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India and weapons of mass destruction

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India is believed to possess an arsenal of nuclear weapons and maintains intermediate-range ballistic missiles to deliver them.

Brief Historical Overview

As early as June 26 1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India's first Prime Minister, announced:

As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.[1]

India is not a signatory to either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in October 1963. India acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1930, the Biological Weapons Convention on July 15, 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 3, 1996.

India announced its lack of intention to accede to the NPT as late as 1997 by voting against the paragraph of a General Assembly Resolution[2] which urged all non-signatories of the treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date.[3]

Controversially the United States is now willing to provide India access to civilian nuclear technology through the 2006 United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, despite India not being a member of the NPT which normally precludes such international cooperation.

Foreign assistance

  • Most of India's modern weapons and armory, including missiles, fighter planes and tanks are supplied by the Russian Federation [2].These consistent supplies date back to the cold war when India had allied itself with the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), while archrival Pakistan was allied with Turkey and the United States.
  • It is also well known that the Soviet Union had also supplied India with a series of nuclear reactors required to build nuclear weapons in 1988, which included Koodankulam nuclear power plant.[3]
  • According to the CIA, the Soviet Union was active in supplying India with key technology to build its nuclear weapons arsenal.[4]
  • Israel today is the second largest supplier of arms to India after the Russian Federation and has provided sophisticated training to the Indian armed forces.[5][6][7]

The Smiling Buddha

Three decades later in 1974, India, under the leadership of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (Nehru's daughter), conducted an underground nuclear test called Operation Smiling Buddha in the Pokhran region of the northern state of Rajasthan. India termed it a "peaceful nuclear explosion". Reports on the actual yield of these tests vary from official accounts of 12 kt, to Western intelligence reports that place the yield to be between 4 and 6 kt. The device tested was essentially a nuclear fission device.

India is believed to have begun work on a thermonuclear weapon in 1980. According to reports, by 1989 India was making efforts to isolate and purify the lithium-6 isotope, a key requirement for the production of a thermonuclear device which they succeeded in doing by 1999.

Shakti

A second series of tests, called Operation Shakti was suddenly carried out in Pokhran under a newly elected BJP government on May 11 and 13, 1998, and took the entire world community by surprise. After the blasts, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced that this was "India's due, the right of one-sixth of humankind". The devices tested were two fission devices, three low-yield devices and one thermonuclear device (the "H-bomb").

Nuclear Policy

India maintains a "no-first-use" "minimum nuclear deterrent," nuclear policy in the event of war as enunciated in its Nuclear Doctrine, released in 1999.

India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally established in 2003, with an Air Force officer, Air Marshall Asthana, as the Commander-in-Chief. The joint services SNC is the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons, missiles and assets. It is also responsible for executing all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the civil leadership, in the form of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) is the only body authorized to order a nuclear strike against another offending strike: In effect, it is the Prime Minister who has his finger "on the button".

It is widely estimated that India currently has approximately 200 warheads.[4] It is known that about 75% of its warheads are assembled and the rest are in a sub-assembled position, and the number is expected to grow in time.[5]

Delivery Systems

In general, nuclear weapons can be "delivered" to their targets by missiles or by fighter aircraft such as bombers.

Missiles

See Also: Integrated Guided Missile Development Program
An Agni-II intermediate range ballistic missile displayed at the Republic Day Parade 2004 (Photo: Antônio Milena/ABr)

India has methodically built an indigenous missile production capability, using its commercial space-launch program to develop the skills and infrastructure needed to support an offensive ballistic missile program. For example, during the 1980s, India conducted a series of space launches using the solid-fueled SLV-3 booster. Most of these launches put light satellites into near-earth orbit. Elements of the SLV-3 were subsequently incorporated into two new programs. In the first, the new polar-space launch vehicle (PSLV) was equipped with six SLV-3 motors strapped to the PSLV's first stage. The Agni IRBM technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster as its first stage.

