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Peshmerga

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Peshmerga
Peshmerga Army Emblem
Active1890-Present
CountryIraqi Kurdistan Region
BranchArmy
TypeSpecial forces
RoleDomestic defense
Size175,000 [1]
Garrison/HQKurdistan National Assembly (KNA)
MarchEy Reqîb
(English: "Hey Guardian")
Engagements- World War I
- The Republic of Kurdistan War
- The Kurdish-Iraqi War
- The Second Kurdish-Iraqi War
- Iran-Iraq War
- Operation Desert Storm
- Operation Iraqi Freedom
- (Various other Battle/Wars)
Commanders
Notable
commanders
- Mahmud Barzanji
- Shaikh Said Piran
- Mustafa Barzani
- Nawshirwan Mustafa
- Jalal Talabani
- Massoud Barzani

Peshmerga, peshmarga or peshmerge (Kurdish: pêşmerge) is the term used by Kurds to refer to armed Kurdish fighters. Literally meaning "those who face death" (pêş front + merg death e is) the peshmerga forces of Kurdistan have been around since the advent of the Kurdish independence movement in the early 1920s, following the collapse of the Ottoman and Qajar empires which had jointly ruled over the area. Peshmerga forces often wear traditional Kurdish garbs, e.g. sharwal (baggy trousers) and a plain jacket, with colourful sashes. Peshmerga forces do make use of female fighters, making Kurdistan one of only three entities in the Middle East that actively uses female soldiers (others being Israel and Iran). [2]


History

Through much of the late 1900s, Peshmerga often came into conflict with Iraqi forces, using Guerilla Warfare style tactics against them. Many of these Peshmerga were led by Mustafa Barzani of the PDK, while others were under the command of the PUK. After Mustafa Barzani's death, his son Masoud Barzani took his position. Most of the Peshmerga's efforts were to keep a region under the specific party's control and to fight off any incursions by the Republican Guard of Iraq. They also came into conflict with PKK forces who came across the border from Turkey.

Following the First Gulf War, Northern Iraq fell into a state of civil war between the KDP and PUK, and their peshmerga forces were used to fight each other.

During the 2006 Anfal campaign trial, the defense team of Saddam Hussein said Peshmerga, a group of separatist guerillas, sided with Iran in its war with Iraq.[3]

The Kurdish Warrior Tradition and the Importance of the Peshmerga

Early Kurdish Warriors

The ideal of the warrior has been engrained in Kurdish culture since long before the 20th century and the definition of the peshmerga. According to Mehrdad Izady, the ancient Babylonians (circa 650 BC) labeled the inhabitants of the Kurdish mountains Qutil, a word possibly derived from the Semetic Akkadim word “qard” and the Indo-European Persian word “gurd”, both of which can be defined as hero or warrior. This reputation was further enhanced by continued pre-Biblical struggles between the mountain inhabitants and the peoples of the Mesopotamian lowlands. Included in these ancient records is the first account of guerrilla warfare in the region.

During the modern era (AD), the Kurdish penchant for combat continued, often accompanying desires for autonomy. Ardashir I, founder of the Persian Sasanian Empire, engaged the Kurds from AD 224-226 in an attempt to seize political control. Whereas Ardashir I could only achieve partial control, his heir, Ardashir II, removed the last vestiges of Kurdish semi-independence. Ardashir, in his battle chronicles, labeled the Kurdish warriors jânspâr, a Persian term meaning “self-sacrificer” to a particular cause, not far removed from the meaning of peshmerga.

Selahaddin Eyyubi was a twelfth century Kurdish general and warrior from Tikrit, in present day northern Iraq.

Perhaps the most famous warrior of Kurdish descent was Saladin. Born in Takrit, Saladin defeated the Christian armies during the Crusades and established the Ayyubid dynasty that lasted from 1169 to the end of the 15th century. Saladin’s ability in battle earned him the title of “Prince of Chivalry” and the respect of generations of European leaders. Saladin may not have thought of himself as Kurdish however, instead he saw himself and his followers as soldiers of Islam.

