1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine

The 1947-48 Palestinian Civil War lasted from 30 November, 1947 to 14 May, 1948. The end of the war marked the end of the British mandate over Palestine. This period constitutes the first phase of the Arab-Israeli war, during which the Jewish community and the Arab community of Palestine clashed, whilst the British, who supposedly had the obligation to guarantee safety there, organised their withdrawal and intervened there only on an occasional basis. The following phase of the Arab-Israeli war began on the 15 May, 1948, after the creation of Israel, when the conflict in Palestine evolved into a war between Israel and several Arab neighbours. This article provides an exhaustive report of the various episodes and key events of the civil war period, followed by a summary.

Historical context

Since 1920, Palestine found itself under the control of a British administration, but the country became the object of a battle between Jewish Zionist nationalists and Palestinian Arab nationalists, who opposed one another just as much as they both opposed the British 'occupation.'

The Palestinian backlash culminated in the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Directed by Palestinian nationalists, those who participated in the uprising opposed Zionism, the British presence in Palestine and the Palestinian politicians who called for pan-Arabic nationalism at the same time. Both the British and the Zionist organisations of the time acted unfavourably to this backlash; nonetheless, the Palestinian nationalists did obtain from the British a draconian reduction of Jewish immigration, legislated by the White Paper of 1939. However, the consequences of the uprising were heavy. Nearly 5000 Arabs and 500 Jewish people died; the various paramilitary Zionist organisations were reinforced, and the majority of the members of the Palestinian political élite exiled themselves, such as the noted anti-Semite Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, chief of the Arab High Committee, who took refuge in Nazi Germany, where he would help to recruit Muslims for the Waffen-SS.

After World War 2 and the horrors of The Holocaust, the Zionist movement attracted sympathy. In Palestine, right-wing Zionist groups fought against the British. occupation. The Palestinian nationalists reorganized themselves, but their organisation remained inferior to that of the Zionists. Nevertheless, the weakening of the colonial British Empire reinforced Arabic countries and the Arab League for the future war against newly-founded Israel.

Diplomacy failed to reconcile the different points of view concerning the future of Palestine. On 18 February, 1947, the British announced their withdrawal from the region. Later that year, on the 29 November, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted for a partition plan with the support of the big global powers, but not that of Britain nor the Arabic nations.

Beginning of the Civil War (30 November, 1947 - 1 April, 1948)

In the aftermath of the adoption of the United Nations' partition plan, the manifestations of joy of the Jewish community were counterbalanced by protests by Arabs throughout the country and after the 1 December, the Arab Higher Committee enacted a general strike that lasted three days.

A 'wind of violence' rapidly took hold of the country, foreboding civil war between the two communities.

Rise of violence

Aftermath of the car bomb attack on the Ben Yehuda St., which killed 53 and injured many more.

In all the mixed zones where both communities lived, particularly Jerusalem and Haifa, increasingly violent attacks, reprisals and counter-reprisals followed each other. Isolated shootings evolved into all-out battles. Attacks against trafic, for instance, turned into ambushes as one bloody attack led to another. For example, on December 30, in Haifa, members of the clandestine militant Zionist group, Irgun, threw two bombs at a crowd of Arab workers who were queueing in front of a refinery, killing 6 of them and injuring 42. An angry crowd killed 39 Jewish people in revenge, until British soldiers reestablished calm^,. In reprisals, some soldiers from the strike force, Palmach and the Carmel brigade, attacked the village of Balad-al-Sheikh and Hawassa. According to different historians, this attack led to between 21 and 70 deaths.

On the 22 February, 1948, supporters of Mohammad Amin al-Husayni organised, with the help of certain British deserters, three attacks against the Jewish community. Using car bombs aimed at the headquarters of the pro-Zionist Jerusalem Post, the Ben Yehuda St. market and the backyard of the Jewish Agency's offices, they killed 22, 53 and 13 Jewish people respectively, and injured hundreds^,. In a counter-attack, Lehi put a landmine on the railroad track in Rehovot on which a train from Cairo to Haifa was travelling, killing 28 British soldiers and injuring 35.

This would be copied on the 31 March, close to Caesarea Maritima, which would lead to the death of forty people, injuring 60, who were, for the most part, Arab civilians

Between December 1947 and January 1948, it was estimated that around 1,000 people were killed and 2,000 injured. By the end of March, a report stated that 2,000 had been killed and 4,000 injured. These figures correspond to an average of over 100 deaths and 200 injuries per week, all of this in a country with 2,000,000 inhabitants.

War of the Roads

Geographic situation of the Jewish zones

Map of Jewish settlements and roads in Palestine by the 1 December, 1947.

Apart from on the coastline, Jewish yishuvim, or settlements, were very dispersed. Communication between the coastal area- which was the most developed in terms of Jewish settlements- and the peripheral settlements was carried out by road links. These road links were an easy target for attacks, as the majority of them passed through or skirted often entirely Arab localities. The isolation of the 100,000 Jewish people in Jerusalem and other Jewish settlements outside the coastal zone, such as Kfar Etzion kibbutz, halfway on the strategic road between Jerusalem and Hebron, the 27 settlements in the Southern desert region of Negev and the settlements to the north of Galilee, were a weak strategic point for Yishuv.

The possibility of evacuating these difficult to defend zones was considered, but the policy of Haganah ('Defence' in Hebrew) was set in Jerusalem and beyond by David Ben-Gurion, first Prime Minister of Israel. He stated that 'what the Jewish people have has to be conserved. No Jewish person should abandon his or her house, farm, kibbutz or job without authorisation. Every outpost, every colony, whether it is isolated or not, must be occupied as though it were Tel Aviv itself . No Jewish settlement was evacuated until the invasion of May 1948. Only a dozen kibbutzim in Galilee as well as those of Gush Etzion sent women and children into the safer interior zones .

Ben Gurion gave instructions that the settlements of Negev be reinforced in number of men and goods, in particular the kibbutzim of Kfar Darom and Yad Mordechai (both north of Gaza,) Revivim (south of Beersheba) and Kfar Etzion. Conscious of the danger that weighed upon Negev, the supreme command of Haganah assigned a whole Palmach battalion there..

