Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Template:Es icon Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
File:Logofarc.png flag and logo of the FARC-EP
Leaders	Alfonso Cano Mono Jojoy Iván Márquez Joaquín Gómez Timoleón Jiménez Mauricio Jaramillo Pablo Catatumbo
Dates of operation	1964–Present
Headquarters	“Mountains of Colombia”
Active regions	concentrated in southern and eastern Colombia,Venezuela. Incursions in Peru, Brazil, Panama. Sporadic presence in other countries of Latin America, predominantly Mexico, Paraguay, Argentina, and Bolivia.
Ideology	Marxism-Leninism
Allies	Foro de São Paulo
Opponents	Government of Colombia Government of Canada Government of the United States European Union Colombian paramilitary groups

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo), also known by the acronym of FARC or FARC-EP, is a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary guerrilla organization.

FARC is considered a terrorist group by the Colombian government, the United States Department of State, Canada and the European Union. Other countries, including Cuba and Venezuela, are more sympathetic to FARC. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, for example, publicly reject their classification as "terrorists" in January 2008 and called on the Colombian government and international community to recognize the guerrillas as a “belligerent force”, arguing that this would then oblige them to renounce kidnappings and terror acts in order to respect the Geneva Conventions. In December 2007 a Copenhagen city court in Denmark found that FARC and the PFLP were "not really terrorist," but in September 2008 a higher court concluded on appeal that both of them were "terrorist organizations that have committed acts aimed at destabilizing a state or a government and have attacked civilian targets".

FARC was established in the 1960s as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. FARC originated as a guerrilla movement. The group later became involved with cocaine trade during the 1980s to finance itself, but remained closely tied to the Communist Party even as it created the Patriotic Union in the early 1980s and later a political structure it calls the Clandestine Colombian Communist Party.

According to the Colombian government, as on 2008, FARC have an estimated 6,000-8,000 members, down from 16,000 in 2001, making it the largest as well as the oldest insurgent group in the Americas. Also, the Colombian government has claimed to have intercepted data that identifies at least 9,387 members of FARC. Other available estimates are higher, including one of up to 18,000 guerrillas in 2007.

FARC-EP was present in around 15-20 percent of Colombia’s territory during 2005, its largest concentrations being located in the southeastern jungles and in the plains at the base of the Andean mountains, occupying, as on late 2008, some 500,000 square kilometers (193,000 square miles) of jungle in Colombia. The group has lost almost half its fighting force since President Alvaro Uribe took office in 2002 and pledged to attack the drug-funded group in their jungle camps.

Overview

See also: Military Structure of the FARC-EP

FARC-EP is governed by a secretariat which has been led by Alfonso Cano and five others, including senior military commander Jorge Briceño, also known as “Mono Jojoy”, after the death of Manuel Marulanda (Pedro Antonio Marín), also known as “Tirofijo”, or Sureshot in 2008. The “international face” of the organization was represented by another member of the secretariat, “Raul Reyes”, who was killed in a Colombian army raid against a guerrilla camp in Ecuador on March 1, 2008.

FARC is organized along military lines and includes several urban fronts or militia cells. The group added “-EP” (Ejército del Pueblo) to its official name during its Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982 as an expression of expected progression from guerrilla warfare to conventional military action outlined on that occasion.

FARC-EP has proclaimed itself as a politico-military Marxist-Leninist organization of Bolivarian inspiration. It claims to represent the rural poor in a struggle against Colombia’s wealthier classes and opposes the United States' influence in Colombia (particularly Plan Colombia). Other prominent areas of focus for the FARC-EP include, the organization claims, fighting against privatization of natural resources, multinational corporations, and paramilitary violence. The FARC-EP says these objectives motivate the group’s efforts to seize power in Colombia through an armed revolution. It funds itself principally through extortion, kidnapping and participation in the illegal drug trade.

FARC-EP says it remains open to a negotiated solution to the nation’s conflict, through a dialogue with a flexible government that agrees to certain conditions, such as the demilitarization of locations and the release of all jailed (and extradited) FARC rebels. At the same time, it claims that until these conditions surface, the armed revolutionary struggle will remain necessary to implement the group’s policy objectives. The FARC-EP says it will continue armed struggle because it perceives the current Colombian government as unfriendly and because of historical politically motivated violence against its members and supporters. Activists of the Patriotic Union, a FARC-created political party, were also among those who suffered from political violence.

File:Guerr2.jpg

A FARC child combatant

National and international critics characterize the FARC-EP as terrorist. Critics of the FARC-EP say that the group's methods have discredited its original goals and ideology. The FARC attacks civilians not involved in the conflict , plants landmines, recruits underage boys and girls, maintains hostages for ransom and political leverage, some of them for as long as 10 years, and is responsible for the displacement of civilians through conflict. FARC spokesman Raul Reyes has claimed that FARC always avoids civilian casualties, does not conscript civilians, and does not accept soldiers under the age of 15, although he fails to acknowledge that the use of mines and mortars is inherently dangerous to civilians.

The FARC also frequently recruits teens as soldiers and informants. Human Rights Watch estimates that the FARC has the majority of child combatants in Colombia, estimating that approximately 20 to 30% of the guerrillas are children under 18 years of age. Children who try to escape the ranks of the guerrillas can be punished with torture and death by firing squad. Regarding female members, Human Rights Watch states one of the reasons they join FARC is to escape sexual abuse. Female FARC members "had roughly the same duties and possibilities of promotion as males. Yet girls in the guerrilla forces still face gender-related pressures. Although rape and overt sexual harassment are not tolerated, many male commanders use their power to form sexual liaisons with underaged girls. Girls as young as twelve are required to use contraception, and must have abortions if they get pregnant."

History

Main article: Communism in Colombia

The period that followed the murder of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 saw the loss of more than 200,000 lives and became known as La Violencia ("The Violence”). By 1953, the Colombian Conservative Party government of Laureano Gómez (elected 1950 in an election boycotted by the Colombian Liberal Party), unable to cope with the situation, became increasingly unpopular in the eyes of both public opinion and other political figures of both parties. In what was seen as a successful effort that sought to reestablish order, the military, under the figure of General Gustavo Rojas, seized control of the country in 1953.

The new military government offered amnesty to insurgents who surrendered their weapons, leading to the demobilization of thousands of former fighters. However, some radical Liberal and Communist guerrilla groups refused to surrender their arms. They retreated to isolated areas of the country where they continued to operate and organize their own communities. In other areas, such as Villarrica, Tolima, former guerrillas suffered attacks. Jacobo Arenas, who would later become the ideological leader of the FARC, was sent by the Colombian Communist Party as a political activist in order to help organize existing self-defense and guerrilla units in a rural enclave during “La Violencia” (1948–1955).

Civilian rule was restored in 1958 after moderate Conservatives and Liberals, with the support of dissident sectors of the military, agreed to unite under a bipartisan coalition known as the National Front. Political alternation within the coalition eventually resulted in the controversial election of Misael Pastrana in 1970 as president. Armed self-defense groups of communists had by then established their own local government in a remote region of the country, Marquetalia.

Jacobo Arenas later wrote a book called “Diario de la resistencia de Marquetalia” ("Diary of the Marquetalian resistance”). The book includes a chronicle of the events of the fight between the guerrilla fighters and the soldiers of the Colombian army brigade.

According to 1958 US embassy and military records on file at the US National Archives, one of the largest Liberal guerrilla bands that came into existence during “La Violencia” had been known as “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” (FARC), This group had been organized some time in the early 1950s by Dumar Aljure, an associate of Guadalupe Salcedo. In the following years, Aljure’s power and that of this early guerrilla organization declined until his own death in 1968, when he still had a degree of control and influence over Puerto Lleras.

Separately, the Colombian government had initially ignored the growing influence of several communist enclaves in and around Sumapaz until 1964 when, under pressure by Conservatives who considered the autonomous communities, which were labeled as “independent republics” by senator Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, to be a threat, the Colombian National Army was ordered to take full control of the area.