Centuries later, the establishment of both the Ottoman and Safavid Empires forced many Kurdish tribes to choose allegiances and become impromptu border guards. Although the Safavids attempted to replace Kurdish tribal forces with a standing army of slaves, the Ottoman Empire allowed for tribal semi-autonomy in exchange for occasional cavalry troops to defend the empire. Kurdish soldiers were not only used as part-time cavalry but also became scouts and raiders for the Ottoman Empire as well. The first idea of a pan-Kurdish government also emerged during the late 16th century, although it failed to gain any influence, especially as Perso-Ottoman hostilities decreased.

The inability of the Ottoman and Safavid Empires to govern their Kurdish areas allowed several Kurdish ruling families to grow in prominence. Among these was the Zand dynasty (1750-1794). The Zands are notable as one of the few Kurdish ruling bodies to allow women in their military. Zand women often fought alongside their husbands against invading Afghan forces. Possibly due to attempts at “modernization” and the need to “assimilate the values of the more powerful ethnic neighbors”, this practice was discontinued until midway through the 20th century.

As the power of the Ottoman Empire diminished in the 19th century in the wake of growing European and Russian expansion, Kurdish tribes found themselves surrounded by little central authority. In this ‘power vacuum’ arose tribal leaders such as Badr Khan and Mir Muhammad of Rawanduz. During the 1820s and 1830s, Mir Muhammad and his tribal forces seized numerous towns throughout Ottoman-controlled Kurdistan and challenged the empire’s rule. Also emerging in the 1830s, Badr Khan rose to power after the Ottoman army granted him military rank, giving him formal authority over his tribal forces. Badr Khan eventually amassed a force of 70,000 tribal warriors and rose against Ottoman rule. Although he declared himself and his followers independent and minted his own coinage, Badr Khan’s hopes for autonomy were dashed upon his defeat in 1846.

The last prominent head of Kurdish armed forces in the 19th century was not a tribal leader, but a religious shaykh. In 1880, Shaykh Ubayd Allah of Nihri gathered 20,000 fighters on the Ottoman-Persian border in an attempt to achieve an “independent principality.” Lacking loyalty and organization, many of the shaykh’s forces left the ranks after pillaging and acquiring riches from the conquered areas. Shaykh Ubayd Allah’s remaining fighters fled or were captured by Ottoman or Persian military forces prior to the shaykh’s exile in 1882. Whereas the Armenians and other Christian minority groups benefited from European or Russian interest and protection within the Ottoman Empire, the lack of outside support and inability to maintain a trained organized force diminished early Kurdish aspirations of autonomy. Over the next century, the military ability and nationalistic ideal among Iraqi Kurds would increase, leading to the creation of loyal units and enabling Iraqi Kurdish leadership to influence the politics of the region.

The Roots of the Peshmerga (1890-1958)

The Hamidiya Cavalry (1891-1908)

File:The short cut to india (1909). Hamidiye alayi Kurt askeri Bimbasi.png
Hamidieh soldier,major.

The roots of the modern-day peshmerga, especially in regards to training, can be found in the early attempts of the Ottoman Empire to create an organized Turkish-Kurdish military force. In 1891, Ottoman Sultan Abd al Hamid II (1876-1909) created the Hamidiya Cavalry, merging Turkish leadership with Kurdish tribal fighters. This force had two primary purposes: to defend the Cossack Region from a possible Russian threat and secondly, to reduce the potential of Kurdish-Armenian cooperation. Dividing two of the largest minority groups in the region ensured the Ottoman Empire control of Eastern Anatolia and countered recent losses of its western lands to the expanding European powers. The Hamidiya Cavalry may also have been instituted to create a feeling of “Pan-Islam”, especially in light of a perceived possible British-Russian-Armenian Christian alliance.

Kurdish Forces in WWI (1914-1918)

As the Ottoman Empire struggled to stay together during World War I, it once again called on the Kurds, with their newly-acquired military experience, to supplement the Turkish army. According to Safrastian, most military age Kurds not already in the light cavalry regiments were drafted into the Turkish army and encouraged to fight with their Muslem Turkish brethren against the Christians and Armenians.

