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Foreign relations of Taiwan

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The Republic of China (ROC), whose jurisdiction is now constituted by the islands of Taiwan, Pescadores, Kinmen, the Matsu Islands and some other minor islands, is currently recognized by states, including the Holy See of Vatican City as sole and legitimate representative of China. By one interpretation, the course of the foreign relations of the Republic of China is dominated by maintaining ties with these countries, as well as diplomatic relations with other countries via its de facto embassies and consulates.

Historical background

Established in 1912, the early years of the Republic of China were characterised by the domination of warlords and foreign incursions. When the First World War broke out in 1914, Japan fought on the Allied side and seized the German possessions in Shandong. The Japanese set before the Beiyang government in Beijing (then romanised as 'Peking') the Twenty-One Demands. The Beijing government rejected some of these demands but yielded to the Japanese insistence on keeping the Shandong territory already in its possession. Beijing also recognised Tokyo's authority over southern Manchuria and eastern part of modern-day Inner Mongolia. In 1917, in secret communiques, Britain, France, and Italy assented to the Japanese claim in exchange for Japanese naval action against Germany.

In 1917, China declared war on Germany in the hope of recovering its lost province [vague], then under Japanese control. But in 1918 the Beijing government signed a secret deal with Japan accepting the latter's claim to Shandong. When the Treaty of Versailles confirmed the Japanese claim to Shandong and Beijing's sellout became public, internal reaction was shattering. The government did not sign the treaty as a result of the May Fourth Movement.

Between 1901 and 1937, the United States military maintained a strong presence in China to maintain Far East trade interests and to pursue a permanent alliance with the Republic of China, after long diplomatic difficulties with the Chinese Empire. The relationship between the U.S. and China was mostly on-again off-again, with periods of both cordial diplomatic relations accompanied by times of severed relations and violent anti-U.S. protests. The United States military in China was slowly withdrawn to protect other U.S. interests in the Pacific with the approach of World War II.

After years of Japanese control of Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, war broke out between Japan and China in 1937 in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

International disputes

The 1970s saw a switch in diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China with countries like the United States, Japan, and Canada making the switch during that decade. In October 1971, Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly, expelling "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" and replacing the China seat on the Security Council (and all other UN organs) with delegates from the People's Republic of China. It declared "that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations" and thus do not regard the Republic of China as legitimately representing the whole of China.

Many attempts by the ROC to rejoin the UN, in recent years, have not made it past committee, under fierce opposition and threatened vetoes from the PRC. The recent resolutions have all emphasized that Resolution 2758, replacing the ROC with the PRC in 1971, only addressed the question of who should have China's seat in the UN rather than whether an additional seat for Taiwan Area can be created to represent the 23 million people on Taiwan and other islands. Today, only states officially recognize the Republic of China, as the PRC makes breaking ties with the ROC and the recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China (including Taiwan) the prerequisite to diplomatic relations.

The relationship with Mongolia is complicated. Until 1945, the ROC claimed jurisdiction over Mongolia (including Tannu Uriankhai, part of which is present-day Tuva), but under Soviet pressure, it recognized Mongolian independence in 1946. Shortly thereafter, it repudiated this recognition and continued to claim sovereignty over Mongolia until 1953, as the ROC alleged that the Soveiet Union breaking the promise of not assisting the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War

Since the late 1990s, relationship with Mongolia has become a controversial topic. The DPP was attempting to establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia, but this move was controversial because it was widely seen as a prelude for renouncing Republic of China's sovereignty over the mainland China thereby declaring de-jure Taiwan independence. Like its claim of Mainland China, the claim of Mongolia is not dropped, but the new de facto relations with Mongolia is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instead of the Mainland Affairs Council, effectively acknowledging Mongolia as a foreign country. Mongolia has been excluded from the "Mainland Area" as defined in the Articles 3 of the "Enforcement Rules of Statute Governing the Relations between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area", revised and announced in 2002.

On less official terms, the ROC is involved in a complex dispute for control over the Spratly Islands with the PRC, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and possibly Brunei; and over the Paracel Islands, occupied by the PRC, but claimed by Vietnam and ROC. ROC claims the Japanese-administered Diaoyu Islands (which the Japanese call "Senakaku-shoto"), as does the PRC.