The key missile applications and types are given below:

  • Prithvi. The Prithvi I is mobile liquid-fueled 150 kilometer tactical missile currently deployed with army units. It is claimed that this missile is equipped only with various conventional warheads (which stay attached to the missile over the entire flight path). The missile is of particular interest to the United States (and potential buyers) in that has the capability of maneuvering in flight so as to follow one of several different preprogrammed trajectories. Based on the same design, a modified Prithvi, the Prithvi II, is essentially a longer-ranged version of the Prithvi I except that it has a 250-kilometer range and a lighter payload. It is suspected that any nuclear missions will be executed by the Prithvi II. Currently, the Prithvi II has completed development and is now in production. When fielded, it will be deployed with air force units for the purpose of deep target attacking manoeuvres against objectives such as air fields. For the Indian Navy, a 350-kilometer version of the Prithvi is under development. The new system is being called the Dhanush, testing is planned to begin in December 1998. It is unclear whether or not this system will be deployed on India's new nuclear missile submarine (under construction).
  • Agni. The 2500-kilometer Agni technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster for its first stage and a liquid-fueled Prithvi for its second stage. Three test shots were conducted before the U.S. successfully pressured India into suspending testing (1994). Of particular interest, the Agni tests demonstrated that India can develop a maneuvering warhead that incorporates endo-atmospheric evasive maneuvers and terminal guidance in the reentry vehicle. India has also developed the carbon-carbon composite materials needed for long-range missile components and reentry vehicle ablative coatings. Recent Indian articles have proposed that the 4000 to 5000-kilometer Agni II project be aggressively pursued. Unlike the Agni I, the Agni II will have a solid-fueled second stage. It is believed that the Agni can only be equipped with a conventional warhead. It is clear that one of the major constraints for this program is the lack of a proven nuclear warhead. Nuclear testing is a key related issue. India developed its own thermonuclear design which has not been tested.
  • Surya. The Surya ICBM is an ICBM program that has been discussed repeatedly in the Indian press. It is reported that the program began in 1994; the missile design is thought to be based on the PSLV. The existence of this program is doubted by some. It is generally thought that the missile would have a range of 10,000 kilometers. There is evidence to support the development of Surya 2 which would have a 20,000 km range [8].

Satellite Launch vehicles

Although these are not primarily weapon delivery systems, many commentators have observed that India could easily modify these into missiles.

  • SLV-3. Satellite Launch Vehicle or SLV was a project started in the early 1970s by Indian Space Research Organisation to develop the technology needed to launch satellites. The project director was Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam who also headed India's Missile Development Program. SLV was intended to reach a height of 400 km and carry a payload of 40 kg. SLV is a four stage rocket with all solid-propellant motors. The first launch of the SLV took place in Sriharikota on 10 August 1979. The last launch of the SLV took place on 17 April 1983. Many, Dr. Kalam himself included, have noted the similarities between the Agni and the SLV-3. This may be due to their similar capabilities and technologies. Although no longer produced, the SLV-3 was a stepping stone for both Satellite launchers as well as Missile programs.
  • PSLV. The Polar Space Launch Vehicle is a missile composed of a booster equipped with six SLV-3 strap-ons and mixed stages of rocket. The Indians claim that the first stage generates nearly one-million pounds of thrust. This missile has successfully launched a 1200 kilogram Indian imaging satellite into an 800-kilometer high orbit on September 1997. During its next excursion, this missile will triple-launch a reconnaissance satellite and two piggy-backed light-weight satellites in an attempt to prove the missile's value to the commercial space-launch world.
  • GSLV. This three-stage space vehicle will allow payloads of 2500 kilograms to be lifted to geo-transfer orbit, 22,000-miles high. The GSLV will use the first two stages (a solid and a liquid) of the PSLV, but replace the third and fourth stages with a single cryogenic stage. In addition, the six solid-fueled strap-on motors used in PSLV launches will be replaced with four 9.2 ft diameter liquid-fueled strap-ons, which are being adapted from the PSLV's 40-ton second stage. This missile made its maiden launch in first-quarter 1999.

India Aircraft Potential Special Weapons Delivery Systems

The current status of delivery systems for Indian nuclear weapons is unclear. India has developed and tested nuclear weapons that could be delivered on the Prithvi and Agni missiles, and is believed that India currently has such an operational capability, although its extent and preparedness in this respect remains unclear.