Jerusalem and the great difficulty of accessing the city became even more critical to its Jewish population, who made up one sixth of the total of Yishuv settlers. The route from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was long and precipitous, which, after leaving the Jewish zone at Hulda, went through the [http://www.rc.net/wcc/israel/latrun.htm foothills of Latrun. Then, the 28 kilometre route between Bab-el-Wadi and Jerusalem took no less than 3 hours, and the route passed the vicinity of the Arab villages of Saris, Qaluniya, Al-Qastal and Deir Yassin.

Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni's strategy

Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, prominent military leader during the Palestinian Civil War.

Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni arrived in Jerusalem with the objective of 'choking' the Jewish community of the town . He moved to Tzurif, a village to the South-West of Jerusalem, with his supporters, around a hundred fighters who were trained in Syria before the war and who served as officers in his army, Jihad al-Muqadas, or Army of the Holy War. He was joined by a hundred or so young villagers and veterans of the British Army. His army soon had several thousand men , and moved training quarters in Bir Zeit, close to Ramallah. Its zone of influence extended up to Lydda and Ramleh, where Hasan Salama, veteran of the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine, commanded 1,000 men and co-ordinated, with Al-Husayni, a plan of disruption and harassment of road traffic .

On the 10 December, the first organised attack occured when ten members of a convoy between Bethlehem and Kfar Etzion were killed .

On the 14 January, Abd al-Qadir himself commanded and took part in an attack against Kfar Etzion, in which 1,000 Palestinian Arab combattants were involved. The attack was a failure, and 200 of al-Qadir's men died. Nonetheless, the attack did not come without losses of Jewish lives: a division of 35 Palmach men who sought to reinforce the establishment were caught by surprise, surrounded and massacred.

On January 25, a large scale attack took place in the Arab village of Al-Qastal. Due to an appeal by al-Husayni, many people from several Arab-majority villages situated in the North-East of Jerusalem joined the attack, although others did not, for fear of reprisals . The campaign for control over the roads became increasingly militaristic in nature, and became a focal point of the Arab war effort. After March 22, supply convoys to Jerusalem stopped, due to a convoy of around thirty vehicles having been destroyed in the gorges of Bab-el-Oued.

On 27 March, an important supply convoy from Kfar Etzion was taken in an ambush in South Jerusalem. They had to give up all arms, ammunition and vehicles to the Arabs. Encircled by several thousand armed Arabs, the Jewish people of Jerusalem had to ask the assistance of the United Kingdom after 24 hours of combat. According to a British report, the situation in Jerusalem, where a food rationing system was already in application, risked becoming desperate after 15 May.

At the same time, the situation was just as critical for the Jewish people in other parts of the country. The settlements of Negev were utterly isolated, due to the impossibility of using the Southern coastal road, which passed through zones densely populated by Arabs . On March 27, a convoy of supplies that was intended for the isolated kibbutzim north-west of Galilee was attacked in the vicinity of Haifa. In the ensuing battle, 42-47 Haganah combattants and around a hundred fighters of the Arab Liberation Army were killed, and all vehicles involved were destroyed^,,.

Death toll and analysis

In the last week of March alone, the losses underwent by Haganah were particularly heavy: they lost three large convoys in ambushes, more than 100 soldiers and their fleet of armoured vehicles.

All in all, Jerusalem West was gradually 'choked;' the settlements of Galilee could not be reached in any other way but via the valley of Jordan and the road of Nahariya, both dominated by Arab villages. Haifa could not be joined to Tel-Aviv by the coastal road due to the chain of Arab villages at the Northern part of it. In the south, the four settlements of the Block of Etzion were beseiged and the pipeline that supplied them with water regularly sabotaged.

This situation, the need to prepare the settlements for the foreseen attack of the Arab states in May, and the earlier projected departure date of the British pushed Haganah to the offensive and to apply the Daleth plan from April onwards.

Intervention of foreign forces in Palestine

Arab volunteers in Palestine

Violence intensified and certain organisations made use of soldiers. Although responsible for law and order up until the end of the mandate, the British did not try to take control of the situation, being more involved in the liquidation of the administration and the evacuation of their troops^,. Furthermore, the authorities felt that they had lost enough men already in the conflict.

The British either could not or did not want to impede the intervention of foreign forces into Palestine . According to a special report by the UN Special Commission on Palestine:

• During the night of 20-21 January, a troop composed of 700 Syrians in battle dress, equipped well and in control of mechanised transport, enters Palestine 'via Transjordan.'
• On 27 January, 'a band of 300 men from outside Palestine, was established in the area of Safed in Galilee and was probably responsible for the intensive heavy weapon and mortar attacks the following week against the settlement of Yechiam.'
• In the night of 29 January-30 January, a batallion commanded by commanded by Fawzi al-Qawuqji that consisted of 950 men in 19 vehicles was deployed by the Arab Liberation Army and entered Palestine 'via Bridge Adam and dispersed itself around the villages of Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarem.'

In addition, a number of other Arab Liberation Army batallions were deployed from between the 10 January, 1948 and the start of March:

• The Second regiment of Yarmouk, under the orders of Adib Shishakli entered Galilee via Lebanon on the night of 11-12 January. The batallion passed through Safed and then settled in the village of Sasa. A third of the regiment's fighters were Palestinian, and a quarter were Syrian.
• The 1st Yarmouk regiment, commanded by Muhammad Tzafa, entered Palestine on the night of 20-21 January, via the Bridge of Damia from Jordan and disperses around Samaria, where it established its HQ, in the Northern Samarian city of Tubas. The regiment is composed chiefly of Palestinians and Iraqis.
• The Hittin regiment, commanded by Madlul Abbas, settled in the west of Samaria with its headquarters in Tulkarem.
• The Hussein ibn Ali regiment provided reinforcement in Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem and several other cities.
• The Qadassia regiment were reserves based in Jab'a.

Fawzi al-Qawuqji, Field Commander of the Arab Liberation Army, arrived, according to himself, on the 4 March, with the rest of the logistics and around 100 Bosniak volunteers in Jab'a, a small village on the route between Nablus and Jenin. He established a headquarters there and a training centre for Palestinian volunteers.

