Iraq War: Difference between revisions

Iraq War
File:Iraqwarimage.jpg An Iraqi Army unit prepares to board a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter for a counterinsurgency mission in Baghdad.
Date March 19, 2003 - Present Location Iraq Result Conflict ongoing Overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government. Capture of Saddam Hussein. Occupation of Iraq by coalition forces. Emergence of Iraqi insurgency and Sectarian violence. Ongoing attempt to reconstruct Iraq after the damage caused by the invasion. Over 40,000 civilian and military casualties. Election of an Iraqi Transitional Government.
Belligerents
Republic of Iraq (Saddam Hussein regime), Ba'ath Loyalists, Iraqi insurgency	United States, United Kingdom, "Coalition of the Willing", New Iraqi Army

For other uses, see Iraq war (disambiguation)

The Iraq War (2003-present) is an ongoing conflict in Iraq [17], which began with the 2003 invasion of Iraq that resulted in the death of several ten thousand civilians and an unprecedented amount of terror in Iraq, infrastructure damage, the defeat of Iraq's Hussein-led regular military forces, the capture of all major Iraqi cities and of Saddam Hussein. The conflict as of May 2006 continues in the form of actions against destabilizing elements, including foreign fighters, irregular Saddam loyalists and elements of a domestic insurgency.[18][19]

After the failure to get a United Nations Security Council resolution supporting military action against Iraq, [20] the 2003 invasion was led by the United States and the United Kingdom, and some partners dubbed by the US as the "Coalition of the willing"[21]. They invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein's government claiming that Hussein was in violation of numerous UN resolutions, the latest being U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, and so posed a grave danger to the world.[22] After the invasion, no weapons of mass destruction were found and the Bush administration has stated the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction was faulty.[23][24] There is disagreement over the extent to which this inaccuracy was a matter of deceit or of intelligence failure. [25][26] Other nations have used the failure to find WMDs to justify their dissent against the Coalition's actions. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's stated that, "the US-led invasion of Iraq was an illegal act that contravened the U.N. Charter"[27]. Many of the other stated reasons for going to war listed in HJ Res 114 have gone uncontested. The resolution titled "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002", passed by both the United States Senate and House, lists twelve reasons for going to war in Iraq. Of those twelve, those relating to WMD and aiding to terrorism are disputed.

Leaders of U.S. President George W. Bush's administration have pointed out the abuse of Human rights in Saddam's Iraq and a desire to spread democracy[28] were all part of the original resolution calling for the war. Critics cite that the government gave the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam and terrorists as the main justification for war, though the other reasons given were casus belli nonetheless. [29][30][31]

The second phase of the conflict began after the government had been overthrown, and centers around U.S. efforts to establish a democratic state capable of defending itself, versus a popular Iraqi demand that the U.S. leave the country either immediatly or after a new government is established. [32][33][34] A growing armed resistance, usually called the "Iraqi insurgency", formed in Iraq after the invasion concluded. Along with the Iraqi insurgency is the mobilization of terrorists such as Al-Qaeda's, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who has since formed "al-Qaeda in Iraq". Several minor coalition members have since pulled out of Iraq. [35]

Since late 2005 Iraq has experienced sectarian violence to the point that former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi has called it a civil war.[36] The U.S. government denies that Iraq is undergoing civil war.[37] The US position regarding this, as stated by US President Bush, is that the sectarian violence in Iraq is a result of Saddam Hussein's prior leadership and incitement by the Iraqi insurgency. [38][39]

War Rationale

Colin Powell holding a model vial of anthrax while giving a presentation to the United Nations Security Council

Main article: Rationales of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq

Prelude

Further information: [[:Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iraq disarmament crisis, and Iraq disarmament crisis timeline 2001-2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom documents, War on Terrorism]]

.

After the 1991 Gulf War, U.N. Resolutions were passed to impose sanctions on the Saddam regime until it was verified that their Weapons of Mass Destruction were destroyed. Starting in the aftermath of the war and continuing until 1998, UNSCOM inspected Iraq, locating and destroying large quantities of chemical agents and other prohibited materials. [40][41] Conflict between Iraq and the U.N. developed during 1998, however, which led to the withdrawal of the U.N. and the authorization of a bombing campaign by the Clinton administration to "degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors". [42][43][44]

Reasons for the invasion and occupation as stated by the United States in 2002 before the Iraq invasion are controversial, having varied over time. The first calls for war on Iraq came from the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and the American Enterprise Institute, with arguments based largely on the alleged threat that Saddam posed to American interests in the region, and the project of American influence into the next century. These reasons were not those originally given (before the 2003 Iraq invasion) by the Bush administration of the United States before or after the initiation of the war, which instead focused on Iraq's alleged arsenal of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the threat they posed to the U.S. in the post-9/11 world. [45][46]

Formally beginning with a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002 President George W. Bush began a public campaign to convince the world that Saddam Hussein possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction and had to be disarmed by any means necessary. [47] Iraq agreed to allow inspectors back into the country on September 17, 2002. [48] Inspections began after passage of U.N. Resolution 1441 on November 18, 2002. [49]

In a January 27, 2003 report to the U.N., chief inspector Hans Blix, while noting Iraqi cooperation with regards to prompt access to inspection sites, stated "...Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace." The reasons for this include a failure to account for quantities of VX nerve agent and anthrax and also the inability of the U.N. to interview Iraqi scientists outside the country. [50]

Numerous presentations were made regarding Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. On February 5, 2003 Colin Powell attempted to convince the UN Security Council of the threat Saddam Hussein's regime posed. [51] The Bush administration also claimed that Iraq had ties to al Qaeda and other terrorists organizations, including the Palestinian Arab liberation Front (PALF).[52][53][54][55] Bush administration officials also claimed that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons. [56]

Despite these efforts to sway public opinion the majority of the world populace did not support the war and the U.S. failed to secure UN support for an invasion of Iraq. In 41 countries less than 10% of the populace supported an invasion of Iraq without UN sanction and half said an invasion should not occur under any circumstances. [57]. Even in the U.S., while 73% of the population supported military action against Iraq, only approximately 33% said they were in favor of a unilateral invasion. [58]. The United States formed a "Coalition of the Willing" and proceeded with the invasion despite massive public protest.[59][60][61]. At the time of the invasion UNMOVIC inspectors were ordered out by the United Nations. The inspectors requested more time as they were unable to account for the destruction of all proscribed items in the four months since inspections had resumed.[62][63]

No weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq following the invasion. President George W. Bush has since admitted that "much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong".[64][65][66] Colin Powell later expressed regret about his presentation at the UN Security Council. [67]

See also: Opposition to the Iraq War, Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Protests against the Iraq war, and Views on the 2003 invasion of Iraq

Possible ulterior motives

Other possible U.S. objectives, denied by the U.S. government but acknowledged by some U.S. policy makers, included the establishment of permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq as a way of projecting power (creating a credible threat of U.S. military intervention) to the oil-rich Gulf region and the Middle East generally. Retired U.S. General Jay Garner, who was in charge of planning and administering post-war reconstruction in Iraq, explained that the U.S. occupation of Iraq was comparable to the Philippine model: "Look back on the Philippines around the turn of the 20th century: they were a coaling station for the navy, and that allowed us to keep a great presence in the Pacific. That's what Iraq is for the next few decades: our coaling station that gives us great presence in the Middle East" (Interview on National Journal 2004, archived at: [68], and at [69]; See also Philippine-American War). Its noted retired U.S. General Jay Garner was replaced by Paul Bremer after reports came out of his position in SY Coleman, a division of defense contractor L-3 Communications specializing in missile- defense systems. It was believed his role in the company was in contention with his role in Iraq[70]. The House "report accompanying the emergency spending legislation...said the money was 'of a magnitude normally associated with permanent bases'" [71].

Combat and occupation summary

Prior to 2003 invasion

No-fly zone detail

Prior to invasion, the United States and other coalition forces involved in the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been engaged in a low-level conflict with Iraq, by enforcing the two controversial Iraqi no-fly zones in the north and the south of the country. Iraqi air-defense installations were engaged on a fairly regular basis after repeatedly targeting American and British air patrols. In mid-2002, the U.S. began to change its response strategy, by increasing the overall number of missions and selecting targets throughout the no-fly zones in order to disrupt the military command structure in Iraq. A change in enforcement tactics was acknowledged at the time, but it was not made public that this was part of a plan known as Operation Southern Watch.

The weight of bombs dropped increased from none in March 2002 and 0.3 in April 2002 to between 8 and 14 tons per month in May-August, reaching a pre-war peak of 54.6 tons in September - prior to Congress' 11 October authorisation of the invasion. The September attacks included a 5 September 100-aircraft attack on the main air defence site in western Iraq. According to The New Statesman this was "Located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone, far away from the areas that needed to be patrolled to prevent attacks on the Shias; it was destroyed not because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied special forces operating from Jordan to enter Iraq undetected." ^[72]

Further information: [[:Governments' pre-war positions on invasion of Iraq, Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq, The UN Security Council and the Iraq war, and American government position on invasion of Iraq]]

Map of the Sunni Triangle

In May of 2003, after the Iraqi conventional forces had been defeated, the coalition military noticed a gradually increasing flurry of attacks on the multinational troops in various regions, such as the "Sunni Triangle." In the chaos after the war, massive looting of the infrastructure and, most catastrophically, munitions occurred. According to the Pentagon, 250,000 tons (of 650,000 tons total) of ordnance were looted, providing an endless source of ammunition for the insurgents. These looted supplies for the insurgents were further strengthened by the hundreds of weapons caches already created by the conventional Iraqi army and Republican Guard.

During the early occupation, a number of widely-cited humanitarian, tactical, and political errors by United States and United Kingdom planners and forces fueled a growing armed resistance, called the Iraqi insurgency. At first the resistance stemmed from fedayeen and Saddam Hussein or Ba'ath loyalists, but soon religious radicals and Iraqis angered by the occupation contributed to the insurgency. In late 2004, foreign fighters from around the Middle East as well as al-Qaeda operatives led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would help to fund and coordinate the insurgency. The insurgents are generally known to the Coalition forces as Anti-Iraqi Forces or AIF.

The initial insurgency in Iraq was concentrated in, but not limited to, an area referred to by Western media and the occupying forces as the Sunni triangle. This location includes Baghdad [73]. The three provinces that had the highest number of attacks were Baghdad, Anbar, and Salah Ad Din--these provinces account for 35% of the population. This resistance has been described as a type of guerrilla warfare. Insurgent tactics include mortars, suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as sabotage against the oil, water, and electrical infrastructure.

In 2006, three years after the US-led invasion, insurgent attacks on an almost daily basis continue to hamper the development of a unified Iraqi government as well inflame sectarian tension among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Insurgents have also resorted to kidnapping civilian journalists and workers. Jill Carroll, a journalist for the Christian Science Monitor, was kidnapped in early 2006, and although later let go, her Iraqi translator was killed.

Post-invasion Iraq, early- and mid-2003

American soldier providing aid

Main article: Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–2006

The post-invasion environment began after the Hussein regime had been overthrown. It centers on Coalition and U.N. efforts to establish a democratic state capable of defending itself ^[74], versus various insurgent demands that the foreign forces leave the country.

Coalition military forces launched several operations around Tigris River peninsula and in the Sunni Triangle. A series of similar operations were launched throughout the summer in the Sunni Triangle. Toward the end of 2003, the intensity and pace of insurgent attacks began to increase. A sharp surge in guerrilla attacks ushered in an insurgent effort that was termed the “Ramadan Offensive,” as it coincided with the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Coaliton forces brought to bear the use of air power for the first time since the end of the war.

