Provisional Irish Republican Army

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA; more commonly referred to as the IRA, the Provos, or by some of its supporters as the army or the 'RA) is an Irish Republican paramilitary organisation dedicated to the end of British rule in Northern Ireland and to a United Ireland. The organisation has been outlawed and classified as a terrorist group in the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States and many other countries. Since its emergence in 1969, its stated aim has been the unification of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as a single sovereign state independent of the United Kingdom, which it believed could only be achieved by an armed campaign against British rule in Northern Ireland. On July 28, 2005, the Provisional IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign, stating that it would work to achieve its aims using "purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means" and that "IRA Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever".

Like all other organisations calling themselves the IRA (see List of IRAs), the Provisionals refer to themselves in public announcements and internal discussions as Óglaigh na hÉireann (literally "Volunteers of Ireland"), the official Irish language title of the Irish Defence Forces (the Irish army).

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An IRA mural in Belfast depicting the hunger strikes of 1981.

Origins

The Provisional IRA has its ideological and organisational roots in the pre-1969 Irish Republican Army. This organisation was the descendant of the defeated faction in the Irish Civil War of 1922-23 when the original Irish Republican Army had split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The subsequent IRA was dedicated to the armed overthrow of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland by force of arms and their replacement with an all-Ireland republic.

The IRA split into two groups at its Special Army Convention in December 1969, over the issue of abstentionism (whether to sit in, or "abstain" from the Dail or parliament of the Republic of Ireland) and over the question of how to respond to the escalating violence in Northern Ireland (see The Troubles. In 1969, serious rioting had broken out in Northern Ireland and hundreds of Catholic homes were destroyed in Belfast by loyalists. The IRA had not been armed or organised to defend the Catholic community, as it had done since the 1920s. The two groups that emerged from the split became known as the Official IRA (which espoused a Marxist analysis of Irish partition) and the Provisional IRA.

The Official IRA did not want to get involved in what it considered to be divisive sectarian violence, nor did it want to launch an armed campaign against Northern Ireland, citing the failure of the IRA's Border Campaign in the 1950s. They favoured building up a political base among the working class (Catholic and Protestant) north and south which would eventually undermine partition. This involved recognising and sitting in elected bodies and north and south of the border. The Provisionals, on the other hand, advocated a robust armed defence of Catholics in the north and an offensive campaign against Northern Ireland to end British rule there. They also denounced the "communist" tendencies of the "Official" faction in favour of traditional Irish republicanism and they refused to recognise the legitimacy of either Northern or southern Irish states.

The Irish government of the day was very concerned about the safety of the Catholic/Irish nationalist community in Northern Ireland and investigated sending arms to "Citizen Defence Committees", which had been set up in Catholic areas. This plan was officially abandoned when the British Army was deployed into Northern Ireland in 1969 to restore law and order. However, a number of ministers of the then Fianna Fáil government in the Republic of Ireland attempted to secretly help the fledgling Provisionals by purchasing arms for them. This gave rise to the Arms Crisis scandal of 1970, and marked the end of Fianna Fail's transition from the "slightly constitutional" party (with an ambiguous attitude to political violence) established by Eamon de Valera in 1926 to a completely constitutional one.

The main figures in the early Provisional IRA were Seán Mac Stiofáin (who served as the organisation's first chief of staff), Ruairí Ó Brádaigh (the first president of Provisional Sinn Féin), Dáithí Ó Conaill, and Joe Cahill. All served on the first Provisional IRA Army Council. The Provisional appellation deliberately echoed the "Provisional Government" proclaimed during the 1916 Easter Rising.

The Provisionals maintained a number of the principles of the pre-1969 IRA. It considered British rule in Northern Ireland and the government of the Republic of Ireland to be illegitimate. Like the pre-1969 IRA, it believed that the IRA Army Council was the legitimate government of the all-island Irish Republic. This belief was based on a complicated series of perceived political inheritances which constructed a legal continuity from the Second Dáil. Most of these abstentionist principles were abandoned in 1986, although Sinn Féin still refuses to take its seats in the British parliament.

As the violence in Northern Ireland steadily escalated, both the Official IRA and Provisional IRA espoused military means to pursue their goals. Unlike the Officials, however, who characterised their violence as purely "defensive" the Provisionals called for a more aggressive campaign against the Northern Ireland state. While the Officials were initially, for a short period, the larger organisation and enjoyed more support from the republican constituency, the Provisionals came to dominate, especially after the Official IRA declared an indefinite ceasefire in 1972. The Provisionals inherited most of the existing IRA organisation in the north by 1971 and the more militant IRA members in the rest of Ireland. In addition they recruited many young nationalists from the north, who had not been involved in the IRA before. These people were known in republican parlance as "sixty niners" (having joined in 1969).

Although the Provisional IRA had a political wing (Provisional Sinn Féin, which split with Official Sinn Féin at the same time as the split in the IRA), the early Provisional IRA was extremely suspicious of political activity, arguing rather for the primacy of armed struggle.

Organisation

The IRA is organised hierarchically. It refers to its ordinary members as volunteers (or óglaigh in Irish). Up until the late 1970s, IRA volunteers were organised according to where they lived. Volunteers living in one area formed a company, which in turn was part of a battalion, which likewise made up brigades.

In the late 1970s, the geographical organisational principle was abandoned by the IRA in many areas in Northern Ireland owing to its inherent security vulnerability. In its place came smaller, tight-knit cells under the direct control of the IRA leadership.

All levels of the IRA are entitled to send delegates to IRA General Army Conventions (GACs). The GAC is the IRA's supreme decision-making authority. Before 1969, GACs met regularly. Since 1970 they have become less frequent, owing to the difficulty in organising such a large gathering of what is an illegal organisation.

The GAC in turn elects a 12-member IRA Executive, which in turn selects seven of its members to form the IRA Army Council. The seats vacated on the Executive are immediately refilled. For day-to-day purposes authority is vested in the Provisional Army Council (PAC) which, as well as directing policy and taking major tactical decisions, appoints a chief of staff from one of its number or, less commonly, from outside its ranks. The chief of staff then appoints an adjutant general as well as a General Headquarters (GHQ), which consists of a number of individual departments. These departments are:

At a regional level, the IRA is divided into a Northern Command, which operates in the area of Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic, and a Southern Command, which operates in the rest of Ireland. There are also organisational units in Britain and the United States.

Strategy 1969-1998

In the early years of the Troubles, the Provisional IRA's strategy was to use as much force as possible to cause the collapse the Northern Ireland administration and to inflict enough casualties on the British forces that the British government would be forced by public opinion to withdraw from Ireland. This was modelled on the success of the Irish Republican Army in the Irish War of Independence 1919-1922. This policy was articulated in slogans such "Victory 1972". However, this policy failed to take into account the strong unionist committment to remain within Great Britain. Previous IRA campaigns from the 1920s to the 1950s had avoided actions in urban centres of Northern Ireland to avoid provoking retaliatory attacks on the Catholic/Nationalist community there. The Provisional IRA determination to do this was one of the principle areas of disagreement between the Provisional and Official IRAs.

