Battle of Leuctra

Leuctra was a village of Boeotia in the territory of Thespiae, chiefly noticeable for the battle fought in its neighborhood in 371 BC between the Thebans and the Spartans and their allies.

A Peloponnesian army, about 10,000–11,000 strong, which had invaded Boeotia from Phocis, was here confronted by a Boeotian levy of perhaps 6,000–7,000 soldiers under Epaminondas. In spite of inferior numbers and the doubtful loyalty of his Boeotian allies, Epaminondas offered battle on the plain before the town.

The battle opened with the Spartan's mercenary peltasts (slingers, javilineers and/or skirmishers) attacking and driving back the Boeotian camp followers and others who were reluctant to fight. There followed a cavalry engagement, in which the Thebans drove their enemies off the field. Initially, the Spartan infantry were sent into disarray when their retreating cavalry hopelessly disrupted Cleombrotus's attempt to outflank the Theban phalanx, and were themselves caught on their flank by Pelopidas and the Sacred Band of Thebes. The decisive issue was then fought out between the Theban and Spartan foot.

The normal practice of the Spartans (and, indeed, the Greeks generally) was to establish their heavily armed infantry in a solid mass, or phalanx, some eight to twelve men deep. This was considered to allow for the best balance between depth (and the pushing power it provided) and width (i.e., area of coverage of the phalanx). The infantry would advance together so that the attack flowed unbroken against their enemy. Traditionally, Greeks placed their most highly regarded (and, usually, deadliest) troops on the right wing of the phalanx. By contrast, the weakest or least influential troops were often placed on the left wing.

In a major break with tradition, Epaminondas massed his cavalry and a fifty-deep column of Theban infantry on his left wing, and sent forward this body against the Spartan right. His shallower and weaker center and right wing columns were drawn up so that they were progressively further to the right and rear of the proceeding column, the so-called Echelon formation.

The infantry footsoldiers engaged, and the Spartans' twelve-deep formation on their right wing could not sustain the heavy impact of their opponents' 50-deep column. The Spartan right was hurled back with a loss of about 1,000 men, of whom 400 were Spartan citizens, including the king Cleombrotus I.

By the time the Theban center and right columns advanced to the point of engaging the enemy, the Spartan right had been devastated. Seeing their right wing beaten, the rest of the Peloponnesians, who were unwilling participants, retired and left the enemy in possession of the field. The arrival of a Thessalian army under Jason of Pherae persuaded a relieving Spartan force under Archidamus not to heap folly on folly and to withdraw instead, while the Thebans were persuaded not to continue the attack on the surviving Spartans.

The battle is of great significance in Greek history, and, by extension, world history. It marks a revolution in military tactics, affording the first known instance of an oblique infantry deployment and one of the first deliberate concentrations of attack upon the vital point of the enemy's line. The use of such tactics by Epaminondas was, perhaps, a direct result of the use of some similar manuevers by Pagondas, his countryman, during the Battle of Delium. Further, Philip of Macedon, who studied and lived in Thebes, was no doubt heavily influenced by the battle. In turn, his son Alexander would go on to develop his father's tactics to an entirely new level.

Historians Victor Davis Hanson and Donald Kagan, among others, have argued that Epaminondas's so-called "oblique formation" was not an intentional and preconceived innovation in infantry tactics, but was rather a clever response to circumstances. Because Epaminondas had stacked his right side to a depth of fifty shields, the rest of his units were naturally left with far fewer troops than normal. This means that their maintenance of a depth of eight to twelve shields had to come at the expense of either number of companies or their width. Because Epaminondas was already outnumbered, he had no choice but to form fewer companies and march them diagonally toward the much longer Spartan line in order to engage as much of it as possible. Hanson and Kagan's argument is therefore that the tactic was more dilatory than anything else. Whatever its motivation, the fact remains that the tactic did represent an innovation and was undoubtedly highly effective.

The battle's political effects were equally far-reaching: The losses in material strength and prestige sustained by the Spartans here and subsequently at the Battle of Mantinea were key in depriving them forever of their supremacy in Greece.

References

• This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)