Because of the anti-Christian and anti-Armenian propaganda, the Turkish army fielded enough Kurds to completely man numerous units. Among the all-Kurdish units were the Eleventh Army, headquartered in Elazig, and the Twelfth Army, headquartered in Mosul. Kurds also made up a majority of the Ninth and Tenth Armies and supplied enough troops for many frontier units and 135 squadrons of reserve cavalry. These forces, with their experience and knowledge of the terrain, were essential in fighting the Russian threat to the Eastern Ottoman Empire.

Shaykh Mahmud Barzanji Revolt (1919-1923)

Although both the Turks and the British used Kurdish tribes to instigate cross-border conflicts, local shaykhs recruited Kurds to revolt against the regional powers. The first of these Kurdish call-to-arms occurred in British controlled Southern Kurdistan in May 1919. Shortly before being appointed governor of Sulaymaniya, Shaykh Mahmud Bazanji ordered the arrest of all British political and military officials in the region. After seizing control of the region, Barzanji raised a military force from his Iranian tribal followers and proclaimed himself “Ruler of all of Kurdistan”.

Tribal fighters from both Iran and Iraq quickly allied themselves with Shaykh Mahmud as he became more successful in opposing British rule. According to McDowall, the Shaykh’s forces “were largely Barzinja tenantry and tribesmen, the Hamavand under Karim Fattah Beg, and disaffected sections of the Jaf, Jabbari, Shaykh Bizayni and Shuan tribes”. The popularity and numbers of Shaykh Mahmud’s troops only increased after their ambush of a British military column.

Among Mahmud’s many supporters and troop leaders was 16-year-old Mustafa Barzani, the future leader of the Kurdish nationalist cause and commander of peshmerga forces in Kurdish Iraq. Barzani and his men, following the orders of Barzani tribal shakyh Ahmad Barzani, traversed the Piyaw Valley on their way to join Shaykh Mahmud Barzanji. Despite being ambushed numerous times along the way, Barzani and his men reached Shaykh Mahmud’s location, albeit too late to aid in the revolt.

The Barzani fighters were only a part of the Shaykh’s 500-person force. As the British became aware of the shaykh’s growing political and military power, they were forced to respond militarily. Two British brigades were deployed to defeat Shaykh Mahmud’s fighters at Darbandi Bazyan near Sulaymaniya in June 1919. Shaykh Mahmud was eventually arrested and exiled to India in 1921.

At the root of the rebellion, Shaykh Mahmud’s leadership appealed to both Kurdish nationalist and religious feelings. Although he knew he could not directly defeat the British, Shaykh Mahmud hoped to seek recognition of Kurdish nationalism by advocating a ‘free united Kurdistan’. Using his authority as a religious leader, Shaykh Mahmud called for a jihad against the British in 1919and thus acquired the support of many Kurds indifferent to the nationalist struggle. Although the intensity of their struggle was motivated by religion, Kurdish peasantry seized the idea of “national and political liberty for all” and strove for “an improvement in their social standing”.

Despite opposition by other regional tribes, possibly fearful of the shaykh’s growing power, Shaykh Mahmud’s fighters continued to oppose British rule after the shaykh’s arrest. Although no longer organized under one leader, this inter-tribal force was “actively anti-British”, engaging in hit-and-run attacks, killing British military officers, and participating in local rebellions. The fighters continued to be motivated by Shaykh Mahmud’s ability to “defy British interference”. The success of the Kurdish fighters’ anti-British revolts forced the British to recognize Kurdish autonomy in 1923. Returning to the region in 1922, Shaykh Mahmud continued to promote raids against British forces. Once these uprisings were subdued, the British government signed Iraq over to King Faysal and a new Arab-led government. After having to retreat into the mountains, the defeated Shaykh Mahmud signed a peace accord with the Iraqi government and settled in the new Iraq.

Shaykh Said Revolt (1920-1925)

As Shaykh Mahmud battled for Kurdish autonomy and independence in Southern Kurdistan, similar uprisings were occurring throughout Northern Kurdistan against the fledgling Turkish government. Of these revolts the primarily tribal Kuchgiri rebellion of 1920 was perhaps the most notable as Kurdish fighters struggled for autonomy and were able to seize numerous Turkish arms and supplies. The defeat of these uprisings inspired the Turkish government to deal with the “Kurdish problem” by enacting laws limiting both Kurdish identity and the governing ability of shaykhs. As the Turkish nationalist position became firmer, attacks on the democratic rights of the Kurds increased.