The British government held secret talks with the PIRA leadership in 1972 to try and secure a ceasefire based on a compromise settlement within Northern Ireland. The PIRA agreed to a temporary ceasefire from 26th of June to the 9th of July. In July 1972, Provisional leaders, Seán Mac Stíofáin, Dáithí Ó Conaill, Ivor Bell, Seamus Twomey, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness met a British delegation led by William Whitelaw. The IRA leaders refused to consider a peace settlement that did not include a commitment to British withdrawal, a retreat of the British Army to barracks and a release of republican prisoners. The British refused and the talks broke up (Taylor p139).

The Provisional's ultimate goal in this period was the abolition of both the Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland states and their replacement with a new all-Ireland federal Republic, with decentralised governments and parliaments for each of the four Irish historic provinces. This programme was known as Eire Nua - "New Ireland". The Eire Nua programme was discarded by the Provisionals at the end of the 1970s, in favour of new unitary all Ireland Republic.

By the mid 1970s, it was clear that the hopes of the PIRA leadership for a quick military victory were receding. Secret meetings between IRA leaders Ruairí Ó Brádaigh and Billy McKee with British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees secured an IRA ceasfire from February 1975 until January of the next year. The republicans believed that this was the start of a long term process of British withdrawal, however, it seems that Rees was trying to bring the Provisionals into peaceful politics without giving them any guarentees. Critics of the IRA leadership, most notably Gerry Adams, felt that the ceasefire was disastrous for the IRA, leading to infiltration by British informers, the arrest of many activists and a breakdown in IRA discipline - leading to sectarian killings (see next section) and a feud with fellow republicans in the Official IRA. The ceasefire broke down in January 1976 (Taylor p156).

Thereafter, the IRA, under the leadership of Adams and his supporters, evolved a new strategy termed the "Long War", which underpinned IRA strategy for the rest of the Troubles. It involved a re-organistion of the IRA into small cells, an acceptance that their campaing would last many years before being successful and an increased emphasis on political activity. The Green Book, The IRA's training manual, describes the methods of the "Long War" in these terms, "

(1) A war of attrition based on causing as many deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their [the British] people at home for their withdrawal.
(2)A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy's financial interests in our country unprofitable while at the same time curbing long term investment in our country.
(3) To make the Six Counties ... ungovernable except by colonial military rule.
(4) To sustain the war and gain support for its ends by National and Internaional propaganda and publicity campaigns.
(5) By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, collaborators and informers. "(cited in O'Brien p 23).

PIRA prisoners had political status removed from them after 1977. In response, over 500 prisoners refused to wash or wear prison clothes (see Dirty protest and Blanket protest. This activity culminated in the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike, when 7 IRA men (and 3 INLA) starved themselves to death in pursuit of political status.

After the success of IRA Hunger Strikers in mobilising support and winning elections on an Anti H-Block platform in 1981, republicans increasingly devoted time and resources to electoral politics, through the Sinn Féin party. Danny Morrison summed up this policy in a 1982 Ard Fheis (annual meeting) as the "Ballot Box in one hand and the Armalite in the other". (See Armalite and ballot box strategy)

In the 1980s, the PIRA made an attempt to escalate the conflict with the so called "Tet Offensive" (see next section). When this did not prove successful, republican leaders increasing looked for a political compromise to end the conflict. Gerry Adams entered talks with John Hume the SDLP (moderate nationalist) leader and secret talks were also conducted with British civil servants. Thereafter, Adams increasing tried to disassociate Sinn Fein from the IRA, claiming they were separate organisations and refusing to comment on IRA actions. Within the Republican movement (the IRA and Sinn Fein), the new strategy was described by the acronym TUAS (meaning either "Tactical Use of Armed Struggle" or "Totally Unarmed Strategy").

The PIRA ultimately called an indefinite ceasefire in 1994 on the understanding that Sinn Fein would be included in political talks for a settlement. When this did not happen, the IRA called off its ceasfire from November 1996 until July 1997, carrying out several bombing and shooting attacks. After its ceasfire was reinstated, Sinn Fein was admitted into the "Peace Process", which produced the Belfast Agreement of 1998.

Weaponry and operations

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Mural in Derry depicting IRA weapons, 1986

Armament and early campaign

In the early days of the Troubles from around 1969-71, the Provisional IRA was very poorly armed, having available only a handful of old fashioned weapons left over from the IRA's Border campaign of the 1950s. Such weapons included Lee-Enfield rifles, Webley revolvers, and Thompson submachine guns. Their explosives were primarily gelignite - a commercial explosive which they either bought or stole from civilian sources. In the first years of the conflict, the Provisionals' main activity was providing firepower to support nationalist rioters, often very young, defend nationalist areas against attacks from loyalists, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the B-Specials (see Battle of the Bogside). In 1969, the IRA (before the split between Oficial and Provisional factions) had failed to defend nationalist areas of Belfast from loyalist attack - leading to the burning of many Catholic homes. By contrast, Provisional IRA members in the summer of 1970 mounted determined armed defences of the nationalist Short Strand and Clonard areas against loyalist attackers. The PIRA gained much of its support from these activities, as they were widely perceived within the nationalist community as being defenders of Irish nationalist and Catholic people against aggression.

Initially, the British Army was welcomed in nationalist areas as a neutral force compared to the Northern Ireland security forces, but this perception did not outlast incidents such as the Falls Road Curfew of July 1970, when 3000 British troops imposed a curfew on the nationalist Lower Falls area of West Belfast, firing over 1500 rounds of ammunition in gun battles with both the Official and Provisional IRA in the area (Taylor p72). Thereafter, the Provisionals began targeting British soldiers. The first to die was Robert Curtis, killed in a gun battle in February 1971 (Taylor p88). After 1969, the Provisionals received a large ammount of stored IRA weaponry from previous IRA campaigns (though the Official IRA retained some of it). This was mainly World War II era weapons, including Lee Enfields, American M1 Garands, German Schmeiser sub machine guns, Thompsons, Bren guns and Webley revolvers. (Taylor p62). John de Chastelain and the decommissioning body reported that this weaponry was still in IRA arms dumps in 2005.

