Iron triangle (US politics)
Iron triangle is a phrase typically used by political scientists to describe what are deemed as cozy relationships between Congress, government bureaucracies, and constituencies; which ultimately result in a very tight policy-making circle. The term is frequently used in discussions having to do with "agency capture" - the co-option of government agencies by special interests.
Central to the issue of iron triangles is the assumption that bureaucratic agencies, as players in the political game, seek to create and consolidate their own power base. The idea is that an agency's power is determined by its constituency, not by its consumers. For these purposes, constituency may be defined as a group of politically active members sharing a common interest or goal; consumers are the expected recipients of goods or services provided by government bureaucracies (often identified in an agency's written goals or mission statement).
A considerable amount of what is seen as bureaucratic dysfunction may be attributable to the alliances formed between the agency and its respective constituency. The official goals of an agency may be thwarted or ignored altogether at the expense of that segment of the citizenry it is meant to serve.
Bureaucratic agencies as political actors
The principles of public administration implemented by progressive reformers around the turn of the twentieth century sought to increase efficiency by freeing government bureaucracies from the influence of the political machine. These reforms did not entirely succeed in eliminating politics from within bureaucracies, as was intended. Some observers believe that as a result of their greater independence, administrative agencies actually began to compete for political power themselves.
Harvard University Professor Graham Allison describes bureaucracies not as neutral bodies dispassionately carrying out policies dictated from above, but rather as active participants in what he calls the "political game". Professor Francis Rourke of Johns Hopkins University picks up where Allison leaves off, by identifying factors which determine the amount of power an agency is able to wield - the most important of these being the existence of a constituency. It's generally believed that only by claiming a distinct constituency can most bureaucracies become powerful players in the game. The more organized and influential the constituency, the more powerful will be the agency representing them.
Cultivating a constituency
The need for a constituency sometimes leads to the cultivation of a particular clientele. Agencies may attempt to seek out those groups (relevant to their policy jurisdiction) that will make the best supporters and give them the most clout within the political arena.
It is often the case, especially in so-called "street-level bureaucracies", that the consumers - those who are the supposed beneficiaries of an agency's services - do not qualify as power brokers and thus make poor constituents. These large segments of the public seldom vote, are rarely or poorly organized, are difficult to mobilize, and are lacking in resources or financial muscle. Welfare recipients, participants in job placement services, and residents of low-income housing, for example, do not usually make good constituents from the agency's perspective.
Private or special interest groups, on the other hand, possess considerable power, as they tend to be well-organized, have plenty of resources, are easily mobilized, and are extremely active in political affairs (e.g., voting, contributing to campaigns, lobbying, and marshaling statistics or information). This being the case, one can say that it is often in the agency's best interest to switch its focus from consumers to a carefully selected clientele of constituents that will aid the agency in its quest for greater political influence.
Dynamics of iron triangles
Bureaucratic power is exercised in Congress. By aligning themselves with constituencies, bureaucracies are able to affect policy outcomes directly. This is where iron triangles manifest themselves. The picture below displays the concept.
At one corner of the triangle are interest groups (constituencies). The interest groups bring issues and policies to the attention of legislators in Congress and suggest the policies they want. At an opposite corner sit members of Congress, who (in their own desire to align themselves with constituencies for the purpose of getting votes) support legislation that advances the interest group's agenda. Occupying the third corner of the triangle are bureaucrats, for whom the benefits of implementing interest group policies include the appropriation of sizable chunks of government funds as well as the chance to exercise their expertise.
Consumers are often left out in the cold with this arrangement. Iron triangles usually result in the passing of very narrow, "pork barrel" policies that benefit only a small segment of the population. The interests of the bureaucracy's constituency are met, while the needs of consumers (which may be the general public) are passed over. This "privatization" of public administration may be viewed as problematic for the concept of democracy, insofar as the common welfare of all citizens is sacrificed for very specific interests; effectively subverting the purpose for which the agency was established in the first place.
References
- Graham T. Allison, Philip Zelikow; Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; Pearson Longman; ISBN 0321013492 (2nd edition, 1999)
- Francis E. Rourke; Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy; Harpercollins; ISBN 0673394751 (3rd edition, 1984)