Since India probably had nuclear weapons prior to the availability of these missiles, the delivery of nuclear weapons would have been from aircraft. The current Indian nuclear weapons inventory includes weapons designed for delivery using aircraft. Raj Chengappa states that this capability was not achieved till 1999 (Weapons of Peace) on a Mirage-2000 aircraft Although, as he states, a bomb could have been dropped from a cargo aircraft if needed.

One or more aircraft types might be used for this purpose. There are no open-source reports suggesting which if any of these aircraft have been equipped to deliver air-dropped atomic weapons. The MiG-27 and the Jaguar were originally designed to perform ground attack missions, and would require only modest modification to deliver nuclear weapons. Since they are now comparatively old aircraft in the IAF's inventory, they may no longer be the designated aircraft in the nuclear payload delivery role.

Other, more modern Indian Air Force aircraft such as the MiG-29, Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 might be the designated aircraft in this role and would be able to deliver such weapons although they were originally designed mainly to perform air-to-air combat missions. the IAF does not presently have any dedicated bomber aircraft analogous to the USAF's B-52s, B-1s and B-2 bombers and Russia's Tu-22 and Su-34 aircraft (although it was speculated that India would buy some Tu-22 aircraft in the strategic bombing role).

Submarines and Ship-launch capabilities

The Indian fleet presently numbers at 140 combat vessels, of which 16 are submarines[6], 1 an aircraft carrier, 8 are destroyers and 13 are frigates. (see Ships of the Indian Navy) India is also building 40 more vessels, including India's own indigenous nuclear submarine built with Russian assitance(Codenamed: ATV - Advanced Technology Vessel).

A total of ten diesel-powered 'Project 877' submarines, known in India as the EKM or Sindhu class, have been built under a contract between Rosvooruzhenie and the Indian Defense Ministry, with the tenth unit delivered to India in 2000. This final unit was the first to be equipped with the Klub ZM-54E SS-N-27 antiship cruise missiles with a range of 220 km. The first Kilo-class submarines of project 877 were built in the USSR in 1979. They have a displacement of 3,000 t, a maximum diving depth of 300 m, speed of up to 18 knots, and is able to operate solo for 45 days with a crew of 53. These submarines have been criticized in India as being highly underpowered for a conventional boat.

India has a number of foreign-produced cruise missile systems in its arsenal, to include Exocet, Styx, Starbright and the Sea Eagle. It also has some indigenous cruise missile systems under development to include the Sagarika and Lakshya variant. The Sagarika (Oceanic) began development in 1994 as a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) which will have a range of at least 300 km (a few claim 1000 km); it is projected for deployment around 2005.

In January 1988 India leased for three years a Soviet nuclear powered attack submarine of the 670A Skat series (CHARLIE class by NATO classification) with eight Ametist (SS-N-7 Starbright) anti-ship missile launchers. In the Indian Navy the ship was called Chakra, and the submarine was manned by a Russian crew training Indian seamen to operate it. Upon expiration of the ship leasing term in 1991, the submarine was returned to Russia and decommissioned from the Russian Navy.

India has been working since 1985 to develop an indigenously constructed nuclear-powered submarine, one that is based on the Soviet Charlie II-class design, detailed drawings of which are said to have been obtained from the Soviet Union in 1989. This project illustrates India's industrial capabilities and weaknesses. The secretive Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project to provide nuclear propulsion for Indian submarines has been one of the more ill-managed projects of India. Although India has the capability of building the hull and developing or acquiring the necessary sensors, its industry has been stymied by several system integration and fabrication problems in trying to downsize a 190 MW pressurized water reactor (PWR) to fit into the space available within the submarine's hull. The Proto-type Testing Centre (PTC) at the Indira Gandhi Centre For Atomic Research. Kalpakkam, will be used to test the submarine's turbines and propellers. A similar facility is operational at Vishakapatnam to test the main turbines and gear box.

