Talk:Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense

Acceptance of incompatibilism

The article states:

Most philosophers accept Plantinga's free will defence, with its implicit incompatibilism…

Yet Compatibilism and incompatibilism:

• seems to indicate that compatibilism has widespread support:

Compatibilism, as championed by the ancient Greek Stoics, Hobbes, Hume and many contemporary philosophers…

• and that it is compatibilism that tends to be supported by theists (see 'Compatibilism in Theology' section) and little indication (just discussion of CS Lewis & indeterminism) that incompatibilism and theism overlap.

This seems rather incongruous. Hrafn^Talk_Stalk(P) 16:12, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Interesting. Meister (2009) is specific in that most philosophers accept Plantinga's argument, and Peterson (1991) says that incompatibilism is implicit in Plantinga's defense. My guess is that the contradiction is due to the poorly sourced nature of the compatibilism article. Gabbe (talk) 18:53, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

This appears to be WP:SYNTH. Meister does not say that they accept incompatibilism, only that they accept the argument. You are synthesising that they accept incompatibilism from the combination of Meister & Peterson. Hrafn^Talk_Stalk(P) 19:23, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

All that Meister says on incompatibilism is "As long as it is logically possible that incompatibilism is true, then the necessary conclusion of the logical problem of evil is undercut." Hrafn^Talk_Stalk(P) 19:26, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Meister doesn't, but Peterson does. Peterson says that "Many contemporary philosophers accept that Plantinga's free will defense, with its implicit incompatibilism, is a strong and effective response to the logical problem of evil" and Meiser says that "Currently, however, most philosophers have agreed that the free will defense has defeated the logical problem of evil". Since Peterson was written two decades ago, and Meiser is from this year, I thought that it was OK to write "Most philosophers accept Plantinga's free will defence, with its implicit incompatibilism". Do you have a suggestion how to reword to avoid the synthesis? Gabbe (talk) 20:28, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

I've reworded to avoid implying that most philosophers accept incompatibilism. Gabbe (talk) 04:18, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

Gabbe

1. I think your current rewording is probably the optimal.
2. If we wanted "implicit incompatibilism" in, we'd probably have to cite purely to Peterson, as Meister appears to be saying that (full-blown certainty of) incompatibilism is not implicit in the argument, merely that the logical possibility of it is.

Incidentally, the opening sentence of Plantinga's defense appears to be loaded with explicit & implicit assumptions:

1. That free will exists
2. That free will is more valuable than the lack of it
3. Explicitly that "all else [is] equal" (clearly untrue) and implicitly that the value of free will is greater than the disvalue of the amount of evil observable
4. That the observable amount of evil is the minimum required for the existence of free will (i.e. that it is not possible to conceive of a world with free will with less evil than the current -- which appears to be a fairly heroic assumption)

Has there been any discussion of these assumptions in the literature? Hrafn^Talk_Stalk(P) 05:49, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

I think what both Meister and Peterson are saying is that "Plantinga has argued that if incompatibilism is logically possible, then it is logically possible that God and evil both exist", rather than "Plantinga has shown that incompatibilism is true".

Regarding the assumptions, I did think about them, but I couldn't find anything in Meister/Peterson, nor in Plantinga's summary. I'll see if I can find an elucidation on the matter in God, Freedom, and Evil when I get the time to go to the library. Gabbe (talk) 09:34, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

The question "Is God's Existence Compatible with the Amount of Moral Evil the World Contains?" is given its own subchapter in Plantinga (1974), but it gets a bit technical. To wit:

The following, however, is possible. There is an action A, a maximal world segment S´ and a member E of S such that

(a) E contains the properties: is significantly free with respect to A in W´ and goes right with respect to A in W´

(b) S´ is included in W´ and includes E's being instantiated, but includes neither E's instantiation's performing A nor E's instantiation's refraining from A

and

(c) if S´ had been actual, E's instantiation would have gone wrong with respect to A.

If this possibility is actual, then God could not have actualized W´.