Following the attack the communists dispersed, only to later reorganize as the “Southern Bloc” ("Bloque Sur”). In 1964, the Bloque Sur renamed itself the “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” (FARC). Jacobo Arenas and Manuel Marulanda were two of the founders of the new guerrilla group and became its two top leaders.

Whether the organization’s new name could have been derived from Dumar Aljure’s earlier Liberal guerrilla, or whether the new FARC may possibly have included among its initial members some of Aljure’s former followers, is not clear. The finer details of this part of the FARC’s early history are unclear, and most histories of the FARC, including those which reference the writings of Arenas and other FARC founders, omit any mention of Aljure’s guerrilla army entirely.

While the group officially came into existence in 1966, some of its leaders were former liberal and communist guerrillas.

Seventh Guerrilla Conference of the FARC-EP

Main article: Seventh Guerrilla Conference of the FARC-EP

FARC ideologue Jacobo Arenas was allegedly the main figure behind the FARC’s Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982, and a contemporary “Strategic Plan”, which would have outlined a series of goals and steps that would organize the FARC into an “Army of the People” (the initials “EP”, Ejército del Pueblo, were adopted during this Conference) capable of potentially seizing power sometime in the 1990s, explicitly combining both the illegal and legal forms of struggle (organically implementing a traditional Marxist and Communist strategy termed “the combination of all forms of struggle”), as well as the political and the military aspects of their group.

Under the guidance of Jacobo Arenas and Manuel Marulanda, the Seventh Guerrilla Conference was a turning point in the FARC’s struggle, as it provided them with the opportunity to finetune their policies and plans in order for them to build their desired socialist state in the future.

Many U.S. and other military experts argue that Manuel Marulanda, as a veteran guerrilla fighter and as an excellent commander for four decades, heads perhaps the most capable and dangerous Marxist guerrilla organization in the world. Marulanda is very often referred to as “Sureshot” ("Tirofijo”), because of a reputation for using firearms very accurately during his earlier years as an insurgent. For some of those analysts, an allegedly problematic aspect in Marulanda’s profile concerns the fact that he has limited educational background, due to the poor economic conditions that his family and many others had to face when growing up in rural Colombia. Jacobo Arenas, on the other hand, had political and ideological education as a communist intellectual, thus it is believed that he realized that FARC’s initial status was not up to the necessary standards needed to properly fight a Colombian Army that could count on the aid of the United States from time to time.

The role of Jacobo Arenas in FARC’s military reorganization was significant. After the Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982, Arenas started to work toward the goal of turning the FARC from a guerrilla organization to a rebel army (the “People’s Army”). According to his instructions, FARC added ranks and badges to many of its uniforms, as well as introducing a new inventory system for firearms and ammunition, in addition to providing new weapons and technology for FARC militants. In theory, a properly organized and trained guerrilla army would thus meet the international requirements for the recognition of a “state of belligerence”, contained within the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and its additional protocols.

Jacobo Arenas died in August 1990. Official FARC versions claimed he died of a sudden heart attack. However, claims of foul play have not gone without notice. Different sources from within the guerrilla group state that he was murdered by a low ranking guerrilla officer sometime after Arenas himself had ordered the execution, for unknown reasons, of this officer’s brother.

Period 1980-1989

Until 1980, the FARC grew in a relatively slow way; besides to undergoing a separation form the part of Javier Delgado and Hernando Pizarro Leongómez, old commanders of the FARC, forming aseparate guerrilla called Commando Ricardo Franco Frente Sur. The FARC counted then between 1,000 and 3,000 men. In the Seventh Conference from the 4^th to 14^th of May of 1982, under the command of the political leader “Jacobo Arenas”, several new strategic directives were issued and it reaffirmed the principle of the “combination of all the forms of fight”, the political and the armed fight.

A rejection to all relation with the emergent phenomenon also takes place of drug trafficking and of its cultures, but gradually during years 80 it is ended up accepting because in the fields it is constituted in an increasing activity. The collection of taxes to producers and narcotics traffickers like financing source settles down gradually, by means of the call “gramaje”

28 of May of 1984, after a meeting of the leaders of the 27 fronts and the General Staff, a cease-fire settles down, like part in the agreements signed with the government of Belisario Betancourt (“Agreements of Cease to the Fire, Truce and Peace”, known like Agreements of La Uribe). The FARC formed Patriotic Union (UP) to lead the political movement.

This attempt of negotiation failed to a great extent due to two elements: the violations of the cease of hostilities by the two parts, and political violence of sectors of the extreme right, among them local political leaders and several members of the Armed Forces, as well as actors of left (among them sectors of the FARC), including between both parts (right and left) some important controls and narcotics traffickers.

In spite of an initial attempt of members of the different guerrillas to reach an agreement with Pablo Escobar, among other narcotics traffickers, the formal contacts due to the kidnappings of relatives and friends of such are possibly broken on the part of the insurgents

The drug trafficking, later also in frontal war against the state to prevent the beginning of the possible one extradition from its members to the United States, it decides to take revenge against the guerrilla and farmers supporters, financing swarms deprived from its own groups of sicarios, including also the participation of associations of cattle dealers and rural proprietors (landowners), counting in addition on the collaboration to several military of the Colombian Army, as much directly or indirectly, constituting the beginnings of the well-known groups at the moment like self-defense or paramilitary (that, from 1997, would be united around AUC).

In September of 1987 all the operative guerrilla detachments (EPL, the FARC-EP and ELN) they were constituted in Guerrilla coordinator Simón Bolivar (CGSB), that would be the result of the entrance of the previous armed groups to the already existing one Guerrilla National coordinator (Cng) in I associate with Commando Ricardo Franco Frente Sur (which soon serious declared enemy of the FARC-EP and expelled from the CGSB by the events of Tacueyó) and Armed movement Quintín Lame; looking for to as much coordinate the actions armed as the negotiations of peace towards the future. This attempt had very little effectiveness and possibly it was divided. The M-19 it ended up signing the peace, and the FARC and the ELN acted completely separated, although later joint operations were made in specific cases.

The Patriotic Union

File:Logo union patriotica up.jpg

Logo of the UP

The violence as much summoned up the lives of important politicians of the traditional legal establishment opposed the drug trafficking, among them the minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, like of numerous members of the legal left in individual of then recently founded legal party of the FARC-EP: Patriotic union. This movement, to weighing of the intentions initiates to them to include it within the strategy of the “combination of all the forms of fight”, was not exclusively an organ of the FARC-EP, because on it counted on participation of civil movements, union and working with different intentions. Several leaders of the UP arrived not to be in agreement with driving armed of the FARC-EP and requested to maintain the political route in spite of the new wave of violence untied, criticizing so much to the government as to the FARC-EP not to make more attempts control the situation.

The UP as so it continued insisting on following with the political route, until practically his extermination, of which gives diverse numbers, of between 2,000 to 4,000 assassinated or disappeared militants.

Period 1990-1998 (SOURCES PLEASE)

9 of December of 1990, day of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, the army, without previous declaration it express military and when informally still it was continued the dialogue process , it sent an offensive against Casa Verde, seat of the National Secretaryship of the FARC-EP, but it failed and it obtained few results. The Colombian government argued that that measurement was taken because the FARC-EP had not fulfilled their commitments, since still they made criminal activities and they had not take refugen in via negotiated.

The Colombian government not only negotiated with the FARC at that time, also maintained negotiations with other armed groups, being obtained by political agreements and contacts with other guerrillas the demobilization of several groups armed in 1991 (process in that the FARC-EP did not participate). The great majority of the demobilized ones, although did not receive specific counterparts, was pardoned, they were gotten up to the civil life and legal processes were not followed to them. Under the company/signature of La Paz some groups demobilized themselves (EPL, ERP, Armed movement Quintín Lame, M-19), and soon what it was left of the Guerrilla Coordinator Simón Bolivar a series of negotiations with the state began.