Alan Cunningham, the British High Commisioner in Palestine, thoroughly protested against the Syrian incursions, but the only reaction that he got from his own government came from Alec Kirkbride, who complained to Ernest Bevin about the fact that 'no serious effort is being made to stop incursions' and about the militants' 'hostile tone and threats'.. The British and the information service of Yishuv expected to take part in an offensive on 15 February, but it would not take place, seemingly because the Mufti troops were not ready .

In March, an Iraqi regiment of the Arab Liberation Army came to reinforce the Palestinian troops of Salameh in the area around Lydda and Ramleh, whilst Al-Hussayni started a headquarters in Bir Zeit, 10 km to the north of Ramallah. At the same time, a number of North African troops, principally Libyans, and hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood entered Palestine. In March, an initial regiment arrived in Gaza and certain militants amongst them reached Jaffa.

Morale of the fighters

The Arab combattants' initial victories reinforced morale amongst them . The Arab Higher Committee was confident and decided to reject the UN-backed partition plan. In an announcement made by the Secretary-General on the 6 February, they declared:

The Palestinian Arabs consider any attempt by Jewish people or by whatever power or group of power to establish a Jewish state in an Arab territory to be an act of aggresion that will be resisted by force [...]

The prestige of the United Nations would be better served by abandoning this plan and by not imposing such an injustice [...]

The Palestinian Arabs make a grave declaration before the UN, before God and before history that they will never submit to any power that comes to Palestine to impose a partition. The only way to establish a partition is to get rid of them all: men, women, and children.

At the beginning of February 1948, the moral of the Jewish leaders was not high: 'distress and despair arose clearly from the notes taken at the meetings of the Mapai party.' 'The attacks against the Jewish settlements and main roads worsened the direction of the Jewish people, who underestimated the intensity of the Arab reaction . The situation of the 100,000 Jewish people situated in Jerusalem was precarious, and supplies to the city, already slim in number, were likely to be stopped. Nonetheless, despite the setbacks suffered, the Jewish forces, in particular Haganah, remained superior in number and quality to those of the Arab forces .

The First Wave of Palestinian Emigration

Main article: Palestinian exodus

The high morale of the Arab fighters and politicians was not shared by the Palestinian civilian population. The UN Palestine Commission reported 'Panic continues to increase, however, throughout the Arab middle classes, and there is a steady exodus of those who can afford to leave the country. .' From December 1947 to January 1948, around 70,000 Arabs fled, and, by the end of March, that number had grown to around 100,000.

These people were part of the first, chiefly voluntary, wave of Palestinian refugees of the conflict. Mostly the middle and upper classes fled, including the majority of the families of local governors and representatives of the Arab Higher Committee. Non-Palestinian Arabs also fled in large numbers. Most of them did not abandon the hope of returning to Palestine once the hostilities had ended

Policies of foreign powers

Many decisions were made abroad that had an important influence over the outcome of the conflict.

Britain and the Jordanian choice

The 'Big Three' in terms of post-World War II Foreign policy, Harry Truman, Joseph Stalin and Ernest Bevin at Potsdam in 1945.

Britain did not want a Palestinian state led by a grand Mufti, and opted unofficially instead, on 7 February, 1948, to support the annexation of Palestine by Abdullah I of Jordan . At a meeting in London between the commander of Transjordan's Arab Legion, Glubb Pasha, and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ernest Bevin, the two parties agreed that they would facilitate the entry of the Arab Legion into Palestine on 15 May and that the Arab part of Palestine be occupied by it. However, they held that the Arab Legion not enter the vicinity of Jerusalem or the Jewish state itself. This option did not envisage a Palestinian Arab state. Although the ambitions of King Abdullah are known, it is not apparent to what extent the authorities of Yishuv, the Higher Arab Council or the Arab League knew of this decision.

The American U-turn

In Mid-March, after the increasing disorder in Palestine and faced with the fear, later judged unfounded, of an Arab petrol embargo, the American administration announces the possible withdrawal of its support for the UN's partition plan and for the dispatching of an international force to guarantee its implementation. The US, instead, suggested that Palestine be put under UN supervision^,. On the 1 April, the UN Security Council voted on the American proposal of a convocation of a special special assembly intended to reconsider the Palestinian problem, a proposal for which the Soviets abstained from voting. This U-turn from the Americans causes concern and debate amongst Yishuv authorities, who could not, after the withdrawal of British troops, afford to face the Arab troops without the support of the USA. In this context, Elie Sasson, the director of the Arab section of Jewish Agency, and several other personalities, ended up convincing David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meyerson to advance a diplomatic initiative towards the Arabs. The job of negotiation was delegated to Joshua Palmon, who was prohibited from limiting the Haganah's liberty of action but was authorised to declare that 'the Jewish people were ready with a truce.'

The logistic support of the Eastern bloc

In the context of the embargo imposed upon Palestinian belligerants - Jewish and Arab alike - and the dire lack of goods in Palestine, Stalin's decision to not adhere to the embargo and support the country by exporting Czechoslovakian goods played a role in the war that was differently appreciated.

Motivations advanced as regards to Stalin's choice include his support towards the UN Partition plan and his interest in financially aiding Czechoslovakia to lessen their financial frustration after having been refused Marshall Plan assistance.

The extent of this support and the concrete role that it played is up for debate. Figures advanced by historians tend to vary. Yoav Gelber spoke of 'small deliveries from Czechoslovakia arriving by air[...] from April 1948 onwards' whereas various pro-Palestinian commentators have argued that there was an unbalanced level of support in favour of Yishuv, given that the Palestinian Arabs did not benefit from an equivalent level of Soviet support. In any case, the embargo was extended against Soviet support in May 1948 by the UN Security Council, which caused great problems . In several circumstances, the embargo was not followed by the British ^, .

Arab leaders' refusal of direct implication

Despite what one may be led to think by their bellicose declarations, the Arab leaders 'did what they possibly could to avoid being directly involved' in support for the Palestinian cause.

