Sasanian conquest of Jerusalem
Siege of Jerusalem | |||||||||
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Part of the Roman-Persian Wars | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Byzantine Empire |
Sassanid Persian Empire, Jewish Allies | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Patriarch Zacharias | Shahrbaraz | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
Unknown | Unknown | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
~90,000 Citizens | Minimal |
The Siege of Jerusalem (614 CE) was part of the Roman-Persian Wars, conducted during Khosrau II early seventh-century push into Byzantine established territories. Following the Persian advances into Syria in the previous year, General Shahrbaraz's next target happened to be the famous Byzantine-controlled city of Jerusalem. Providing direct access to the Mediterranean Sea, the city would provide a strategic location for the Persian Empire to begin constructing a naval fleet and its capture would undoubtedly weaken the Byzantine-Empire's overseas strength. After 21 days[1] of relentless siege warfare, Jerusalem's walls yielded and and the conclusive Persian victory resulted in the territorial annexation of Jerusalem, and all of Palestine.
The Siege
Customary to military tradition, when the Persian force arrived outside Jerusalem, Shahrbaraz offered a peaceful transition of power should the city surrender without resistance.[2] The Sassanid general's offer was however rebuffed, and he consequently prepared his troops for a blockade. Shahrbaraz, alongside fellow general Shahin prepared for what would they believed would be a long and fierce siege; given Jerusalem's powerful city fortifications. For twenty non-stop days, the Persians army continually blasted the walls of Jerusalem with ballistas and other military engines.[3] While the Byzantine city was composed primarily of civilians and priesthood, there is mention of a formidable Greek force, which was gathered by monk Abba Modestus to assist Jerusalem.[4] However, once the Greek troops caught eye of the overwhelming Persian army encamped outside the city's walls, they fled fearing a suicidal battle proceeding the siege.[5] Unexpectedly, the city fell quite expeditiously after a short siege, notably due to the Jewish allies' invaluable assistance to the Persian army. The Jews whom had long been marginalized and oppressed in their Roman-controlled homeland, thus had more favorable views toward the Persian invaders. Some 26,000 Jews betrayed the Byzantine Christian population and fought against them.[6] Once the Sassanid army had breached the city's fortifications, the Jewish rebels joined the Persians, and Shahrbaraz ordered a swift razing and looting of Jerusalem. Having recognized the assistance of the Jews in the significant capture, he even gave them the opportunity to personally massacre their Christian enemies.
Aftermath
Shortly after the Persian army entered Jerusalem, unprecedented looting and sacrilege took place. Church after church was burned down alongside the innumerable Christian artifacts, which were stolen or damaged, by the ensuing arson.[7] But Persia's most devastating crime (as regarded by Heraclius and the Byzantine Empire) was stealing the True Cross and carrying it back to their capital as a battle-captured holy relic.[8] The human toll of Jerusalem's razing was also catastrophic, some 90,000 Christian citizens are said to have perished[9] in the sacking, as a result of both the Persian army's actions, but also the commissioned attacking opportunity given to the Jews by Shahrbaraz. Given that Khosrau II generally practiced religious tolerance and did deem Christians respectfully, it is not known why Shahrbaraz ordered such a massacre on the population. One reason could simply have been Shahrbaraz's rage at the resistance that had been offered by Jerusalem's Christian populace. The conquered city would remain in Sassanid control for some fifteen years until Heraclius recovered it in 629.
References
Sources
- Antiochus Strategos, The Capture of Jerusalem by the Persians in 614 AD, F.C. CONYBEARE, English Historical Review 25 (1910) pp. 502-517.