According to several books about the rise of the PIRA, the IRA began receiving modern arms during the early 1970's. Pro-IRA groups in the Republic of Ireland began suppling the IRA with arms. Most of these were probably the old weaponry listed above, but other arms such as the American made M-16 and British made Sten sub-machine guns also found their way into the hands of the IRA. Unionists also sometimes allege that the PIRA was armed by the Irish Government, though this was not found to be the case when investigated in the Arms Trial. By 1972, The Provisionals had large quantities of modern arms (especially Armalite rifles) procured in the USA. The IRA's main gun runner in the US was George Harrison, an IRA veteran, living in New York since 1938. He bought guns via a Corsican arms dealer named George de Meo, who had organised crime connections (English p116). All sources agree that Harrison was funded by NORAID - the IRA support group in America. Joe Cahill was the liason between NORAID and Harrison. In 1971, the RUC had already captured 700 modern weapons, 2 tonnes of explosive and 157,000 rounds, most of which was US made (English p116). Harrison spent an estimated US$1 million in the 1970s on over 2500 guns (Moloney p16). According to Brendan Hughes (an IRA man, later IRA prison commander in Long Kesh), the IRA smuggled the American arms by sea on the QE2 from New York via Southhampton (Taylor p108). These included AR-15 and Armalite assault rifles, UZI sub-machine guns, and Browning and Smith & Wesson pistols. In addition, another IRA man Gerry Megahey was sent to the US in the late 1970s. He procured Armalite AR15s, Heckler and Koch Hk19s and other weapons, again, funded by Irish American republicans (Taylor p4). Harrison was arrested by the FBI in 1981. Megahey was arrested by the FBI in 1982 in a "sting" operation, while trying to buy surface-to-air missiles (Moloney p16). The last major American arms shipment was intecepted by the Irish authorities in the Marita Ann ship off county Kerry, allegedly after a tip off from IRA informer Sean O'Callaghan (English p117) (Moloney p16) Template:Fn. The other source of IRA arms in the 1970s was Libya, whose leader Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi sympathised with them. The first Libyan arms donation to the PIRA occurred in 1972-3, via Joe Cahill's visits to Libya. Cahill was arrested on board the Claudia in 1973, off Waterford with a shipload of Libyan arms (English p117). This included 250 Russian made rifles, 240 other guns and anti tank mines and other explosives. Its is estimated that three other similar shipments got through at this time (Taylor p156). Moloney reports that Qaddafi also donated US$3-5 million at this time (Moloney p10)Template:Fn

As the conflict escalated in the early 1970s, the numbers recruited by the IRA mushroomed, in response to the nationalist community's anger at events such as the introduction of internment without trial and Bloody Sunday (1972) when the Parachute Regiment of the British army shot dead 13 unarmed civil rights marchers in Derry. The IRA leadership took the opportunity to launch an offensive, believing that they could force a British withdrawal from Ireland by inflicting severe casualties, thus undermining public support in Britain for its continued presence.

The first half of the 1970s was the most intense period of the PIRA campaign. About half the total of 500 or so British soldiers to die in the conflict were killed in the years 1971-1973 (O'Brien p135). In 1972 alone, the IRA killed 100 British soldiers and wounded 500 more. In the same year, they carried out 1,300 explosions and lost over 90 Volunteers killed themselves (O'Brien p19). Up to 1972, The Provisionals controlled large urban areas in Belfast and Derry, but these were eventually re-taken by a major British operation known as Operation Motorman. Thereafter, fortified Police and military posts were built in republican areas throughout Northern Ireland. During this period, a typical IRA operation involved sniping at British patrols, killing local police and soldiers when on or off-duty, and the bombing of commercial targets such as shops and businesses. The most effective tactic the IRA developed for its bombing campaign was the car bomb, where large amounts of explosives were packed into a car, which was driven to its target and then exploded. The most spectaular example of the Provisionals' commercial bombing campaign was Bloody Friday in July 1972 in Belfast city centre, where 22 bombs were exploded, 9 people were killed and 130 injured (Moloney p116). While most of the IRA's attacks on commercial targets were not designed to cause casualties, on many occasions they killed civilian bystanders. Other examples include the bombing of the Abercorn resaurant in Belfast in 1972, where two people were killed and 130 wounded (Mallie Bishop p215) and the bombing of the La Mon restaurant in county Down in February 1977, where 12 customers were killed by an incendiary bomb (Mallie, Bishop p337). In rural areas such as South Armagh, the IRA units most effective weapon was the "culvert-bomb" - where explosives were planted under drains in country roads. This proved so dangerous for British army patrols that all troops in the area had to be transported by helicopter, a policy which they have continued down to the present day. The highest military death toll from an IRA attack came in August 1979, at Warrenpoint, County Down, when 18 British soldiers from the Parachute Regiment were killed by "culvert bombs". Another very effective IRA tactic devised in the 1970s was the use of home-made mortars mounted on the back of trucks that were fired at police and army bases. The most lethal of these attacks came in February 1985, when 9 RUC officers were killed by mortar rounds fired at a police station in Newry.

Accusations of sectarian attacks

The IRA has always argued that its campaign was aimed not at the Protestant/Unionist community, but at the British presence in Ireland, manifested in the British Army and the Northern Ireland security forces. However, many Unionists believe that the IRA's campaign was sectarian and there are many incidents where the organisation targetted Protestant civilians.

The 1970s were the most violent years of the Troubles, with 1972 being the most bloody single year - over 500 people being killed. As well as its campaign against the security forces, the IRA became involved, in the middle of the decade, in a "tit for tat" cycle of sectarian killings with loyalist paramilitaries. The worst example of this occurred in 1976, when a IRA unit in Armagh shot dead ten Protestant building workers at Kingsmills, in reprisal for Ulster Volunteer Force killings of local Roman Catholics. As the IRA campaign continued through the 1970s and '80s, the organisation increasingly targeted RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment servicemen -including when they were off duty. Because these men were almost exclusively Protestant and unionist, these killings were also widely portrayed (and percieved in unionist circles) as a campaign of sectarian assassination. Another example of an IRA sectarian attack happened in 1987, when the IRA placed a bomb near a Remembrance Day service in Enniskillen, killing eleven, mostly Protestant, by-standers. (See Remembrance Day Massacre). Towards the end of the troubles, the Provisionals widened their campaign even further, to include the killing of people who worked in a civilian capacity with the RUC and British Army. The bloodiest example of this came in 1992, when an IRA bomb killed eight building workers who were working on a British Army base at Teebane. Again, since Protestants and unionists were more likely to work for the British Army and police, this was widely seen as part of a campaign against Protestants. For the IRA, such attacks may have been counter-productive, as incidents such as these facilitated the British government's aims to "criminalise" the IRA and portray the conflict as one between sectarian gangs, and itself as a neutral arbiter.

Another plank of the IRA strategy was developed in the mid-seventies and continued up until the 1996 ceasefire. This was the bombing of civilian targets in Britain. On several occasions, including at Birmingham and Guildford, bombings of pubs (on the basis that they were used by British soldiers) caused large-scale civilian loss of life.