At the Arab League summit of October 1947, in Aley, the Iraqi general, Ismail Safwat, painted a realist picture of the situation. He underlined the better organisation and greater financial support of the Jewish people in comparison to the Palestinians. He recommended the immediate deployment of the Arab armies at the Palestinian borders, the dispatching of weapons and ammunition to the Palestinians, and the contribution of a million pounds of financial aid to them. His proposals were rejected, other than the suggestion to send financial support, which was not followed up on. Nonetheless, a techno-military committee was established to coordinate assistance to the Palestinians. Based in Cairo, it was directed by Sawfat, who was supported by Libyan and Syrian officers and representatives of the Higher Arab Committee. A Transjordian deleguate was also appointed, but he did not participate in meetings.

At the December 1947 Cairo summit, under pressure by public opinion, the Arab leaders decided to create a military command that united all the heads of all the major Arab states, headed by Safwat. They still ignored his calls for financial and military aid, prefering to defer any decision until the end of the Mandate, but, nevertheless, decide to form the Arab Liberation Army, which would go into action in the following weeks.

In February 1948, Safwat reiterated his demands, but they fell on deaf ears: the Arab governments hoped that the Palestinians, aided by the Arab Liberation Army, could manage on their own until the International community renounced the partition plan.

The Arms Problem

Sten machine gun

Whereas the Arab states had state armies and official structures that guaranteed a steady flow of weapons, ammunition and materials, the other protagonists of the conflict did not. The Palestinian Arabs and the Jews' situation was more delicate, since, during the British mandate, the authorities always prohibited the possession of weapons, and confiscated all that they found. Consequently, neither had heavy weaponry or the advantages that recognised, established states have, and their forces had to be clandestine.

The Arab Liberation Army was, in theory, financed and equipped by the Arab League. A budget of one million pounds sterling had been promised to them, due to the insistance of Ismail Safwat. In reality, though, funding never arrived, and only Syria truly supported the Arab volunteers in concrete terms. On the ground, logistics were completely neglected, and their leader, Fawzi al-Qawuqji, envisaged that his troops survive only on the expenses accorded to them by the Palestinian population.

The situation that the Army of the Holy War and the Palestinian forces were in was worse. They could not rely on any form of foreign support and had to get by on the funds that Mohammad Amin al-Husayni could raise. The troops' armament was limited to what the fighters already had. To make things even worse, they had to be content with arms bought on the black market or pillaged from British warehouses, and, as a result, did not really have enough arms to wage war .

The situation in which Jewish fighters found themselves in was a little better than that of the Palestinian Arabs, since they benefitted from a number of clandestine factories that manufactured light weapons and ammunition. However, they had far less than what was necessary to carry out a war: in November, only one out of every three Jewish combatants was armed, rising to two out of three within Palmach .

However, for Ben-Gurion, the problem was not essentially having the capacity of waging war, but of constructing an army that was worthy to be a state army. The importance that he accorded to this is illustrated by the practice of combining the cabinet posts of Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, a practice that he initiated and that many of his successors follow.

To arm and equip this army, he sent agents to Europe and to the USA, thence came the essential support in terms of light arms and munitions, which began to arrive at the start of April. From June, onwards, there was also a flow of heavy arms.

Until March, Haganah suffered a lack of arms similar to that of the Army of Holy War. From April onwards, it was armed better than the Palestinians, but, after May 15, during the first weeks of the Arab-Israeli War, the arms advantage leant in favour of the Arab states. From June, after the first truce, the advantage leant clearly towards the Israelis. This situation's changing was due to the contacts made in November 1947 and afterwards.

The Jewish armament movement was helped out after the Yishuv agents obtained a supply of Avia planes from Czechoslovakia and, later on in the conflict, supermarine Spitfires, machine guns and munitions. In the stockpiles left over from World War II, they procured all the necessary equipment, vehicles and logistics needed for an army. In France, they procured armoured vehicles despite the ongoing embargo. Jewish agents also bought machines to manufacture arms and munitions, forming the foundations of the Israeli armament industry..

In the USA, they bought a number of bombadiers and aeroplanes, which allowed for the transporting of arms purchased in Europe. Operation Balak was put in place to bring these arms and munitions to Israel by the end of March. Some ships were also leased out from various European ports so that these goods could be transported by the 15 May. To finance all of this, Golda Meir managed, by the end of December, to collect twenty-five million dollars through a fundraising campaign set about in the USA to capitalise on American sympathisers to the Zionist cause. Out of the 129 million US dollars raised between October 1947 and March 1949 for the Zionist cause, more than 78 million dollars, over 60%, were used to buy arms and munition.

Reorganisation of Haganah

Theatre of Operation of each Haganah brigade.

After 'having gotten the Jews of Palestine and of elsewhere to do everything that they could, personally and financially, to help Yishuv,' Ben-Gurion's second greatest achievement was his having succesfully transformed Haganah from being a clandestine paramilitary organisation into a true army. Ben-Gurion appointed Israel Galili to the position of head of the High Command counsel of Haganah and divided Haganah into 6 infantry brigades, numbered 1 to 6, alloting a precise theatre of operation to each one. Yaakov Dori was named Chief of Staff, but it was Yigal Yadin who assumed the responsibility on the ground as chief of Operations. Palmach, commanded by Yigal Allon, was divided into 3 élite brigades, numbered 10-12, and constituted the mobile force of Haganah</ref>^,.

On 19 November, 1947, obligatory conscription is instituted and all men and women received military training.

In March or April, the tactical unit surpassed brigade level, and the units started to be operational towards the end of April and the beginning of May, at the second phase of the war, but they remain under-equipped. In April, Haganah led operations at brigade level, and from July onwards, it carried out operations at division level, acting in offensives on several fronts simultaneously.

Plan Dalet

Main article: Plan Dalet

Yaakov Dori, Haganah's Chief of Staff, and his right hand man, Yigal Yadin, Chief of Operations.

Plan Dalet was finalised on 10 March, 1948, under the direction of Yigal Yadin. 75 pages long, it laid down the rules and the objects that were to be followed by Haganah during the second phase of the war. Its principal objective was to secure Yishuv's uninterrupted territorial connections, particularly in response to the war of the roads carried out by Al-Hussayni and in preparation for the Arab states' declared intervention. Plan Dalet caused quite a controversy amongst historians. Some anti-Zionist historians see it as an offensive plan that approves of ethnic cleansing, and the conquering of as much of Palestine as possible, whereas others think that the plan was primarily defensive and military in nature and a preparation against invasion. This is discussed at greater length in the main article.