During that same year the guerrilla head (Jacobo Arenas) died.

On June the third 1991 the dialogue between the Coordinator and the government was reinitiated, in territory Venezuelan (Caracas) and soon Mexican (Tlaxcala). The war did not stop and continued the actions armed by both parts. The negotiation process was broken in 1993 when not reaching an agreement. The Coordinator as so it disappeared not much after that moment, and the guerrilla detachments followed their activities independently.

Before this breaking, one occurred to know a letter written by a group Colombian intellectuals (between who it was included Nobel of Literature Gabriel Garcia Márquez) directed to the Coordinating Simón Guerrilla Bolivar, where one called to each other to them about the ominous form in which they are carrying out its fight and consequences that this one was leaving in the country.[47]

During the first years of the Nineties, the FARC-EP had between 7,000 and 10,000 combatants, organized in 70 fronts distributed in all the country. During the years 1996 to 1998 the FARC-EP achieved important triumphs, including taking Mitú in the department of Vaupés for three days.

Andres Pastrana's Presidency (1998-2002)

1999–2002 Peace Process

Main article: 1999–2002 FARC-Government peace process

On September 4, 1996 the FARC-EP attacked a military base in Guaviare, which started three weeks of guerrilla warfare that claimed the lives of at least 130 Colombians, soldiers and civilians included.

By June, 1997, more than 4,600 Colombian police officers had been killed on the job since 1990, believed to be the highest police fatality in the world.

In hope of negotiating a peace settlement, on November 7, 1998, President Andrés Pastrana granted FARC a 42,000 km² (16,200 sq mi) safe haven meant to serve as a confidence building measure, centered around the San Vicente del Caguán settlement. The demilitarization of some of the included Colombian locations had previously been among the FARC-EPs conditions for beginning peace talks. The peace process with the government continued at a slow pace for three years during which the BBC and other news organizations reported that the FARC-EP also used the safe haven to import arms, export drugs, recruit minors, and build up their armed forces. After a series of high-profile guerrilla terrorist actions, including the hijacking of an airplane, the attack on several small towns and cities, leaving a trail of death on its path, the arrest of the Irish Colombia Three (see below) and of training FARC militants in bomb making, and the kidnapping of several political figures, Pastrana ended the peace talks on February 21, 2002 and ordered the armed forces to start retaking the FARC-controlled zone, beginning at midnight. A 48-hour respite that had been previously agreed to with the rebel group was not applied at this time; the government argued that it had already been granted and almost used up during an earlier crisis in January, when most of the more prominent FARC commanders had apparently left the demilitarized zone. Shortly after the end of talks, the FARC kidnapped green presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was traveling in guerrilla territory. Betancourt was rescued by the Colombian government on July 2, 2008.

Alleged IRA connections

On April 24, 2001, the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations published the findings of its investigation into IRA activities in Colombia. Their report allegedly demonstrated a longstanding connection with the FARC, mentioned at least 15 IRA terrorists who have been traveling in and out of Colombia since 1998, and estimated that the IRA had received at least $2 million in drug proceeds for training members of FARC. The IRA/FARC connection was first made public on August 11, 2001, following the arrest in Bogota of two IRA explosives and urban warfare experts and of a representative of Sinn Fein (the IRA's political wing) who was known to be stationed in Cuba. The three had explosive traces on their clothes and luggage, but claimed they were in Colombia to advise the FARC on their "peace talks" with the government. The false travel documents they carried, however, raised doubts about their peaceful intentions. On April 24, 2002, Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, turned down a request to testify in Washington D.C. on Wednesday that week before a Congressional panel investigating connections between the IRA and Colombian rebels. In a Belfast news conference, Mr. Adams said lawyers had told him that his appearance before the House Committee on International Relations could prejudice the coming trial in Colombia of two IRA men and Sinn Fein's Cuba representative, two of them from the Republic of Ireland and one from Northern Ireland. Jim Monaghan, Martin McCauley and Niall Connolly, were arrested in Colombia in August 2001 and accused of teaching bomb-making methods to insurgents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Mr. Adams said he had written a letter to the committee chairman, Henry J. Hyde, Republican of Illinois, offering to meet legislators the next time he was in Washington. Mr. Adams said he was satisfied with the IRA's denial that it had sent anyone to Colombia "to train or engage in any military cooperation with any group". The disclosure of the IRA and Sinn Fein activity in Colombia infuriated George W. Bush administration officials last fall and compromised support among Irish-Americans and on Capitol Hill in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington D.C.. After reading a summary of the committee's report stating that "Colombian authorities assert that not only has the IRA operated in the former safe haven on behalf of the FARC, but also the Iranians, Cubans, and possibly ETA, among others," President George W. Bush linked IRA to the "axis of evil".

There were signs of political divisions across party lines about how to deal with the situation. Members of the Republican Party such as the New Yorkers Peter T. King and Ben Gilman and Representative Chris Smith from New Jersey are long term allies of Irish nationalism. The same can be said for members of the Democratic Party like the New Yorkers Joseph Crowley and Gary Ackerman. At one stage, Congressman Gilman is reported to have asked for the IRA hearing to be suspended. However, the committee chairman Henry Hyde, himself an Irish Catholic from Chicago, insisted on pressing ahead. Despite the position of the chairman of the committee, serious doubts have been raised about its conclusions by other committee members. The chairman argued that the IRA's presence in the region probably went beyond the three men awaiting trial in Bogota and dismissed the possibility that their visit to the country was innocent. However, some senior members of the committee from both sides attacked the basic premise of the hearing. Democrat Congressman William Delahunt said: "Unfortunately we have been presented with a report short on facts and replete with speculation, and surmise and opinion, much of which I disagree with. "This report and other documents have received wide circulation both here and abroad and is quickly being accepted as the position of this committee". The Commander in Chief of Colombia's armed forces claimed seven members of the IRA had been helping to train FARC guerillas in his country. In a statement that same week, the IRA again said its leadership had sent "no-one to Colombia to train or to engage in any military co-operation with any group", while claiming that the arrest of the three Irishmenhad been "used again in an intense way by opponents of the peace process in Ireland and Britain". It added: "The IRA has not interfered in the internal affairs of Colombia and will not do so." The declarations followed a US Congress report claiming the IRA had formed part of a global terror network based in Colombia where it helped train guerrilla groups.

Some members or the US Congress see Colombia as part of America's backyard, and any activity which appears to strengthen the Marxist FARC guerrillas, is seen as impinging on US national interests. On 15 February 2002 Jim Monaghan, Martin McCauley and Niall Connolly, the Colombia Three, were charged with training FARC rebels in bomb-making. The trial closed on 1 August 2003, being found guilty of travelling with false passports and they were given sentences of up to 44 months. They were found not guilty on the charges relating to training FARC rebels and were released in June 2004 upon payment of fines.

According to RAND Corporation, beginning in early 2001 FARC sharply intensified its operations, killing more than 400 members of the Colombian armed forces in 18 months with car bombs and homemade mortars similar in design to those previously used by Irish Republicans. FARC then expanded its campaign into Colombian cities. The February 2003 bombing of the El Nogal club in Bogotá was attributed to the guerrilla group by authorities, investigators and prosecutors. FARC themselves denied any involvement.

Alvaro Uribe's Presidency (2002-Present):

2002-2005 period

President Álvaro Uribe has intensified military operations against the FARC, seeking to defeat them.

For most of the period between 2002 and 2005, the FARC-EP was believed to be in a strategic withdrawal due to the increasing military and police actions of new hardline president Álvaro Uribe, which led to the capture or desertion of many fighters and medium-level commanders. One of the most important combatants captured was Simón Trinidad (Juvenal Ovidio Palmera Pineda), in January 2004. He was a former banker turned rebel, who had participated as a high-profile negotiator in the recent Pastrana peace talks, and who was also part of the central command of the organization.