Forced underground, Kurdish nationalist leaders formed the political group Azadi (Freedom) in Dersim, Turkey in 1921. Unlike earlier Kurdish nationalist groups, the core of Azadi was comprised of experienced military men, not the urban Kurdish intelligentsia. According to Olson, Azadi’s fighting forces included numerous tribal fighters and several former Hamidiya regimental leaders, all equipped with rifles and other weapons previously owned by the Turks.

The strength and expansion of Azadi would lead to its downfall. During a Turkish military expedition in September 1924 several Azadi leaders mutinied, fleeing into the mountains with numerous weapons and hundreds of lower-ranking Kurdish soldiers. Over 500 officers and soldiers – three companies of one battalion and one company of another – left the Turkish ranks to join the Kurdish army.

In response to the rebellion, the Turkish government, realizing the strength of Azadi, quickly arrested many of the organization’s leaders, both munitineers and conspirators. With their leadership depleted, a power vacuum formed in the political-military structure of Azadi. Out of the remnants of Azadi emerged Shaykh Said of Palu, a Naqshbandi shaykh related by marriage to Khalid Beg, Turkish Army colonel and Azadi founder. The remaining Azadi infrastructure supported the Shaykh’s leadership, believing a shaykh could generate more support than an army officer.

Once convinced to join the rebellion, Shaykh Said immediately began mobilizing participants and establishing a chain of command. According to Van Bruinessen, Shaykh Said “knew what he wanted, had the capacity to convince others, and had a great reputation for piety, which was useful when his other arguments were insufficient”.

As a new leader, Shaykh Said, like Shaykh Mahmud years earlier, appealed to the Kurdish sense of Islamic unity. Besides the usual fighting retinue of a Kurdish shaykh, Shaykh Said was able to increase his ranks during his tour of Eastern Anatolia in January 1925. New recruits answered the call to arms as Said issued fatwas, gave speeches denouncing the secular Kemalist policies, and wrote letters inviting numerous tribes to join in a jihad against the government. Said also met personally with tribal leaders and their representatives, including Barzan tribal representative Mustafa Barzani. Although some tribes refused to follow Said, he was received positively in many towns. The Shaykh’s rise to power enabled him to proclaim himself ‘emir al-mujahidin’ (commander of the faithful and fighters of the holy war) in January 1925. Overall, 15 to 20,000 Kurds mobilized in support of Shaykh Said and Azadi. Many of these fighters were equipped with horses, rifles, or sabers acquired from the numerous munition depots across the countryside. Other Kurdish firepower was either personally owned prior to the rebellion or taken from the Armenians, despite Turkish attempts at Kurdish disarmament.

With sufficient firepower recruited from the tribes, a plan of attack was set in place. In creating a battle plan, Said and the other prominent remaining Azadi leadership established five major fronts to be commanded by regional shaykhs. These shaykh leaders were assisted by former Hamidiya Cavalry officers who provided military structure to the rebellion. After organization, unit responsibility was divided among nine areas. The overall headquarters of Said’s military force was located in Egri Dagh and protected by a force of 2,000 men. During the onset of the revolt, Said’s fighters, facing nearly 25,000 Turkish troops, gained control of a vilayet near Diyarbakir. Besides seizing Turkish land and acquiring additional munitions, early victories instilled confidence in the rebellion and garnered further Kurdish support.

Throughout the conflict, Said’s fighters used both conventional military tactics, including multi-front assaults and attempts at urban seizure, and unconventional warfare, including guerrilla tactics. An example of the conventional military organization was evident in the assault on Diyarbakir, where reports saw “three columns of 5,000 strong, under the personal command of Shaykh Said”. The establishment of conventional higher levels of Kurdish military command may also be assumed as documents written by foreigners were addressed to a ‘Kurdish War Office’. These documents, found by Turkish forces, may have been propaganda however, designed to create the illusion of international support for the Kurdish rebellion.