Libyan arms and the "Tet Offensive"

The first donation of arms and money from Libya to the PIRA occurred in the early 1970s (see above). In the 1980s, the IRA obtained very large quantities of weapons and explosives from Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya, who wanted to strike indirectly at Britain in reprisal for their government's support of US air strikes on Libya in 1986. This second major Libyan contribution to the IRA came in 1986-87. These arms included 9mm Browning, Taurus, Glock and Beretta pistols, Kalashnikov rifles, MP5 Submachine guns, rocket propelled grenades, heavy Soviet made DShK machine guns, American made M60 Machine guns, US Military Flamethrowers, the plastic explosive Semtex and SA 7 and Stinger Surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. However, a third of the Libyan arms consignment was intercepted by Irish and French authorities in the Ship, the Eksund in 1987. The Eksund contained 120 tonnes of weapons, including heavy machine guns, 36 RPGs, 1000 detonaters, 20 SAMs, Semtex and 1,000,0000 rounds of ammunition (O'Brien p142). An indication of what was aboard the other vessels can be got from subsequent Garda arms finds, which in 1988 included several hundred Kalashnikovs, including models from Romania, Yugoslavia and The USSR, Russian DSHK machine guns, NATO calibre M60 machine guns and semtex (O'Brien p143). Ed Moloney claims that the Eksund shipment contained military mortars and 106 millimetre canons, a fact never acknowledged by the Irish authorities (Moloney p22). It is also estimated that al-Qaddafi (known familiarly throughout western society as Colonel Gaddafi) donated the equivilent of £2million with the 1980s shipments(O'Brien p143) Template:Fn.

By the early 1990's, the IRA needed a new source of weapons, since the Libyan pipeline had been closed. According to Jane's Intelligence Online, the IRA used former KGB contacts (many of whom were now members of the Russian Mafia), to establish a new pipeline via Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In 2002, the Moscow Times and the Belfast Telegraph wrote articles in which they claimed Russian intelligence officers of the FSB had infomred British intelligence, that the IRA had recieved substantial arms from Croatia, Yugoslavia and Estonia. The Article went on to say that this pipeline had allowed the IRA to continue it's war against Britian throughout the 1990's.

Access to these various weapons pipelines, allowed the IRA to be very well armed by the end of the Troubles, but this did not necessarily correlate with the intensity of its armed campaign. Most of the losses in inflicted on the British Army occurred in the early to mid 1970s, although they continued to inflict substantial casualties on the British Military, the RUC and UDR throughout the Troubles. The IRA Army Council had plans for a dramatic escaltion of the conflict which they likened to the Tet Offensive of the Vietnam War in the late 1980s with the aid of the arms obtained from Libya. However this failed to materialise. IRA sources quoted in The Secret History of the IRA by Ed Moloney say that the interception of the Eksund shipment eliminated the element of surprise which they had hoped to have for this offensive. The plan had been to take and hold several areas along the border, forcing the British Army to either withdraw or use maximum force. Much of the IRA's new heavy weaponry, for instance the surface-to-air missiles and flamethrowers, were never used. As it was, the numbers of British soldiers killed by the IRA increased slightly in the years 1988-1990, from 4 in 1986 to 22 in 1988, 24 in 1989 but decreased again to 10 in 1990 and dropped to 5 by 1991 (Moloney p338). The failure to intensify the conflict in the mid 1980s meant that the PIRA, while it could not be defeated by the British security forces, was effectivley contained. Such republican sources as Mitchel McLaughlin and Danny Morrison argued by the early 1990s neither the British Military nor the PIRA could attain their objectives by military means (Taylor p 314).

War with special forces and Loyalists

The IRA did suffer some heavy losses at the hands of British special forces like the SAS (Special Air Service), the most spectacular being the ambush and killing of eight armed IRA members at Loughgall in 1987 (see shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland). The Provisional IRA East Tyrone Brigade was particularly hard hit by British killings of their volunteers in this period, losing 28 members killed by British forces in the period 1987-1992, out of 53 dead in the whole Troubles. (Moloney p319). Another high profile instance of British "shoot to kill" policy took place in Gibraltar in March 1988, when three unarmed IRA volunteers were shot dead by an SAS unit while scouting out a bombing target (Moloney page330). (See Also Operation Flavius) The subsequent funerals of these IRA members in Belfast were attacked by loyalist gunman Michael Stone. At the funerals of Stone's victims, two un-uniformed British Army corporals were lynched when they produced a weapon amongthe mourners (O'Brien p164). See also Corporals killings. According to "Janes Intelligence Online", during the course of the Northern Ireland Troubles, at least five SAS active service and undercover operatives were killed by the IRA.

The IRA and also its political wing, Sinn Féin also suffered from a campaign of assassination launched against their members by Loyalist paramilitaries in the early from the late 1980s. These latter attacks killed about 12 IRA and 15 Sinn Fein members between 1987 and 1995 (Geraghty, p320). In addition, the loyalists murdered family members of known republicans. However, the vast majority of loyalist victims were innocent Catholic civilians. It has been alleged that the loyalists were aided in this campaign by elements of the security forces including the British Army and RUC Special Branch (see Stevens Report). Loyalist sources have since confirmed that they received intelligence files on republicans from Army and Police intelligence in this period and an Army agent within the UDA, Brian Nelson, was convicted in 1992 of the killings of Catholic civilians. It was later revealed that Nelson, while working as a British Army agent, was also involved in the importation of arms for loyalists from South Africa in 1988 (O'Brien p231). In 1993, for the first time, Loyalist paramilitaries killed more people than Republican paramilitaries. While the difference was only two, the following year saw Loyalists having killed eleven more people than Republicans, and 1995 saw them having killed twelve more. In 1996, after the Provisional IRA ceasefire, the number of killings by Loyalist groups had dropped to two, and Republican groups had once more killed more people than other groups - totalling seven people. The years 1997, 2000 and 2001 also saw Loyalists killing more people than Republican groups. This trend has continued in successive years, mostly due to internal fueding between the various Loyalist paramilitaries (source: CAIN).

In response to these attacks, the IRA began a systematic assassination campaign against leading members of the UDA and UVF. In the mid 1970s, from 1974, the IRA had a policy of retaliating to loyalist attacks on Catholics with attacks on Protestants such as the Kingsmill massacre of 1976 (see section above). However, by the late 1980s, the IRA Army Council would not sanction attacks on Protestant civilians, but only at named, identified loyalist targets. Gerry Adams publicly said in 1989, "Sinn Fein does not condone the deaths of people who are non combatants" (Moloney p321). To maximise the impact of such killings, the IRA killed senior loyalist figures. Among such leading loyalists killed were John McMichael, Joe Bratty, Raymond Elder and Ray Smallwoods of the UDA and Leslie Dallas and Trevor King of the UVF (Moloney p321, O'Brien p 314). One infamous IRA attempt to kill the entire leadership of the UDA on October 23rd 1993 caused enormous collateral damage, when a bomb planted at a Shankill Road fish shop killed 9 people. The bomb was intended to kill the entire senior leadership of the UDA, including Johnny Adair, who were meeeting in a room above the shop. Instead, the meeting finished early and the bomb ended up killing only 2 confirmed UDA members as well as the bomber (Thomas Begley) himself, whose device exploded prematurely. The remaining 7 deaths were those of innocent Protestant shoppers and bystanders, 58 more people were injured (Coogan p437). This provoked a series of 16 retaliatory murders of Catholic civilians, none of them with political or paramilitary connections, by the UVF and UDA, (Moloney p415).