During the first two years of the Uribe administration, the strength of several FARC fronts, mostly notably in Cundinamarca and Antioquia, was broken by the government’s military operations.

In June 2004, 34 coca farmers were found bound hand and foot and shot with automatic weapons. Blame was placed on the FARC-EP by the government, and after several days of uncertainty the FARC-EP publicly claimed responsibility for the massacre, saying they had killed the farmers for being supporters of right-wing paramilitaries and accusing the government of shedding “crocodile tears” for their deaths. The United Nations condemned the massacre as a war crime. After the FARC’s communique was made public, other human rights organizations likewise denounced the event and called on the Colombian government to protect villagers from the guerrillas.

Another incident occurred on July 10, 2004, when the FARC allegedly killed seven peasants (Francisco Giraldo, Carlos Torres, José Velásquez, Israel Velásquez, Mauricio Herrera, John Jairo Usuga and Pablo Usuga), in Samaná, near the municipality of San Carlos, Antioquia, according to the mayor of San Carlos, Colombian authorities and witnesses to the event.

The victims of the massacre were labourers who had returned to the zone after being forcefully displaced by the FARC earlier, presumably due to military or paramilitary activity in the area. They were apparently murdered because they had not received permission from the FARC to return yet, according to witnesses. The July 10 massacre provoked a further exodus of at least 80 persons from the surrounding rural area towards the urban locality of San Carlos.

On July 13, 2004, the office of the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights publicly condemned this further act of violence and the ensuing displacement, accusing the FARC of violating article 17 of the additional Protocol II of the Geneva Convention and of international humanitarian law, expressing its solidarity towards the families of the victims.

The office reminded the FARC, which in the past has publicly rejected the legal applicability of the Geneva Convention to its case (though it also claims to be following most of its directives anyway), that these principles must be followed by any person or group of persons, independent of their legal condition.

According to the AP news agency, on August 18, 2004, a Colombian arms broker, Carlos Gamarra Murillo, arrested on April 1, 2004 in Tampa, Florida, USA, was charged with attempting to buy $4 million in rocket launchers, machine guns, and other heavy weapons and ammunition for the FARC, which would have been paid for with 2 tons of cocaine (worth 60% of the total amount, according to investigators) and cash.

The weapons would then have been shipped through Venezuela, according to investigators. US Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that Gamarra “attempted to provide the fuel to feed a dangerous foreign terrorist organization”. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) chief Michael Garcia signaled the indictment as “a significant achievement”.

Gamarra apparently made contact with an undercover informant in Colombia in March 2003, according to an ICE agent who testified in April. During the next year, it is alleged that he met and called the agents in order to arrange the weapons shipment and also inquired about buying surface-to-air missiles, presumably for use against Colombian military helicopters and other aircraft. Gamarra is currently held without bail.

On November 27, 2004, Colombian Defense Minister Jorge Alberto Uribe told reporters that apparently the FARC leadership had secretly commanded their followers to attempt to attack visiting U.S. President George W. Bush during his visit to the city of Cartagena. It was mentioned that any such intentions were made impractical by the presence of about 15,000 members of the Colombian security forces in the area, in addition to U.S. security personnel. No specific evidence (such as the content of the intelligence reports) that FARC actually managed to organize such an attack has been publicly released. [2] Interior and Justice Minister Sabas Pretelt later downplayed the comments, stating that he had no specific details about any concrete assassination plots directed against President Bush and the FARC strongly denied the accusation, blaming it on US intelligence sources.

In early February 2005, a series of small scale military actions by the FARC around the southwestern departments of Colombia, resulted in an estimated 40 casualties (dead and wounded). The FARC-EP, in response to government military operations in the south and in the southeast, would now be displacing its military center of gravity towards the Nariño, Putumayo and Cauca departments.

Attacks during 2005:

See also: List of FARC attacks in 2005

During 2005, the FARC launched a response to Álvaro Uribe’s security strategy and to Plan Patriota, apparently adopting a new style of operations, in particular near the southwest of Colombia.

The FARC would have previously implemented what was later called “Plan Resistencia” in order to endure Plan Patriota’s continuing effects, by withdrawing into the jungle and executing a temporary halt in its larger scale attacks. It is widely believed that their military capacity has been weakened enormously.

Possibility of prisoner exchange with the government:

See also: Humanitarian exchange

The FARC-EP have demanded a mechanism for prisoner exchange, which would involve the liberation of 45 political and military hostages (not those civilians held for extortion or ransom, which may number in the thousands) that the group currently holds, in exchange for the release of at least 500 jailed criminal rebels. During the duration of the DMZ negotiations, an exchange took place.

However the current demands of the group include a DMZ including two towns (Florida and Pradera) in the strategic region of Valle del Cauca, where much of the current military action against them has taken place, plus this region is also an important way of transporting drugs to the Pacific coast. This demand has been rejected by the Colombian government based on previous experience during the 2002 peace talks.

The Uribe administration initially ruled out any negotiation with FARC that did not include a cease-fire, and instead pushed for rescue operations, many of which have traditionally been successful when carried out by the police’s GAULA anti-kidnapping group in urban settings (as opposed to the mountains and jungles where the FARC keeps most hostages), according to official statistics.

However, relatives of most FARC kidnapping victims have come to strongly reject any potential rescue operations, in part due to the tragic death of the governor of Antioquia department, Guillermo Gaviria, his peace advisor and several soldiers, kidnapped by the FARC during a peace march (protected by the UN symbol) in 2003. The governor and the others were shot at close range by the FARC when the military made presence in the jungle nearby.

In August 2004, after several false starts and in the face of mounting pressure from relatives, former Liberal presidents Alfonso López Michelsen and Ernesto Samper and, as shown in recent Colombian polls the growing majority popular backing in favor of a humanitarian exchange (more than 60% would consider Colombia a “better country” if the exchange took place), the Uribe government seems to have become more flexible in its position, announcing that it has given the FARC a formal proposal on July 23, in which it offers to free 50 to 60 jailed rebels in exchange for the political and military hostages held by the FARC (not including ransom kidnapees as well, as the government had earlier demanded).

The government would make the first move, releasing insurgents charged or condemned for rebellion and either allowing them to leave the country or to stay and join the state’s reinsertion program, and then the FARC would release the hostages in its possession, including Íngrid Betancourt. The proposal would have been carried out with the backing and support of the French and Swiss governments, which publicly supported it once it was revealed.

The move has been signaled as potentially positive by several relatives of the victims and political figures.

FARC released a communique, dated August 20 but apparently published publicly by August 22, in which they denied having received the proposal earlier through the mediation of Switzerland (as the government had stated) and, while making note of the fact that a proposal had been made by Uribe’s administration and that it hoped that common ground could eventually be reached, criticized it because they believe that any deal should allow them to decide how many of its jailed comrades should be freed and that they should be able to return to rebel ranks.

On September 5, what has been considered as a sort of FARC counter proposal was revealed in the Colombian press. The FARC-EP is proposing that the government declare a “security” or “guarantee” zone for 72 hours in order for official insurgent and state negotiators to meet face to face and directly discuss a prisoner exchange. Government military forces would not have to leave the area but to concentrate in their available garrisons, in a similar move to that agreed by the Ernesto Samper administration (1994-1998) which allowed the rebel group to free some captured police and military. In addition, the Colombian government’s peace commissioner would have to make an official public pronouncement regarding this proposal.

If the zone was created, the first day would be used for travelling to the chosen location, the second to discuss the matter, and the third for the guerrillas to abandon the area. The government would be able to choose the location for the “security zone” among one of the municipalities of Peñas Coloradas, El Rosal or La Tuna, all in Caquetá department, where the FARC has clear rebel influence.