Despite the valiant efforts of Said’s fighters, the Kemalist government was able to quickly amass forces to suppress the rebellion by early April 1925 and capture Shaykh Said as he attempted to flee to Iran on 27 April 1925. After his capture, Shaykh Said was promptly tried for his actions against the Turkish government. Said, along with a number of his followers, was hung on 29 June 1925. Like the Iraqi Kurds under Shaykh Mahmud, Shaykh Said’s surviving followers did not stop their attacks after the removal of their leader. Throughout 1925 and 26 their assaults continued as they conducted guerrilla operations against Turkish military units. After their capture, these remaining fighters proclaimed themselves to be ‘the unvanquished clan of the nation’. Whether or not these ideas of nationalism were expressed by all the remaining followers cannot be determined, although, according to Van Bruinessen, “neither the guerrilla troops, nor the leaders of the Ararat revolt that followed, used religious phraseology”.

Because of growing Kurdish awareness, nationalism, despite its early urban, intellectual, and political-only roots, had become a military cause in and of itself, separate from religious motivations. Although recruitment remained based on tribal or shaykh allegiances, the Kurdish nationalist struggle became a legitimate call to arms. By fighting for “Kurdistan,” Kurdish fighters, the future peshmerga, separated themselves from the mujihadeen, their regional religious warrior brethren.

Khoybun (The Ararat Revolt) (1927-1930)

Emergence of Barzani’s Forces and the Barzani Revolt (1943-1945)

The Republic of Kurdistan - Mahabad (1945-1946)

In 1941 Britain and the USSR partitioned Iran into two zones of control in order to prevent the country from entering the war on the side of Germany. In the Soviet zone, the Kurds of northwest Iran enjoyed de facto independence. At war's end, Teheran pressured the Soviets to leave, which they did in December 1945. As they left, the Kurds formally proclaimed themselves independent in January 1946, with their capital at Mahabad. The government included many Kurds from Iraq, including Mustafa Barzani, the army commander. Their forces were Soviet-equipped and uniformed, but they owed no ideological allegiance to the USSR. Their flag was the tricolor of the Kurdish Communist Party (Komala) plus a golden sun in the center.

Teheran gradually marshalled its forces, and when they were satisfied the Soviets would not intervene they crushed the Mahabad Republic in December 1946. The leaders were executed, but Barzani led the Iranian forces on a wild goose chase and eventually escaped to the Soviet Union. His escapades contributed much to Kurdish legend and nostalgia for independence. In 1946 he founded the Kurdish Democratic Party, Partiya Demokrata Kurdistane (PDK). The Mahabad Republic stands as the high point of the Kurdish nationalist movement. This short period of national identity marked the official creation of the peshmerga and cemented the role of Mustafa Barzani as a military hero of the Kurdish people.

Post-Mahabad Journeys and Conflicts (1946-1947)

Peshmerga in the USSR (1947-1958)

The Peshmerga in Modern Iraq (1958-2003)

Barzani's Return to Iraq / Prelude to War (1958-1961)

h.

The Kurdish-Iraqi War (1961-1970)

Mustafa Barzani allied the KDP (PDK) with Israel in 1963. [citation needed] The peshmerga were trained and commanded by officers from Israels military intelligence and the Israelis participated in the Kurdish war from 1965. [citation needed] The Israeli-commanded peshmerga were highly effective and killed thousands of Iraqi troops. [citation needed]

Peshmerga and the Barzani-Talabani/Ahmed Split

The Second Kurdish-Iraqi War (1974-1975)

Israel's military presence in Kurdistan was evacuated after the US and Iran abandoned Iraq's Kurds. [citation needed] The Kurdish troops were now left without their Israeli officers. [citation needed]

Creation of the PUK (1975-1979)

The PUK, lead by Jalal Talibani, broke off from the KDP in the 1970's as a result of disagreement between the two party leaders. Becoming the second biggest party in Northern Iraq, the PUK and the KDP would soon pursue a rivalry that would even lead to war between the two factions.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

1989-1990

Peshmerga During Operation Desert Storm (1990-1991)

