Epistemic minimalism

Epistemic minimalism is the epistemological thesis that mere true belief is sufficient for knowledge. That is, the meaning of "Smith knows that it rained today" is accurately and completely analyzed by these two conditions:

1. Smith believes that it rained today.
2. It is true that it rained today.

The thesis is called minimalist by way of contrast with the competing accounts, which more or less universally require that true belief is necessary but insufficient for knowledge--that is, that a belief needs to be true in order to count as knowledge, but that truth alone is not enough--that something else is needed. Traditionally, that something else was held to be evidential justification, until Edmund Gettier turned contemporary epistemology on his head by introducing the Gettier problem cases--counterexamples which seem to demonstrate that mere justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge, and that the justified true belief (JTB) account must be revised. Since Gettier, most analyses of knowledge have either tried to tinker with the notion of "justification" in such a way that it avoids the Gettier problem, or to find some fourth condition that will defuse Gettier cases when added to the JTB triad.

Epistemic minimalists go in entirely the opposite direction: whereas Gettier and the responses he elicited tended to push towards narrower analyses of truth, minimalists argue for a much more inclusive analysis, which includes not only Gettier cases but also lucky guesses and completely unjustified beliefs as long as they happen to be true. The thesis is a minimalism because it eschews the additional requirements piled on top of true belief and argues that the intuitive reasons given for the JTB analysis and its descendents are either misleading or misunderstood.

The most famous (or infamous) proponents of epistemic minimalism is Crispin Sartwell (1991). The view has been criticized by many epistemologists, with an influential criticism being delivered by William Lycan (1994). However, for a criticism of Lycan's arguments, and an extensive taxonomy of the possible varieties of minimalism, see David Martens (2003).

This entry is, as you may have noticed, somewhat stubby. Someone with more time and expertise could do a great service by summarizing some of the motivations and arguments for epistemic minimalism, and some of the reasons traditionally given against it. There are many varieties of epistemic minimalism, and a taxonomy of these varities would also be helpful. Please edit at will.

References

• Sartwell, C. (1991): Knowledge is Merely True Belief in American Philosophical Quarterly 28.
• Lycan, W. (1994): Sartwell's Minimalist Analysis of Knowing in Philosophical Studies 73.
• Martens, D. (2003): Confidence in Unwarranted Knowledge. Presented for the Alabama Philosophical Society, 25 October 2003.