Shock and awe: Difference between revisions
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[[Image:Nagasakibomb.jpg|thumb|250px|According to its original theorists, Shock and Awe renders an adversary unwilling to resist through overwhelming displays of power. Frequent comparisons are made by these theorists to the effect of the [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]].<ref name="common">Chernus, I. (January 27, 2003) " Shock & Awe: Is Baghdad the Next Hiroshima?" ''Common Dreams News Center'' [http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0127-08.htm article at CommonDreams.org] accessed July 26, 2006.</ref>]] |
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'''Rapid Dominance''' is a military doctrine that has as its main principles "overwhelming decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness," "dominant maneuvers," and "spectacular displays of power" (also known as '''Shock and Awe''') as a means of destroying an adversary's will to fight and adversely affecting the psychology and the will of the enemy to resist. The doctrine was written by Harlan K. Ullman and James. P. Wade and is a product of the [[National Defense University]] of the [[United States]]. The military operation named "Shock and Awe" signaled the beginning of the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]]. Debate exists as to whether or not this operation actually was a true Rapid Dominance campaign or truly elicited Shock and Awe. |
'''Rapid Dominance''' is a military doctrine that has as its main principles "overwhelming decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness," "dominant maneuvers," and "spectacular displays of power" (also known as '''Shock and Awe''') as a means of destroying an adversary's will to fight and adversely affecting the psychology and the will of the enemy to resist. The doctrine was written by Harlan K. Ullman and James. P. Wade and is a product of the [[National Defense University]] of the [[United States]]. The military operation named "Shock and Awe" signaled the beginning of the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]]. Debate exists as to whether or not this operation actually was a true Rapid Dominance campaign or truly elicited Shock and Awe. |
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Critics point out that the words "shock" and "awe" are both [[synonym]]s of [[terror]]. Shock and awe is in many ways difficult to distinguish from [[terrorism]] because of the large number of [[collateral damage|indiscriminate civilian deaths]]. For example, mortality due to violence in Iraq since 2003, for example, has been due to coalition forces far more than insurgents,[http://www.ukwatch.net/article/983] estimated by ''The Lancet'' researchers as about 285,000 people in the first 18 months of invasion (reported as "at least 100,000.") Shock and awe has has rarely succeeded as a military tactic. After several days of bombing, many Iraqis in Baghdad continued with working and shopping as bombs fell around them. |
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==Doctrine of Rapid Dominance== |
==Doctrine of Rapid Dominance== |
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Apparently, the "Bush administration throttle[d] back on the Iraqi bombing"[http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=31858] and the original plan was scrubbed days before its implementation on "political concerns over civilian casualties factored into the decision."[http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=31858] |
Apparently, the "Bush administration throttle[d] back on the Iraqi bombing"[http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=31858] and the original plan was scrubbed days before its implementation on "political concerns over civilian casualties factored into the decision."[http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=31858] |
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==Criticism of the doctrine== |
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Shock and awe a a doctrine has met significant criticism from both military and civilian sectors. United States theorists have criticized its assumptions of total information awareness, unmatched technology, and assumptions of symmetric warfare. |
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In coverage by [[mass media]] before the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|United States' invasion of Iraq]], "Shock and Awe" was often used to mean an indiscriminate "[[Doomsday]]" or [[Terror bombing|terror aerial bombardment]] <ref>Oliver Burkeman, "[http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,921286,00.html Shock tactics]", [[The Guardian]], [[25 March]] [[2003]].</ref>. Critics of the war compared the plans of the United States to the [[bombing of Guernica]] during the [[Spanish Civil War]],<ref>Gar Smith, "[http://www.alternet.org/story/15027 Shock and Awe: Guernica Revisited]", [[Alternet]], [[27 January]] [[2003]].</ref> and described such plans as savagery.<ref name="common" /> The [[United States armed forces]] had said that targets, munitions and attack times were chosen to minimize civilian casualties |
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<ref>"[http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/22/opinion/22SAT1.html?th The Blitz Over Baghdad]", [[The New York Times]], [[22 March]] [[2003]].</ref>. |
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Shock and awe has has rarely succeeded as a military tactic. After several days of bombing, many Iraqis in Baghdad continued with working and shopping as bombs fell around them, going on with their everyday lives. The Shock and Awe attack was perhaps too precise because it did not instill terror in Iraqis.<ref>Trivedi, B. (Feb. 14, 2005) "Inside Shock and Awe" ''National Geographic Channel'' [http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/channel/blog/2005/03/explorer_shockawe.html story at nationalgeographic.com] accessed July 26, 2006.</ref> Shock and Awe–style warfare has proven to be even less effective against the extended insurgency than against Iraq's military. |
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===Shock and awe versus terrorism=== |
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At face value, the doctrine of shock and awe shares much in common with the tenets of terrorism, with both intending to affect political outcomes through non-traditional uses of military power. American supporters of Shock and Awe claim that unlike terrorism, Shock and Awe does not deliberately target civilians, although civilians could be killed. Critics however, point to the difficulty in reducing civilian casualties while bombing locations with high civilian population density. |
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Ullman and Wade themselves write, "the ability to Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the ability to frighten, scare, intimidate, and disarm." (Chapter 2) |
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Excluding considerations of moral supremacy, it is difficult to determine if Shock and Awe is empirically different from terrorism, as both tactics' primary goal is to elicit terror, shock and awe. The words "shock" and "awe" are in fact both synonyms of "terror." [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=shock] [http://thesaurus.reference.com/search?q=awe] |