On November 7, 2003, ties were established with Kiribati. However, Taipei did not demand that ties be broken with Beijing and ROC Foreign Minister Eugene Chien said that he would not reject having both sides of the Taiwan strait recognized simultaneously.[1] The PRC also broke precedent by not cutting ties until November 29 and spent the interim lobbying for Kiribati President Anote Tong to reverse his decision. The decision to hold off for weeks was possibly due to the strategic importance of the PRC's satellite tracking base on Kiribati, which had been used for Shenzhou V and thought to have been used to spy on a U.S. missile range in the Marshall Islands.

Relations and changes

List of countries with diplomatic relations with the ROC

Dates indicate establishment or duration of relations; * indicates an embassy in Taipei

Africa (4 states)


Europe (1 state)


Oceania (6 states)


Americas (12 states)
Countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC
  diplomatic relations and embassy in Taipei
  diplomatic relations
Like many embassies to the Vatican City, the Republic of China's embassy to the Holy See is actually located in Rome, outside the borders of the Vatican and in a country with which the ROC has no official diplomatic recognition.

All of the states which have official diplomatic ties with the ROC recognize it as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China, instead of just its current jurisdiction of the island groups of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and some other islands.

Saudi Arabia and South Korea ended their diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1990 and 1992 respectively, and South Africa switched recognition to the PRC in 1998. Liberia switched from the PRC to the ROC in 1989, and back again in October 2003. In March 31,2004, Dominica ended its recognition, which began in 1983, because of offers from the PRC to provide $117 million over 6 years. The Republic of Macedonia recognized the ROC in the 1990s but switched diplomatic recognition after the PRC imposed economic sanctions and used a rare veto on the UN Security Council to block peacekeeping efforts.

List of countries with no relations with either the ROC or PRC

Countries that have switched recognition from ROC to PRC after 1949

The Republic of China has publicly feared that if any one state should switch its recognition to the People's Republic of China, it would create a domino effect, encouraging other states to do so as well.[7] The Holy See of Vatican City– the only European state to recognize the ROC– made efforts in 2007 to create formal ties with the PRC.[8] High-ranking bishops in the Roman Catholic Church have implied that such a diplomatic move was possible,[9] predicated on the PRC granting more freedom of religion[10] and interfering less in the hierarchy of the Chinese church.[11] (Note: The Catholic Church, the Holy See, and the Vatican City state are interconnected and share a leader.)

Country Period of recognition of ROC
or year recognition ceased
 Argentina 1972
 Australia 1972
 Bahamas 1989–97
 Belgium 1971
 Canada 1970
 Chad 1962–72, 1997–2006[12]
 Central African Republic 1962–64, 1968–76, 1991–98
 Costa Rica 1944–2007[13]
 Dominica 1983–2004
 Federal Republic of Germany 1972
 Grenada 1989–2005
 Guinea-Bissau 1990–98
 France 1964
 Ireland 1979[14]
 Italy 1970
 Japan 1952–72
 Lesotho 1966–83, 1990–94
 Liberia 1957–77, 1989–1993, 1997-2003
 Malawi 1966–2008[15]
 Malaysia 1957-1974
 New Zealand 1972
 Niger 1963–74, 1992–96
 Nigeria 1960–71
 Pakistan 1947-1951
 Philippines 1948–75
 Republic of Macedonia 1999–2001
 Saudi Arabia 1946–90
 Senegal 1969–72, 1996–2005
 Singapore 1965-1992
 South Africa 1976–98[16]
 Spain 1973
 South Korea 1949–92
 Tonga 1972–98
 Turkey 1971 [17]
 Uruguay 1966–88
 United Kingdom 1912-1950
 United States 1912–79
 Vanuatu 2004

Relations with the United States

Republic of China-United States relations

Taiwan

United States

Current relations between the United States and the Republic of China are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. In addition Taiwan has been mentioned in the Three Communiques between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

According to the US Department of State's Background Notes,[18]

The U.S. has welcomed and encouraged the cross-Strait dialogue as a process which contributes to a reduction of tension and to an environment conducive to the eventual peaceful resolution of the outstanding differences between the two sides. The United States believes that differences between Taipei and Beijing should be resolved by the people on both sides of the Strait themselves. The U.S. has consistently stated that its abiding interest is that the process be peaceful.