It is considered that this proposal is also seeking to reduce the pressure that recent military offensives may be exerting against the insurgents in Caquetá, Guaviare and Putumayo departments, and president Uribe stated that the “security zone” would demoralize the military, since they should free a region that has been fought fiercely. Also, the FARC has been known to change their mind easily and they seem to be using the kidnapped families' hopes of freedom to put the government under civilian pressure. Relatives of hostages currently in rebel hands have considered that both the FARC and government proposals may represent the biggest public advance in the last couple of years regarding their plight.

On September 14, the FARC released an official communique in which they denied that the 72-hour proposal came from their organization, and instead asked for the demilitarization of San Vicente del Caguán and Cartagena del Chairá in Caquetá department in order to discuss the prisoner exchange, without any concrete time limit. The document also mentions that several hostages had to be moved to other locations, due to increased military activity in the south. The FARC again stated that, while they are open to discuss a prisoner exchange with the current representatives of the government, they will only consider opening peace negotiations with a different administration.

On December 2, the government announced the pardon of 23 FARC prisoners, to encourage a reciprocal move. The FARC ignored the gesture, and the 23 rebels released were all of low rank and had promised not to rejoin the armed struggle. The government is hoping to win the release of dozens of hostages, including three US citizens. In November, the FARC rejected a proposal to hand over 60 (number at the time) of its captives in exchange for 50 guerrillas imprisoned by the government.

In a communique dated November 28 but released publicly on December 3, the FARC-EP declared that they are no longer insisting on the demilitarization of San Vicente del Caguán and Cartagena del Chairá as a pre-condition for the negotiation of the prisoner exchange, but instead that of Florida and Pradera in the Valle department. They state that this area would lie outside the “area of influence” of both their Southern and Eastern Blocks (the FARC’s strongest) and that of the military operations being carried out by the Uribe administration.

They request security guarantees both for the displacement of their negotiators and that of the guerrillas that would be freed, which are specifically stated to number as many as 500 or more, and ask the Catholic Church to coordinate the participation of the United Nations and other countries in the process.

The FARC-EP also mention in the communique that Simón Trinidad’s extradition, which has been approved by the Supreme Court but still lacks the president’s go-ahead, would be a serious obstacle to reaching a prisoner exchange agreement with the government.

On December 17, 2004, the Colombian government authorized Trinidad’s extradition to the United States, but stated that the measure could be revoked if the FARC released all 59 (number at the time) political and military hostages in its possession before December 30. The FARC rejected the demand.

Partial hostage releases and escapes during 2006 and 2007

On March 25, 2006, after a public announcement made weeks earlier, the FARC-EP released two captured policemen at La Dorada, Putumayo. The release took place some 335 miles (539 km) southwest of Bogotá, near the Ecuadorean border. The Red Cross said the two were released in good health. Military operations in the area and bad weather had prevented the release from occurring one week earlier.

In a separate series of events, civilian hostage and German citizen Lothar Hintze was released by FARC on April 4, 2006, after five years in captivity. Hintze had been kidnapped for extortion purposes, and his wife had paid three ransom payments without any result.

One hostage, Julian Ernesto Guevera Castro died of an unknown illness on January 28, 2006. He was a police captain and was captured on November 1, 1998. As of January 2008, the FARC had not returned his body to his family.

Another civilian hostage, Fernando Araújo, later named Minister of Foreign Relations and formerly Development Minister, escaped his captors on December 31, 2006. Araújo had to walk through the jungle for five days before being found by troops in the hamlet of San Agustin, 350 miles (560 km) north of Bogotá. He was kidnapped on December 5, 2000 while exercising in the Caribbean coastal city of Cartagena. He was reunited with his family on January 5, 2007.

Another hostage, Jhon Frank Pinchao a low ranking police officer, escaped his captors on April 28, 2007 after nine years in captivity. He was reunited with his family on May 15, 2007.

2007 Murder of 11 hostage lawmakers:

Main article: Valle del Cauca Deputies hostage crisis

On June 28, 2007, the FARC reported the death of 11 out of 12 provincial deputies from the Valle del Cauca Department whom the guerrillas had kidnapped in 2002. The guerrillas claimed that the deputies had been killed by crossfire during an attack by an “unidentified military group.” The Colombian government has stated that government forces had not made any rescue attempts and that the FARC executed the hostages.

The guerrillas did not report any other casualties on either side and delayed months before permitting the Red Cross to recover the remains. According to the government, the guerrillas delayed turning over the corpses in order to let decomposition hide evidence of how they died. The Red Cross reported that the corpses had been washed and their clothing changed before burial, hiding evidence of how they were killed. The Red Cross also reported that the deputies had been killed by multiple close-range shots, many of them in the back of the victims, and even two by shots to the head.

Major developements during 2008:

Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez liberation

Clara Rojas was kidnapped in February 2002 along with Ingrid Betancourt, who was campaigning for the presidency as they were travelling from Florencia to San Vicente del Caguan in the Department of Caquetá, southern Colombia. San Vicente del Caguan was one of five towns from which the military had withdrawn over the failed peace talks between former Colombian president Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) and FARC. Betancourt and Rojas, candidates of the independent Green Oxygen party, travelled to the town despite warnings from the authorities, alerting them that their lives were at risk just three days after peace talks collapsed. A couple of days after the kidnapping, FARC told Rojas she could go, but she opted to remain a hostage out of solidarity with Betancourt. They soon tried to escape but got lost and were caught. As punishment the rebels chained them to trees by the ankles. On January 10, 2008, former vice presidential candidate Clara Rojas and former congresswoman Consuelo Gonzalez were freed after nearly six years in captivity. Colombian Congresswoman Consuelo Gonzalez was abducted in September 2001. Getting off the plane in Venezuela, Gonzalez embraced her 2-year-old granddaughter for the first time. She also became a widow during her years as a hostage. In a Venezuela-brokered deal, a helicopter flew deep into Colombia to pick up both hostages. The women were escorted out of the jungle by armed guerrillas to a clearing where they were picked up by Venezuelan helicopters that bore International Red Cross insignias. In a statement published on a pro-rebel Web site, the FARC said the unilateral release demonstrated the group's willingness to engage the Colombian government in talks over the release of as many as 700 people who are still being held. "Venezuela will continue opening the way for peace in Colombia," Chavez said. "We are ready, and in contact with the FARC, and we hope the Colombian government understands. I'm sure they will understand." In a televised speech, Colombia's U.S.-allied president, Alvaro Uribe, thanked Chavez for his efforts. The guerrillas also offered to exchange the 44 high-profile hostages for hundreds of rebel fighters imprisoned in Colombia and the United States. It was a day of triumph for Mr. Chávez, who had suffered a stinging political defeat in a referendum in December to overhaul the Constitution of Venezuela. Mr. Chávez used his government’s media apparatus to celebrate the release of the two women, broadcasting the meetings with family members live on state television. It then ferried them back across the border, where a plane took them to Caracas. In parting, the two kissed young armed women rebels on the cheeks and shook hands with the men. They then hugged their rescuers and spoke to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez via satellite telephone, thanking him for his mediation. It was the first time Latin America's oldest rebel group has freed high-profile hostages, and the most important hostage release in the Colombian conflict since 2001, when the FARC freed some 300 soldiers and police officers. In Caracas, both women met their families and again thanked Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez for engineering their release. During the period she was retained in the jungle, Clara Rojas gave birth to her son during 2004 by kitchen-knife Caesarean. The first rumours that she had given birth to a son in captivity came in April 2006, when journalist Jorge Enrique Botero claimed in a book that Rojas had had a child in a relationship with a rank-and- file rebel. Botero wrote that the child had been conceived in a consensual relationship and was not been the product of rape. The baby was taken from the jungle at 8 months old. Due to her pregnancy, she was separated from the rest and moved to a tent where she waited out the final months alone, sleeping on a cot and trying to "have the peace to face the situation of the birth." She asked for a doctor, but none came. When the contractions came in April 2004, it was the start of a full day of difficult labor, and Rojas said the rebels, including a male nurse who was in charge, explained she would need a Caesarean section because there were risks to the baby and her own life. When she awoke from the anesthesia, one rebel told her: "Clara, don't move. ... It's a boy". Rojas didn't hear of the boy again until Dec. 31, when she heard Colombian President Alvaro Uribe say on the radio that the child was no longer with her captors. DNA tests later confirmed the boy had been living in a Bogota foster home for more than two years under a different name. Obviously, she reclaimed her son. Asked if she sees the FARC as a terrorist group, Rojas did not answer directly but called it "a criminal organization," condemning its kidnappings as "a total violation of human dignity" and saying some captive police and soldiers are constantly chained.