According to some accounts India plans to have as many as five nuclear submarines capable of carrying missiles with nuclear warheads. The Indian nuclear powered attack submarine design is said to have a 4,000-ton displacement and a single-shaft nuclear power plant of Indian origin. Once the vessel is completed, it may be equipped with Dhanush/Sagarika missiles and an advanced sonar system. However, according to some analysts the most probable missile for the Indian submarine would be the Brahmos anti-ship cruise missile designed jointly by India and Russia, based on the Yakhont missile by NPO Mashinostroyeniya.

Nuclear Weapons

India is currently thought to have had a stockpile of around 70-120 warheads. India is generally credited with having sufficient fissile material to build 60-200 nuclear weapons, with most reports placing the figure at 85-100. India's first Nuclear test occurred on the 18th of May, 1974. Since then she has conducted another series of test at the Pokhran test range in the state of Rajasthan. Indians routinely note that China was not given much international respect until it developed nuclear weapons and missile delivery capabilities. In terms of nuclear nonproliferation, since India has an extensive civil and military nuclear program, which includes 10 nuclear reactors, uranium mining and milling sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium enrichment plant, fuel fabrication facilities, and extensive nuclear research capabilities, it is now impossible to stop India's nuclear program by means of a nuclear export control regime. In the future, India plans to commission fast-breeder reactors, thorium 232 reactors (which will yield U233--a plutonium-type substance), and nuclear-powered submarines. In short, India has the capability of becoming an overt nuclear power if it is willing to absorb the short-term economic and political pain that the resulting international sanctions would inflict. The progress in weapons development was made mostly without any help from other nations. Many research and development facilities exists in India, capable of designing and manufacturing advanced missiles and warheads.

Chemical Weapons

India has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and produces the bulk of its own chemicals for domestic consumption. In 1992 India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, stating that it did not have chemical weapons and the capacity or capability to manufacture chemical weapons. India became one of the original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] in 1993, and ratified it on 02 September 1996. Since, unlike the nuclear non- proliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban treaty, this treaty's provisions were equally applicable to all countries, including the powerful countries, India had readily accepted it. The treaty came into force on April 29, 1997. The full destruction of the weapons grade chemicals will take place only at the end of a 10-year period. As India has one of the largest chemical industries in the world, this industry will benefit from unrestricted trade and technology access which would be denied to non-members of the treaty. Although India had endorsed the treaty in September 1996, becoming the 62nd country to do so, when it appeared as though the United States might not approve it, India too declared that it might review its earlier decision endorsing the treaty. Indian observers were of the view that, should America itself fail to approve the treaty, there would be diminished pressure on China and Pakistan against producing chemical weapons. According to India's ex-Army Chief General Sunderji, a country having the capability of making nuclear weapons does not need to have chemical weapons, since the dread of chemical weapons could be created only in those countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the fact that India has found chemical weapons dispensable highlighted its confidence in the conventional weapons system at its command.

When the Third UN Disarmament Conference, held in 1988, decided that the next logical step in the disarmament process would be measures to halt production of chemical weapons, Indian diplomats responded by claiming that India had no chemical weapons. Foreign Minister K Natwar Singh repeated this claim in 1989 in the Paris Conference of the State Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as did Minister of State Eduardo Faleiro repeated at the January 1993 Paris Conference CWC signing ceremony. However, India declared its stockpile of chemical weapons to the Chemical Weapons Convention in Geneva on 26 June 1997, the deadline for all signatories to the pact. New Delhi publicly declared that, in keeping with the stipulations arising from the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, India had filed initial declarations on "testing and development of chemical weapons and their related facilities which were developed only to deal with the situation arising out of possible use of chemical warfare against India."

In its required declarations under the CWC, India acknowledged the existence of a chemical warfare program. and disclosed the details of its stockpiles and the availability of manufacturing facilities on a very small scale. New Delhi has pledged that all facilities related to its CW program would be open for inspection. The declaration kept India's chemical armory under wraps, since the CWC Secretariat maintains the confidentiality of the declaration.