According the to the CAIN University of Ulster statistics, the PIRA killed 45 loyalist paramilitaries from rougly 1987 to 1994. According to "Jane's Intelligence Online", and the books "The Irish War" by Tony Gerahty, and the "IRA" by Tim Pat Coogan, the IRA (along with the smaller Republican terror group, the INLA, killed a total of 90 leading Loyalist paramilitaries from 1974 to 1998 (Geraghty, p340). Such killings intensified just before the IRA ceasefire of 1994 and it has been speculated that this assassination programme against Loyalist terrorist leaders helped convince the leadership of both the UDA and UVF, to call ceasefires at this point. However the Loyalists called their ceasefire six weeks after the IRA ceasefire of that year and indeed argued that it was their murder campaign against Catholics in general that had forced the IRA ceasefire by placing intolerable pressure on the nationalist community. Republicans deny this - citing how few of the loyalist victims were republican paramilitaries.

Campaign up to the 1994 ceasefire

By the early to mid 1990s, the IRA found it more difficult to kill British military personnel in Northern Ireland, who were by now familiar with operating there and well protected by body armour. One of several methods the IRA used to counter this, was the use of high velocity Barrett M98 sniper rifles, several of which the Provisionals imported from the US. Around this time the IRA also developed a new bomb detonation method using infra-red technology. This new technique of remote detonation, allowed the IRA to continue a concerted bombing campaign against the British Army. However, the number of British soldiers killed dropped from the worst years of the 1970's and 80's. Some of this was attributed to a increased emphasis on killing police officers and Loyalist paramilitary leaders, along with a stepped up commercial bombing campaign. However The Provisional leadership maintained that, the British Army was their prefferred target. Gerry Adams in an interview given in 1988, said it was, "vastly preferable" to target the British Army as it "removes the worst of the agony from Ireland" and "diffuses the sectarian aspects of the conflict because loyalists do not see it as an attack on their community" (Taylor p337).

During this period, the IRA also established a highly successful economic bombing campaign against the British mainland, particularly London, and other major British cities, which caused a huge amount of physical and economic damage to property. Among their targets were the City of London, Birmingham, Canary Wharf and the Manchester city centre. It has been argued by many historians that this successful bombing campaign helped convince the British government (who had hoped to contain the conflict to Northern Ireland with its Ulsterisation policy) to negotiate with Sinn Fein.

Despite their ceasfires of 1994 and 1997 the IRA continued to buy arms. They needed a new source for weapons, since the Libyan pipeline had been closed. In 2001, an IRA operative named Connor Claxton purchased several hundred "Forensically clean" handgun's and rifles from arms dealers in Florida. According to the UK Guardian newspaper, most of these guns made it to the IRA, before the FBI and ATF managed to close down the Florida pipeline. Despite these successes by the FBI, most experts agree that at least 60% of the guns shipped to the IRA from America, made it into the IRA's arsenal.

Decommissioning of arms

The Provisional IRA decomissioned its arms in July-September 2005. Among the weaponry detroyed were: 1,000 rifles 3 tonnes of Semtex 20-30 heavy machine guns 7 Surface-to-air missiles (unused) 7 flame throwers 1,200 detonators 20 rocket-propelled grenade launchers 100 hand guns 100+ grenades Source: Security estimates/Jane's Intelligence Review

However according to recent reports, the British intelligence services believe that not all PIRA arms were destroyed. Belfast Telegraph 6th February 2006

Casualties

The Provisional IRA have killed more people than any other organisation since the Troubles began. However according to "Jane's Intelligence" and the "Council On Foreign Relations:, the Loyalist terror groups have killed the most "civillains". The IRA killed an estimated 497 civillians during the troubles as opposed to an estimated 860 killed by Loyalist terror groups. (CFR.ORG, Loyalist Terrorist FAQ,p2)

According to the CAIN research project at the University of Ulster, the Provisional IRA was responsible for the deaths of 1,706 people during the Troubles up to 2001. This figure represents 48.4 percent of the total fatalities in the conflict. Official British, Irish and American statistics however quote a larger IRA death toll. According these official statistics (provided by groups such as Jane's Intelligence, and the US. Sate Dept. "Patterns Of Global Terrorisim", 1999) The IRA was responsible for 1,824 deaths between 1969 to 2001. This represents 52.3% of the total deaths during the "Troubles". The official breakdown according to the US State Dept. is,

800 British Military. 210 Police (RUC) 222 UDR (Ulster Defense Regiment) 90 Loyalist Paramilitary members. 5 members of British Special Forces (SAS). 497 civillians. (Sources. Jane's Intelligence, US State Dept. "patterns Of Global Terrorisim", 1999)

The IRA was chiefly active in Northern Ireland, although it took its campaign to the Republic of Ireland, Britain, and also carried out several attacks in the Netherlands and Germany. The IRA is believed to have extensive support cells in America, Canada, Australia and Cuba.

The IRA lost 276 members during the Troubles according to the CAIN figures. Lost Lives states that 294 PIRA members died in the Troubles (p1531). In addition, many members of Sinn Fein were killed, some of whom were also IRA members, but this was not publicly acknowledged. An Phoblacht gives a figure of 341 IRA and Sinn Fein members killed in the Troubles, indicating betwen 50-60 Sinn Fein deaths if the IRA deaths are subtracted (cited in O'Brien, Long War p26). In 132 of these cases, IRA members either caused their own deaths (as a result of hunger strikes, premature bombing accidents etc.), or were killed on allegations of having worked for the security forces (CAIN). Lost Lives gives a figure of 163 killings of republican paramilitary members (but this includes republicans from other organisations) (Lost Lives p 1536). Of these self inflicted deaths, accordingto an RUC report of 1993, 105 were accidental deaths of IRA volunteers through the premature detonation of their own bombs (O'Brien p160). These incidents killed more IRA members than any other single organisation did during the course of the Troubles.

Far more common than the killing of IRA Volunteers however, was their imprisonment. Journalists Eamonn Mallie and Patrick Bishop estimate in the The Provisional IRA, that between 8-10,000 PIRA members were imprisoned during the course of the conflict, a number they also give as the total number of IRA members during the Troubles (Mallie, Bishop p12).

Categorisation

Due to its frequent use of bombs; its killing of hundreds of policemen, soldiers, UDA/UVF leaders and civilians, predominantly though not exclusively in Northern Ireland; its status as an illegal organisation; its role in racketeering, bank robberies, 'street justice' and the fact that the unionist majority in Northern Ireland wanted to continue living under British rule, it is internationally considered a terrorist group Template:Fn, although its supporters preferred the labels freedom fighter, guerrilla and volunteer.

IRA attacks on the British security forces (i.e. the British Army and the RUC) and loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland could be described as guerrilla warfare, so "guerrilla" is a technically accurate term. This definition was criticised by unionists and constitutional republicans as suggesting that the IRA's actions had at least some legitimacy. In addition, aside from excessive collateral damage, IRA attacks have repeatedly specifically focussed on non-military, non-police targets, which supports the use of the term "terrorist."