And so on. I did add Plantinga's own counterargument regarding Mackie and Flew's compatibilism argument to the article, but I haven't yet found an explication regarding the value of free will. Gabbe (talk) 08:31, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Looks more than a little obtuse. The more I think about it, the more difficulty I have in viewing 'incompatibilist free will' as either meaningful or valuable. Incompatibilist 'free will' cannot have its basis in deterministic influences (knowledge, beliefs, instincts, emotions, etc -- anything that can be reduced to neurons firing/brain chemistry/etc), so must be either random (e.g. the influence of quantum fluctuations) and/or externally generated (God/the devil made me do it). I have difficulty seeing either as particularly 'free' or morally valuable. I know that lacking a RS, this is effectively OR. But it seems odd to me that no philosopher has noticed what would appear to be fairly obvious flaws. But even apart from that, I think an article on an argument that is based on an incompatibilist interpretation of free will needs to give the reader some understanding of what 'incompatibilist free will' would look like -- particularly as none of the related articles seem to do so. Hrafn^Talk_Stalk(P) 09:57, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Is the viewpoint that Plantinga is taking Libertarianism (metaphysics)? The chart in the article appears to be implying so. Hrafn^Talk_Stalk(P) 10:14, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Some problems

Before marking this a Good Article, a couple of things should be resolved. The article starts off stating that Augustine's theodicy is widely criticized, but it doesn't make clear how Plantinga improved on it. The summary of Plantinga's argument seems very generic. More specifially, I'm not happy with the following statements:

1. "The argument says that it is possible (or possibly true) that God would create a world of free creatures, who chose to do evil." This is just a plain truism. The argument really needs to show that God could not have done otherwise.
2. As Mackie asked: "Why could [God] not have made men such that they always freely choose the good?" Indeed, that is precisely what Transworld Depravity was supposed to address. I believe (but I'm not sure) this is completely orthogonal to concerns about compatibilism. The free will defense relies on a libertarian notion of free will, but even granted incompatibilism, one may wonder why God could not have actualized a world where agents freely choose only the good, a world in which, to use a religious language, people are only tested to their limits. Plantinga's real contribution, I thought, was to argue that God could not actualize such a world.
3. Some criticism is lacking. Michael Tooley's insistence on the concrete logical problems of evil. Marilyn McCord Adams refers to this as the Logical Problem of Horrendous Evil. Then, David Kellogg Lewis accounts of selective freedom. A good summary of critique is available in this article by Derk Pereboom.
4. Acceptance. This article includes three sentences about the widespread acceptance of the defense. Furthermore, the sources used here, with the notable exception of William Rowe, are committed theists. It would strengthen the neutrality of the article to include the assessments from atheist philosophers of religion as well, e.g., Graham Oppy's "Arguing About Gods", p. 262, where he admits that most philosophers "seem to suppose" the logical argument is refuted, but adds "I do not think this is an accurate assessment of the current state of play." He goes on to argue that Plantinga's defense is inconsistent and relies on controversial assumptions.

Hope this helps, Vesal (talk) 09:41, 21 September 2009 (UTC)

I haven't been working on this article, but I agree with your points. Well, all your points except for 1), that is. :) Plantinga doesn't need to show that God could not have done otherwise, as that would entail a traditional theodicy. Instead he just needs to offer a logical possibility. If his new premise held (that moral good entails moral evil) then it would follow that there is a case where the presence of (moral) evil would not logically deny the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God, and thus the logical problem of evil would no longer be a disproof. This lessens the burden of proof for Plantinga. - Bilby (talk) 14:43, 21 September 2009 (UTC)

Yes, you're absolutely right. I shouldn't have said it like that, but the phrasing in the article feels a bit empty. I will try to fix it. This is a minor issue, though. The most critical thing would be to say something about transworld depravity. It really can't be evaded if this is to be a Good Article on Plantinga's Defense. Vesal (talk) 21:11, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

I agree there. It might also be worth mentioning the transworld sanctity response. I'm inclined to suggest that some coverage of Leibniz's lapse would be valuable as well. Even though it is commonly accepted that omnipotence doesn't mean doing the logically impossible, a formal statement of such seems valuable to Plantinga in forming the groundwork. - Bilby (talk) 22:17, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

Plantinga's actual argument isn't really touched on by this article. Wes Morriston sums it up here: http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/wes/plantfwd.html While the language is technical, this stuff belongs in the article. This article has more details on the criticisms of the FWD than on the actual argument! This is why I believe this article needs serious expansion. 88.68.118.143 (talk) 17:29, 24 October 2009 (UTC)

GA Review

This review is transcluded from Talk:Plantinga's free will defense/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.