Suspected ambush sites and mortar launching positions struck from the air and with artillery fire. Surveillance of major routes, patrols, and raids on suspected insurgents were stepped up. In addition, two villages, including Saddam’s birthplace of al-Auja and the small town of Abu Hishma were wrapped in barbed wire and carefully monitored. On 22 July 2003, during a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and men from Task Force 20, Saddam Hussein's sons (Uday and Qusay) and one of his grandsons were killed.

• Operation Peninsula Strike (09 June 2003 - 12 June 2003)
• Operation Desert Scorpion (15 June 2003 - 29 June 2003)
• Operation Scorpion Sting
• Operation Spartan Scorpion
• Operation Rifles Scorpion
• Operation Sidewinder (29 June 2003 - 07 July 2003)
• Operation Soda Mountain (12 July 2003 - 17 July 2003)
• Operation Ivy Serpent (12 July 2003 - 21 July 2003)
• Operation Iron Bullet (July 2003)
• Operation Tyr (July 2004)
• Operation Ivy Lightning (12 August 2003)
• Operation Silverado (16 August 2003)
• Operation Ivy Needle (26 August 2003 - ?)
• Operation Longstreet (September 2003)
• Operation Tiger Clean Sweep (07 September 2003)

• Operation Industrial Sweep (October 2003)
• Operation Chamberlain (15 October 2003 - ?)
• Operation Sweeney (15 October 2003 - ?)
• Operation OK Corral (19 October 2003)
• Operation Iron Hammer (November 2003)
• Operation Eagle Curtain (November 2003)
• Operation All American Tiger (06 November 2003 - ?)
• Operation Ivy Cyclone (07 November 2003 - ?)
• Operation Ivy Cyclone II (17 November 2003 - ?)
• Operation Boothill (10 November 2003)
• Operation Rifles Blitz (20 November 2003 - ?)
• Operation Rifle Sweep (26 November 2003)
• Operation Bayonet Lightning (02 December 2003)
• Operation Bulldog Mammoth (04 December 2003 - ?)
• Operation Clear Area (06 December 2003)
• Operation Abilene (08 December 2003)
• Operation Panther Squeeze (10 December 2003)

In the wave of intelligence information fueling the raids on remaining Ba’ath Party members connected to insurgency, Saddam Hussein himself was captured on December 13 2003 on a farm near Tikrit. The operation was conducted by the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121.

• Operation Red Dawn (13 December 2003)

Post-invasion Iraq, late-2003

With the capture of Saddam and a drop in the number of insurgent attacks (an average of 18 a day), some concluded the multinational forces were prevailing in the fight against the insurgency. With the weather growing cooler, United States forces were able to operate in full armor which reduced their casualty rate. The provisional government began training a security force intended to defend critical infrastructure, and the United States promised over $20 billion in reconstruction money in the form of credit against Iraq's future oil revenues. Of this, less than half a billion dollars had been spent in 10 months after it had been promised. Oil revenues were also claimed to be used for rebuilding schools and for work on the electrical and refining infrastructure.

However, the failure to restore basic services to above pre-war levels, where over a decade of sanctions, bombing, corruption, and decaying infrastructure had left major cities functioning at much-reduced levels, also contributed to local anger at the IPA government headed by an executive council. On 2 July 2003, President Bush declared that American troops would remain in Iraq in spite of the attacks, challenging the opponents with "My answer is, bring 'em on," a line the President later expressed misgivings about having used. ^[75] In the summer of 2003, the multinational forces focused on hunting down the remaining leaders of the former regime, culminating in the shooting deaths of Saddam's two sons in July. In all, over 300 top leaders of the former regime were killed or captured, as well as numerous lesser functionaries and military personnel.

Shortly after the capture of Saddam, elements left out of the CPA began to agitate for elections and the formation of a Iraqi Interim Government. Most prominent among these was the Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani. More insurgents stepped up their activities. The two most turbulent centers were the area around Fallujah and the poor Shia sections of cities from Baghdad to Basra in the south.

• Operation Panther Backroads (15 December 2003)
• Operation Ivy Blizzard (17 December 2003 - ?)
• Operation Arrowhead Blizzard (17 December 2003 - ?)
• Operation Iron Justice (18 December 2003 - ?)
• Operation Rifles Fury (21 December 2003 - ?)

• Operation Salm (23 December 2003)
• Operation Devil Siphon (23 December 2003 - ?)
• Operation Iron Grip (24 December 2003 - ?)
• Operation Iron Force (24 December 2003 - ?)
• Operation Choke Hold (30 December 2003)

Military occupation, early-2004

Early 2004 was marked by a relative lull in violence. Insurgent forces reorganized during this time, studying the multinational forces' tactics and planning a renewed offensive. Guerrilla attacks were less intense.

See also: Occupation of Iraq timeline

Increased insurgent activity and the Mahdi Army

Insurgent activity increased during the beginning of 2004 as hundreds of Iraqi civilians and police were killed over this period in a series of massive bombings. One possibility for these increased bombings hypothesized that the relevance of Saddam Hussein and his followers was diminishing in direct proportion to the influence of radical Islamists, both foreign and Iraqi. An organized Sunni insurgency, with deep roots and both nationalist and Islamist motivations, was becoming more powerful throughout Iraq. The Mahdi Army also began launching attacks on coalition targets and to seize control from Iraqi security forces. The southern and central portions of Iraq were beginning to erupt in urban guerrilla combat as multinational forces attempted to keep control and prepared for a counteroffensive.

• Operation Warhorse Whirlwind (January 2004)
• Operation Iron Resolve (January 2004)
• Operation Market Sweep (13 January 2004)
• Operation Saloon (14 January 2004)
• Operation Rock Slide (15 January 2004)
• Operation Final Cut (28 January 2004 - ?)

• Operation Saber Turner II (February 2004)
• Operation Tomahawk (February 2004)
• Operation Trailblazer (February 2004)
• Operation Eagle Liberty 3 (19 February 2004)
• Operation Devil Clinch (21 February 2004)
• Operation Rocketman (26 February 2004)

Fallujah

The coalition and the Coalition Provisional Authority decided to face the growing insurgency with a pair of assaults: one on Fallujah, the center of the "Mohammed's Army of Al-Ansar", and another on Najaf, home of an important mosque, which had become the focal point for the Mahdi Army and its activities. Just before the attack on Fallujah, four private military contractors, working for Blackwater USA, were ambushed and their corpses mutilated by a large crowd, receiving a great deal of media attention.

After this incident, the 1st Marine Regiment began plans to re-establish a coalition presence in Fallujah. On April 4, the multinational forces began assaults to clear Fallujah of insurgents. On April 9, the multinational force allowed more than 70,000 women, children and elderly residents to leave the besieged city, reportedly also allowing males of military age to leave. On April 10, the military declared a unilateral truce to allow for humanitarian supplies to enter Fallujah. Troops pulled back to the outskirts of the city; local leaders reciprocated the ceasefire, although lower-level intense fighting on both sides continued.

The usage by the U.S. of white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon against insurgents in Fallujah attracted controversy. [76]

The city of Fallujah remained under insurgent control despite the Marine's attempt to recapture it in Operation Vigilant Resolve. In the April battle for Fallujah, Coalition troops killed about 600 insurgents and a number of civilians, while 40 Americans died and hundreds were wounded in a fierce battle. The coalition forces were unable to dislodge the insurgents, and instead suffered repeated attacks on its own rear and flank. The Marines were ordered to stand-down and cordon off the city, maintaining a perimeter around Fallujah. A compromise was reached in order to ensure security within Fallujah itself by creating the local "Fallujah Brigade". While the Marine regiment attacking had clear superiority in ground firepower and air support, it decided to accept a truce and a deal which put a former Baathist general in complete charge of the town. This compromise soon fell apart and insurgent control returned. By the end of the spring uprising, the cities of Fallujah, Samarra, Baquba, and Ramadi had been left under guerrilla control with coalition patrols in the cities at a minimum.

The Shi'ite south

Meanwhile, the fighting continued in the Shiite south. The marines were then shifted south, because Italian and Polish forces were having increasing difficulties retaining control over Nasiriya and Najaf. The marines relieved the Poles and Italians, and put down the overt rebellion, but were unable to reestablish control over the centers of the towns. British forces in Basra were faced with increasing insurgency and became more selective in the areas they patrolled. In all, April, May and early June saw more fighting. Over the next three months, the multinanational forces took back the southern cities. Due to various setbacks, the Coalition gradually began admitting that it was facing independent organized rebel forces. Also, various insurgent leaders entered into negotiations with the provisional government to lay down arms and enter the political process.

• Operation Iron Promise (March 2004)
• Operation Shillelagh (March 2004)
• Operation Devil Thrust (March 2004)
• Operation Aloha (March 2004)
• Operation Centaur Rodeo (March 2004)
• Operation Warrior (03 March 2004)
• Operation Suicide Kings (17 March 2004)
• Operation Tiger Fury (30 March 2004 - ?)
• Operation Iron Saber (April 2004 - June 2004)
• Operation Duke Fortitude (April 2004)
• Operation Lancer Fury (April 2004)
• Operation Lancer Lightning
• Operation Vigilant Resolve (05 April 2004)
• Operation Resolute Sword (08 April 2004)

• Operation Danger Fortitude (11 April 2004 - 17 April 2004)
• Operation Ripper Sweep (12 April 2004 - ?)
• Operation Yellow Stone (23 April 2004)
• Operation Rapier Thrust (May 2004)
• Operation Spring Clean-up (May 2004)
• Operation Striker Hurricane (1 May 2004)
• Operation Wolfpack Crunch (4 May 2004)
• Operation Disarm (19 May 2004)
• Operation Giuliani (June 2004)
• Operation Slim Shady (June 2004)
• Operation Striker Tornado (June 2004)
• Operation Rocketman III (June 2004)
• Operation Dragon Victory (19 June 2004 - ?)
• Operation Gimlet Crusader (24 June 2004)

The new Iraqi government

Main article: Iraqi coalition counter-insurgency operations

Toward the end of June (2004), the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred the "sovereignty" of Iraq to a caretaker government, whose first act was to begin the trial of Saddam Hussein. However, fighting continued in the form of an insurgent rebellion against the new sovereignty, with some parts composed of non-Iraqi Muslim militant groups like al Qaeda. The new government began the process of moving towards open elections, though the insurgency and the lack of cohesion within the government itself, has lead to delays. Militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr took control of Najaf and, after negotiations broke down, the government asked the United States for help dislodging him. Through the months of July and August, a series of skirmishes in and around Najaf culminated with the Imman Ali Mosque itself under siege, only to have a peace deal brokered by al-Sistani in late August.

The Iraqi insurgency

File:Destroyed humvee.jpg

Humvee after being attacked

Main article: Iraqi insurgency

When the ruling Ba'ath party organization disintegrated after the fall of the Iraqi government, elements of the secret police and Republican Guard formed guerrilla units, since some had simply gone home rather than openly fight the multinational forces. Many of these smaller units formed the center of the initial anti-coalition insurgency, based primarily around the cities of Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah. The militants and guerrilla units favored attacking unarmored vehicles and avoiding major battles. The early Iraqi insurgency was concentrated in, but not limited to, an area referred to by the Western media and the occupying forces as the Sunni triangle which includes Baghdad ^[77].