Membership of the IRA remains illegal in both the UK and the Republic of Ireland, but IRA prisoners convicted of offences committed before 1998 have been granted conditional early release as part of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement. In the United Kingdom a person convicted of membership of a "proscribed organisation", such as the IRA, still nominally faces imprisonment for up to 10 years.

Strength and support

In the early to mid 1970s, the numbers recruited by the Provisional IRA, may have reached several thousand, but these were reduced when the IRA re-organised its structures from 1977 onwards. An RUC report of 1986 estimated that the PIRA had 300 or so members in Active Service Units and up to 750 active members in total in Northern Ireland (O'Brien p161). This does not take into consideration the IRA units in the Republic of Ireland or those in Britain and continental Europe. In 2005, Irish Minister for Justice Michael McDowell told the Dáil that the organisation had "between 1,000 and 1,500" active members [1]. According to The Provisional IRA (Eamon Mallie and Patrick Bishop), roughly 8000 people passed through the ranks of the IRA during the 30 year Troubles, many of them leaving after arrest, "retirement" or dissilusionment (Mallie, Bishop p12). According to the US State Department, the Provisional IRA has hundreds of hardcore members, as well as tens of thousands of civilian sympathisers in Ireland. In recent times the IRA's strength has been somewhat weakened by members leaving the organisation to join hardline splinter groups such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA. According to Irish Minister for Justice Michael McDowell, these organisations have little more than 150 members each [2]. Despite some successes by the British security services, military and police at infiltrating the IRA, as of the year 2001, the British, Irish and American governments believed that the IRA remained an extremely potent and capable terrorist organisation.

The popular support for the IRA's campaign in the Troubles is hard to guage, given that Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing, did not stand in election until the early 1980s. Even after this, most nationalists in Northern Ireland voted for the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) until the early 2000s. After the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike, Sinn Fein mobilised large electoral support and won 105,000 votes or 43% of the nationalist vote in Northern Ireland, in the United Kingdom general election, 1983, only 34,000 votes behind the SDLP (O'Brien p115). However, by the 1992 UK General Election, the SDLP won 184,445 votes and four seats to Sinn Fein's 78,291 votes and no seats (O'Brien p198). In the 1993 Local District Council Elections in Northern Ireland, the SDLP won roughly 150,000 votes to Sinn Fein's 80,000 votes (O'Brien p196). During the Troubles, therefore, nationalists in Northern Ireland tended to vote for non-violent nationalism rather than for Sinn Fein, who endorsed the IRA campaign. Sinn Fein did not overtake the SDLP as the main nationalist party in Northern Ireland until after the Belfast Agreement, by which time they no longer advocated violence. Very few Protestant voters voted for Sinn Fein. In 1992, many of them voted for SDLP West Belfast candidate Joe Hendron rather than a unionist candidate in order to make sure Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein lost his seat in the consticuency (Coogan p284).

However, it is widely recognised that the IRA possessed substantial support in parts of Northern Ireland since the early 1970s. Areas of IRA support included working class Catholic/nationalist areas of Belfast, Derry and other towns and cities. The most notable of these include parts of the north and west Belfast and the Bogside and Creggan areas of Derry City. In addition, the PIRA has been strongly supported in rural areas with a strong republican tradition, These include South Armagh, East Tyrone, South county Derry and several other localities. Such support would be indicated by the recuitment of IRA volunteers from an area and the populace hiding weapons, providing safe houses to IRA members and providing information on the movements of the Security Forces.

In the Republic of Ireland, there was some sympathy for the Provisional movement in the early 1970s. However, the movement's appeal was hurt badly by more notorious bombings widely perceived as atrocities, such as the killing of civilians attending a Remembrance Day ceremony at the cenotaph in Enniskillen in 1987 (the IRA maintain that their target was a contingent of British soldiers due to pass the cenotaph), and the murder of two children when a bomb went off in Warrington, which led to tens of thousands of people demonstrating on O'Connell Street in Dublin to call for an end to the IRA's campaign. In the 1990s the IRA moved to attacking economic targets, such as the Baltic Exchange and Canary Wharf, the latter of which killed two civilians. Sinn Fein did very badly in elections in the Republic of Ireland during the IRA's campaign. For example, in the 1981 Irish General Election, Sinn Fein won just 5% of the popular vote (Mallie, Bishop p444) by the 1987 Irish General Election, Sinn Fein won only 1.7% of the votes cast (O'Brien p199).They did not make significant electoral gains in the Republic until after the IRA ceasefires anf the Belfast Agreement of 1998.

Sinn Féin now has 24 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (out of 108), five Westminster MPs (out of 18 from Northern Ireland) and five Republic of Ireland TDs (out of 166). This increase is widely perceived as support for the IRA ceasefire and some commentators maintain this support would decrease if the IRA returned to violence (although this did not happen during the brief resumption that occurred between the 1994 and 1997 ceasefires).

Support from other countries and organisations

In the United States in November 1982, five men were acquitted of smuggling arms to the IRA after they revealed the CIA had approved the shipment (although the CIA officially denied this). The IRA has also, on occasion, received assistance from foreign governments, including considerable training and arms from Libya. There are allegations of training, weapons, and support from the Cuban DGI, Soviet KGB and the East German Stasi, based on the testimony of Soviet defectors to British intelligence, and analysis by intelligence agencies such as the CIA, MI6, and Israeli Mossad. The IRA has also received weapons and logistical support from Irish Americans, especially the NORAID group. It has recived some training and support from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Since the late 1970's it is believed by many intelligence agencies that the IRA has shared bomb making and urban warfare tactics with a list of terror groups including: The Basque Separatist Movement (ETA), South African ANC, Italian Red Brigades, German RAF, the PLO, Hezbollah, and even the Sicilian Mafia. In 2001 IRA bomb experts were caught allegedly training Colombian guerrillas, (the FARC), in bomb making and urban warfare techniques Template:Fn.

U.S. support has been weakened by the War against Terrorism, and the fallout from the events of the 11 September 2001. The organisation has also historically raised funds through smuggling, racketeering and bank robberies. A significant US supporter since 1969 has been Noraid (Irish Northern Aid Committee).

In February 2005 the IRA was denounced by relatives of Robert McCartney, who was murdered in public by IRA members. The resulting controversy led Gerry Adams to advise republicans to give evidence against those IRA members who were involved, a first for the republican leader. Three IRA members were expelled from the organisation following the murder and an offer was made by the organisation to shoot those responsible for the killing. The family of Mr. McCartney allege that, notwithstanding public calls for information by Sinn Féin leaders, no one has come forward with information that would allow a prosecution to go further. They also allege that republican intimidation of witnesses has continued and that even the friend of Mr. McCartney who was stabbed with him is too afraid to make a police statement.

Activities

For the IRA campaign 1970-1994 see Weaponry and Operations above.