Reviewer: Jezhotwells (talk) 16:39, 11 November 2009 (UTC)

GA review (see here for criteria)

1. It is reasonably well written.

   a (prose): b (MoS):

   In a truncated form, Plantinga's argument goes something like this: Could this be reworded in a more encyclopaedic manner - e.g. Plantinga's argument can be summarized as:

   Lead: can we have one sentence summarising the position of those who oppose this idea. The lead should adequately summarize the whole artcile which it does not do at the moment.

2. It is factually accurate and verifiable.

   a (references): b (citations to reliable sources): c (OR):

   I accept all references to print sources in good faith as I cannot check them. The Harvard citation template used {{harvnb}} doesn't seem to work as documented at Template:Harvard citation no brackets. Reading User:RexxS/Cite multiple pages. It might be to do with the naming of the inline citations. Can this be sorted as currently nothing happens when you click on the wiki links, but in fact one should be taken to the citation fo teh summarized work. Fixed the Harvard referencing. It needed the addition of |ref=harv into the target cite book or journal.

3. It is broad in its coverage.

   a (major aspects): b (focused):

4. It follows the neutral point of view policy.

   Fair representation without bias:

5. It is stable.

   No edit wars, etc.:

6. It is illustrated by images, where possible and appropriate.

   a (images are tagged and non-free images have fair use rationales): b (appropriate use with suitable captions):

7. Overall:

   Pass/Fail:

   Some attention to the lead and making the Havard inline citations work corrcetly. On hold for seven days.

   Thanks for fixing my concerns. I am happy to pass this as worthy of GA status. A good concise and clear explanation of a tent of philosophy. Jezhotwells (talk) 14:32, 13 November 2009 (UTC)

Acceptance again

The section claims that Plantinga's argument is widely accepted. There are some references said to be supporting this claim, but they are not quoted. The people actually quoted are partisan sources (in so far as they were on Plantinga's side anyway). Some doubt is shed by the last quote, but then, nothing is really said in it.

The section and the article (as well as other parts of the Wikipedia) completely misses Mackie's answer - or rebuttal - in The Miracle of Theism. Other aspects of the reception are left out, too. I fail to see the neutrality in that. -- Zz (talk) 00:23, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Do you have non-partisan sources saying that Plantinga's argument is not accepted by most philosophers? If not, this feels like a moot point. Meister 2009 explicitly says that the argument is accepted by most philosophers, as does Gutting 2009. I'll look up more exact quotes from them if you'd like. The quotes by specific philosophers are merely meant to reflect this range of opinion. Believe me, I've tried looking for standard textbooks by big university presses saying that Plantinga's argument is hotly contested by scores of other philosophers, but there doesn't seem to be any reliable sources to this effect.

That being said, I'll see if I can find a copy of The Miracle of Theism. Gabbe (talk) 05:57, 21 April 2010 (UTC)

The burden of proof lies on the side asserting something. After checking Gutting and Meister, I rate them as partisan sources as well. Giving one partisan source is ok, as it reflects philosophical debate. But listing partisan sources only is clearly POV.

The Miracle of Theism is a well known work. Even theists like Swinburne rate it as Mackie's magnum opus. I do not trust sources that do not at least address Mackie's answer. It works basically like this: Creating beings with transworld depravity is not logically necessary, but contingent. So god, without need, creates beings condemned to do evil. Complete failure. -- Zz (talk) 12:30, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

What do you mean when you say that Gutting and Meister are "partisan"? They're typical textbooks published by well-renowned presses, is that insufficient? Anyway, if you have suggestions for other reliable secondary sources with contrasting opinions regarding FWD's acceptance among philosophers I'd gladly welcome them, I'm just saying I haven't been able to locate any. Furthermore, regarding the quotes there are as many of them from detractors (Rowe and Oppy) as from proponents (Alston and Adams). Gabbe (talk) 14:21, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

You can be an established philosopher with books by renowned publishing houses and yet clearly be on one side of a philosophical debate. It is quite telling that all your sources are this. And I have already pointed to other views exactly where one would look for them, namely the opposing side of the debate, in this case Mackie. It seems your secondary sources do not even mention that. If they really missed that, they would not be scientific. Do they? And with Mackie's book, you have a pointer to a lot of further literature. -- Zz (talk) 16:36, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