Hugo Chavez's call to stop branding FARC as terrorists:

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez urged European and Latin American governments on January 11 2008 to stop branding Colombia's cocaine-funded Marxist guerrillas as terrorists, a day after welcoming two hostages released by the rebels. "I am asking the governments (across Latin America) to take the FARC and ELN (National Liberation Army) off their lists of global terrorist groups," Chavez told the National Assembly, saying he asked European nations to do the same. He added that (the leftist Colombian rebel groups) "are not any terrorist body, they are real armies that occupy territory in Colombia; they must be recognized, they are insurgent forces that have a political project, a Bolivarian project, which here is respected." Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was quick to respond, ruling out any change in the FARC's or ELN's status. "For no reason at all will we accept removing the terrorist label from these groups and replace it with "belligerent status"," Uribe said in a statement read out by his spokesman, Cesar Mauricio Velasquez. Instead, Uribe added, Colombia will continue considering the ELN and FARC, as well as all right-wing paramilitary groups, terrorist organizations, since "they are attacking a respectable democracy and because of their methods of extermination". Alvaro Uribe later issued a statement saying the insurgents are indeed terrorists who fund their operations with cocaine smuggling, recruit children and plant land mines in their effort to topple a democratically elected government.

February 2008 liberations

On January 31, 2008, the FARC announced that they would release civilian hostages Luis Eladio Perez Bonilla, Gloria Polanco, and Orlando Beltran Cuellar to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez as a humanitarian gesture. All of them were kidnapped in 2001. On February 27, 2008, the three hostages and Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay (who was added to the list due to his poor health) were released by FARC. With the authorization of the Colombian government and the participation of the International Red Cross, a Venezuelan helicopter transported them to Caracas from San Jose del Guaviare. The four Colombian politicians were freed in a clearing in the southern jungles of Colombia around midday. Two Venezuelan helicopters with doctors aboard were flying them directly to Colombia. President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, into whose custody the four were released, spoke with them by phone after they were freed, said Jesse Chacón, a senior aide to the president. The helicopters flew to the Venezuelan border town of Santo Domingo. The freed hostages would then fly on to Caracas to be reunited with their families. Polanco is said to have suffered health problems including thyroid trouble, while Gechem has heart, back and ulcer problems. The FARC freed the four in the same region where it freed two other politicians - Clara Rojas and Consuelo González - on Jan. 10. Aboard the helicopters were the Venezuelan interior minister, Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, and Senator Piedad Córdoba of Colombia, a close Chávez collaborator, as well as four Red Cross representatives and a team of doctors. The FARC had called its planned release of the hostages a gesture of recognition for the mediation efforts of Chávez, who last month called on the international community to recognize the rebels as belligerents. "You've given me the opportunity to live again," hostage Gloria Polanco said as she was freed in a Colombian jungle clearing, thanking Chavez for allowing her to see her three grown sons again. Polanco made a passionate plea for the Venezuelan leader to help win the release of ailing former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt: "As a woman and a mother, I ask from my heart here in front of everyone that you fight to get Ingrid free as soon as possible," Polanco implored. "She is very ill, president, very ill. She has recurrent hepatitis B and is near the end." Chavez turned to TV cameras recording the meeting and asked the rebel leader Manuel Marulanda, "from my heart to change Ingrid's location. Move her to a base closer to you, while we continue working to pave the way for her definitive release. He also pledged "to continue doing all we can to liberate the very last" of the hostages held by the FARC. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, who has tense relations with Chavez, thanked the socialist leader and called for the release of all hostages. He said Colombia is still in a fight "against terrorist actions" but is open to reconciliation. The rebels have an ideological affinity with Chavez and have turned to him as their preferred facilitator.

Death of Raúl Reyes:

Main article: 2008 Andean diplomatic crisis

On March 1 2008, the Colombian military attacked a FARC camp inside Ecuador’s territory, resulting in the death of over 20 people, with at least 16 of them being FARC guerillas. Raúl Reyes was among the killed, along with at least 16 of his fellow guerrillas. Raúl Reyes was FARC’s international spokesman and considered to be FARC’s second-in-command. This incident led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Colombia, and between Venezuela and Colombia. Ecuador condemned the attack.

This is considered the biggest blow against FARC in its more than four decades of existence. This event was quickly followed by the death of Ivan Rios, another member of FARC's top leadership, less than a week later, by the hands of his own forces as a result of heavy Colombian military pressure.

Death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez:

Manuel Marulanda Vélez died on March 26, 2008 after a heart attack. His death would be kept a secret, until Colombian magazine, Revista Semana, published an interview with Colombian defense minister Juan Manuel Santos on May 24, 2008 in which Santos mentions the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez. The news was confirmed by FARC-commander 'Timochenko' on Venezuelan based television station Telesur on May 25, 2008. 'Timochenko' announced the new commander in chief is 'Alfonso Cano' After speculations in several national and international media about the 'softening up' of the FARC and the announcement of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe that several FARC-leaders were ready to surrender and liberate hostages, the secretariat of the FARC sent out a communique emphasizing the death of their founder would not change their approach towards the hostages or the humanitarian agreement.

Hugo Chavez's call to disarm:

On June 08, 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez urged Colombian rebels to lay down their weapons, unilaterally free dozens of hostages and end a decades-long armed struggle. The venezuelan President sent the uncharacteristic message to the FARC saying their ongoing efforts to overthrow Colombia's democratically elected government were unjustified. During his weekly television and radio program "Hello President", he declared that "the guerrilla war is history," and that "at this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place." The declarations follow the Colombia's government claims that a laptop recovered from a FARC camp in March shows a history of deep collaboration between the rebels and Chavez, something the Venezuelan leader denies.

Operation Jaque:

Main article: Operation Jaque

On July 2, 2008, under a Colombian military operation called Operation Jaque, the FARC was tricked by the Colombian Government into releasing 15 hostages to Colombian Intelligence agents disguised as rebels in a helicopter rescue. Military intelligence agents infiltrated the guerrilla ranks and led the local commander in charge of the hostages, Gerardo Aguilar Ramírez, alias Cesar, to believe they were going to take them by helicopter to Alfonso Cano, the guerrillas' supreme leader. The hostages rescued included Íngrid Betancourt (former presidential Candidate), U.S. military contractors Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell, as well as eleven Colombian police officers and soldiers. The commander, Cesar and one other rebel were taken into custody by agents without incident after boarding the helicopter.

Immediately after the hostage rescue, Colombian military forces cornered the rest of FARC's 1st Front, the unit which had held the hostages captive. Colombian forces have so far elected not to attack the 1st Front, but is instead offering them amnesty if they'll surrender.