By the fall of 2003, these anti-occupation groups began using typical guerrilla tactics; such as ambushes, bombings, kidnappings, and improvised explosive devices. Other tactics included mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as sabotage against the oil, water, and electrical infrastructure. The insurgents primarily targeted coalition forces, checkpoints, and as well as some civilian targets--usually those civilians associated with coalition forces. These irregular forces especially favored attacking unarmored or lightly armored Humvee vehicles which was the U.S. military's primary transport vehicle. In November 2003, some of these forces successfully attacked U.S. rotary aircraft with SAM-7 missiles bought on the global black market.

There is evidence that some guerrilla groups are organized, perhaps by the fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or Ba'ath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis angered by the occupation, and foreign fighters. [78] The insurgents are known by the Coalition military (especially in the United States armed forces) as Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF). ^{g1 g2}.

see also: History of Iraqi insurgency, Sectarian violence in Iraq

Casualties

Most U.S. casualties, like these in a C-17, return to Dover AFB. The Pentagon has been reluctant to release photos of caskets but has been forced to do so through requests under the Freedom of Information Act.

See also: Casualties of the Iraqi insurgency (2011–present)

White and red flags, representing Iraqi and American deaths, respectively, sit in the grass quadrangle of The Valley Library on the Corvallis, Oregon, campus of Oregon State University. As part of the traveling Iraq Body Count exhibit from 2008 to 2009 (not related to Iraq Body Count project), the flags aim to "raise awareness of the human cost of the Iraq War." (May 2008)

Estimates of the casualties from the Iraq War (beginning with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the ensuing occupation and insurgency and civil war) have come in several forms, and those estimates of different types of Iraq War casualties vary greatly.

Estimating war-related deaths poses many challenges. Experts distinguish between population-based studies, which extrapolate from random samples of the population, and body counts, which tally reported deaths and likely significantly underestimate casualties. Population-based studies produce estimates of the number of Iraq War casualties ranging from 151,000 violent deaths as of June 2006 (per the Iraq Family Health Survey) to 1,033,000 excess deaths (per the 2007 Opinion Research Business (ORB) survey). Other survey-based studies covering different time-spans find 461,000 total deaths (over 60% of them violent) as of June 2011 (per PLOS Medicine 2013), and 655,000 total deaths (over 90% of them violent) as of June 2006 (per the 2006 Lancet study). Body counts counted at least 110,600 violent deaths as of April 2009 (Associated Press). The Iraq Body Count project documents 186,901 – 210,296 violent civilian deaths in their table. All estimates of Iraq War casualties are disputed.

Tables

The tables below summarize reports on Iraqi casualty figures.

Scientific surveys:

Source	Estimated violent deaths	Time period
Iraq Family Health Survey	151,000 violent deaths	March 2003 to June 2006
Lancet survey	601,027 violent deaths out of 654,965 excess deaths	March 2003 to June 2006
PLOS Medicine Survey	460,000 deaths in Iraq as direct or indirect result of the war including more than 60% of deaths directly attributable to violence.	March 2003 to June 2011

Body counts:

Source	Documented deaths from violence	Time period
Associated Press	110,600 violent deaths.	March 2003 to April 2009
Iraq Body Count project	186,901 – 210,296 civilian deaths from violence.	March 2003 onwards
Classified Iraq War Logs	109,032 deaths including 66,081 civilian deaths.	January 2004 to December 2009

Overview: Iraqi death estimates by source Summary of casualties of the Iraq War. Possible estimates on the number of people killed in the invasion and occupation of Iraq vary widely, and are highly disputed. Estimates of casualties below include both the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the following Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–present.

Iraq war logs	Classified US military documents released by WikiLeaks in October 2010, record Iraqi and Coalition military deaths between January 2004 and December 2009. The documents record 109,032 deaths broken down into "Civilian" (66,081 deaths), "Host Nation" (15,196 deaths),"Enemy" (23,984 deaths), and "Friendly" (3,771 deaths).
Iraqi Health Ministry	The Health Ministry of the Iraqi government recorded 87,215 Iraqi violent deaths between January 1, 2005, and February 28, 2009. The data was in the form of a list of yearly totals for death certificates issued for violent deaths by hospitals and morgues. The official who provided the data told the Associated Press said the ministry does not have figures for the first two years of the war, and estimated the actual number of deaths at 10 to 20 percent higher because of thousands who are still missing and civilians who were buried in the chaos of war without official records.
The Associated Press	Associated Press stated that more than 110,600 Iraqis had been killed since the start of the war to April 2009. This number is per the Health Ministry tally of 87,215 covering January 1, 2005, to February 28, 2009 combined with counts of casualties for 2003–2004, and after February 29, 2009, from hospital sources and media reports. For more info see farther down at The Associated Press and Health Ministry (2009).
Iraq Body Count	The Iraq Body Count project (IBC) figure of documented civilian deaths from violence is 183,535 – 206,107 through April 2019. This includes reported civilian deaths due to Coalition and insurgent military action, sectarian violence and increased criminal violence. The IBC site states: "many deaths will probably go unreported or unrecorded by officials and media."
Iraq Family Health Survey	Iraq Family Health Survey for the World Health Organization. On January 9, 2008, the World Health Organization reported the results of the "Iraq Family Health Survey" published in The New England Journal of Medicine. The study surveyed 9,345 households across Iraq and estimated 151,000 deaths due to violence (95% uncertainty range, 104,000 to 223,000) from March 2003 through June 2006. Employees of the Iraqi Health Ministry carried out the survey. See also farther down: Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS, 2008).
Opinion Research Business	Opinion Research Business (ORB) poll conducted August 12–19, 2007, estimated 1,033,000 violent deaths due to the Iraq War. The range given was 946,000 to 1,120,000 deaths. A nationally representative sample of approximately 2,000 Iraqi adults answered whether any members of their household (living under their roof) were killed due to the Iraq War. 22% of the respondents had lost one or more household members. ORB reported that "48% died from a gunshot wound, 20% from the impact of a car bomb, 9% from aerial bombardment, 6% as a result of an accident and 6% from another blast/ordnance."
United Nations	The United Nations reported that 34,452 violent deaths occurred in 2006, based on data from morgues, hospitals, and municipal authorities across Iraq.
Lancet studies	The Lancet study's figure of 654,965 excess deaths through the end of June 2006 is based on household survey data. The estimate is for all excess violent and nonviolent deaths. That also includes those due to increased lawlessness, degraded infrastructure, poorer healthcare, etc. 601,027 deaths (range of 426,369 to 793,663 using a 95% confidence interval) were estimated to be due to violence. 31% of those were attributed to the Coalition, 24% to others, 46% unknown. The causes of violent deaths were gunshot (56%), car bomb (13%), other explosion/ordnance (14%), airstrike (13%), accident (2%), unknown (2%). A copy of a death certificate was available for a high proportion of the reported deaths (92% of those households asked to produce one).
PLOS Medicine Study	The PLOS Medicine study's figure of approximately 460,000 excess deaths through the end of June 2011 is based on household survey data including more than 60% of deaths directly attributable to violence. The estimate is for all excess violent and nonviolent deaths. That also includes those due to increased lawlessness, degraded infrastructure, poorer healthcare, etc. 405,000 deaths (range of 48,000 to 751,000 using a 95% confidence interval) were estimated as excess deaths attributable to the conflict. They estimated at least 55,000 additional deaths occurred that the survey missed, as the families had migrated out of Iraq. The survey found that more than 60% of excess deaths were caused by violence, with the rest caused indirectly by the war, through degradation of infrastructure and similar causes. The survey notes that although car bombs received more significant press internationally, gunshot wounds were responsible for the majority (63%) of violent deaths. The study also estimated that 35% of violent deaths were attributed to the Coalition, and 32% to militias. Cardiovascular conditions accounted for about half (47%) of nonviolent deaths, chronic illnesses 11%, infant or childhood deaths other than injuries 12.4%, non-war injuries 11%, and cancer 8%.
Ali al-Shemari (previous Iraqi Health Minister)	Concerning war-related deaths (civilian and non-civilian), and deaths from criminal gangs, Iraq's Health Minister Ali al-Shemari said that since the March 2003 invasion between 100,000 and 150,000 Iraqis had been killed. "Al-Shemari said on Thursday [November 9, 2006] that he based his figure on an estimate of 100 bodies per day brought to morgues and hospitals – though such a calculation would come out closer to 130,000 in total." For more info see farther down at Iraq Health Minister estimate in November 2006.
Costs of War Project	268,000 - 295,000 people were killed in violence in the Iraq war from March 2003 - Oct. 2018, including 182,272 - 204,575 civilians (using Iraq Body Count's figures), according to the findings of the Costs of War Project, a team of 35 scholars, legal experts, human rights practitioners, and physicians, assembled by Brown University and the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, "about the costs of the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the related violence in Pakistan and Syria." The civilian violent death numbers are "surely an underestimate."

Overview: Death estimates by group

Iraqi Security Forces (aligned with Coalition)	From June 2003, through December 31, 2010, there have been 16,623 Iraqi military and police killed based on several estimates. The Iraq Index of the Brookings Institution keeps a running total of ISF casualties. There is also a breakdown of ISF casualties at the iCasualties.org website.
Iraqi insurgents	From June 2003, through September 30, 2011, there have been 26,320-27,000+ Iraqi insurgents killed based on several estimates.
Media and aid workers	136 journalists and 51 media support workers were killed on duty according to the numbers listed on source pages on February 24, 2009. (See Category:Journalists killed while covering the Iraq War.) 94 aid workers have been killed according to a November 21, 2007, Reuters article.
U.S. armed forces	Graph of monthly deaths of U.S. military personnel in Iraq from beginning of war to June 24, 2008. As of July 19, 2021, according to the U.S. Department of Defense casualty website, there were 4,431 total deaths (including both killed in action and non-hostile) and 31,994 wounded in action (WIA) as a result of the Iraq War. As a part of Operation New Dawn, which was initiated on September 1, 2010, there were 74 total deaths (including KIA and non-hostile) and 298 WIA. See the references for a breakdown of the wounded, injured, ill, those returned to duty (RTD), those requiring medical air transport, non-hostile-related medical air transports, non-hostile injuries, diseases, or other medical reasons.
Coalition deaths by hostile fire	As of 23 October 2011, hostile-fire deaths accounted for 3,777 of the 4,799 total coalition military deaths.
Armed forces of other coalition countries	See Multinational force in Iraq. As of 24 February 2009, there were 318 deaths from the armed forces of other Coalition nations. 179 UK deaths and 139 deaths from other nations. Breakdown: Australia – 2 Azerbaijan – 1 Bulgaria – 13 Czech Republic – 1 Denmark – 7 El Salvador – 5 Estonia – 2 Fiji – 1 Georgia – 5 Hungary – 1 Italy – 33 Kazakhstan – 1 Latvia – 3 Netherlands – 2 Poland – 30 Portugal – 1 Romania – 4 Slovakia – 4 South Korea – 1 Spain – 11 Thailand – 2 Ukraine – 18 United Kingdom – 179
Contractors	Contractors. At least 1,487 deaths between March 2003 and June 2011 according to the list of private contractor deaths in Iraq. 245 of those are from the U.S. Contractors are "Americans, Iraqis and workers from more than three dozen other countries." 10,569 wounded or injured. Contractors "cook meals, do laundry, repair infrastructure, translate documents, analyze intelligence, guard prisoners, protect military convoys, deliver water in the heavily fortified Green Zone and stand sentry at buildings – often highly dangerous duties almost identical to those performed by many U.S. troops." A July 4, 2007, Los Angeles Times article reported 182,000 employees of U.S.-government-funded contractors and subcontractors (118,000 Iraqi, 43,000 other, 21,000 U.S.).