The IRA was chiefly active in Northern Ireland, although it took its campaign to the Republic of Ireland, Britain, and also carried out several attacks in the Netherlands, Germany. The IRA also developed Arms importaion, logistical support and intelligence units in Canada, America, Australia and Latin America.

The Provisional IRA's activities included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings of civilians accused of criminal or "antisocial" behaviour, extortion and robberies (most notably being widely blamed for the £26 million Northern Bank robbery in 2004, though as of February 2006, no evidence has ever been given to support these claims). Previous targets have included the British military, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and loyalist militants — against all of whom IRA gunmen and bombers fought a guerrilla war.

The IRA also targeted certain British government officials, politicians, judges, senior Military and police officers and civilians in both Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and in other areas such as Germany, Canada, Holland and Australia. Many civilians assisting or perceived to have been assisting the security forces were killed in Northern Ireland, whilst many British civilians were killed during the IRA bombing campaign in England, which was often directed against civilian targets such as pubs and public transport, and targets of an economic significance such as shops and Canary Wharf. IRA bombing campaigns have been conducted against rail and London Underground (subway) stations, pubs and shopping areas on the island of Great Britain, and a British military facility in Germany.

Republicans contend that these bombings concentrated minds in the British government far more than the violence in Northern Ireland, which led to the beginning of informal contacts with the IRA soon after. The IRA had an official policy of bombing only targets in England (not the Celtic countries of Scotland and Wales), although they detonated a bomb at an oil terminal in the Shetland Isles in 1981 while Queen Elizabeth II was performing the official opening of the terminal.

One of their most famous victims was the uncle of Prince Philip, Lord Louis Mountbatten, killed along with two children and his cousin on 27 August 1979 in County Sligo, by an IRA bomb placed in his boat.

The IRA looked on itself as the police force of nationalist areas of Northern Ireland during the Troubles instead of the RUC, during a time when the Catholic community had zero confidence in the equality of the state forces. Some Catholic civilians have been killed by the IRA for collaboration with the British security forces (i.e. the British Army or the RUC). The IRA also summarily executed or otherwise punished suspected drug dealers and other suspected criminals in the past, sometimes after kangaroo trials. In addition the PIRA habitually carried out beatings, known as "punishment beatings" and "knee cappings" (shootings in the knees) of petty criminals until recently. IRA members suspected of being British or Irish government informers were also executed, often after interrogation and torture and a kangaroo trial. The IRA had a special unit for this purpose, known in republican circles as the "nutting squad".

The PIRA has also targetted other republican paramilitary groups. In 1972 and 1975, the Official IRA and Provisional IRA fought a feud with each other in Belfast, leaving several Volunteers dead on either side. In 1992, The PIRA eliminated the Irish People's Liberation Organisation, which was widely involved in drug dealing. Two IPLO members were killed, several more beaten and the remainder told to disband and in some case leave the country.

Although the IRA's General Order No. 8 forbids military action "against 26 County forces under any circumstances whatsoever" (O'Brien p121), members of the Garda Síochána (the Republic of Ireland's police force) have also been killed; most notorious was the killing of Detective Garda Jerry McCabe, who was killed by sustained machine-gun fire while sitting in his car in Adare county Limerick while escorting a post office delivery in 1996. The Provisionals have killed 6 Gardai and one Irish Army soldier, mostly during robberies.

The IRA has carried out many robberies of bank and post offices over the 30 or so years of its existance. In 1982-83, the RUC estimated thaat the IRAstole roughly £700,000 in such raids (O'Brien p121). It is strongly suspected to have carried out the Northern Bank Robbery of December 2004, although this is unproven.

In the 1980s, IRA members are suspected to have kidnapped the racehorse Shergar and attempted to ransom it. It has also been involved in the kidnapping and ranson of busnessmenGaeln Weston, Ben Dunne and Don Tidey in the early 1980s. Activities such as these were linked to the IRA's fundraising. Gardai estimate that the PIRA got up to £1.5 million from these activities (O'Brien p121).

Although the IRA only formally announced an end to its armed campaign in 2005, it had been on ceasefire since 1997 (although hardline splinter groups such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA continue their campaigns). It previously observed a cease-fire from 1 September 1994 to February 1996, after the Downing Street Declaration, although this was ended when the British government refused to talk to Sinn Féin.

The PIRA was and (according to the Irish Minister of Justice, Michael McDowell)]involved in organised crime on both sides of the Irish border. These activities include smuggling, sale of contraband cigarettes, extortion and money laundering.

The Belfast Agreement

The IRA ceasefire in 1997 formed part of a process that led to the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The Agreement has among its aims that all paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland cease their activities and disarm by May 2000. This is one of many Agreement aims that have yet to be realised.

Calls from Sinn Féin have led the IRA to commence disarming in a process that has been overviewed by Canadian General John de Chastelain's decommissioning body in October 2001. However, following the collapse of the Stormont power-sharing government in 2002, which was partly triggered by allegations that republican spies were operating within Parliament Buildings and the Civil Service (although no convictions came from the widely-publicised police operation, and it has since emerged that it was actually MI5 who had a spy in Stormont's Sinn Féin offices), the IRA temporarily broke contact with General de Chastelain. Increasing numbers of people, from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) under Ian Paisley and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) under Mark Durkan to the Irish government under Bertie Ahern and the mainstream Irish media, have begun demanding not merely decommissioning but the wholesale disbandment of the IRA.

In December 2004, attempts to persuade the IRA to disarm entirely collapsed when the Democratic Unionist Party, under Ian Paisley, insisted on photographic evidence. The IRA stated that this was an attempt at humiliation. The Irish government (generally in private), and Justice Minister Michael McDowell (in public, and often) also insisted that there would need to be a complete end to IRA activity. This is felt by many to have been a major reason for the collapse of this deal. Politicians who called loudest for IRA decommissioning were often reticent on the corresponding obligation of loyalist groups to do the same.

At the beginning of February 2005, the IRA declared that it was withdrawing from the disarmament process, but in July 2005 it declared that its campaign of violence was over, and that transparent mechanisms would be used, under the de Chastelain process, to satisfy the Northern Ireland communities that it was disarming totally

In mid 2003, the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) set up to assess IRA and Loyalist paramilitary activity, issued a report on the strength and intent of the PIRA. The report stated that the IRA continued to engage in intelligence gathering, (Mostly on Loyalist paramilitary leaders) arms importation, urban guerilla training, and organised crime. They also concluded that the IRA had no intention of returning to war, even though they easily had the means. An even more damning assessment was made about the Loyalist UDA and UVF groups, which the IMC claimed were heavily into crime, drug dealing and terrorisim. The IMC concluded that the IRA was committed to the peace process, but remained one of the most lethal and powerful terrorist organisations in the world.

End of the armed campaign

On July 28, 2005, the Provisional IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign. In a statement read by Séanna Breathnach, the organisation stated that it has instructed its members to dump all weapons and not to engage in "any other activities whatsoever" apart from assisting “the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means". Furthermore, the organisation authorised its representatives to engage immediately with the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) to verifiably put its arms beyond use "in a way which will further enhance public confidence and to conclude this as quickly as possible".