The published literature detailing India's chemical weapons capabilities is extremely sparse. According to one published report, India's stockpile of chemical weapons consists of mustard gas shells left by the British of World War II vintage. These shells, fired from a 25 pounder gun, are said to be in storage and not under the operational control of the Indian Army. India is also reported to have manufacturing facilities for production of agents in small quantities.

The Indian government has set up Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) warfare directorates in the Services, besides an inter-Services coordination committee to monitor the programme. The Indian Army established a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) cell at Army HQ to study the effects of NBC warfare. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is also participating in the program. Research on chemical weapons has continued in various establishments of the military and DRDO research labs. In addition, work is carried out by DRDO to design and fabricate protective clothing and equipment for troops on the battlefield in case of a chemical weapons attack. The Defence Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior is the primary establishment for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. In addition, research is carried out on antibodies against chemical agent poisoning and heavy metal toxicology. Chemical agents such as Sarin and nerve gas are produced in small quantities to test on protective equipment.

Protective clothing and equipment are designed and manufactured amongst other places at the Defence Materials and Stores Research and Development Establishment at Kanpur. India has developed five types of protective systems and equipment for its troops as a safeguard against nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) hazards. The development of all five types of protective systems and equipment has been completed and their induction into the service has been formally approved. The five types of protective systems and equipment are: NBC individual protective equipment, NBC collective protection system, NBC medical protection equipment, NBC detection equipment and the NBC decontamination system.

India is said to have acquired chemical weapons in the 1980s in response to Pakistan's acquisition of chemical agents and protective clothing. It is widely believed in India that Pakistan used chemical weapons against Indian soldiers in Siachen in 1987. Reportedly when Pakistan used chemical weapons in Siachen against Indian troops there was panic in the defence headquarters and officials rushed to the defence research establishment in Gwalior in search of protective measures. In 1992 India declared to Pakistan that it did not possess chemical weapons, and India and Pakistan issued a declaration that neither side possessed or intended to acquire or use chemical weapons.

It is reported that even after India ratified the Chemical Weapons Treaty in September 1996, efforts continued for manufacturing and stockpiling chemical weapons for use against Pakistan. India's Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) can carry five different types of warheads. Two types of warheads have already been deployed, and three other warheads, presumably nuclear, chemical and biological, are under development. On 25 June 1997, the Indian government stated that "India will disclose to Pakistan stocks of its chemical weapons". The decision was taken to make a unilateral disclosure on the instruction of Prime Minister I.K. Gujral.

In June 1999 there were published allegations that India had used or was planning to use chemical weapons against the Mujahideen and Pakistani army elements fighting at the Kashmir border. Former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence chief Gen.(retd) Hamid Gul [who had opposed Pakistani ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention] said that Mujahideen had captured a very sensitive posts at Kargil and that there were clear chances that India would use chemical weapons against the Mujahideen. Despite published reports of evidence that India had shifted chemical weapons and to the Kashmir theater, claims of the use of lethal or non-lethal chemical agents remain unconfirmed.

Biological Warfare

India is a signatory to the BWC of 1972. India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that includes numerous pharmaceutical production facilities bio-containment laboratories (including BL-3) for working with lethal pathogens. It also has qualified scientists with expertise in infectious diseases. Some of India’s facilities are being used to support research and development for BW defense purposes. These facilities constitute a substantial potential capability for offensive purposes as well. The Defence Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior is the primary establishment for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. Work is in progress to prepare responses to threats like Anthrax, Brucellosis, cholera and plague, viral threats like smallpox and viral haemorrhage fever and biotoxic threats like botulism. Researchers have developed chemical/biological protective gear, including masks, suits, detectors and suitable drugs.

Notes

  1. ^ B. M. Udgaonkar, India’s nuclear capability, her security concerns and the recent tests, Indian Academy of Sciences, January 1999.
  2. ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 52 Verbatim 67. A/52/PV.67 9 December 1997. Retrieved 2007-08-22.
  3. ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 52 Resolution A/RES/52/38 page 16. Retrieved 2007-08-22.
  4. ^ Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. "India's nuclear forces, 2005", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61:5 (September/October 2005): 73–75,[1]
  5. ^ http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/
  6. ^ http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Submarine.html