Overview: Iraqi injury estimates by source

Iraqi Human Rights Ministry	The Human Rights Ministry of the Iraqi government recorded 250,000 Iraqi injuries between 2003 and 2012. The ministry had earlier reported that 147,195 injuries were recorded for the period 2004–2008.
Iraqi Government	Iraqi Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh reported that 239,133 Iraqi injuries were recorded by the government between 2004 and 2011.
Iraq war logs	Classified US military documents released by WikiLeaks in October 2010, recorded 176,382 injuries, including 99,163 civilian injuries between January 2004 and December 2009.
Iraq Body Count	The Iraq Body Count project reported that there were at least 20,000 civilian injuries in the earliest months of the war between March and July 2003. A follow-up report noted that at least 42,500 civilians were reported wounded in the first two years of the war between March 2003 and March 2005.
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq	The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that there were 36,685 Iraqi injuries during the year 2006.
Iraqi Health Ministry	The Health Ministry of the Iraqi government reported that 38,609 Iraqi injuries had occurred during the year 2007, based on statistics derived from official Iraqi health departments' records. Baghdad had the highest number of injuries (18,335), followed by Nineveh (6,217), Basra (1,387) and Kirkuk (655).

Additional statistics for the Iraq War

Overview of casualties by type

(see the rest of the article below for more info)

Dead

• Iraqis:
• Deadliest single insurgent bombings:
  • August 14, 2007. Truck bombs – 2007 Yazidi communities bombings (in northwestern Iraq):
    • 796 killed.
• Other deadly days:
  • November 23, 2006, (281 killed) and April 18, 2007, (233 killed):
    • "4 bombings in Baghdad kill at least 183. ... Nationwide, the number of people killed or found dead on Wednesday [, April 18, 2007, ] was 233, which was the second deadliest day in Iraq since Associated Press began keeping records in May 2005. Five car bombings, mortar rounds and other attacks killed 281 people across Iraq on November 23, 2006, according to the AP count."

Graph of monthly wounded in action of U.S. military personnel in Iraq.

Wounded in action

• As of January 12, 2007, 500 U.S. troops have undergone amputations due to the Iraq War. Toes and fingers are not counted.
• As of September 30, 2006, 725 American troops have had limbs amputated from wounds received in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• A 2006 study by the Walter Reed Medical Center, which serves more critically injured soldiers than most VA hospitals, concluded that 62 percent of patients there had suffered a brain injury.
• In March 2003, U.S. military personnel were wounded in action at a rate averaging about 350 per month. As of September 2007, this rate has increased to about 675 per month.

Injured/fallen ill

• U.S. military: number unknown.
  • An October 18, 2005, USA Today article reports:
    • "More than one in four U.S. troops have come home from the Iraq war with health problems that require medical or mental health treatment, according to The Pentagon's first detailed screening of service members leaving a war zone."
• Iraqi combatants: number unknown

Refugees

• As of November 4, 2006, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 1.8 million Iraqis had been displaced to neighboring countries, and 1.6 million were displaced internally, with nearly 100,000 Iraqis fleeing to Syria and Jordan each month.

Iraqi invasion casualties

Franks reportedly estimated soon after the invasion that there had been 30,000 Iraqi casualties as of April 9, 2003. That number comes from the transcript of an October 2003 interview of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld with journalist Bob Woodward. But neither could remember the number clearly, nor whether it was just for deaths, or both deaths and wounded.

A May 28, 2003, Guardian article reported that "Extrapolating from the death-rates of between 3% and 10% found in the units around Baghdad, one reaches a toll of between 13,500 and 45,000 dead among troops and paramilitaries."

An October 20, 2003, study by the Project on Defense Alternatives at Commonwealth Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated that for March 19, 2003, to April 30, 2003, the "probable death of approximately 11,000 to 15,000 Iraqis, including approximately 3,200 to 4,300 civilian noncombatants."

The Iraq Body Count project (IBC) documented a higher number of civilian deaths up to the end of the major combat phase (May 1, 2003). In a 2005 report, using updated information, the IBC reported that 7,299 civilians are documented to have been killed, primarily by U.S. air and ground forces. There were 17,338 civilian injuries inflicted up to May 1, 2003. The IBC says its figures are probably underestimates because: "many deaths will probably go unreported or unrecorded by officials and media."

Iraqi civilian casualties

A soldier carries a wounded Iraqi child into the Charlie Medical Centre at Camp Ramadi, Iraq (March 20, 2007).

A disabled 28-year-old Iraqi woman lost both of her legs during combat operations (May 7, 2006)

Iraq Body Count project (IBC)

An independent British-American group, the Iraq Body Count project (IBC project) compiles reported Iraqi civilian deaths resulting from war since the 2003 invasion and ensuing insurgency and civil war, including those caused directly by coalition military action, Iraqi military actions, the Iraqi insurgency, and those resulting from excess crime. The IBC maintains that the occupying authority has a responsibility to prevent these deaths under international law.

The IBC project has recorded a range of at least 185,194 – 208,167 total violent civilian deaths through June 2020 in their database. The Iraq Body Count (IBC) project records its numbers based on a "comprehensive survey of commercial media and NGO-based reports, along with official records that have been released into the public sphere. Reports range from specific, incident based accounts to figures from hospitals, morgues, and other documentary data-gathering agencies." The IBC was also given access to the WikiLeaks disclosures of the Iraq War Logs.

Iraq Body Count project data shows that the type of attack that resulted in the most civilian deaths was execution after abduction or capture. These accounted for 33% of civilian deaths and 29% of these deaths involved torture. The following most common causes of death were small arms gunfire at 20%, suicide bombs at 14%, vehicle bombs at 9%, roadside bombs at 5%, and air attacks at 5%.

The IBC project, reported that by the end of the major combat phase of the invasion period up to April 30, 2003, 7,419 civilians had been killed, primarily by U.S. air-and-ground forces.

The IBC project released a report detailing the deaths it recorded between March 2003 and March 2005 in which it recorded 24,865 civilian deaths. The report says the U.S. and its allies were responsible for the largest share (37%) with 9,270 deaths. The remaining deaths were attributed to anti-occupation forces (9%), crime (36%) and unknown agents (11%). It also lists the primary sources used by the media – mortuaries, medics, Iraqi officials, eyewitnesses, police, relatives, U.S.-coalition, journalists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), friends/associates and other.

According to a 2010 assessment by John Sloboda, director of Iraq Body Count, 150,000 people including 122,000 civilians were killed in the Iraq War with U.S. and Coalition forces responsible for at least 22,668 insurgents as well as 13,807 civilians, with the rest of the civilians killed by insurgents, militias, or terrorists.

The IBC project has been criticized by some, including scholars, who believe it counts only a small percentage of the number of actual deaths because of its reliance on media sources. The IBC project's director, John Sloboda, has stated, "We've always said our work is an undercount, you can't possibly expect that a media-based analysis will get all the deaths." However, the IBC project rejects many of these criticisms as exaggerated or misinformed.

According to a 2013 Lancet article, the Iraq Body Count is "a non-peer-reviewed but innovative online and media-centred approach that passively counted non-combatant civilian deaths as they were recorded in the media and available morgue reports. In passive surveillance no special effort is made to find those deaths that go unreported. The volunteer staff collecting data for the IBC have risked criticism that their data are inherently biased because of scarcity or absence of independent verification, variation in original sources of information, and underestimation of mortality from violence... In research circles, random cross-sectional cluster sampling survey methods are deemed to be a more rigorous epidemiological method in conflict settings."

Civilian deaths by perpetrator

In 2011, the IBC published data in PLOS Medicine on 2003-2008 civilian deaths in Iraq by perpetrator and cause of death. The study broke down civilian deaths by perpetrator into the following categories:

• 74% unidentified perpetrator: defined as "those who target civilians (i.e., no identifiable military target is present), while appearing indistinguishable from civilians: for example, a suicide bomber disguised as a civilian in a market. Unknown (i.e., unidentified) perpetrators in Iraq include sectarian combatants and Anti-Coalition combatants who maintain a civilian appearance while targeting civilians."

• 11% anti-coalition forces: defined as "un-uniformed combatants identified by attacks on coalition targets" during the event. Anti-Coalition combatants in the event of targeting purely civilians would instead be classed under the "unidentified perpetrator" category.

• 12% coalition forces: identified by uniforms or use of air attacks.

IBC table of violent civilian deaths

Following are the yearly IBC Project violent civilian death totals, broken down by month from the beginning of 2003. Table below is copied irregularly from the source page, and is soon out-of-date as data is continually updated at the source. As of June 12, 2023 the top of the IBC database page with the table says 186,901 – 210,296 "Documented civilian deaths from violence". That page also says: "Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence."

Monthly civilian deaths from violence, 2003 onwards

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Yearly totals
2003	3	2	3986	3448	545	597	646	833	566	515	487	524	12,152
2004	610	663	1004	1303	655	910	834	878	1042	1033	1676	1129	11,737
2005	1222	1297	905	1145	1396	1347	1536	2352	1444	1311	1487	1141	16,583
2006	1546	1579	1957	1805	2279	2594	3298	2865	2567	3041	3095	2900	29,526
2007	3035	2680	2728	2573	2854	2219	2702	2483	1391	1326	1124	997	26,112
2008	861	1093	1669	1317	915	755	640	704	612	594	540	586	10,286
2009	372	409	438	590	428	564	431	653	352	441	226	478	5,382
2010	267	305	336	385	387	385	488	520	254	315	307	218	4,167
2011	389	254	311	289	381	386	308	401	397	366	288	392	4,162
2012	531	356	377	392	304	529	469	422	400	290	253	299	4,622
2013	357	360	403	545	888	659	1145	1013	1306	1180	870	1126	9,852
2014	1097	972	1029	1037	1100	4088	1580	3340	1474	1738	1436	1327	20,218
2015	1490	1625	1105	2013	1295	1355	1845	1991	1445	1297	1021	1096	17,578
2016	1374	1258	1459	1192	1276	1405	1280	1375	935	1970	1738	1131	16,393
2017	1119	982	1918	1816	1871	1858	1498	597	490	397	346	291	13,183
2018	474	410	402	303	229	209	230	201	241	305	160	155	3,319
2019	323	271	123	140	167	130	145	93	151	361	274	215	2,393
2020	114	148	73	52	74	64	49	82	54	70	74	54	908
2021	64	56	49	66	49	46	87	60	41	65	23	63	669
2022	62	46	42	31	82	44	67	80	68	63	65	90	740
2023	56	52	76	85	45								314

People's Kifah

The Iraqi political party People's Kifah, or Struggle Against Hegemony (PK) said that its survey conducted between March and June 2003 throughout the non-Kurdish areas of Iraq tallied 36,533 civilians killed in those areas by June 2003. While detailed town-by-town totals were given by the PK spokesperson, details of methodology are very thin and raw data is not in the public domain. A still-less-detailed report on this study appeared some months later on Al Jazeera's website, and covered casualties up to October 2003.

Iraqi refugees crisis

Main article: Refugees of Iraq

Roughly 40 percent of Iraq's middle class is believed to have fled, the U.N. reported in 2007. Most are fleeing systematic persecution and have no desire to return. All kinds of people, from university professors to bakers, have been targeted by militias, Iraqi insurgents and criminals. An estimated 331 school teachers were slain in the first four months of 2006, according to Human Rights Watch, and at least 2,000 Iraqi doctors have been killed and 250 kidnapped since the 2003 U.S. invasion.