Oh, I thought you were disputing the statement "Most philosophers accept Plantinga's argument". As I said, I haven't found any secondary sources saying that most philosophers do not accept Plantinga's argument, and neither have you provided any. Whether the secondary sources that are cited in the article (ie. Meister, Gutting and Peterson) are "on Plantinga's side" is irrelevant, as long as theirs is the dominant view among philosophers there's no violation of WP:NPOV. Without sources contradicting them (ie. secondary sources that say Plantinga's argument is not widely accepted) we can't just assume that they're wrong, can we? Also, Peterson 1991 (p. 130-133) does address Mackie's objection at length, and still concludes that most philosophers accept the FWD as a persuasive response to the logical problem of evil. Anyway, as I said, I'll try to find a copy of The Miracle of Theism and see if I can get around to including more details of Mackie's argument(s) against the FWD to the Criticism-section. Gabbe (talk) 17:09, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

We are making progress. It is nice to hear that at least one of the sources addresses Mackie's answer. I am careful when statements about numbers come from one side of the debate only, but as long as it is is attributed to the source, it should not be a problem. I suspect the numbers might be different in European philosophy, but I have no numbers anyway. As for English language philosophers still disagreeing with Plantinga, there are Quentin Smith and Raymond Bradley. -- Zz (talk) 17:51, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

Validity of Meister as a source

I've started a discussion of this edit at this place. Please take any discussion there rather than here. Gabbe (talk) 07:52, 7 June 2010 (UTC)

Argument

I quote the following arguments in the article and my comments are found under each argument, numbered accordingly :

1.There are possible worlds that even an omnipotent being can not actualize.

    1.1. This is acceptable if and only if what God creates does not defeat or nullify His own nature or
         existence.

2.A world with morally free creatures producing only moral good is such a world.

    2.1. Following from 1.1., this imagined world does not defeat or nullfiy God's nature or existence,
         hence, God can create it.
    2.2. What may constrain God from creating such a world is that it defeats its very concept or purpose.
         But as an omnipotent being, He can actualize.
    2.3. It is not impossible that morally free creatures can attain a point wherein their actions are
         consistently morally upright. If we have to cite the Scriptures, there are individuals there
         whom God called righteous, Prophet Job, for example. This means that they were able to produce
         moral good only out of free choice.

These 2 arguments denies God's omnipotence on another ground and despite the Scriptural evidence, doubts man's ability to be morally upright consistently. In short, these arguments clearly run counter to Christian theology.

Montenegro620 (talk) 09:03, 22 August 2010 (UTC)

Interesting. However, this talk page is for discussing ways to improve the article (preferably sourced ones), not a general discussion page on the topic. See WP:NOTAFORUM, WP:TALK and WP:V. Gabbe (talk) 16:12, 22 August 2010 (UTC)

Not bad. I do wish that this defense got more attention, if not just so could have more sources for more arguments like this and responses. If you got this from a credible source, you should consider putting it in the article. 68.227.169.133 (talk) 19:30, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Annoyance

I'm a bit annoyed with the definite wording of article , i.e. that Plantinga "solved the problem" , which he obviously did not . There is only proposition that free world with evil is somehow better than world without freedom and evil , but no proof of it . Also , whole concept of "greater good" in incompatible with concept of perfect good (God being perfectly good) . Even more so , Plantiga only demonstrated that God cannot be omnipotent because he need to tolerate certain degree of evil in order to achieve freedom . —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.30.188.198 (talk) 19:51, 29 August 2010 (UTC)

Feel free to make any changes to the article that you think would be improvements, but be prepared to discuss here if you get reverted. See, for example, WP:BRD as well as policies such as WP:V and WP:NOR. Gabbe (talk) 07:03, 30 August 2010 (UTC)

The part that says that it is "solved" is a quote. It's a pretty flawed defense, to be sure, and the acceptance section might be able to use a bit of refining. You also might note the introduction. 68.227.169.133 (talk) 19:23, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Most philosophers accept it?

Does anyone have the actual text that backs up the claim of a majority? All I see is the implication and statement that many do (as Oppy says). That's quite a difference from most. Just asking, really. I just find it curious that there are both 3 critics (including Oppy in the acceptance section) and 3 whom seem to accept it. I also somewhat take issue with the idea that most accept it, as just before the section, it states clearly that it doesn't account for the problem of natural evil, which is almost contradictory with it having been "thoroughly rebutted. Really, I'd just like to see the actual wording that backs this up this assertion if it's available. 68.227.169.133 (talk) 10:08, 15 September 2010 (UTC)