Haganah on the offensive (1 April, 1948 - 15 May, 1948)

The second phase of the war, which began in April, marked a huge change in direction, as Haganah moved from being on the defensive to the offensive. The armed Palestinian groups were roundly defeated, Yishuv took control of some of the principal routes that linked the Jewish settlements, and as a consequence, Jerusalem, which was seized along with a number of mixed zones and the Arab-majority city of Jaffa, was able to receive supplies again. Palestinian society collapsed and a massive exodus was triggered.

Operation Nachshon, 5-20 April

Main article: Operation Nachshon

Theatre of operations

Haganah soldier in Al-Qastal on the 5 April, 1948.

At the end of March, 1948, Hussayni's troops prevented supply convoys from reaching Jerusalem. The city was besieged and the Jewish population was forced to adhere to a rationing system to survive. In this context, David Ben-Gurion decided to launch the Nachshon plan to open up the town and provide supplies to Jerusalem.

Between 5-20 April, 1500 men from the Guivati and Harel brigades took control of the road to Jerusalem and allowed 3 or 4 convoys to get to the city.

The operation was a military success. All the Arab villages that blocked the route were either taken or destroyed, and the Jewish forces were victorious in all their engagements. Nonetheless, not all the objectives of the operation were achieved, since only 1800 tonnes of the 3,000 envisaged were transported to the town, and two months of severe rationing had to be assumed.

Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni was killed during the night of 7-8 April, in the middle of the battles taking place in Al-Qastal. The loss of this charismatic Palestinian leader 'disrupted the Arab strategy and organisation in the area of Jerusalem.' His successor, Emil Ghuri, changed tactics: instead of provoking a series of ambushes throughout the route, he had a huge road block erected at Bab-el-Oued, and Jerusalem was once again isolated as a consequence.

The Nashon operation exposed the bad military organisation of the Palestinian paramilitary groups. Due to lack of logistics, particularly food and ammunition, they were incapable of maintaining engagements that were more than a few hours away from their permanent bases.

Faced with these events, the Higher Arab Council asked Alan Cunningham to authorise the return of the Mufti, the only person capable of redressing the situation. Despite his giving his permission, he did not get to Jerusalem. His falling prestige cleared the way for the expansion of the influence of the Arab Liberation Army and the Army of the Holy War within Jerusalem.

Deir Yassin massacre

Main article: Deir Yassin massacre

Deir Yassin is a village situated 5 kilometres west of Jerusalem. Outside the confines of Operation Nahshon, 120 Irgun and Lehi members killed between 100 and 120 inhabitants, who mostly were civilians.

This massacre led to indignation from the international community, the moreso since the press of the time reported that the death toll was 254. Ben-Gurion roundly condemned it, as did the principal Jewish authorities: Haganah, the Great Rabbinate and the Jewish Agency for Israel, who sent a letter of condemnation, apology and condolence to King Abdullah I.

According to Morris, 'the most important immediate effect of the atrocity and the media campaign that followed it was how one started to report the fear felt in Palestinian towns and villages, and, later, the panicked fleeing from them..'

Another important consequence was the repercussion felt within the Arab population of neighbouring Arab states, which, one again, increased the pressure on the representatives of these states to intervene and come to the aid of the Palestinians ^,.

On the 13 April, in revenge, a medical convoy that was driving towards Jerusalem's Hadassah of Mount Scopus hospital was attacked by Arabs, killing twenty-two doctors and patients. A few British soldiers tried to intervene to stop this massacre, but without success.

The Battle of Mishmar HaEmek (4 avril - 15 avril 1948)

Women training at Mishmar HaEmek

Mishmar HaEmek is a kibbutz that was founded by Mapam in 1930, in the Jezreel Valley, close to the road between Haifa and Jenin that passes the Megiddo kibbutz. It is situated in a place that Haganah officers considered to be on one of the most likely axes of penetration for a 'major Arab attack' against Yishuv^,.

On 4 April, the Arab Liberation Army launched an attack on the kibbutz with ten cannons that they had accrued. The attack was fought off by the members of the kibbutz, who were supported by Haganah soldiers. The artillery fire that had almost totally destroyed the kibbutz was stopped by a British column, who arrived on the scene by order of General MacMillan, and, on April 7, Fawzi Al-Qawuqji accepted a 24-hour ceasefire, but required that the kibbutz be surrendered. The inhabitants of the kibbutz evacuated their children, and, after having consulted Tel-Aviv, refuse to surrender^,.

On the 8 or 9 April, Haganah prepared a counter-offensive, with accordance to Plan Dalet. Yitzhak Sadeh was put in charge of operations, with the order to 'clean out' the region. The battle lasted until the 15 April. Sadeh's men sieged all the villages around the kibbutz, and the Arab Liberation Army had to retreat to its bases in Jabba. The majority of the inhabitants of the region fled, but those who did not were either imprisoned or vanquished to Jenin. The villages were plundered by some kibbutznikim and razed to the ground with explosives.

According to Morris, the Arab Liberation Army soliders were demoralised by reports of the Deir Yassin massacre and the death of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni. Throughout battle, they had generally been forced to withdraw and to abandon the people of the villages . Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins report that Joshua Palmon, head of a unit of 6 men, failed to seize invaluable pieces of artillery, and they depict the events as a débâcle for which Fawzi Al-Qawuqji offered extravagent excuses, declaring in particular that the Jewish forces has 120 tanks, six squadrons of fighter and bomber aeroplanes and that they were supported by a regiment of gentile Russian volunteers.

When the battle finished, Palmach forces continued 'cleaning' operations until the 19 April, destroying several villages and forcing those who inhabited them to flee. Some villages were also evacuated under the instruction of Arab authorities .

In May, Irgun acted in several operations in the region, razing a number of villages and killing some of their inhabitants, as would some drafts from the Golani and Alexandroni brigades.

The Battle of Ramat Yohanan and the Defection of the Druzim

Following the 'fiasco' of Mishmar HaEmek, Fawzi Al-Qawuqji ordered the Druze regiment of the Arab Liberation Army into action, to carry out diversion operations. Druze soldiers took position in several Arab villages 12 kilometres to the east of Haifa, whence they occasionally attacked traffic and Jewish settlements, including Ramat Yohanan.