Coalition military casualties

Coalition deaths by country USA: 4,492 UK: 179 Italy: 33 Poland: 23 Ukraine: 18 Bulgaria: 13 Spain: 11 Denmark: 7 El Salvador: 5 Georgia: 5 Slovakia: 4 Latvia: 3 Romania: 3 Australia: 2 Estonia: 2 Netherlands: 2 Thailand: 2 Azerbaijan: 1 Czech Republic: 1 Fiji: 1 Hungary: 1 Kazakhstan: 1 South Korea: 1 TOTAL: 4,810

Most U.S. casualties, like these in a C-17 military transport aircraft, return to Dover Air Force Base in Dover, Delaware. (unknown date)

For the latest casualty numbers see the overview chart at the top of the page.

Since the official handover of power to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004, coalition soldiers have continued to come under attack in towns across Iraq.

National Public Radio, iCasualties.org, and GlobalSecurity.org have month-by-month charts of American troop deaths in the Iraq War.

A U.S. Marine killed in April 2003 is carried away after receiving his Last Rites.

The combined total of coalition and contractor casualties in the conflict is now over ten times that of the 1990–1991 Gulf War. In the Gulf War, coalition forces suffered around 378 deaths, and among the Iraqi military, tens of thousands were killed, along with thousands of civilians.

Troops fallen ill, injured, or wounded

See the overview chart at the top of the page for recent numbers.

On August 29, 2006, The Christian Science Monitor reported: "Because of new body armor and advances in military medicine, for example, the ratio of combat-zone deaths to those wounded has dropped from 24 percent in Vietnam to 13 percent in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, the numbers of those killed as a percentage of overall casualties is lower."

Wounded U.S. personnel flown from Iraq to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, for medical treatment. (February 2007)

Many U.S. veterans of the Iraq War have reported a range of serious health issues, including tumors, daily blood in urine and stool, sexual dysfunction, migraines, frequent muscle spasms, and other symptoms similar to the debilitating symptoms of "Gulf War syndrome" reported by many veterans of the 1991 Gulf War, which some believe is related to the U.S.'s use of radioactive depleted uranium.

A study of U.S. veterans published in July 2004 in The New England Journal of Medicine on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental disorders in Iraq and Afghanistan veterans found that 5 percent to 9.4 percent (depending on the strictness of the PTSD definition used) suffered from PTSD before deployment. After deployment, 6.2 percent to 19.9 percent suffered from PTSD. For the broad definition of PTSD that represents an increase of 10.5 percent (19.9 percent – 9.4 percent = 10.5 percent). That is 10,500 additional cases of PTSD for every 100,000 U.S. troops after they have served in Iraq. ePluribus Media, an independent citizen journalism collective, is tracking and cataloging press-reported possible, probable, or confirmed incidents of post-deployment or combat-zone cases in its PTSD Timeline.

Information on injuries suffered by troops of other coalition countries is less readily available, but a statement in Hansard indicated that 2,703 U.K. soldiers had been medically evacuated from Iraq for wounds or injuries as of October 4, 2004, and that 155 U.K. troops were wounded in combat in the initial invasion.

Leishmaniasis has been reported by U.S. troops stationed in Iraq, including visceral leishmaniasis. Leishmaniasis, spread by biting sand fleas, was diagnosed in hundreds of U.S. troops compared to just 32 during the first Gulf War.

Accidents and negligence

As of August 2008, sixteen American troops have died from accidental electrocutions in Iraq according to the Defense Department. One soldier had been electrocuted in a shower, while another had been electrocuted in a swimming pool. KBR, the contractor responsible, had been warned by employees of unsafe practices, and was criticised following the revelations.

Nightline controversy

Ted Koppel, host of ABC's Nightline, devoted his entire show on April 30, 2004, to reading the names of 721 of the 737 U.S. troops who had died thus far in Iraq. (The show had not been able to confirm the remaining sixteen names.) Claiming that the broadcast was "motivated by a political agenda designed to undermine the efforts of the United States in Iraq", the Sinclair Broadcast Group took the action of barring the seven ABC network-affiliated stations it controls from airing the show. The decision to censor the broadcast drew criticism from both sides, including members of the armed forces, opponents of the war, MoveOn.org, and most notably Republican U.S. Senator John McCain, who denounced the move as "unpatriotic" and "a gross disservice to the public".

Amputees

Amputee U.S. soldier (February 2007)

As of January 18, 2007, there were at least 500 American amputees due to the Iraq War. In 2016, the number was estimated to be 1,650 U.S. troops. The 2007 estimate suggests amputees represent 2.2% of the 22,700 U.S. troops wounded in action (5% for soldiers whose wounds prevented them returning to duty).

Traumatic brain injuries

By March 2009, the Pentagon estimated as many as 360,000 U.S. veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts may have suffered traumatic brain injuries (TBI), including 45,000 to 90,000 veterans with persistent symptoms requiring specialized care.

In February 2007, one expert from the VA estimated that the number of undiagnosed TBIs were higher than 7,500.

According to USA Today, by November 2007 there were more than an estimated 20,000 US troops who had signs of brain injuries without being classified as wounded during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mental illness and suicide

A top U.S. Army psychiatrist, Colonel Charles Hoge, said in March 2008 that nearly 30% of troops on their third deployment suffered from serious mental-health problems, and that one year was not enough time between combat tours.

A March 12, 2007, Time article reported on a study published in the Archives of Internal Medicine. About one third of the 103,788 veterans returning from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars seen at U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs facilities between September 30, 2001, and September 30, 2005, were diagnosed with mental illness or a psycho-social disorder, such as homelessness and marital problems, including domestic violence. More than half of those diagnosed, 56 percent, were suffering from more than one disorder. The most common combination was post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.

In January 2008, the U.S. Army reported that the rate of suicide among soldiers in 2007 was the highest since the Army started counting in 1980. There were 121 suicides in 2007, a 20-percent jump over the prior year. Also, there were around 2100 attempted suicides and self-injuries in 2007. Other sources reveal higher estimates.

Time magazine reported on June 5, 2008:

Data contained in the Army's fifth Mental Health Advisory Team report indicate that, according to an anonymous survey of U.S. troops taken last fall, about 12% of combat troops in Iraq and 17% of those in Afghanistan are taking prescription antidepressants or sleeping pills to help them cope. ... About a third of soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq say they can't see a mental-health professional when they need to. When the number of troops in Iraq surged by 30,000 last year, the number of Army mental-health workers remained the same – about 200 – making counseling and care even tougher to get.

In the same article Time also reported on some of the reasons for the prescription drug use:

That imbalance between seeing the price of war up close and yet not feeling able to do much about it, the survey suggests, contributes to feelings of "intense fear, helplessness or horror" that plant the seeds of mental distress. "A friend was liquefied in the driver's position on a tank, and I saw everything", was a typical comment. Another: "A huge f______ bomb blew my friend's head off like 50 meters from me." Such indelible scenes – and wondering when and where the next one will happen – are driving thousands of soldiers to take antidepressants, military psychiatrists say. It's not hard to imagine why.

Concern has been expressed by mental health professionals about the effects on the emotional health and development of returning veterans' infants and children, due to the increased rates of interpersonal violence, posttraumatic stress, depression, and substance abuse that have been reported among these veterans. Moreover, the stressful effects of physical casualties and loss pose enormous stress for the primary caregiver that can adversely affect her or his parenting, as well as the couple's children directly. The mental health needs of military families in the aftermath of combat exposure and other war-related trauma have been thought likely to be inadequately addressed by the military health system that separates mental health care of the returning soldier from his or her family's care, the latter of whom is generally covered under a contracted, civilian managed-care system.

Iraqi insurgent casualties

Total insurgent deaths are hard to estimate. In 2003, 597 insurgents were killed, according to the U.S. military. From January 2004 through December 2009 (not including May 2004 and March 2009), 23,984 insurgents were estimated to have been killed based on reports from Coalition soldiers on the frontlines. In the two missing months from the estimate, 652 were killed in May 2004, and 45 were killed in March 2009. In 2010, another 676 insurgents were killed. In January and March through October 2011, 451 insurgents were killed. Based on all of these estimates some 26,405 insurgents/militia were killed from 2003, up until late 2011.

However, this number could be low compared to reality as it only counts combat deaths against US-led forces; insurgents also frequently clashed between each other and those killed by noncombat causes are not counted. There have been contradictions between the figures released by the U.S. military and those released by the Iraqi government. For example, the U.S. military's number of insurgents killed in 2005, is 3,247, which is in contrast to the Iraqi government's figure of 1,734, however, fear of civilians fatalities, numbers were lowered. In 2007, 4,544 militants were killed according to the Iraqi ministries, while the U.S. military claimed 6,747 died. Also, in 2008, 2,028 insurgents were reported killed and in 2009, with the exception of the month of June, 488 were killed according to the Iraqi Defence Ministry. These numbers are also not in line with the U.S. military estimate of some 3,984 killed in 2008 and 2009.

U.S. military- and Iraqi Defence Ministry-provided numbers, including suicide bombers

• 2011 – 451 (not including February & August)
• 2010 – 676
• 2009 – 488 (not including June)
• 2008 – 2,028
• 2007 – 6,747 (U.S. military), 4,544 (Iraqi Defence Ministry)
• 2006 – 3,902
• 2005 – 3,247 (U.S. military), 1,734 (Iraqi Defence Ministry)
• 2004 – 6,801
• 2003 – 603

In addition as of August 22, 2009, approximately 1,719 suicide-bombers had also been reported killed.

Main article: List of bombings during the Iraq War

• 2009–73
• 2008 – 257
• 2007 – 442
• 2006 – 297
• 2005 – 478
• 2004 – 140
• 2003 (from August to December) – 32

Grand total – 21,221–26,405 insurgents dead

On September 28, 2006, an Al Qaeda leader claimed that 4,000 foreign insurgents had been killed in the war.

On June 6, 2008, an Iraqi Army official revealed that about 6,000 Al Qaeda fighters were among the insurgents killed since the start of the war up until April 2008.

The US military also reported on the number of suspected insurgents who were detained, arrested, or captured. From June 2003 through August 2007 the US military reported that 119,752 were detained, compared to 18,832 that had been killed.

Contractor casualties

By July 2007, the Department of Labor recorded 933 deaths of contractors in Iraq. By April 2007, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated that the number of civilian contractor deaths on US-funded projects in Iraq was 916. In January 2007, the Houston Chronicle reported that the Pentagon did not track contractor deaths in Iraq. In January 2017, an estimated 7,761 contractors had been injured in Iraq, but their nationality was not known. By the end 2006, civilian contractors suffered "3,367 injuries serious enough to require four or more days off the job." The Labor Department had these numbers because it tracked workers' compensation claims by injured workers or families of slain contractors under the federal Defense Base Act.

Health outcomes

By November 2006, there were reports of a significant deterioration of the Iraq health care system as a result of the war.

In 2007, an Iraqi Society of Psychiatrists and WHO study found that 70% of 10,000 primary school students in the Sha'ab section of north Baghdad are suffering from trauma-related symptoms.

Subsequent articles in The Lancet and Al Jazeera have suggested that the number of cases of birth defects, cancer, miscarriages, illnesses and premature births may have increased dramatically after the first and second Iraq wars, due to the presences of depleted uranium and chemicals introduced during American attacks, especially around Fallujah, Basra and Southern Iraq.

Total Iraqi casualties

Estimates of the total number of Iraqi war-related deaths for certain periods of time are highly disputed.