Colombia’s Program for Humanitarian Attention for the Demobilized announced in August that 339 members of Colombia’s rebel groups surrendered and handed in their weapons in July, including 282 guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. [3]

Óscar Tulio Lizcano liberation:

Lizcano, a Colombian Conservative Party congressman, was kidnapped Aug. 5, 2000. On Sunday, October 26, 2008, the ex-congressman, Óscar Tulio Lizcano escaped from FARC rebels. Tulio Lizcano was a hostage for over 8 years, and escaped with a FARC rebel he convinced to travel with him. They evaded pursuit for three days as they trekked through mountains and jungles, encountering the military in the western costal region of Colombia. Tulio Lizcano is the first hostage to escape since the successful military rescue of Ingrid Betancourt, and the longest held political hostage by the organization. He became the 22nd Colombian political hostage to gain freedom during 2008. At a news conference at a military base in the western city of Cali, Lizcano, 62, had a scraggly beard and wore ripped, muddy pants. He appeared exhausted and at a loss for words, since he wasn't allowed to speak, not even to the guerrillas who were guarding him. Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos said a military operation made Lizcano's dash for freedom possible. He declared that a guerrilla deserter had provided a general idea of where Lizcano was held. For three months, the military encircled the zone to cut off supplies of food and ammunition. Finally, the pressure paid off. During his final days in captivity, Lizcano told Santos, they had nothing to eat but wild palm hearts and sugar cane. With the military tightening the noose, a FARC rebel turned himself in and provided Colombian authorities with Lizcano's exact location in the northwest state of Choco. As police and army troops prepared to launch a rescue operation, Lizcano escaped alongside one of his guerrilla guards who had decided to desert. The two men hiked through the rain forest for three days and nights until they encountered an army patrol. Speaking from a clinic in the western city of Cali, Mr Lizcano said that when soldiers saw him screaming from across a jungle river, they thought he was drunk and ignored him. Only when he lifted Mr Bueno's Galil assault rifle did the soldiers begin to understand that he was escaping from the Farc rebels. "They jumped into the river, and then I started to shout, 'I'm Lizcano'," he said. On Thursday night, he and Mr Bueno departed at about 9pm. They hid during the day and did not sleep for 72 hours, he said. Mr Lizcano said he was so weakened by malnutrition that at one point he told the rebel: "'I can't make it, save yourself'... and he said, 'No, no way. I want to leave here with you'. He took me by both hands, almost dragged me". During the following days to his liberation, the colobian army claimed to have rescued Tulio Lizcano, until he spoke of the dedication of the rebel who aided him. President Alvaro Uribe said the rebel who helped Lizcano escape would receive a cash payment and asylum in France along with his girlfriend, who had fled his rebel column in June, and his family. The FARC still holds about 20 political hostages, including some who have spent more than 11 years in captivity.

Other late 2008 developements:

Soon after the liberation of this prominent political prisoner, the Vice President of Colombia Francisco Santos called Latin America's biggest guerrilla group a "paper tiger" with little control of the nation's territory, adding that "they have really been diminished to the point where we can say they are a minimal threat to Colombian security," and that "After six years of going after them, reducing their income and promoting reinsertion of most of their members, they look like a paper tiger." However, he warned against any kind of premature triumphalism, because "crushing the rebels will take time." The 500,000 square kilometers (193,000 square miles) of jungle in Colombia makes it hard to track them down to fight.

Criticism

2008 demonstrations against FARC

On February 4, 2008, several rallies were held in Colombia and in other locations around the world, criticizing FARC and demanding the liberation of hundreds of hostages. The protests were originally organized through the popular social networking site Facebook. According to the Washington Post, millions of people in Colombia and thousands worldwide participated in the rallies.

Activities

See also: Military History of the FARC-EP, Kidnappings in Colombia, and Illegal drug trade in Colombia

Financing

FARC has financed itself through kidnapping ransoms, extortion, and drug trafficking which includes but it is not limited to coca plant harvesting, protection of their crops, processing of coca leaves to manufacture cocaine, and drug trade protection. Businesses operating in rural areas, including agricultural, oil, and mining interests, were required to pay “vaccines” (monthly fees) which “protected” them from subsequent attacks and kidnappings. An additional, albeit less lucrative, source of revenue was highway blockades where guerrillas stopped motorists and buses in order to confiscate jewelry and money, which were especially prevalent during the presidencies of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) and that of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002).

Over time, fewer recruits joined the organization for ideological reasons, debatably as a means to escape poverty and unemployment.

In 1991, a small group of guerrillas invaded the Brazilian side of the jungle, and attacked an army post near the Traira River, in the first and only confirmed clash with the Brazilian army to date. Three soldiers were killed and some weapons stolen. A few days later a Brazilian commando struck back, killing seven guerrillas. There has also been alleged FARC activity in Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador where in 1993 they ambushed a group of military and police who were training with boats on the Putumayo river 11 Ecuadorian policemen died.

By 1998, some studies showed that FARC’s ranks could have swelled to approximately some 15,000 guerrilla fighters, up from an estimated 7,500 in 1992, and effectively were in a position to control and freely operate through large rural areas of the country (the high-end estimates being about 40%-50%, according to some analysts). Other observers would dispute the current applicability of this assessment in the face of increased U.S. aid and training to the Colombia state and its military.

In 1999 NYSE Chairman Richard Grasso flew into a demilitarized region of Colombia’s southern jungle for his talks with a member of the general secretariat of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

Drug trafficking

The FARC have ties to narcotics traffickers, principally through the provision of armed protection and a form of “taxation” over drugs crops and their profits. During the mid- to late-1990s, several drug war analysts have stated that the FARC would have become increasingly involved in the drug trade, controlling farming, production and exportation of cocaine in those areas of the country under their influence. This claim has been made by U.S. and Colombian authorities.

Brazilian druglord Luiz Fernando da Costa (aka Fernandinho Beira-Mar) was captured in Colombia on April 20, 2001 while in the company of FARC-EP guerrillas. Colombian and Brazilian authorities have claimed that this constitutes proof of further cooperation between the FARC-EP and the druglord based on the exchange of weapons for cocaine. Fernandinho himself and the FARC-EP have denied this. FARC itself has claimed that in their areas of influence the growth of coca plants by farmers would be taxed on the same basis as any other crop, though there would be higher cash profits stemming from coca production and exportation.

In August 2006, Chilean authorities seized more than 108 kilograms of cocaine and captured twelve members of an international drug trafficking ring, which they described as being led by an unnamed Colombian in Panama who received and distributed the ring’s profits to finance FARC activities. [4]

Modus operandi

The FARC-EP has employed vehicle bombings, gas cylinder bombs, assassinations, landmines, kidnapping, extortion, hijacking, guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, economic as well as civilian targets, to attack those it considers a threat to its movement. It has not been uncommon for civilians to die or suffer forced displacement, directly or indirectly, due to many of these actions. The FARC-EPs April 16 and April 18 2005 gas cylinder attacks on the town of Toribió, Cauca led to the displacement of more than two thousand indigenous inhabitants and the destruction of two dozen civilian houses. A February 2005 report from the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights mentioned that, during 2004, “FARC-EP continued to commit grave breaches [of human rights] such as murders of protected persons, torture and hostage-taking, which affected many civilians, including women, returnees, boys and girls, and ethnic groups."

IEDs

The FARC’s tactic of employing a type of improvised mortars made from gas canisters (or cylinders) as explosives, a weapon it often uses when launching attacks at towns and sites in them that they consider as military objectives (such as police stations), has a high degree of inaccuracy. Resulting targeting difficulties have caused these weapons to often level civilian houses and/or harm civilians, such as the case in Toribío on April 24 2005, and the earlier 2002 attack on a church in Bojayá which killed 119 civilians.

Attacks on civilian population

Human Rights Watch considers that “the FARC-EPs continued use of gas cylinder mortars shows this armed group’s flagrant disregard for lives of civilians...gas cylinder bombs are impossible to aim with accuracy and, as a result, frequently strike civilian objects and cause avoidable civilian casualties."

Murder of three Americans

In March 1999, the FARC-EP killed three U.S. Native American rights activists in Venezuelan territory after kidnapping them in Colombia. After initial denials and claims that these U.S. citizens were CIA agents, the FARC-EP subsequently admitted that this action was a mistake and claimed that it would internally punish those responsible.

Human Rights Watch has criticized FARC for not applying any serious punishment to those involved in the incident since "the two guerrillas who killed Americans Terence Freitas, Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok on March 5, 1999, were eventually sentenced to construct fifty meters of trench and clear land."