The Kibbutznikim and the Haganah soldiers that supported them forced back their attacks with ease, and razed the villages from which they launched their attacks in retaliation. Having run out of ammunition, the Druzim withdrew to their base in Shafa'amr, with one hundred casualties^,.

The Druzim had already made contact on several occasions with Yishuv agents, and, following their defeat at Ramat Yohanan, the Druze officers, without the knowledge of their officer, offered to defect and to join the ranks of Haganah. This proposition was discussed with Yigael Yadin, who refused the proposal but suggested that they could help to carry out sabotage operations behind the backs of the Arabs and to influence their comrades into deserting the army. By the start of May, 212 Wahab soldiers deserted, Taking into account the attitude of his men, Wahab met with Jewish liaison officers on the 9 May and agreed to cooperate with Haganah. The two parties avoided clashes, and Wahab created a neutral enclave in the centre of Galilee. Wahab's army did not respond to calls for it to help fight Haganah's occupation of Acre, and avoided being present whilst Haganah occupied the police fortress of Shafa'amr during its evacuation by the British.

The position that the Druzim took influenced their fate after the war. Given the good relationship between the Druzim and Yishuv from 1930 onwards despite their collaboration with the Arab Higher Council and the Arab League, Ben-Gurion insisted that the Druzim, as well as the Circassians and the Maronites benefit from a different position to that of the other Arabs.

The siege of mixed localities

The Daleth plan intended to ensure Jewish territorial continuity in the zones allocated to the Jewish people in the UN Partition plan. In accordance with this strategy, mixed urban centres, or on the borders of this zone had to be attacked and beseiged by the Jewish forces. Tiberias was attacked on 10 April and fell six days later; Haifa fell on 23 April, after only one day of combat, and Jaffa is attacked on 27 April, but only fell after the British abandoned it. Safed fell on 11 May, within the framework of Operation Yitfah, and Beisan and Acre fell, on 13 and 17 May respectively, within the framework of Operation Ben Ami. The Arab inhabitants of these towns fled en masse. In these 6 cities, only 13,000 of the total of 177,000 Arab inhabitants remained by the end of May. This phenomenon ricocheted also in the suburbs and the majority of the zone's Arab villages.

Operation Yiftah (20 April-24 May)

Theatre of operations

The Finger of Galilee, a zone in North-West Galilee, between the Lake Tiberias and Metula, was the Jewish-controlled area that was the most distant and isolated from the area most densely populated by Jewish people, the coastal plain. The presence of the Lebanese border to the North, the Syrian border to East and the Arab presence in the rest of Galilee made it a probable target for intervention of the Arab armies . Within the framework of the Dalet plan, Yigal Yadin entrusted Yigal Allon, commander of the Palmach, with the responsibility of managing Operation Yiftah, whose objectives were to control all the aforementioned area and consolidate it ahead of the Arab attack that was planned for 15 May.

Allon was in charge of two undermanned Palmach batallions, which had to face the populce of Safed and several dozen Arab villages. The situation was made more problematic by the presence of the British, although they began their evacuation of the area. According to his analysis, it was essential that they empty the zone of any Arab presence to completely protect themselves; the exodus would also encumber the roads that the Arab forces would have to penetrate.

On 20 April, Allon launched a campaign that mixed propaganda, attacks, seizing control of strongholds that the British had abandoned, and destroying conquered Arab villages. On 1 May, a counter-offensive is launched by Arab militiamen against Jewish settlements, but it is without success. On 11 May, Safed fell, and the operation finished on 24 May after the villages of the valley of Hula were burnt down. Syrian forces' planned offensive in the area failed and, by the end of June, the zone covering everywhere from Tiberias to Metula, encorporating Safed, was emptied of all its Arab population.

Meeting of Golda Meir and King Abdullah I of Jordan (10 May)

File:Golda43.jpg

Golda Meir in 1943

King Abdullah of Jordan

On 10 May, Golda Meir and Ezra Danin secretely went to Aman, to the palace of King Abdullah to discuss the situation with him. The situation that Abdullah found himself in was difficult. On one hand, his personal ambitions, the promises made by Yishuv in November 1947 and the British approval of these promises pushed him to consider annexing the Arab part of Palestine without intervening against the future state of Israeli. On the other hand, the pressure exerted by his people in reaction to the massacre of Deir Yassin, combined with their feelings with regard to the Palestinian exodus and his agreements with other members of the Arab League pushed him to be more strongly involved in the war against Israel. He also found himself in a position of power, having the benefit of military support from not only the Arab League, but the British. In his diary, Ben-Gurion wrote about Golda Mair's reaction to the meeting:

We met [on 10 May] amicably. He was very worried and looks terrible. He did not deny that there had been talk and understanding between us about a desirable arrangement, namely that he would take the Arab part [of Palestine]. (...) But Abdallah had said that he could now, on 10 May, only offer the Jews "autonomy" within an enlarged Hashemite kingdom. He added that while he was not interested in invading the areas allocated for Jewish statehood, the situation was volatile. But he voiced the hope that Jordan and the Yishuv would conclude a peace agreement once the dust had settled.

Historical analysis of the motivations and conclusions of this meeting are disparate.

According to Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins - as well as Israeli historiographers - the intention behind Yishuv's negotiation was to come up with a peace treaty and avoid an attack by Arab forces. At that time, the balance of power was not favourable for them, but Mair did not manage to convince the King.

According to Morris, Abdullah 'reconsidered the promises that he made in November to not be opposed to the partition plan,' but left Mair with the impression that he would make peace with the Jewish state once the civil war had finished.

Avi Shlaim spoke of a 'tacit' agreement to prevent the division of Palestine with the Palestinians, arguing the idea that there was a collusion between the Hashemite Kingdom and Yishuv. The historian Yoav Gelber, however, rejected this idea and devoted an entire work to dismounting it. .

Pierre Razoux indicated that 'the majority of experts consider it probable' that Ben-Gurion and King Abdullah had an understanding over dividing Palestine, and that only the pressure of the Arab states that Abdullah was under constrained him from following up on his promise. According to Razoux, this idea explains the attitude of the British, who, following this option, would respond to the promises made by Arthur Balfour to Yishuv and the Hashemite empire at the same time. He stated that 'the presence [...] of Arab Legion drafts, before 15 May, near strategic positions held by the British was fully realised .'