Iraq Living Conditions Survey (2004)

A study commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), called the Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS), sampled almost 22,000 households across all Iraqi provinces. It estimated 24,000 war-related violent deaths by May 2004 (with a 95 percent confidence interval from 18,000 to 29,000). This study did not attempt to measure what portion of its estimate was made up of civilians or combatants. It would include Iraqi military killed during the invasion, as well as "insurgents" or other fighters thereafter. This study has been criticized for various reasons. For more info see the section in Lancet surveys of Iraq War casualties that compares the Lancet and UNDP ILCS studies.

Lancet (2004)

Main article: Lancet surveys of Iraq War casualties

The October 2004 Lancet study done by public health experts from Johns Hopkins University and published on October 29, 2004, in The Lancet medical journal, estimated that 100,000 "excess" Iraqi deaths from all causes had occurred since the U.S. invasion began. The study did not attempt to measure how many of these were civilian, but the study's authors have said they believe that the "vast majority" were non-combatants, based on 7% of the casualties being women and 46% being children under the age of 15 (including Falluja data). To arrive at these excess death figures, a survey was taken from 988 Iraqi households in 33 clusters throughout Iraq, in which the residents were asked how many people lived there and how many births and deaths there had been since the war began. They then compared the death rate with the average from the 15 months before the war. Iraqis were found to be 1.5 times more likely to die from all causes after the invasion (rising from 0.5% to 0.79% per year) than in the 15 months preceding the war, producing an estimate of 98,000 excess deaths. This figure excluded data from one cluster in Falluja, which was deemed too much of an outlier for inclusion in the national estimate. If it included data from Falluja, which showed a higher rate of violent deaths than the other 32 clusters combined, the increased death rate would be raised from 1.5 to 2.5-fold, violent deaths would be 58 times more likely with most of them due to air-strikes by coalition forces, and an additional 200,000 fatalities would be estimated.

Iraqiyun estimate (2005)

The Iraqi non-governmental organisation, Iraqiyun, estimated 128,000 deaths from the invasion until July 2005. A July 2005 United Press International (UPI) article said the number came from the chairman of the Iraqiyun humanitarian organization in Baghdad, Dr. Hatim al-'Alwani. He said 55 percent of those killed were women, and children aged 12 and under. The UPI article reported: "Iraqiyun obtained data from relatives and families of the deceased, as well as from Iraqi hospitals in all the country's provinces. The 128,000 figure only includes those whose relatives have been informed of their deaths and does not include those were abducted, assassinated or simply disappeared." A 2010 book by Nicolas Davies reported the Iraqiyun estimate, and that Iraqiyun was affiliated with the political party of Interim President Ghazi Al-Yawer. Davies wrote: "The report specified that it included only confirmed deaths reported to relatives, omitting significant numbers of people who had simply disappeared without trace amid the violence and chaos."

Lancet (2006)

Main article: Lancet surveys of Iraq War casualties

The October 2006 Lancet study by Gilbert Burnham (of Johns Hopkins University) and co-authors estimated total excess deaths (civilian and non-civilian) related to the war of 654,965 excess deaths up to July 2006. The 2006 study was based on surveys conducted between May 20 and July 10, 2006. More households were surveyed than during the 2004 study, allowing for a 95% confidence interval of 392,979 to 942,636 excess Iraqi deaths. Those estimates were far higher than other available tallies at the time.

The Burnham et al. study has been described as the most controversial study in survey research on armed conflict, and its findings have been widely disputed in the academic literature. Shortly after publication, the study's estimate and methodology came under criticism from a number of sources, including the United States government, academics, and the Iraq Body Count. At the time, other experts praised the methodology of the study. John Tirman, who commissioned and directed the funding for the study defended the study. A 2008 systematic review of casualty estimates in the Iraq War in the journal Conflict and Health concluded that the highest quality studies have used "population-based methods" that have "yielded the highest estimates. A 2016 study described the Lancet study as seen "widely viewed among peers as the most rigorous investigations of Iraq War–related mortality among Iraqi civilians," and argued that part of the criticism "may have been politically motivated."

A number of peer-reviewed studies criticized the Lancet study on the basis of its methodology and exaggerated casualty numbers. The authors of the Lancet study were also accused of ethical breaches in terms of how the survey was conducted and in how the authors responded to requests for data and information. In 2009, the lead author of the Lancet study was censured by American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) for refusing to provide "several basic facts about" the study. AAPOR had over a 12-year period only formally censured two other individuals. In 2012, Michael Spagat noted that six peer-reviewed studies had identified shortcomings in the Lancet study, and that the Lancet authors had yet to make a substantive response to the critiques. According to Spagat, there is "ample reason" to discard Lancet study estimate. Columbia University statistician Andrew Gelman said in 2014 that "serious flaws have been demonstrated" in the Lancet study, and in 2015 that his impression was that the Lancet study "had pretty much been discredited". Joshua Goldstein, professor emeritus of International Relations at American University, wrote that critics of the study "have argued convincingly that the sample method was biased." According to University of Delaware sociologist Joel Best in his book Stat-Spotting: A Field Guide to Identifying Dubious Data, "it seems likely that [the Lancet estimate] was too large". Conflict scholars Nils Petter Gleditsch, Erik Melander and Henrik Urdal said there were "major biases" in the study, leading to oversampling of households affected by violence.

A 2008 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that the 2006 Lancet study may have considerably overestimated Iraq War casualties, that the study made "unusual" methodological choices, and called on the 2006 Lancet study authors to make all of their data available. The 2008 study was awarded "Article of the Year – 2008" by the Journal of Peace Research, with the jury of Lars-Erik Cederman (ETH Zürich), Jon Hovi (University of Oslo) and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (University of Iowa) writing that the "authors show convincingly that previous studies which are based on a cross-street cluster-sampling algorithm (CSSA) have significantly overestimated the number of casualties in Iraq." American University political scientist Thomas Zeitzoff said the Journal of Peace Research study showed the Lancet study to be "wildly inaccurate" due to its reliance on information from biased samples.

Michael Spagat criticized the 2006 Lancet study in a 2010 article for the journal Defence and Peace Economics. Spagat wrote that he found "some evidence relating to data fabrication and falsification" and "this evidence suggests that this survey cannot be considered a reliable or valid contribution towards knowledge about the extent of mortality in Iraq since 2003". Spagat also chided the Lancet study for "ethical violations to the survey's respondents including endangerment, privacy breaches and violations in obtaining informed consent". In a letter to the journal Science, Spagat said that the Lancet study had failed replication in a study by the WHO (the Iraq Family Health Survey). Spagat noted that the lead author of the 2006 study had been censured by the American Association for Public Opinion Research for "repeatedly refusing to disclose the corresponding information for his survey".

The Iraq Family Health Survey published by WHO researchers in The New England Journal of Medicine found that the 2006 Lancet study results "considerably overestimated the number of violent deaths" and that the results are highly improbable. In comparing the two studies, peace researcher Kristine Eck of Uppsala University notes that the IFHS study which covered the same period as the Lancet survey "was based on a much larger sample (9,345 households compared to Burnham et al's 1,849) in far more clusters (1,086 clusters compared to Burnham et al's 47)." In comparing the two studies, Joachim Kreutz of Stockholm University and Nicholas Marsh of PRIO said the IFHS study produced "a more reliable estimate." Oxford University political scientist Adam Roberts wrote that the IFHS study was "more rigorous."

Burnham, Edward J. Mills, and Frederick M. Burkle noted that the IFHS's data indicated that Iraqi mortality increased by a factor of 1.9 following the invasion, compared to the factor of 2.4 found by Burnham et al., which translates to some 433,000 excess Iraqi deaths (violent and non-violent). Timothy R. Gulden considered it implausible that fewer than one-third of these excess deaths would have been violent in nature. Francisco J. Luquero and Rebecca F. Grais argued that the IFHS's lengthy survey and use of IBC data as a proxy for particularly dangerous areas likely resulted in an underestimate of violent mortality, while Gulden hypothesized that respondents may have been reluctant to report violent deaths to researchers working with the Iraqi government. In a similar vein, Tirman observed that the Iraqi Health Ministry was affiliated with Shi'ite sectarians at the time, remarking that there was evidence that many violent deaths may have been recategorized as "non-violent" to avoid government retribution: "For example, the number of deaths by auto accidents rose by four times the pre-invasion rate; had this single figure been included in the violent deaths category, the overall estimate would have risen to 196,000." Gulden even commented that "the IFHS results are easily in line with the finding of more than 600,000 violent deaths in the study by Burnham et al." However, the authors of the IFHS rejected such claims: "Because the level of underreporting is almost certainly higher for deaths in earlier time periods, we did not attempt to estimate excess deaths. The excess deaths reported by Burnham et al. included only 8.2% of deaths from nonviolent causes, so inclusion of these deaths will not increase the agreement between the estimates from the IFHS and Burnham et al."

A graph in the Lancet article purportedly demonstrating that its conclusions are in line with violence trends measured by the IBC and Defense Department used cherry-picked data and had two Y-axes; the authors conceded that the graph was flawed, but the Lancet never retracted it.

Iraq Health Minister estimate (2006)

In early November 2006 Iraq's Health Minister Ali al-Shemari said that he estimated between 100,000 and 150,000 people had been killed since the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion. The Taipei Times reported on his methodology: "Al-Shemari said on Thursday [, November 9, 2006,] that he based his figure on an estimate of 100 bodies per day brought to morgues and hospitals – though such a calculation would come out closer to 130,000 in total." The Washington Post reported: "As al-Shemari issued the startling new estimate, the head of the Baghdad central morgue said Thursday he was receiving as many as 60 violent death victims each day at his facility alone. Dr. Abdul-Razzaq al-Obaidi said those deaths did not include victims of violence whose bodies were taken to the city's many hospital morgues or those who were removed from attack scenes by relatives and quickly buried according to Muslim custom."

From a November 9, 2006, International Herald Tribune article:

Each day we lost 100 persons, that means per month 3,000, per year it's 36,000, plus or minus 10 percent", al-Shemari said. "So by three years, 120,000, half-year 20,000, that means 140,000, plus or minus 10 percent", he said, explaining how he came to the figures. "This includes all Iraqis killed – police, ordinary people, children", he said, adding that people who were kidnapped and later found dead were also included in his estimate. He said the figures were compiled by counting bodies brought to "forensic institutes" or hospitals.

From a November 11, 2006, Taipei Times article:

An official with the ministry also confirmed the figure yesterday [November 10, 2006], but later said that the estimated deaths ranged between 100,000 and 150,000. "The minister was misquoted. He said between 100,000–150,000 people were killed in three-and-a-half years", the official said.

United Nations (2006)

The United Nations reported that 34,452 violent deaths occurred in 2006, based on data from morgues, hospitals, and municipal authorities across Iraq.

D3 Systems poll (2007)

From February 25 to March 5, 2007, D3 Systems [79] conducted a poll for the BBC, ABC News, ARD and USA Today.

ABC News reported: "One in six says someone in their own household has been harmed. ... 53 percent of Iraqis say a close friend or immediate family member has been hurt in the current violence. That ranges from three in 10 in the Kurdish provinces to, in Baghdad, nearly eight in 10."

The methodology was described thus: "This poll... was conducted February 25 – March 5, 2007, through in-person interviews with a random national sample of 2,212 Iraqi adults, including oversamples in Anbar province, Basra city, Kirkuk and the Sadr City section of Baghdad. The results have a 2.5-point error margin."

There was a field staff of 150 Iraqis in all. That included 103 interviewers, interviewing selected respondents at 458 locales across the country. "This poll asked about nine kinds of violence (car bombs, snipers or crossfire, kidnappings, fighting among opposing groups or abuse of civilians by various armed forces)."