This is not the first time that organisations styling themselves IRA have issued orders to dump arms. After its defeat in the Irish Civil War in 1924 and at the end of its unsuccessful Border Campaign in 1962, the IRA Army Council issued similar orders. However, this is the first time in Irish republicanism that any organisation has voluntarily decided to destroy its arms.

On 25 September 2005, international weapons inspectors supervised the full disarmament of the outlawed Irish Republican Army, a long-sought goal of Northern Ireland's peace process. The office of IICD Chairman John de Chastelain, a retired Canadian general who oversaw the weapons destruction at secret locations, released details regarding the scrapping of many tons of IRA weaponry at a news conference in Belfast on 26 September. He said the arms had been "put beyond use" and that they were "satisfied that the arms decommissioned represent the totality of the IRA's arsenal."

The IRA permitted two independent witnesses, including a Methodist minister and a Roman Catholic priest close to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams, to view the secret disarmament work. However, Ian Paisley, the leader of the DUP, has complained that since the witnesses were appointed by the IRA themselves, rather than being appointed by the British or Irish governments, they therefore cannot be said to be unbiased witnesses to the decommissioning. These claims came as expected by Nationalists and Catholics, who view Ian Paisley’s consistent refusal to support devolution in northern Ireland with Catholics in power as a simple unwillingness to accept an end to Unionist rule and Catholic equality. [3]

Notable events

See Chronology of Provisional IRA Actions

P. O'Neill

The PIRA traditionally uses a well-known signature in its public statements, which are all issued under the pseudonymous name of "P. O'Neill" of the "Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin".

According to Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, it was Seán Mac Stiofáin, as chief of staff of the Provisionals, who invented the name. However, under his usage, the name was written and pronounced according to Irish orthography and pronunciation as "P. Ó Néill". Ó Brádaigh also maintains that there is no particular significance to the name, thus discounting claims that it is a reference to Sir Phelim O'Neill, the executed leader of the Irish Rebellion of 1641.

Some Unionists have sarcastically commented that the "P" actually stands for Pinocchio, given the claimed factual unreliability of some of P. O'Neill's statements over the years.

Infiltration

The IRA has often been infiltrated by British Intelligence agents, and in the past some IRA members have been informers. IRA members suspected of being informants were usually executed after an IRA 'court-martial'.

In May 2003 a number of newspapers named Freddie Scappaticci as the alleged identity of the British Force Research Unit's most senior informer within the Provisional IRA, code-named Steakknife, who is thought to have been head of the Provisional IRA's internal security force, charged with rooting out and executing informers. Scappaticci denies that this is the case and is taking legal action to challenge this claim.

Footnotes

Template:FnbOther books such as the "Financing of Terror" by James Adams, claim that Irish-American Organised Crime groups in Boston, New York and Chicago also supplied weaponry. This is also disputed, although it is possible that George Harrison liased with Irish American organised crime to buy weapons.

Template:Fnb According to the book "The Sword and the Shield" by Christopher Andrew, the KGB and East German Stasi shipped large consignment's of weapons to the IRA including Skorpion sub-machine pistols and AK-47 assault rifles. This is disputed however and is not mentioned in any of the mainstream histories of the Provisional IRA. It is possible that Eastern Block intelligence funnelled arms to the IRA through the Libyan regime.

Template:Fnb. The IRA contined arming itslef throughout the 1990s, despite its cesefires of 1994-96 and 1997-present. During the 1990's the IRA secured more weapons from the Balkans and other areas of Eastern Europe including Estonia, Croatia and Serbia. These weapons were supplied via an Eastern pipline allegedly set up by IRA contacts within the Russian Mafia. In addition, several IRA men were arrested in Florida in the USA in 1999, while trying to smuggle arms to Ireland.

Template:Fnb The PIRA is described as a terrorist organisation by the governments of the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Spain, Germany and Italy, the latter three of which have alleged the existence of IRA links with terrorist organisations within their own jurisdictions including ETA and the Red Brigades. It is described as a terrorist organisation by An Garda Síochána, the police force of the Republic of Ireland, and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, (PSNI). It is generally called a terrorist organisation by the following media outlets: The Irish Times, the Irish Independent, the Irish Examiner, the Sunday Independent, the Evening Herald, the Sunday Tribune, Ireland on Sunday, the Sunday Times. On the island of Ireland among political parties Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats who together form a coalition government in the Republic of Ireland refer to it as a terrorist organisation, as do the main opposition parties Fine Gael, the Labour Party, the Green Party, and the Workers Party, while in Northern Ireland it is described as a terrorist movement by the mainly nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party, the cross community Alliance Party, and from the unionist community the Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Progressive Unionist Party. Members of the IRA are tried in the Republic in the Special Criminal Court, a court set up by emergency legislation and which is described in its functioning as dealing with terrorism. On the island of Ireland the largest political party to suggest that the IRA is not a terrorist organisation is Sinn Féin, currently the largest pro-Belfast Agreement political party in Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin is widely regarded as the political wing of the IRA, but the party insists that the two organisations are separate. The United States Department of State and the European Union have taken the Provisional IRA off their lists of terrorist organisations due to the fact that there is a cease-fire. The RIRA and CIRA are still listed. Peter Mandelson, a former Northern Ireland Secretary (a member of the British cabinet with responsibility for Northern Ireland) contrasted the activities of the IRA and those of Al-Qaeda, describing the latter as "terrorists" and the former as "freedom fighters".

Template:Fnb These men were originally acquitted of aiding FARC and convicted solely on the lesser charge of possessing false passports; however the acquittal was overturned on appeal. The three men disappeared while on bail and have returned to Ireland, having departed from Colombia before the appeal was concluded. The Colombian government has said that it will seek their extradition, a position which has been supported by U.S. officials and by members of the Democratic Unionist Party in Ireland, while the British government has said that it will extradite them if they ever come within its jurisdiction. The case was controversial for several reasons, including accusations of heavy reliance on the testimony of a former FARC member (who was subsequently found to have perjured himself) and of dubious forensic evidence. The 3 Irishmen at one point accused the U.S. and British governments, who provided details about their background activities and gave technical support to Colombian forensic investigators, of setting them up (through the activities of their embassies in Bogotá). There was also political pressure from the government of Alvaro Uribe, supporters and members of which had previously called for a guilty verdict.

Sources

Martin Dillon, 25 Years of Terror - the IRA's War against the British,
Richard English, Armed Struggle - the IRA and Sinn Fein
Peter Taylor, Provos - the IRA and Sinn Fein
Ed Moloney, The Secret History of the IRA
Eamonn Mallie and Patrick Bishop, The Provisional IRA
Toby Harnden, Bandit Country -The IRA and South Armagh
Brendan O'Brien, The Long War - The IRA and Sinn Fein.
Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles
Tony Geraghty, The Irish War
David McKitrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton, David McVea, Lost Lives.

External links