Ilan Pappé stressed that neither Abdallah's ministers, nor the Arab world itself, seemed to be privy to the discussions held between him and Yishuv, even if his ambitions on Palestine were widely known. He also stated that Sir Alek Kirkbride and Glubb Pasha thought at the time that, at the very least, Azzam Pasha, the Secretary of the Arab League, must have known about Abdullah's double game.

It is certain, on the other hand, that Golda Meir and King Abdullah did not come to an agreement on the status of Jerusalem. On 13 May, the Arab Legion took Kfar Etzion, strategically located halfway along the road between Hebron and Jerusalem, where fifteen Jewish captives were murdered, while on 17 May, Abdullah ordered Glubb Pasha to launch an attack against the Holy City.

The Fall of Gush Etzion (12-13 May)

Theatre of operations

Jewish prisoners taken after the fall of Gush Etzion

Kfar Etzion is a group of 4 settlements established on the strategic route between Hebron and Jerusalem, right in the middle of Arab territory. It was comprised on 400 inhabitants at the end of 1947. After the adoption of the partition plan, it was the object of Arab attacks. Ben Gurion reinforced it on 7 December, protecting it with a Palmach division, but on 8 January, he authorised the evacuation of the women and children of the settlements.

After 26 March, the last date upon which a supply convoy succeeded to reach it, despite heavy losses of life, the 151 defenders1 of Kfar Etzion were completely isolated.

On 12 May, Arab Legion units started to attack the settlements. The motivations advanced include their desire to protect one of their last supply convoys before the embargo took effect, which had to travel down the road by Kfar Etzion. Another theory is that the block of settlements obstructed the deployment of the Legion in the area around Hebron, whose attack was one of Abdullah's principal objectives. External defences fell quickly, and, on the 13 May, the first kibbutz was captured, and those who were taken prisoner were massacred; only four survived^,. The other three establishments surrender, and the kibbutzim are first plundered, then razed to the ground.

The events that took place at Kfar Etzion made apparent the limitations of the policy prohibiting evacuation. Although it was effective during civil war, when facing militias, isolated Jewish settlements could not resist the fire power of a regular army, and an evacuation could have made it possible to avoid the captivity or death of those who defended the settlements.

According to Yoav Gelber, the fall and massacre of Kfar Eztion influenced the decision of Ben-Gurion to launch an offensive on Jerusalem, where it had been initially hesistant, fearing the reaction of the Christian world. The battle for Jerusalem was thus set in motion.

Operation Kilshon (15 May)

Bevingrad, centre of the British security zone in Jerusalem

In Jerusalem, the British held several strategically-located buildings, with a security zone, named Bevingrad, at its centre. The city's radio station, telephone exchange and government hospital were located there, along with a number of barracks and the fashionable Notre Dame country inn, which dominated the city.

The prime objective of the Kilshon Operation was to take control of this zone of strategic importance whilst the British withdrew. The secondary objective of the operation was to simultaneously create a continuous frontline between the various isolated Jewish localities. For this aim, Brigadier General David Shealtiel, Haganah's former envoy to Europe, was deployed along with a troop of 400 Haganah soldiers and 600 militia soldiers. Emil Ghuri, the new leader of the Army of the Holy War, also envisaged taking these districts and mobilised 600 soldiers for the mission, but prepared no specific operation.

Thanks to British complicity, Haganah obtained the precise schedule of evacuation, and, on 15 May at 04:00, they took all of the buildings, one after the other, having started only a few minutes after the British evacuation. Having taken the Arab troops by surprise, they are unable to offer any resistance.

The secondary aim was also succesful. In the North of the city, Jewish forces seized Sheikh Jarrah, made a connection with Mount Scopus, and took the villages surrounding the American settlement. In the South, they ensured the connection of the the German and Greek settlements with Talpiot and Ramat Rahel, after having taken the Allenby barracks. A Palmach unit even re-established contact with the Jewish district in the Old City via the Zion Gate.

The irregular Arabic forces were rendered impotent and yielded to panic, calling the situation hopeless and announcing the imminent fall of the city.

Operation Ben'Ami (13-22 May)

Theatre of operations

Within the framework of Plan Dalet, Yigal Yadin intended to make a breakthrough in the west of Galilee, wherein a number of isolated Jewish settlements were situated. This zone, which covers the land from Acre all the way to the Lebanese border, was allocated to the Arabs by the Partition plan, but was on the road through which Lebanese forces intended to enter into Palestine.

The command of this operation was entrusted to Moshe Carmel, head of the Carmeli brigade. It consisted of two phrases: the first began on the evening of 13 May, when a column of Haganah's armoured vehicles and lorries advanced along the coast with no resistance. The forces of the Arab Liberation Army fled without entering battle, and the first phase of the operation finished when Acre was taken on 18 May. In the second phase, from the 19 May to the 21 May, troops got as far as the Yehi'am kibbutz by the Lebanese border, connecting it and conquering and destroying a number of Arab villages on the way.

The Palestinian Exodus of 1948

Main article: 1948 Palestinian exodus

Palestinian refugees in 1948

Haganah's move from primarily defensive to primarily offensive operations during the second phase of the war was accomapnied by a huge exodus that involved 300,000 Arab refugees, not to forget the 100,000 of the First wave. The term 'Palestinian exodus' is often used to refer to both. These two waves of emigration gained a considerable amount of press interest and were widely relayed in the press of the time, moreso than most other Palestine-related events.

The causes of and responsability for this exodus are highly controversial topics amongst commentators on the conflict and even historians who specialise in this era. Amongst the various possible causes, some allot the exodus mainly to the Arab authorities' instructions to escape, whereas others feel that a policy of expulsion had been organised by the Yishuv authorities and implemented by Haganah. Others yet reject these two assumptions and see the exodus as the cumulated effect of all the civil war's consequences.

This topic is debated in further detail within the 1948 Palestinian exodus article.