Question 35 asked: "Have you or an immediate family member – by which I mean someone living in this household – been physically harmed by the violence that is occurring in the country at this time?" Here are the results in percentages:

Groups	Yes	No	No opinion
All	17	83	0
Sunni	21	79	0
Shiite	17	83	0
Kurdish	7	93	0

17% of respondents reported that at least one member of the household had been "physically harmed by the violence that is occurring in the country at this time." The survey did not ask whether multiple household members had been harmed.

Opinion Research Business (ORB) survey (2007, 2008)

A September 14, 2007, estimate by Opinion Research Business (ORB), an independent British polling agency, suggested that the total Iraqi violent death toll due to the Iraq War since the U.S.-led invasion was in excess of 1.2 million (1,220,580). These results were based on a survey of 1,499 adults in Iraq from August 12–19, 2007. ORB published an update in January 2008 based on additional work carried out in rural areas of Iraq. Some 600 additional interviews were undertaken and as a result of this the death estimate was revised to 1,033,000 with a given range of 946,000 to 1,120,000.

Participants of the ORB survey were asked the following question: "How many members of your household, if any, have died as a result of the conflict in Iraq since 2003 (ie as a result of violence rather than a natural death such as old age)? Please note that I mean those who were actually living under your roof."

This ORB estimate has been strongly criticised as exaggerated and ill-founded in peer reviewed literature. According to Carnegie Mellon University historian Jay D. Aronson, "Because this was a number that few people could take seriously (given the incredible magnitude of violence that would have had to take place daily for such a number to be even remotely possible), the ORB study has largely been ignored."

Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS, 2008)

The Iraq Family Health Survey published in 2008 in The New England Journal of Medicine surveyed 9,345 households across Iraq and was carried out in 2006 and 2007. It estimated 151,000 deaths due to violence (95% uncertainty range, 104,000 to 223,000) from March 2003 through June 2006.

The study was done by the "Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group", a collaborative effort of six organizations: the Federal Ministry of Health, Baghdad; Kurdistan Ministry of Planning, Erbil; Kurdistan Ministry of Health, Erbil; Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, Baghdad; World Health Organization Iraq office, Amman, Jordan; World Health Organization, Geneva.

The Associated Press and Health Ministry (2009)

In April 2009, the Associated Press reported that Iraq Health Ministry had recorded (via death certificates issued by hospitals and morgues) a total of 87,215 violent deaths of Iraqi citizens between January 1, 2005, and February 28, 2009. The number excludes thousands of missing persons and civilians whose deaths were unrecorded; the government official who provided the data told the AP that if included, the number of dead for that period would be 10 to 20 percent higher.

The Associated Press used the Health Ministry tally and other data (including counts of casualties for 2003–2004, and after March 1, 2009, from hospital sources and media reports, in major part the Iraq Body Count) to estimate that more than 110,600 Iraqis were killed from the start of the war to April 2009. Experts interviewed by the AP found this estimate to be credible and an "important baseline" although necessarily an estimate because of unrecorded deaths, especially in inaccessible areas. While mass graves discovered over time shed more light on deaths in the Iraq War, the AP noted that "how many remain will never be known."

PLOS Medicine (2013)

A 2013 study by Hagopian et al. in PLOS Medicine estimated that 461,000 Iraqis died as a result of the Iraq War. The study used a similar methodology as the 2006 Lancet study and had the lead author of the 2006 study as one of the 12 authors. According to one of the authors, Amy Hagopian, half of the casualties not resulting from violence were due to inadequate treatment of cardiovascular disease. Upon the study's publication, Michael Spagat, a critic of the 2006 Lancet study, said that the 2013 study seemed "to fix most of the methodological flaws of the 2006 paper". Spagat however noted that he found the large confidence interval of the 2013 study disconcerting. Other critics of the 2006 Lancet study mirrored Spagat's views, noting that the 2013 study was an improvement but that the large confidence interval was concerning.

A 2017 study by Spagat and Van Weezel replicated the 2013 study by Hagopian et al. and found that the 500,000 casualty estimate by Hagopian et al. was not supported by data. Spagat and Van Weezel said that Hagopian et al. made many methodological errors. Hagopian et al. defended their original study, arguing that Van Weezel and Spagat misunderstood their method. Van Weezel and Spagat answered, saying that the response by Hagopian et al. "avoids the central points, addresses only secondary issues and makes ad hominem attacks."

Some media estimates

In December 2005 President Bush said there were 30,000 Iraqi dead. White House spokesman Scott McClellan later said it was "not an official government estimate", and was based on media reports.

For 2006, a January 2, 2007, Associated Press article reports: "The tabulation by the Iraqi ministries of Health, Defence and Interior, showed that 14,298 civilians, 1,348 police and 627 soldiers had been killed in the violence that raged across the country last year. The Associated Press figure, gleaned from daily news reports from Baghdad, arrived at a total of 13,738 deaths." The Australian reports in a January 2, 2007, article: "A figure of 3700 civilian deaths in October '[2006]', the latest tally given by the UN based on data from the Health Ministry and the Baghdad morgue, was branded exaggerated by the Iraqi Government." Iraqi government estimates include "people killed in bombings and shootings but not deaths classed as 'criminal'." Also, they "include no deaths among the many civilians wounded in attacks who may die later from wounds. Nor do they include many people kidnapped whose fate remains unknown."

A June 25, 2006, Los Angeles Times article, "War's Iraqi Death Toll Tops 50,000", reported that their estimate of violent deaths consisted "mostly of civilians" but probably also included security forces and insurgents. It added that, "Many more Iraqis are believed to have been killed but not counted because of serious lapses in recording deaths in the chaotic first year after the invasion, when there was no functioning Iraqi government, and continued spotty reporting nationwide since." Here is how the Times got its number: "The Baghdad morgue received 30,204 bodies from 2003 through mid-2006, while the Health Ministry said it had documented 18,933 deaths from 'military clashes' and 'terrorist attacks' from April 5, 2004, to June 1, 2006. Together, the toll reaches 49,137. However, samples obtained from local health departments in other provinces show an undercount that brings the total well beyond 50,000. The figure also does not include deaths outside Baghdad in the first year of the invasion."

Reviews

A 2008 review of Iraqi death estimates concluded that 600,000 deaths between 2003 and 2006 likely undercounted total mortality:

Studies assessed as the highest quality, those using population-based methods, yielded the highest estimates... Our review indicates that, despite varying estimates, the mortality burden of the war and its sequelae on Iraq is large... Of the population-based studies, the Roberts and Burnham studies provided the most rigorous methodology as their primary outcome was mortality... not surprisingly their studies have been roundly criticized given the political consequences of their findings and the inherent security and political problems of conducting this type of research.

A 2016 review came to similar conclusions, stating that estimates of very high Iraqi casualties published in the journal Lancet are

"...widely viewed among peers as the most rigorous investigations of Iraq War–related mortality among Iraqi civilians; we agree with this assessment and believe that the [PLOS] study is also scientifically rigorous... [Iraqi civilian deaths] in fact, may have been underestimated by these scientifically conservative studies."

According to a 2017 review by Keith Krause of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, "the consensus seems to be that around 150,000 people died violently as a result of the fighting between 2003 and 2006."

Undercounting

Some studies estimating the casualties due to the war in Iraq say there are various reasons why the estimates and counts may be low.

Morgue workers have alleged that official numbers underestimate the death toll. The bodies of some casualties do not end up in morgue and thus may go unrecorded. In 2006, The Washington Post reported: "Police and hospitals often give widely conflicting figures of those killed in major bombings. In addition, death figures are reported through multiple channels by government agencies that function with varying efficiency."

A January 31, 2008 Perspective in the New England Journal of Medicine contains the following discussion of undercounting Iraqi civilian casualties in household surveys:

... sometimes it was problematic or too dangerous to enter a cluster of households, which might well result in an undercount; data from the Iraq Body Count on the distribution of deaths among provinces were used to calculate estimates in these instances. If the clustering of violent deaths wasn't accurately captured, that could also increase uncertainty. The sampling frame was based on a 2004 count, but the population has been changing rapidly and dramatically because of sectarian violence, the flight of refugees, and overall population migration. Another source of bias in household surveys is underreporting due to the dissolution of some households after a death, so that no one remains to tell the former inhabitants' story.

The Washington Post noted in 2008 that

research has shown that household surveys typically miss 30 to 50 percent of deaths. One reason is that some families that have suffered violent deaths leave the survey area. ... Some people are kidnapped and disappear, and others turn up months or years later in mass graves. Some are buried or otherwise disposed of without being recorded. In particularly violent areas, local governments have effectively ceased to function, and there are ineffective channels for collecting and passing information between hospitals, morgues and the central government.

The October 2006 Lancet study states:

Aside from Bosnia, we can find no conflict situation where passive surveillance [used by the IBC] recorded more than 20% of the deaths measured by population-based methods [used in the Lancet studies]. In several outbreaks, disease and death recorded by facility-based methods underestimated events by a factor of ten or more when compared with population-based estimates. Between 1960 and 1990, newspaper accounts of political deaths in Guatemala correctly reported over 50% of deaths in years of low violence but less than 5% in years of highest violence.

The report describes no other specific examples except for this study of Guatemala.

Juan Cole wrote in October 2006 that even though heavy fighting could be observed, none of the Iraqi casualties in the skirmishes were reported on, which suggests undercounting.

A July 28, 2004, opinion piece by Robert Fisk published by The Independent reports that "some families bury their dead without notifying the authorities."

Stephen Soldz, who runs the website "Iraq Occupation and Resistance Report", wrote in a February 5, 2006, article:

Of course, in conditions of active rebellion, the safer areas accessible to Western reporters are likely to be those under US/Coalition control, where deaths are, in turn, likely to be due to insurgent attacks. Areas of insurgent control, which are likely to be subject to US and Iraqi government attack, for example most of Anbar province, are simply off-limits to these reporters. Thus, the realities of reporting imply that reporters will be witness to a larger fraction of deaths due to insurgents and a lesser proportion of deaths due to US and Iraqi government forces.

An October 19, 2006, The Washington Post article reports:

The deaths reported by officials and published in the news media represent only a fraction of the thousands of mutilated bodies winding up in Baghdad's overcrowded morgue each month. ... Bodies are increasingly being dumped in and around Baghdad in fields staked out by individual Shiite militias and Sunni insurgent groups. Iraqi security forces often refuse to go to the dumping grounds, leaving the precise number of bodies in those sites unknown. Civilian deaths, unlike those of American troops, often go unrecorded.

The Australian reported in January 2007 that Iraqi government casualty estimates do not count deaths classed as 'criminal', deaths of civilians who get wounded and die later from the wounds, or kidnap victims who have not been found.

The Iraq Body Count project (IBC) stated in November 2004 that "we have always been quite explicit that our own total is certain to be an underestimate of the true position, because of gaps in reporting or recording".

Underreporting by U.S. authorities

An April 2005 article by The Independent reports:

A week before she was killed by a suicide bomber, humanitarian worker Marla Ruzicka forced military commanders to admit they did keep records of Iraqi civilians killed by US forces. ... in an essay Ms Ruzicka wrote a week before her death on Saturday and published yesterday, the 28-year-old revealed that a Brigadier General told her it was "standard operating procedure" for US troops to file a report when they shoot a non-combatant. She obtained figures for the number of civilians killed in Baghdad between February 28 and April 5 [2005], and discovered that 29 had been killed in firefights involving US forces and insurgents. This was four times the number of Iraqi police killed.