This statement is an example of the careful wording that the United States has to undergo in order to avoid possibly disastrous diplomatic gaffes. A clear statement that the United States does not recognize the PRC claim to Taiwan would bring instant diplomatic retaliation from the PRC. A clear statement that the United States does recognize the PRC claim over Taiwan would risk encouraging the PRC to take military action against Taiwan, and would also be politically almost impossible, in view of the sympathy that Taiwan has in the United States. So the United States responds by making a clear statement that it prefers dialogue over tension and peace over war; about the PRC's claim to Taiwan, it makes no statement at all.

Fortunately, all of the parties in this issue are satisfied by the current situation [citation needed], and there is a general agreement to maintain the "status quo," which includes not being very clear about what the "status quo" really is. There was some worry that the policy of strategic ambiguity would cause mistaken impressions of people's intentions. Partly to deal with this situation, the policy of the Four Noes and One Without has been developed in which the ROC has pledged not to take certain actions that would be provocative toward Beijing. In a number of cases, when the ROC appeared to be moving away from this policy, Washington has asked for and received assurances that this was not the case.

Similar positions on Taiwan are taken by a majority of countries. Twenty-four states recognize the ROC as the legitimate ruler of China and reject the PRC claims to legitimacy. During the 1990s, the ROC actively encouraged such recognition through generous grants of foreign aid. In the 2000s, this strategy was abandoned because the PRC could outbid the ROC with foreign aid, and the spending of large sums of money to buy recognition became quite unpopular in Taiwan.

In the 2000s, the diplomatic strategy of the ROC appears to have shifted to encourage "democratic solidarity" with major powers such as the United States, Europe, and Japan.

In 2007, a measure was introduced into the United States Congress that would dramatically strengthen U.S. ties with the ROC.[19] The US House Of Reprensentatives passed a resolution calling for the lift of United States Government curbs on visits by high ranking or top ROC officials. The Resolution noted that "High-Level visitors from Taiwan, including the President, seek to come to the United States, their requests results in a period of complex, lengthy and humiliating negotiations." In an additional note on the resolution it said: "Lifting these restricitions will help bring a United States friend and ally out of its isolation, which will be beneficial to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region."

A bill was also introduced by US lawmakers to back the UN bid by Taiwan. The bill stated that Taiwan and its 23 million people "deserve membership in the United Nations" and that the United States should fulfill a commitment "to more actively support Taiwan's membership in appropriate international organizations." The bill was introduced on the 8th of November 2007, at the House Foreign Affairs Committee by 18 Republican legislators and one Democrat. Congressional records show that the move was led by New Jersey Republican Representative Scott Garrett. [1]

Diplomatic representation in the US

Official diplomatic relations are currently nonexistent; unofficial diplomatic relations with the government of the US are maintained through a de facto embassy named the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) with offices in Washington and 12 other US cities. TECRO is technically a "private organization," but its staff consists of career diplomats who have temporarily "retired." TECO is the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, and has office locations in major cities such as Los Angeles and others throughout the U.S. and throughout the world.

Diplomatic representation from the US

Official diplomatic relations were ended in 1979 as a prerequisite for establishing ties with the PRC. However, unofficial diplomatic relations with the government on the ROC are maintained through a de facto embassy called the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Technically, the AIT is a "private organization," but its staff consists of career diplomats from the United States Department of State who are formally "on leave" to serve in the AIT.

Relations with the People's Republic of China

The relations between the Republic of China with the People's Republic of China, which controls mainland China, has been complicated by history and politics.

Neither the government of the Republic of China nor the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) sees their relations as foreign relations. The government position that both Taiwan and the mainland are parts of the same state is not universally accepted in Taiwan. In particular, the pro-independence Pan-Green Coalition considers the ROC as "Taiwan", and considers the PRC as "China" and a foreign country. By contrast, the pro-reunification Pan-Blue Coalition supports the official position that both Taiwan and the mainland are parts of the same state, the Republic of China. Former president Lee Tung-hui, described these relations as "Special State-to-State Relations"[20]. The subsequent administrations of President Chen Shui-bian described the ROC and the PRC by saying ""...with Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country.". Current President Ma Ying-jeou has departed from these policies, calling relations with the PRC special relations between two areas within one state. That state according to the ROC is the Republic of China, and due to constitutional reasons, neither the ROC nor the PRC recognises each other as a legitimate government.[21][22][23]

The term preferred by the ROC and PRC governments is "cross-strait relations", referring to the geographical separator, the Taiwan Strait. The constitutional position of the ROC is that the territory of the ROC is divided into the "Mainland Area" and the "Free Area" (also known as "Taiwan Area"). Administratively, cross-strait relations are not conducted by the Foreign Ministry of the ROC, but by the Mainland Affairs Council, an instrumental of the Executive Yuan. The relations with Hong Kong and Macau are also conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council, although not all regulations applicable to mainland China are automatically applied to those territories.