In the wake of the First Persian Gulf War (aka "Operation Desert Storm": January to March 1991), humanitarian considerations drove the United States to establish two "no-fly" zones in Iraq: one zone was in southern Iraq, where the Hussein regime had viciously persecuted the Shiite Arabs; the other zone was in the Kurdish territory in northern Iraq. The Baghdad government was forbidden to operate any aircraft in either of these zones, a proscription enforced by United States military assets in the region. Unable to use air power in the north, and with its conventional capabilities having been all but demolished during Desert Storm, Baghdad had little choice to but to sit by and witness the rebirth of the Kurdish self-governing region. American and Israeli training turned the peshmerga into a highly effective military force.

File:PeshmergaMosul.jpg
Kurdish Peshmerga look back at a car bomb explosion that targeted their convoy near Mosul. Two Peshmerga were killed.

The 1991 Uprisings

1991-1995

The Kurdish Civil War (1995-1998)

The civil war among the peshmergas of the PUK and the KDP held up the military development of the peshmerga as the attention was no longer on outside threats.

1998-2003

Peshmerga During Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)

Peshmerga in the New Iraq (2003-Present)

The Peshmerga are allied with the American-led coalition. The Peshmergas of the PUK and the KDP are now united.[citation needed] They are considered an effective military force.[citation needed]

The New Peshmerga Military

A Kurdish Army Peshmerga "Special Forces" Soldier places his AKM assault rifle on the ground to pose for a photograph at a river stream located in the countryside near Dohuk.

Peshmerga forces fought side by side with American troops in the 2003 Iraq War in Iraqi Kurdistan. Since that time the Peshmerga have assumed full responsibility for the security of the Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq.

In early 2005 it was speculated by Newsweek magazine that Peshmerga forces could be trained by the US to take on Sunni rebels in Iraq.

In late 2004, when Arab Iraqi Police and ING (Iraqi National Guard) units in the city of Mosul collapsed in the face of an insurgent uprising, Kurdish Peshmerga battalions, who had recently been converted into ING forces, led the counter-attack alongside US military units. To this day, there are a number of Kurdish battalions of former Peshmerga in the Iraqi Army serving in Northern Iraq.

It is estimated that as of January, 2005 there were 80,000 Peshmerga fighters in Iraqi Kurdistan. A February 2005 The New York Times article mentioned that Massoud Barzani wants to retain the Peshmerga forces. The article estimates their number to be 100,000. A recent CBS News reports places their number at 175,000.

The peshmergas are an active partner in the American-led coalition in Iraq. Many peshmerga are fluent in Arabic, in contrast to foreign coalition troops, and they therefore play an important role in the Sunni triangle of Central Iraq. On the strategic level the peshmergas are ready to fight a guerrilla war in case of a Turkish or an Iranian invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Current Equipment of the Peshmerga

Unlike the other militias, the Peshmerga were not prohibited by the transitional government, the Kurdish army has been formed out of the Peshmerga. They are usually armed with AK-47s and AK-74s, RPKs (light Soviet machine guns) and DShKs (heavy Soviet machine guns). During the American-led invasion the Peshmerga captured the rest of the arms of the Iraqi forces, consisting of more than 2000 armored vehicles (some hundred of them PT-76s and a smaller number of T-55s) and an unknown number of artillery guns.

  • Individual Weapons
    • Assault Rifle
    • Submachine Gun
    • Machine Gun
      • RPK (LMG - 7.62 x 39 mm)
      • RPK-74 (LMG - 5.45 x 39 mm)
      • PKM (GPMG - 7.62 x 54 mmR)
      • DShK (Heavy Machine Gun - 12.7 x 107 mm)
    • Sniper Rifle
    • Anti-Tank Explosive
      • RPG-7 (rocket-propelled grenade launcher - 40 mm)
    • Man-Portable Air-Defence System
  • Vehicles
File:Type-69-Armor-Plate.jpg
Type-69 Q-M with plating armor reinforcement
A curious example of the so called Enigma, an Iraqi Command vehicle widely reinforced with appliqué armor, 1991

Peshmerga Gallery

See also

References and notes