Preparations made by the Arab League

During the last meeting of the Arab League in February 1948, the Arab leaders expressed their convictions in the capacity of the Arab Liberation Army to help the Palestinians and to force the international community to give up on the UN-backed partition plan. The following summit took place in Cairo on 10 April, with the situation having clearly developed with the death of Al-Hussayni and the debacle at Mishmar Ha'emek.

Once again, Ismail Safwat called for the immediate deployment of the Arab state armies at the borders of Palestine, and for the need to go beyond the established policy of participating in little more than small-scale raids towards taking part in large-scale operations. For the first time, the Arab leaders discussed the possibility of intervening in Palestine.

Syria and Lebanon declared themselves ready to intervene immediately, but King Abdullah refuses to let the Arab Legion forces intervene immediately in favour of the Palestinians, a move which irritated the Secretary-General of the League, who declared that Abdallah only cedes to the British diktat.

Nonetheless, Abdullah declared himself ready to send the Legion to assist the Palestinian cause after 15 May. In response, Syria insisted that the Egyptian army also take part, and, in spite of the opposition of Egypt's prime minister, King Farkouk responded favourably to the Syrian request, but due to his aim of curbing the Jordanians' hegemonic goals rather than his desire to help the Palestinians.

Later on, following the visit of several Palestinian dignitaries in Amman, and despite the opposition of Syria and the Mufti, Hadj Amin Al-Hussayni, Azzam Pasha accepted Abdullah's proposition and sent Ismail Safwat to Amman to organise a coordination between the Arab Liberation Army and Jordan's Arab Legion. It was decided that command over the operations would be reserved for King Abdullah, and that the Iraqis would deploy a brigade in Transjordan to prepare for intervention on 15 May. 

On 26 April, the 'intention to occupy Palestine' was officially announced at the Transjordanian parliament and the Jewish people were 'invited to place themselves beneath King Abdullah's jurisdiction.' The intention to spare their lives was also promised. Yishuv perceived this declaration as being one of war and encourages the Western world to pressure the King, through diplomatic means, to prevent his intervention.

On 30 April, Jordanians, Egyptians and Iraqis disputed the command of Abdullah. Abdullah received the honorary title of Commander-in-Chief, whilst the Iraqi general, Aldine Nur Mahmud, was named Chief of Staff. Despite this show of unity, it was agreed that each army would act independent of each other in the theatre of operations.

On 4 May, the Iraqi task force arrived at Mafraq. It was comprised of a regiment of armoured tanks, a regiment of mechanised infantry, and twenty-four artillery weapons, and included 1500 men. The Egyptians formed two brigades, deploying around 700 men into the Sinai. The Syrians could not put together a better force, whereas the Lebanese announced that they could not take part in military operations on 10 May. 

It was only two days before, on 8 May, that the British Foreign Office was certain of the Arab invasion. Whereas British analysts considered that all Arab armies, except the Arab Legion, were not prepared for the engagements to come, the Egyptian officers claimed that their advance would be 'a parade with the least risk,' and that their army 'would be in Tel-Aviv after just two weeks.'

The state of preparation of the army was such that they did not even have maps of Palestine. At the time, the final plans of invasion had not even been established yet. British leaders tried in vain to make the Arab leaders reconsider their decision, and Ismail Safwat resigned in indifference, but the Arab states seemed resolute. On 15 May, 1948, Azzam Pasham declared, in Cairo, that 'this war will be a war of extermination and an imposing massacre, about which one will speak like those of the Mongols and the Crusaders.'

Sources

Principal sources

• Yoav Gelber, Palestine 1948, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2006, ISBN 1845190750
• Ilan Pappé, La guerre de 1948 en Palestine, La fabrique éditions, 2000, ISBN 226404036X
• Efraïm Karsh, The Arab-Israeli Conflit - The Palestine War 1948, Osprey Publishing, 2002, ISBN 1841763721
• Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, Palestine 47, un partage avorté, Editions Complexe, 1994, ISBN 2870275218.
• Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins, O Jérusalem, Robert Laffont, 1971, ISBN 2266106988
• Benny Morris, The Birth Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University Press, 2003, ISBN 0521009677
• Benny Morris, Histoire revisitée du conflit arabo-sioniste, Editions complexe, 2003, ISBN 2870279388
• Bickerton, Ian and Hill, Maria (2003). Contested Spaces: The Arab-Israeli Conflict. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0074712179
• Eugène Rogan, Avi Shlaim et al., La guerre de Palestine 1948 : derrière le mythe, Autrement, 2002, ISBN 2746702401
• Henry Laurens, Paix et guerre au Moyen-Orient, Armand Colin, Paris, 2005, ISBN 2200269773
• Pierre Razoux, Tsahal, nouvelle histoire de l'armée israélienne, Perrin, 2006, ISBN 226202328X

Secondary sources

• Jon and David Kimche, A clash of destinies, The Arab-Jewish War and the founding of the state of Israel, Praeger, New-York, 1960,
• Elie Barnavi, Une histoire moderne d'Israël, Champs / Flammarion, 1988, ISBN 2080812467
• Yitzhak Rabin, Mémoires, Buchet/Chastel, 1980,
• Ahron Bregman, Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947, 2002, London: Routledge. ISBN 0415287162

Other sources

• Uri Milstein, History of Israel's War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War, vol.1, University Press of America, 1996, ISBN 0761803726
• Uri Milstein, History of Israel's War of Independence: The First Month, vol.2, University Press of America, 1997, ISBN 0761807217
• Uri Milstein, History of Israel's War of Independence: The First Invasion, vol.3, University Press of America, 1999, ISBN 0761807691
• Uri Milstein, History of Israel's War of Independence: Out of Crisis Came Decision, vol.4, University Press of America, 1999, ISBN 0761814892
• Salim Tamari, Jérusalem 1948 : Les faubourgs arabes et leur destin durant la guerre, Institut des études palestiniennes, 2002, ISBN 9953900191

Online sources

• Plan Daleth from mideastweb.org

Online documents

• United Nations Special Commission, First special Report to the Security Council : The Problem of Security in Palestine, 16 April 1948, from the United Nations website.
• Palestine remembered Palestinian view.
• Jewish Virtual Library Jewish view.

Filmography

• Elie Chouraqui, Ô Jérusalem, 2006.