Consistently with the policies of both governments, the ROC and the PRC governments do not directly interact. Talks are conducted by the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits of the PRC and the Straits Exchange Foundation of the ROC, formally privately constituted bodies that are controlled and directly answerable to the executive branch of their respective governments.

Until the late 1990s Hong Kong and Macau were British and Portuguese colonies respectively. They provided neutral detour points for people and goods moving from one side of the strait to the other. They, as well as Singapore, also served as venues for talks between the two sides. Among the fruits of these negotiations were the 1992 Consensus, reached in Hong Kong in 1992.

East asian countries

Relations with Mongolia

The Republic of China has long considered Mongolia part of its territory. As such, there have never been formal diplomatic relations between the two states. In 2002, a representative office was opened in Ulaanbaatar, and on 3 October 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Taiwan recognizes Mongolia as an independent country.[24] However, the ROC has not renounced its claim to Mongolian territory. In 2002, the Republic of China government excluded Mongolia from the definition of the "mainland area" for administrative purposes. In 2006, old laws regulating the formation of banners and monasteries in Outer Mongolia were repealed. However, the official borders of the Republic of China have not been changed via a vote of the National Assembly (as required by the Constitution prior to 2005) or via a referendum (as required by the Constitution after amendments made in 2005). The official status of recognition is currently ambiguous, though in practice Mongolia is treated as an ordinary foreign power.

Relations with Japan

Japan-Republic of China relations are guided by the 1972 Japan-PRC Joint Communique. Japan has maintained non-governmental, working-level relations with the Republic of China ever since.

Relations with Singapore

Singapore had maintained unofficial relations with both the ROC and the PRC until 1992. After the establishment of diplomatic ties between Singapore and the PRC on October 3, 1992, it continues to maintain close economic and military ties with the ROC as part of its attempt to position itself as a neutral party to both sides. This is, however, a diplomatically delicate situation which has flared up occasionally. A severe diplomatic row broke out between the PRC and Singapore when Lee Hsien Loong visited Taiwan a month before being sworn-in as the Prime Minister of Singapore on 12 August 2004.[25] The Singaporean defence ministry took great pains to correct an erroneous report in the Liberty Times on a joint military exercise between the Singapore and the ROC in March 2005.[26] Still, Singapore is the only foreign country to maintain military training camps in Taiwan, and continues to regularly send infantry, artillery, and armoured personnel there for training annually. There has been talk in recent years, however, of the possibility of moving some or all of these facilities to Hainan following an offer by the PRC, although this may not be taken up due to sensitivities in diplomatic relations between Singapore and its largely Muslim neighbours.[27][28]

Relations with South Korea

Relations between the Republic of China and South Korea date back to 4 January 1949, four months after the formal establishment of the South Korean government, when the Republic of China set up an embassy in Seoul's Myeongdong district. However, on 23 August 1992 the Republic of China severed diplomatic relations with South Korea in advance of the latter's announcement of formal recognition of the People's Republic of China.

Latin America and Pacific

Relations with Venezuela

In 2007 Venezuela decided not to renew visas for five members of Taiwanese commercial representation in Caracas.[29] Relations with Venezuela have worsened because of the increasing partnership between the government of Hugo Chávez and the People's Republic of China.

Relations with Oceania

The Republic of China maintains diplomatic relations with six countries in Oceania: Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. The People's Republic of China has relations with the other eight (including Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and Fiji). The Pacific is an area of intense and continuous diplomatic competition between the PRC and the ROC, with several countries (Nauru, Kiribati, Vanuatu) having switched diplomatic support from one to the other at least once. Both the PRC and the ROC provide development aid to their respective allies. In exchange, the ROC's allies support Taiwan's membership bid in the United Nations. The Republic of China is one of tiny Tuvalu and Nauru's most important economic partners.