Kidnappings

The FARC-EP is responsible for most of the ransom kidnappings in Colombia. The group’s kidnapping targets are usually those that it considers wealthy landowners and businessmen, the police and military, as well as foreign tourists and entrepreneurs, and prominent international and domestic officials. Colombian and international NGOs have documented that in recent years the FARC has also resorted to kidnapping people from lower income sectors (that is, from the Colombian middle class downward), in particular when they are thought to be collaborators or relatives of the FARC’s enemies. It is argued that many of these kidnappings have taken place with little to no regard for the target’s age, gender or health conditions.

File:Concentration camps FARC Colombia.png

Alias “Mono jojoy” reviewing a prison camp where hostages are being held in the jungle.

In February 2005, Juan José Martínez Vega, also known as “Gentil Alvis Patiño” or “El Chigüiro”, was arrested by Venezuelan authorities during a rescue operation that freed the mother of baseball player Ugueth Urbina. According to authorities, Martínez Vega had some 600 to 650 kilograms of cocaine on location. Colombian authorities identified him as a member of FARC and accused him of exchanging cocaine for weapons in the black market. Martínez Vega had several false identity papers, including some which identified him as Gentil Albis Patiño, which delayed his initial identification. Eventually Venezuela confirmed him to be “El Chigüiro” and subsequently extradited him to Colombia.

Arms trafficking

During the first quarter of 2005, joint intelligence and police operations by law enforcement authorities from Honduras and Colombia resulted in the seizure of a number of AK-47 and M16 assault rifles, M60 machineguns, rocket launchers and ammunition cartridges that were stated to be part of illegal weapons shipments from criminal gangs and black market dealers in Central America to the FARC in exchange for drugs, allegedly for two thousand kilos of cocaine. Ethalson Mejia Hoy, a Colombian who was illegally released from Honduran custody in July 2004 24 hours after his arrest, was named as one of the key figures in such an arms-for-drugs traffic. It was reported that “Police intelligence were monitoring communications between two 14th Front guerrillas when they heard 'the package' being discussed. In actuality the package consisted of sufficient weapons to arm a minimum of 180 combatants." Arms dealers in the region were also accused of providing similar weapons to right wing paramilitaries in Colombia.

Organization and structure

Main article: Military Structure of the FARC-EP

See also: FARC-EP Chain of Command

Development

The FARC's force is usually estimated to be at around 6,000 to 8,000 strong, organized in more than 80 fronts.

From approximately 1949 to 1964, during the “La Violencia” period of Colombian history, the FARC’s precursor was a small Communist guerrilla band situated in and around Marquetalia. In May 1964, the Colombian Army retook Marquetalia. The rebels scattered, reorganized, and in 1966, the FARC was formally created as a slightly enlargened guerrilla entity (estimated at 350 members).

During the 1970s, the FARC kept a low profile by staying inside its traditional heartland areas, but the Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982 represented a significant change in outlook, as the FARC changed its structure.

Manuel Marulanda was the organization’s leader until his death, subsequently replaced by Alfonso Cano. Jacobo Arenas was the FARC’s main ideologue and academic (died August 10, 1990). From the early 1980s, the FARC added ranks and unit badges to uniforms, and it also introduced a new inventory system for firearms and ammunition, in addition to providing new weapons and technology for its militants. Jacobo Arenas was probably central to planning the logo and flag for FARC-EP, which is used to this day.

Unit structure

These are the units the FARC uses:

• Squad: the basic unit consisting of 12 combatants;
• Guerrilla, a unit consisting of two squads;
• Company (Compañía), two Guerrillas (that is, 48 personnel, a lower level of command than a company in most armies);
• Column, two or more companies;
• Front, comprising more than one column;
• Block of Fronts, consisting of five or more fronts — there are seven such blocks;
• Central High Command (Estado Mayor Central).

The FARC believes that since the early 1980s it has met the requirements for the recognition of a “state of belligerence” contained within the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and additional protocols. Their opponents and the Colombian government claim that the practice of civilian kidnapping for ransom and the tax levied on coca crop buyers makes it an illegitimate army and also point to a wide rejection of the guerrilla policies in national surveys.

The FARC-EP is organized into seven main operational regions and “block” is the name given to each FARC military command inside one of the main operational regions. According to the FARC’s military operational strategies, which take into account factors such as the size of the area and its population, each block is composed of between 5 to 15 fronts.

In addition, there are various independent, elite or mobile fronts attached to some blocks normally under the direct control of the FARC’s high command. The FARC also maintains various “Military intelligence units”.

The FARC-EP maintains a Military Academy and a two-month basic military training program, mainly involving infantry tactics. After basic training, guerrilla fighters are further assessed and have evaluation and performance records. After some time, better candidates may do advanced training.

Ranks

Ranks (in ascending order of seniority):

Equivalent to "other ranks":

• Squad Deputy commander
• Squad Commander
• Guerrilla Deputy commander
• Guerrilla Commander
• Company Deputy commander

Equivalent to officers:

• Company Commander
• Column Deputy commander
• Column Commander
• Front Deputy commander
• Front Commander
• Block Deputy commander

Equivalent to general officers:

• Block Commander
• Deputy Commander of the Central High Command (there are currently five men of this rank)
• Commander of the Central High Command (Jorge Briceño, known as “Mono Jojoy”)
• Commander in Chief of the Central High Command (Alfonso Cano)

It should be remembered that a FARC company is a lower level of command (of approximately 50 men) than a company in traditional army organization.

See also

• List of political hostages held by FARC

Further reading

• Diario de la resistencia de Marquetalia. Jacobo Arenas, Ediciones Abejón Mono, 1972 (Espanol)
• Schmid, Alex Peter, and Crelinsten, Ronald D., Western Responses to Terrorism. Routledge, 1993, ISBN 0714640905
• Kline, H. F., Colombia: Democracy Under Assault, Harper Collins, 1995, ISBN 0813310717
• Maullin, Richard L., The Fall of Dumar Aljure, a Colombian Guerrilla and Bandit. The Rand Corporation, 1968
• Osterling, Jorge P., Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, Transaction Publishers, 1989, ISBN 0887382290
• "Drug Control: US Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges", United States General Accounting Office, February 1998
• "Colombia: Guerrilla Economics", The Economist, January 13, 1996
• The Suicide of Colombia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 7, 1998
• "Las FARC lamentan expectativas exageradas", El Nuevo Herald, April 22, 1999
• Killing Peace: Colombia’s Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Intervention, Garry M. Leech, Information Network of the Americas (INOTA), ISBN 0-9720384-0-X, 2002
• War in Colombia: Made in U.S.A., edited by Rebeca Toledo, Teresa Gutierrez, Sara Flounders and Andy McInerney, ISBN 0-9656916-9-1, 2003
• The Profits of Extermination: How U.S. Corporate Power is Destroying Colombia, Aviva Chomsky and Francisco Ramírez Cuellar, Common Courage Press, ISBN 1-56751-322-0, 2005

External links

• FARC-EP Home Page
• A million voices against FARC (Spanish), Asociación Colombia Soy Yo CSY
• AUC website
• Amnesty International – Press Release on FARC kidnapping and hostage-taking
• Colombian Army website (Ejército Nacional)
• El Tiempo – mainstream Colombian newspaper reporting on the conflict (in Spanish)
• Evolution of the Colombian Civil War – by Paul Wolf (collection of declassified U.S. documents online)
• Human Rights Watch – Humanitarian Law and its Application to the Conduct of the FARC-EP
• UN High Commissioner for Human Rights – Colombia 2005 Report (Spanish and English)
• De ratón de archivos del FBI a defensor del guerrillero ‘Simón Trinidad’
• CNN: FARC-EP Recruits child soldiers
• Death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez in "La Patria Grande de Caracas" (Es-It)
• The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade, Ricardo Vargas Meza, Transnational Institute (TNI), June 1999