The December 2006 report of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) found that the United States has filtered out reports of violence in order to disguise its perceived policy failings in Iraq. A December 7, 2006, McClatchy Newspapers article reports that the ISG found that U.S. officials reported 93 attacks or significant acts of violence on one day in July 2006, yet "a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light more than 1,100 acts of violence." The article further reports:

The finding confirmed a September 8 McClatchy Newspapers report that U.S. officials excluded scores of people killed in car bombings and mortar attacks from tabulations measuring the results of a drive to reduce violence in Baghdad. By excluding that data, U.S. officials were able to boast that deaths from sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital had declined by more than 52 percent between July and August, McClatchy newspapers reported.

From the ISG report itself:

A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. personnel doesn't count.

Casualties caused by criminal and political violence

U.S. Army medics lift a wounded Iraqi police officer into an ambulance (March 2007)

In May 2004, Associated Press completed a survey of the morgues in Baghdad and surrounding provinces. The survey tallied violent deaths from May 1, 2003, when President Bush declared an end to major combat operations, through April 30, 2004.

From the AP article:

In Baghdad, a city of about 5.6 million, 4,279 people were recorded killed in the 12 months through April 30, [2004], according to figures provided by Kais Hassan, director of statistics at Baghdad's Medicolegal Institute, which administers the city's morgues. "Before the war, there was a strong government, strong security. There were a lot of police on the streets and there were no illegal weapons", he said during an AP reporter's visit to the morgue. "Now there are few controls. There is crime, revenge killings, so much violence." The figure does not include most people killed in big terrorist bombings, Hassan said. The cause of death in such cases is obvious so bodies are usually not taken to the morgue, but given directly to victims' families. Also, the bodies of killed fighters from groups like the al-Mahdi Army are rarely taken to morgues.

Accidental trauma deaths from car accidents, falls, etc. are not included in the numbers. The article reports that the numbers translate to 76 killings per 100,000 people in Baghdad, compared to 39 in Bogotá, Colombia, 7.5 in New York City, and 2.4 in neighboring Jordan. The article states that there were 3.0 killings per 100,000 people in Baghdad in 2002 (the year before the war). Morgues surveyed in other parts of Iraq also reported large increases in the number of homicides. Karbala, south of Baghdad, increased from an average of one homicide per month in 2002 to an average of 55 per month in the year following the invasion; in Tikrit, north of Baghdad, where there were no homicides in 2002, the rate had grown to an average of 17 per month; in the northern province of Kirkuk, the rate had increased from 3 per month in 2002 to 34 per month in the survey period.

See also

• Casualty recording
• Center for Civilians in Conflict
• Civilian casualty ratio
• Health in Iraq
• International Criminal Court and the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• Iraq Body Count project
• Iraq Family Health Survey
• Lancet surveys of Iraq War casualties
• List of aviation shootdowns and accidents during the Iraq War
• ORB survey of Iraq War casualties
• Post-traumatic stress disorder
• United States military casualties of war
• Violence against academics in post-invasion Iraq

External links

• "Likely Humanitarian Scenarios", UN internal memo predicting 100,000 direct and 400,000 indirect casualties as a result of the invasion.
• "iraqimemorial.org", online database and traveling exhibition of proposals and projects to memorialize the civilian casualties in Iraq.
• "Eyes Wide Open" Archived February 3, 2005, at the Wayback Machine, a traveling exhibition on the human cost of war

Human rights abuses

Spc. Charles Graner poses over Manadel al-Jamadi's corpse.

Main article: Human rights in post-Saddam Iraq

Throughout the entire Iraq war there have been numerous human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict.

Occupation forces

Some of the most publicized abuses include:

• Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse
• Detainees held within Iraq without due process in various occupation bases and prisons.
• Beating and torturing of Iraqi minors by UK forces, including the drowning of a 15 year old teenager.

Insurgent forces

The Islamic militant groups Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Islam and others are responsible for numerous atrocities, including:

• The publicized murders of several non-military persons including; Paul Marshall Johnson, Jr., Eugene Armstrong, Jack Hensley, Kim Sun-il, Kenneth Bigley, Shosei Koda, Fabrizio Quattrocchi, Margaret Hassan and Seif Adnan Kanaan.
• Suicide attacks on the Iraqi civilian population.
• Torture and murder of civilians associated with either the occupying forces or the new Iraqi government.
• Indiscriminate use of land mines and other IEDs

Water tower in Nasiriyah, unusable because of war damage.

Iraqi government

Other abuses have been blamed on the new Iraqi government, including:

• The widespread use of torture by Iraqi security forces.[80]
• Shiite-run death squads run out of the Interior Minitry that are accused of committing numerous massacres of Sunni Arabs.[81][82]

After suffering 4 months of setbacks, the Iraqi Government nominated Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister. Al Meliki's role is to select a cabinet within four weeks.

Financial Costs

As of March 31, 2006, over $251 billion has been allocated by the US Congress for the Iraqi war, as well as the war in Afghanistan.

It is not known how much more money has been spent by other members of the coalition, especially the UK--however, the US's share of the cost is by far the largest.

Ever since the beginning of the war, President Bush has not included the cost of the Iraq war and occupation in the regular defense spending request. Instead he has submitted emergency spending bills to Congress to cover those estimated costs of the war and occupation. These are best documented in a series of Congressional Research Service reports. The April 24, 2006 report is briefly summarized and available in full here [83].

By some estimates, the total costs of the Iraq War on the US economy could top $2 trillion [84].

References

• ^ Hague Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities, article one.
• ^ "Powell calls pre-Iraq U.N. speech a 'blot' on his record". USAToday, 8 September 2005.
• An Ounce of Prevention- Looting of Munitions- Sept 2005
• The Borgen Project
• ^ Secretary Colin L. Powell, "Interview On BBC's NewsNight". state.gov (Washington, DC), February 20 2003.

February 20, 2003.

• ^ "U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council". whitehouse.gov, February 5 2003.
• ^ Smith, Michael, "The war before the war". New Statesman, 30 May 2005.
• ^ "Iraq Poll 2003". gallup-international.
• ^ "Post War Iraq Poll". gallup-international.
• ^ , Dana, Bash, "White House pressed on 'mission accomplished' sign; Navy suggested it, White House made it, both sides say". CNN Washington Bureau, Wednesday, October 29 2003.
• ^ Karon, Tony, "Why Turks and Kurds Prize Kirkuk : Kurdish fighters have captured Kirkuk and Turkey is agitated. The U.S. could soon find itself policing an ugly brawl". Time Magazine, Thursday, 10 April 2003.
• ^ "Operation Iraqi Freedom Maps". globalsecurity.org.
• ^ Soriano, Cesar G., and Steven Komarow, "Poll: Iraqis out of patience". USA TODAY. 30 April 2004 6:54 AM.
• ^ "President Regrets 'Bring 'Em On'". NewsMax.com Wires, Friday, 14 January 2005.

See also

Years in Iraq

• 2003 in Iraq
• 2004 in Iraq
• 2005 in Iraq
• 2006 in Iraq
• Human rights in post-Saddam Iraq
• Reconstruction of Iraq

General

• List of wars 2003–current
• List of people associated with the 2003 invasion of Iraq

Multinational forces

• Australian contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• Deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq
• Polish contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• "You forgot Poland"

Casualties

• Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003
• Suicide bombings in Iraq since 2003

Other related articles and concepts

• Popular opposition to the 2003 Iraq War
• List of Coalition aircraft crashes in Iraq
• Foreign hostages in Iraq
• United States and weapons of mass destruction
• British Mandate of Iraq
• Dover test
• Military rule
• 2004 energy crisis
• Opposition to the Iraq War

Iraq War literature

• Night Draws Near (2005) by Anthony Shadid

External articles

Road to War

• White House Meeting Memo; Details of 31 January 2003 private meeting between George W. Bush and Tony Blair where they discussed using U.S. spyplanes in UN colours to lure Saddam Hussein into war.
• UK Attorney-General leak; Legal advice given to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair weeks before the 2003 invasion.
• Presidential address given by George W. Bush on the evening of March 19, 2003, announcing war.

Iraqi Sources

• Iraq documents on Weapons of Mass Destruction This is a U.S. military site containing approximately 1 million files captured from the Iraqi military in the aftermath of the invasion.

Opinions and polls

• Extraordinary renditions: the playwright and the president; Jeff Sommers, Khaled Diab and Charles Woolfson explore the dynamics between playwright and president as America's 'war on terror' stands in the dock. January 2006, published in Al Ahram Weekly
• Caspar Henderson, "Three polls: attitudes across frontiers". 12 December 2002.
• Karl Zinsmeister, "What Iraqis Really Think". Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2003.
• "1st Major Survey of Iraq". Zogby International, September 10, 2003.
• Carl Conetta, "What do Iraqis want? Iraqi attitudes on occupation, U.S. withdrawal, governments, and quality of life". Project on Defense Alternatives, 01 February 2005.
• "Iraq". Polling Report.com. (ed. Chronological polls of Americans 18 & older)

Casualties

• Carl Conetta, "The Wages of War; Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict". Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #8, 20 October 2003.
• Hamit Dardagan, et. al., "Iraq Body Count". (ed. reportedly comprehensive tally of deaths resulting from the war and occupation based on media reports compiled by various antiwar activists.)

Combat operations related

• "Aerial Propaganda Leaflet Database". Psywar.org, 06 November 2005. (ed. Iraq War PSYOP leaflets and posters)

News

• The Struggle for Iraq: BBC Best Link: All the latest news, analysis and images from Iraq.
• War in Iraq: CNN Special Report: This page was archived in May 2003 when President Bush declared an end to major combat. However, the coalition casualties list continues to be updated.
• Iraq: Transition of Power: CNN Special Report: Three years later, debate rages.

Anti-war activists and war critics

• David Shuster, "Road to war; How the Bush administration sold the Iraq War to American people". MSNBC, Nov. 8, 2005
• Charlie and Katrina, "Mourning the Vote". (ed. Students (Boston University and Oglethorpe University) site presenting their opinion about the Iraq War)
• OnlyOneWorld.NET Contains information, news, and opinion on the Iraq War.
• What Barry Says Written by Barry McNamara in 2003, Winner of the Best Animation award at the Brooklyn International Film Festival and Portobello Film Festival in 2004.
• [85] Dahr Jamail's Iraq Dispatches. Independent journalist in Iraq. Many despatches, reports and photos.

War supporters and operation proponents

• Victor Davis Hanson, "An American 'Debacle'? More unjustified negativity on the war in Iraq." National Review Online, October 14, 2005.
• An interesting analogy presented by Jessica Well where she shows a Life magazine article from 1946 discussing the failures of Denazification entitled Americans are Losing the Victory in Europe

Economics

• Scott Wallsten and Katrina Kosec, "The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq". AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper 05-19. September 2005.
• Online cost estimator allows users to change assumptions for predicting expected future cost of the Iraq war.
• "Dollar cost of war". (ed. Reportedly actual total of the U.S. taxpayer cost of the Iraq War.)
• "Iraq war costs could top $2 trillion". Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 10, 2006 based on "The Economic Costs of the Iraq War" by Linda Bilmes, Harvard University, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, laureate of the Nobel Prize of Economics in 2001.

Media Echo

• Eliot Weinberger: What I Heard About Iraq in 2005, and What I Heard about Iraq (a collage of various statements concerning the war)

• Tatham, Steve (2006), 'Losing Arab Hearts & Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera & Muslim Public Opinion' Hurst & Co (London) Published 1 Jan 06