In May 2008, Republic of China's Foreign Minister James Huang resigned, along with two other top officials, after wasting over €19 million in a failed attempt to win diplomatic recognition for the Republic of China from Papua New Guinea. The misuse of the money caused public outrage, forcing Huang's resignation.[30] Papua New Guinea's foreign minister Sam Abal subsequently confirmed that his country had no intention of recognising the Republic of China.[31]

The incident led the Republic of China's then president Ma Ying-jeou to call for what he referred to as a "cease-fire" in the competition between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China for diplomatic allies.[32]

Relations with other countries

While maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC, many countries still maintain unofficial 'trade missions' or 'representative offices' in Taipei, to deal with commercial and consular issues. As an example, France maintains a "French institute" in Taipei, whose first apparent purpose is "cultural," but which also has consular and economic sections.[33] However, owing to political sensitivities, these countries may often forward visa applications to their nearest embassy or consulate, rather than processing them locally. Similarly, the ROC maintains Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices or Taipei Representative Offices in other countries, which handle visa applications as well as relations with local authorities.

Relation with International organizations

Under PRC pressure, the ROC have been exclude or 'satelized' from many International organizations, but often keep links with them, with close cooperation, such in the WHO: ROC is not a member, but share datas and cooperate with the WHO. In other cases, the ROC may have a full participation granted, the PRC allowing this participation until ROC use specific “non-rebel” names, such as 'Chinese Taipei', by example for the Olympic games. These names provide information about the RPC/ROC balance of power in these organizations.

There is a list of such international organization and the ROC represention's names:

Territorial disputes

Territorial disputes of the Republic of China.

The Republic of China claims to be the sole legitimate government of China. Accordingly, the Republic of China claims all territories currently administered by the People's Republic of China and Mongolia. This includes Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Outer Mongolia. As part of the same claim, the Republic of China also claims some surrounding areas which it says were historically part of Chinese territory, including Arunachal Pradesh, eastern part of Bhutan, Heixiazi Island (Russian-administered part), northern part of Burma, part of Pamir Mountains, Sixty-Four Villages East of the Heilongjiang River and Tannu Uriankhai. However, the ROC government does not currently actively pursue these claims.

The Republic of China also claims islands in the South China Sea on the same basis as its claim to historical Chinese territory. Unlike its claims on the Asian mainland, however, the ROC government actively pursues and defends some of its claims to these islands. These include all of the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal. These islands are administered by a number of governments around the South China Sea. The ROC also claims the Diaoyutai Islands, currently administered by Japan.

The People's Republic of China, in turn, asserts itself as the sole legitimate government of China, and claims all territories administered by the Republic of China as part of that territory.

Other minor issues

Sporting events

The Republic of China also has to compete at the Olympic Games and other international sporting events under the politically "neutral" name "Chinese Taipei," with a different flag and anthem, because of diplomatic pressure from the People's Republic of China.

The dispute over the ROC's status has also affected the island's air links with the outside world, particularly Europe, North America and Australia. For many years, Mandarin Airlines, a subsidiary of the ROC's national airline, China Airlines (CAL) served many international destinations that CAL did not, owing to political sensitivities. However, in 1995 CAL dropped the ROC national colours from its livery, and now flies to international destinations under its own name.

Many countries' national airlines similarly set up special subsidiaries in order to operate services to Taipei, with a different name, and livery omitting national symbols. For example, British Airways' now defunct subsidiary, British Asia Airways operated flights to London, KLM's subsidiary KLM Asia operated flights to Amsterdam, and Swissair's subsidiary Swissair Asia operated flights to Zurich, while other countries' flag carriers, such as Germany's Lufthansa, operated flights to Taipei using an existing subsidiary (in Lufthansa's case, Condor). Qantas had a subsidiary called Australia Asia Airlines, which flew between Sydney and Taipei, but now operates flights to the island as a code share with EVA Air.

Japan Air Lines established a subsidiary called Japan Asia Airways in order to operate flights to Tokyo. Before the completion of the second runway at New Tokyo International Airport (now Narita International Airport) near Tokyo, Japan, airlines from Taiwan were required to fly to Tokyo International Airport (commonly known as Haneda Airport) in Ota, Tokyo in order not to offend the airlines from the People's Republic of China that flew to Narita.

As of July 2008, charter flights between mainland China and Taiwan which were traditionally only allowed on special holidays such as the Chinese New Year, were expanded greatly. Under current plans, the opening of these flights may eventually reach a capacity of 3,000 mainland Chinese tourists per day entering Taiwan.