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===Indiscriminate civilian deaths=== |
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Exemplifying the problem of indiscriminate civilian deaths inherent in execution of the Shock and Awe doctrine, anti-war author [[Noam Chomsky]] writes in ''[[Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy]],'' about the deaths at the onset of the [[2003 Invasion of Iraq]]: |
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:''The ''Lancet'' study estimating 100,000 probable deaths by October 2004 elicited enough comment in England that the government had to issue an embarrassing denial, but in the United States virtual silence prevailed. The occasional oblique reference usually describes it as the "controversial" report that "as many as 100,000" Iraqis died as a result of the invasion. The figure of 100,000 was the most probable estimate, on conservative assumptions; it would be at least as accurate to describe it as the report that "as few as 100,000" died. Though the report was released at the height of the U.S. presidential campaign, it appears that neither of the leading candidates was ever publicly questioned about it.'' [http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=73753] |
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Other sources support this estimate of large numbers of civilian deaths, often — and even commonly — referred to by the [[euphemism]]s "causalties" or "[[collateral damage]]." [http://www.ukwatch.net/article/983] One of the authors of the ''Lancet'' study in question has stated in a letter to the U.K. ''Independent'' newspaper, “Please understand how extremely conservative we were: we did a survey estimating that 285,000 people have died due to the first 18 months of invasion and occupation and we reported it as at least 100,000.” [http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Feb2006/davies0206.html] |
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==Popular culture== |
==Popular culture== |
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Revision as of 22:51, 30 July 2006
 | The neutrality of this article is disputed. |
Rapid Dominance is a military doctrine that has as its main principles "overwhelming decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness," "dominant maneuvers," and "spectacular displays of power" (also known as Shock and Awe) as a means of destroying an adversary's will to fight and adversely affecting the psychology and the will of the enemy to resist. The doctrine was written by Harlan K. Ullman and James. P. Wade and is a product of the National Defense University of the United States. The military operation named "Shock and Awe" signaled the beginning of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Debate exists as to whether or not this operation actually was a true Rapid Dominance campaign or truly elicited Shock and Awe.
Doctrine of Rapid Dominance
Rapid Dominance is defined by its authors, Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, as attempting "to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe."[1] Further, Rapid Dominance will
- "impose this overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on . . . [to] seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at the tactical and strategic levels."[2]
Introduced in a report to the United States' National Defense University in 1996, Ullman and Wade describe it as an attempt to develop a post-Cold War military doctrine for the United States. Rapid Dominance and Shock and Awe, they write, may become a "revolutionary change" as the United States military is reduced in size and information technology is increasingly integrated into warfare.[3] Subsequent U.S. military authors have written that Rapid Dominance exploits "superior technology, precision engagement, and information dominance" of the United States.[4]
Ullman and Wade identify four vital characteristics of Rapid Dominance: "near total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and environment; rapidity and timeliness in application; operational brilliance in execution; and (near) total control and signature management of the entire operational environment."[5]
Shock and Awe is most consistently used by Ullman and Wade as the effect which Rapid Dominance seeks to impose upon an adversary. It is the desired state of helplessness and lack of will. It can be induced, they write, by direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of disinformation, overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action.
Evolution from Decisive Force
The doctrine of Rapid Dominance has evolved from the concept of Decisive Force. Ullman and Wade enumerate the elements between the two concepts in terms of objective, use of force, force size, scope, speed, causualties, and technique.
Historical applications of Shock and Awe
Ullman and Wade argue that there have been military applications that fall within some of the concepts of Shock and Awe. They enummberate nine examples.
- Overwhelming Force: The "application of massive or overwhelming force" to "disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as few causualities to ourselves and to noncombatants as possible."
- Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The establishment of Shock and Awe through "instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems."
- Massive Bombardment: Described as the "precise destructive power largely against military targets and related sectors over time."
- Blitzkrieg: The "intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of scale."
- Sun Tzu: The "selective, instant decapitation of military or societal targets to achieve Shock and Awe."
- Haitian Example: The "imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and indeed through deception, misinformation, and disinformation."
- The Roman Legions: "Achieving Shock and Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary’s perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own invincibility."
- Decay and Default: "The imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period, but without the application of massive destruction."
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police: The selective application of force emphasizing "standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in place" to attain military objectives.
Iraq War
Before the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, officials in the United States armed forces described their plan as employing Shock and Awe.[6] During the war, however, Harlan K. Ullman, principal author of Shock and Awe, said the United States did not execute a Shock and Awe campaign.[7]
Limited bombing began on 19 March 2003 as United States forces unsuccessfully attempted to kill Saddam Hussein. Attacks continued against a small number of targets until 21 March, when at 1700 UTC the main bombing campaign of the Coalition began. Its forces launched approximately 1700 air sorties (504 using cruise missiles).[8] Coalition ground forces had begun a "running start" offensive towards Baghdad on the previous day, attempting to strike quickly. Coalition ground forces seized Baghdad on 5 April, and the United States declared victory on 14 April.
