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EE-T1 Osório

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EE-T1 Osorio
TypeMain battle tank
Place of originBrazil
Service history
Used bySee Users
Production history
DesignerEngesa
Designed1982–86
ManufacturerEngesa
Unit cost$ 6,855,859.20 BRL,
($3,840,261.00 USD)
Produced1986
No. built2 prototypes
Specifications
Mass42.9 short tons (38.9 t; 38.3 long tons)
Length9.99 metres (32 ft 9 in)
Width3.26 metres (10 ft 8 in)
Height2.37 metres (7 ft 9 in)
Crew4 (commander, gunner, loader, driver)

Armorcomposite, including aluminum/steel, carbon fibers, and ceramics.
Main
armament
120 mm GIAT G1 smoothbore gun(P2),
105 mm L/52 L7 rifled gun(P1),
Secondary
armament
M2HB 12.7 mm machine gun x2
(coaxial and roof mounted)
Engine12-cylinder MWM TBD 234 Diesel engine
1,100 hp [1]
Power/weight26 hp/tonne
Suspensionhydropneumatic
Operational
range
550 km (340 mi) [1]
Maximum speed 70 km/h (43 mph)

The Engesa EE-T1 Osório was a Brazilian main battle tank prototype. It was developed as a privately funded venture by Engesa, with little government support. It was intended to be sold first to Arab and other Third World countries, jump-starting production — and enabling the Brazilian Army to later place its own orders without having to fund development costs. However macro-political events including the Gulf War and American political pressure led to the tank's demise, and the tank was never acquired by the Brazilian Army.

Development

The EE-T1 was envisioned by Engesa as a cost-effective tank made using domestically produced components. The tanks was intended for the foreign market - primarily third world countries - as opposed to use by the Brazilian Army.[2] Development started in 1982 and the first prototype was completed in 1985.[1] The initial development of the tank was expensive and caused a cashflow crisis at Engesa, prompting the Brazilian National Development Bank to extend a $65 million loan to finance the program.[3]

The tank was seen by some sources as an example of Brazil's modernizing defense industry, while others noted that the tank continued to use imported parts; according to an anonymous Engesa official cited in the Latin American Research Review, the EE-T1 would make heavier use of imported parts (including the tank's turret) as opposed to the company's armored cars.[2] One source noted that the tank was seemingly comparable to American and European MBTs, but also expressed that some where skeptical of the EE-T1's commercial viability.[4] The production model of the EE-T1 was considered to be less expensive than other Western MBTs, with one source calculating it as costing $1.5-2 million per unit.[2] The tank was reportedly considered for adoption by Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, but these potential deals never materialized.[1][2] The loss of the Saudi Arabian deal was particularly devastating and led to the EE-T1 remaining in the prototype stage. The program was scrapped following the collapse of Brazilian armored vehicle industry in the mid-1990s.[5][5]

Users

References

  1. ^ a b c d Gelbart, Marsh (1996). Tanks main battle and light tanks. Brassey’s UK Ltd. pp. 13–14. ISBN 1-85753-168-X.
  2. ^ a b c d Neto, Raul De Gouvea (1991). "How Brazil Competes in the Global Defense Industry". Latin American Research Review. 26 (3): 83–107. ISSN 0023-8791.
  3. ^ Conca, Ken. "Technology, the Military, and Democracy in Brazil." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34, no. 1 (1992): 141-77. Accessed November 28, 2020. doi:10.2307/166152.
  4. ^ Kapstein, Ethan B. "The Brazilian Defense Industry and the International System." Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 4 (1990): 579-96. Accessed November 28, 2020. doi:10.2307/2150936.
  5. ^ a b Conca, Ken. "Between Global Markets and Domestic Politics: Brazil's Military-Industrial Collapse." Review of International Studies 24, no. 4 (1998): 499-513. Accessed November 28, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097547.