Telecommunications

International dialling codes are assigned by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to its member states and their dependencies. However, as the ROC was not an ITU member state, it had to be allocated the code 886 unofficially, with the ITU listing the code as 'reserved'. Originally, until the late 1970s, the ROC used the code 86, but the code was re-assigned to the People's Republic of China in conformity with ITU's official membership, forcing the ROC to utilize another code for countries that wished to maintain direct dial connections.

The PRC has reserved part of its numbering plan for calls to Taiwan, using the prefix 06, but despite this, calls from the PRC to Taiwan are still currently made by using the international dialling code 00886.

Notes

  1. ^ MOFA says Taiwan will not reject ally's simultaneous recognition, 20 November 2003
  2. ^ Foreign Ministry of the PRC: Bilateral relations with Bhutan
  3. ^ 中華民國外交部 - 國家與地區
  4. ^ 中華民國外交部 - 國家與地區
  5. ^ 中華民國外交部 - 國家與地區
  6. ^ 中華民國外交部 - 國家與地區
  7. ^ "Taiwan alarm at Costa Rica move". BBC News Online. 2007-06-07. Retrieved 2007-06-07.
  8. ^ "Pope offers olive branch to China". BBC News Online. 2007-01-20. Retrieved 2007-06-07.
  9. ^ "HK bishop hints at Vatican switch". BBC News Online. 2005-04-05. Retrieved 2007-06-07.
  10. ^ "China welcomes Vatican initiative". BBC News Online. 2005-04-05. Retrieved 2007-06-07.
  11. ^ "China ordains new Catholic bishop". BBC News Online. 2006-11-30. Retrieved 2007-06-07.
  12. ^ "Chad recognizes the PRC". Associated Press. Yahoo.com. 2006-08-06. Retrieved 2006-08-06.
  13. ^ "Costa Rica forges new China ties". BBC News Online. 2007-06-06. Retrieved 2007-06-06.
  14. ^ Centre for Asian Studies, University Collete Dublin, China the Emerging Power: Prospects for Sino-Irish Relations, By Conor O'Clery, Asia Correspondent, The Irish Times - Ireland’s official relationship with the People’s Republic of China began on June 22nd 1979. The Irish government press release said: "Ireland recognises the Government of the people’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China...."
  15. ^ BBC News - Malawi severs links with Taiwan as of December 28, 2007.
  16. ^ "Taiwan loses a major ally". BBC News Online. 1997-12-30. Retrieved 2007-06-07.
  17. ^ Turkey´s Political Relations with China, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
  18. ^ Taiwan (10/06, US State Department
  19. ^ http://www.unpo.org/article.php?id=6316
  20. ^ Taiwan won't broach state-to-state concept again "The press reports quoted Taiwan's incoming top China policy-maker Tsai Ing-wen as saying Thursday that the special state-to-state label was an adequate description of Taiwan's current ties with China." "'The two-states theory is a good thing. It is a way to describe the current (cross-strait) situation,'" "Tsai said on local television. 'We can refrain from using it as a description, although we cannot deny the existence of the situation described by it,' Tsai said on local television."
  21. ^ "Ma refers to China as ROC territory in magazine interview". Taipei Times. 2008-10-08.
  22. ^ "馬總統:兩岸關係是現實關係 (President Ma: Cross-strait relations are relations based on current reality)" (in Traditional Chinese). Central News Agency of the Republic of China. 2008-10-08.
  23. ^ "馬:大陸是中華民國領土 (Ma: the mainland is the territory of the Republic of China)" (in Traditional Chinese). Liberty Times. 2008-10-08.
  24. ^ "Mongolian office to ride into Taipei by end of the year". Taipei Times. 2002-10-11. Retrieved 2008-02-05. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  25. ^ China warns Singapore officials against future visits to Taiwan
  26. ^ Singapore denies reports of joint military exercise with Taiwan
  27. ^ A David-and-Goliath tussle: FEER
  28. ^ Taiwan PROFILE
  29. ^ International Herald Tribune Report: Taiwanese diplomats may have to leave Venezuela (18 July 2007). Accessed 19 December 2007
  30. ^ "Taiwan foreign minister resigns over diplomatic blunder", Jonathan Adams, International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2008
  31. ^ "PNG dismisses Taiwan's diplomatic moves", ABC Radio Australia, May 7, 2008
  32. ^ "Taiwan's next leader urges truce in cash diplomacy battle", AFP, May 6, 2008
  33. ^ La France à Taiwan
  34. ^ Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana SICA

See also

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