trained or fought in Bosnia. We cleaned them out, and they had to move much further east into Afghanistan. So if it hadn't been for Dayton, we would have been fighting the terrorists deep in the ravines and caves of Central Bosnia in the heart of Europe. [18]

In 1996, in a book titled "Offensive In the Balkans", Dr. Yossef Bodansky, Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the US House of Representatives from 1988 to 2004, wrote as follows on the "Bosnian Jehad":

"...The build-up of new Islamist units was completed in Bosnia- Herzegovina in the Spring of 1995. These forces are closely associated with the Armed Islamist Movement (AIM) and Islamist international terrorismsuicide terrorists), both veteran Arabs and newly trained Bosnians. [19]

London's The Spectator has noted, "If Western intervention in Afghanistan created the mujahedin, Western intervention in Bosnia appears to have globalised it." Several current and former top al-Qaeda militants and financiers reportedly participated in the Bosnian civil war with the full support of the United States. It was for the Bosnian jihad that the 9/11 'paymaster', Omar Sheikh, was reportedly recruited to fight by the CIA and MI6. Al-Qada, in addition to his reported financing of the Bosnian jihad, has been identified as one of Osama bin Laden's "chief money launderers". [20] In his paper on the connection between Bosnian mujahideen and 'home grown' terrorists in Europe, terrorism expert Evan F. Kohlmann writes that:

Indeed, some of the most important factors behind the contemporary radicalization of European Muslim youth can be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the cream of the Arab mujahideen from Afghanistan tested their battle skills in the post-Soviet era and mobilized a new generation of pan-Islamic revolutionaries. [21]

Further reading

  • Radio Free Europe - Al-Qaeda In Bosnia-Herzegovina: Myth Or Present Danger, Vlado Azinovic's research about the alleged presence of Al-Qaeda in Bosnia and the role of Arab fighters in the Bosnian War
  • The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe, by, Evan F. Kohlmann. The paper was presented at a conference held by the Swedish National Defence College's Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) in Stockholm in May 2006 at the request of Dr. Magnus Ranstorp - former director of the St. Andrews University Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence - and now Chief Scientist at CATS). It is also the title of a book by the same author.

See also

References and notes

  1. ^ ,LA Times, Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001
  2. ^ United States Institute of Peace, Dayton Implementation: The Train and Equip Program, September 1997 | Special Report No. 25
  3. ^ ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  4. ^ ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  5. ^ ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  6. ^ ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006. See section "VI. The Mujahedin"
  7. ^ ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  8. ^ Spero News, Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders, Adrian Morgan, 13 November 2006
  9. ^ ,LA Times, Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001
  10. ^ http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/trialc/judgement/060315/hadz-sum060315.htm ICTY], Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  11. ^ Reuters, Muslim fighter begins testimony in Bosnia trial, 7 September 2007
  12. ^ Reuters, Tape suggests Bosnian general lied about mujahideen, 14 September 2007
  13. ^ Trial Watch: Rasim Delic
  14. ^ Trial Watch: Rasim Delic
  15. ^ Trial Watch: Rasim Delic
  16. ^ LA Times, Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists, 8 October 2001
  17. ^ BBC, Mujahideen fight Bosnia evictions, 18 July 2000
  18. ^ PBS Newshour with Jim Jim Lehrer, A New Constitution for Bosnia, 22 November 2005
  19. ^ South Asia Analysis Group, Bosnia & Hyderabad, by B.Raman, 3 September 2001
  20. ^ The American Monitor, Scratching the Surface, by Devlin Buckley, 16 November 2006
  21. ^ The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe, by Evan F. Kohlmann
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