Whether or to what extent the United States fought a campaign of Shock and Awe is unclear by contradictory post-war assessments. Within two weeks of the United States' victory declaration, on 27 April, the Washington Post published an interview with Iraqi military personnel detailing demoralization and lack of command.[9] According to the soldiers, Coalition bombing was surprisingly widespread and had a severely demoralising effect. When United States tanks passed through the Iraqi military's Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units outside Baghdad to Saddam's presidential palaces, it caused a shock to troops inside Baghdad. Iraqi soldiers said there was no organization intact by the time the United States entered Baghdad, and that resistance crumbled under the presumption that "it wasn't a war, it was suicide."
In contrast, in an October 2003 presentation to the United States House Committee on Armed Services, staff of the United States Army War College did not attribute their performance to Rapid Dominance. Rather, they cited technological superiority and "Iraqi ineptitude."[10] The speed of the Coalition's actions ("rapidity"), they said, did not affect Iraqi morale. Further, they said that Iraqi armed forces ceased resistance only after direct force-on-force combat within cities.
The operation "shock and awe" described the initiation of the Iraqi campaign and not the fight against the insurgency.
Criticism of execution
The principal author of "Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance," Harlan Ullman was one of the most vocal critics of the "Shock an Awe" campaign. Ullman stated "The current campaign does not appear to correspond to what we envisioned."[1] In addition, "the bombing that lit up the Baghdad night skies the next day, and in the following days, did not match the force, scope and scale of the broad-based shock-and-awe plan, Ullman and U.S. officials say."[2] In a quesiton directed to Ullman, asking if "it too late for shock and awe now?" Ullman responded "We have not seen it; it is not coming."[3]
The original "shock and awe, as planned, was supposed to be a short but ferocious and nonstop bombing campaign simultaneously directed across a broad number of targets – from command-and-control centers in Baghdad to the Baath Party headquarters there to the Republican Guard divisions in the field. More firepower was to be unleashed on Iraq in just the first few days of the operation than in the entire 38-day air campaign of the 1991 Gulf war – with the goal being to stun Saddam's regime into surrendering."[4] Ullman noted that plan called for "an attack into the center of Baghdad, taking it over, followed by successive takeovers expanding from the center of the city."[5] Also the "bombing campaign did not immediately go after Iraqi military forces in the field, particularly the Republican Guard divisions and political levers of power, such as the Baath Party headquarters."[6] Instead Ullman, states that the "shock and awe" implementation was more of a seige.[7]
Apparently, the "Bush administration throttle[d] back on the Iraqi bombing"[8] and the original plan was scrubbed days before its implementation on "political concerns over civilian casualties factored into the decision."[9]
Popular culture
Following the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, the term "shock and awe" has been used for commercial purposes. The United States Patent and Trademark Office received at least 29 applications using "Shock and Awe."[11] The first came from a fireworks company on the day the United States started bombing Baghdad. The video game manufacturers Midway Games and Sony have attempted to use "shock and awe" in titles, but met with criticism. Miscellaneous uses of the term include golf equipment, an insecticide, a horse and a set of bowling balls called Shock & Awe and Total Shock & Awe by the company MoRich. Neil Young's 2006 album "Living With War" features a song titled "Shock and Awe." The album largely represented Young's response to the invasion of Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom).
See also
References
- ^ Harlan K. Ullmann and James P. Wade, Shock And Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (National Defense University, 1996), XXIV.
- ^ Ullmann and Wade, Shock and Awe, XXV.
- ^ Ullmann and Wade, Shock and Awe, Prologue.
- ^ David J. Gibson, Shock and Awe: A Sufficient Condition for Victory? (Newport: United States Naval War College, 2001), 17.
- ^ Ullmann and Wade, Shock and Awe, XII.
- ^ "Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage" (CBS News, 24 January 2003.
- ^ Paul Sperry, "No shock, no awe: It never happened", World Net Daily, 3 April 2003.
- ^ "Operation Iraqi Freedom - By the Numbers", USCENTAF, 30 April 2003, 15.
- ^ William Branigin, "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers", Washington Post, 27 October 2003.
- ^ "Iraq and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy", presentation by the United States Army War College to United States House Committee on Armed Services, 21 October 2003.
- ^ Robert Longley, "Patent Office Suffers 'Shock and Awe' Attack", About.com, 27 October 2003.
Further reading
- Blakesley, Paul J. "Shock and Awe: A Widely Misunderstood Effect". United States Army Command and General Staff College, 17 June 2004.
- Branigin, William. "A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq's Military Officers". Washington Post, 27 October 2003.
- Peterson, Scott. "US mulls air strategies in Iraq". Christian Science Monitor, 30 January 2003.
- Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. Shock And Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. National Defense University, 1996. PDF available here (4.4MBs).
- Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons. Royal United Services Institute in Defense Studies, 1998.
External links
Text:
- Shock and awe, from SourceWatch