Mission-type tactics

Mission-type tactics (German: Auftragstaktik, also known as directive control in the US), are a central component of the tactics of German armed forces since the 19th century. In mission-type tactics the military commander gives its subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal and the forces needed to accomplish that goal with a time-frame after which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leader then implements the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, initiative and a freedom in execution which enables flexibility in order execution. In addition the mission-type tactics free higher leadership levels from tactical details.

For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently. In contrast to the mission-type tactics is Command and control used by American armed forces.

After the heavy defeat of the Prussians at Jena-Auerstadt by Napoleon the Prussians completely rethought their military approach and as a key part of that aimed to build a college of military capability, the General Staff, as a counter to the individual genius that had soundly beaten them. As well as institutionalising excellence within the German ARmy the role of the General Staff Officer was to make sure each unit could and did perform their assigned mission. This monitoring, coaching and training role built a level of trust, competency and understanding across the whole German pre-war 4000 strong officer corps which made excellence possible.

Excellence in this case is derived in part from the tradition of Scharnhorst,Hans von Clausewitz, and Moltke, and was based upon the premise that hard-and-fast rules had no place in the environment of war, which was the realm of human emotion, friction, chance, and uncertainty. Under the Auftragstaktik system the selection of combat formations, as well as their route and rate of advance, was based upon a unit's specific mission, the circumstances of the terrain and the enemy's disposition. Building a high level of trust, competency and understanding is key to the effective operation of such a doctrine.

As may be imagined from the paragraph above it is difficult to define the Auftragstaktik doctrine since it is sometimes more important to explain what is not done. The success of the doctrine rests upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent of the issuer of the orders and acting to achieve their goal even if their actions violated other guidance or orders they had received. Clearly taking the risks of violating other previously expressed limitations as a routine step to achieving a mission is a behaviour most easily sustained in a particular type of innovative culture. That culture is often one associated today with elite units and not a whole army.

Auftragstaktik can be seen as doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in oredr to overcome "Friction". Carl von Clausewitz stated that "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey Orders and revise their effect as long as the intent of the commander is maintained.

Analysis by the US Army of the 1939 German campaign in Poland found that "The emphasis which the Germans placed on the development of leadership and initiative in commanders during years of preparatory training brought its rewards in the Polish campaign. With confidence that these principles had been properly inculcated, all commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons, felt free to carry out their missions or meet changes in situations with a minimum of interference by higher commanders." They recognised that "initiative, flexibility and mobility" were the essential aspects of German tactics.