Talk:Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda link allegations

The title of this article, "Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda", has been chosen after lots of discussion and numerous votes, with unclear consensus. Ongoing discussion is always welcome.

New Talk Page

The old talk page topics can still be reached by the links under Archive 4. Please continue live discussions there, but start new discussions here. Derex 22:09, 25 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Silverback, you simply cut and paste back over the entire old talk page. That completely screws up the edit history. If you have a serious problem with how I've tried to archive this page, go request an admin to move the old page back. Is it really so hard to click on a link? What you have done is the worst possible solution. I am undoing, in the hopes of keeping some semblance of a coherent history intact. Derex 19:45, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Here is perhaps a simple way to resolve some of the dispute in this page (apologies if this has been discussed before). We agree that 'if it is legitimate to say that Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda had ties', it certainly is equally legitimate to say that 'A number of US governments have had ties with al-Qaeda'. Now we will be forced precisely define what 'ties' means and then there might be some resolution.

Csloats allegation of Silverback's destructive editing

Again, SB, I implore you to knock it off. I have asked on your user page as well, and encourage others who see Silverback's conduct as destructive to do so as well; if talking to him does not work perhaps there are grounds here for an RfC to get outside voices to at least look at what is going on here. Just to be clear on the issues I am laying them out below (though they have been discussed ad nauseum in the archived page):

Able Danger. this is not relevant to this page. There are no newspaper articles or other available sources of information that tie Able Danger together with the purported Saddam/AQ connection. SB says that the Able Danger stuff impacts the credibility of the 911 Commission, but (1) that commission is only one of many sources on this page; (2) nobody has tied these things together in the mainstream media, and for SB to tie them together constitutes original research. The sentence SB writes - "Any 9/11 Commission conclusions may not be reliable because it rejected information that did not agree with its preconceived conclusions." - is sheer speculation and there is no evidence to support it that specifically relates to this issue.
CIA conclusions: SB cites a line from the Senate report on the CIA's investigation as if it were the "conclusion" of the CIA. The CIA conclusion is clear that there was no Saddam/AQ cooperation. The passage cited speculates that Saddam "might" employ terrorists like AQ "if sufficiently desperate". This is hardly a "conclusion." The conclusion was that they did not do so, and the Senate concluded that the CIA's conclusions were justified.
Minor wording changes to the following paragraph:

"Much of the evidence of alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaeda is based on speculation about meetings that may have taken place between Iraqi officials and al-Qaeda members. What took place at those meetings is unclear, but often the mere act of meeting has been taken as evidence of substantial collaboration. As terrorism analyst Evan Kohlman points out,"

SB wants to change the above to: "Some of the evidence of alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaeda is based on inferences about meetings that may have taken place between Iraqi officials and al-Qaeda members. What took place at those meetings is unclear, but the act of meeting has been taken as evidence of substantial collaboration. Terrorism analyst Evan Kohlman states that"

But it is clear that "Much" is more accurate; "Most" would be even more accurate; that "speculation" is far more accurate than "inferences" (hell, many of the supposed meetings most likely did not occur at all!). Most problematically, SB changes "often the mere act of meeting has been taken as evidence of substantial collaboration" to "the act of meeting has been taken as evidence of substantial collaboration", completely reversing the meaning of the sentence. The point that is backed up by the Kohlman quote that follows is that having meetings alone does not mean cooperation. SB is trying to distort things here.

Again, all these issues have been clearly indicated in the discussion (check the archive) and SB has refused to engage the arguments yet insists on repeating his position over and over and reverting the page without ever actually responding to the arguments.--csloat 09:42, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Quoting your edit summary "you have not replied to the arguments". As an exercise you should search on "credib" above on the talk page, and in the edit summaries. Your responses have been as unpersuasive as your characterizations of my edits have been deliberately misleading. The 9/11 commisions credibility is relevant, if it isn't then lets not use them as a source. "speculation" characterizes in a POV manner, you are violating NPOV. "mere" was POV dismissive of the inference, once again violating NPOV. If the Kolman quote backs this up, it should be the source of the POV characterizations and dismissive language, not you.

I see that when reason fails you, you call to the herd. You would be better served by putting more thought into your posts, and listening to a more objective perspective on your POV. You have been unwilling to accept any compromises, as if you are the only one who could possibly be right. --Silverback 18:05, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I listed the arguments that you have not answered above for convenience, but it seems you found it inconvenient to respond to them, again. Yet you insist on more destructive reversions. I will revert as per the arguments above.--csloat 18:23, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Please try to be more civil. Saying "cut it out" is not much different from "shut up". Please make informative edit summaries and comments instead.--Silverback 18:46, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

My informative comments are above which you ignored. I'm asking you to "cut it out" because we have a conduct problem, not just a disagreement. So, again, please, cut it out.--csloat 18:50, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Now you have violated the 3RR too - you have done your fourth rv today. Do not whine that you made minor changes; you clearly violate the spirit of the 3RR. If you want to show good faith, revert back, and try to actually address the issues in talk. You have so far refused to do so. --csloat 19:21, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I never claimed to have made minor changes. Do you have a valid wiki argument for why the able danger cite does not fit where I put it? I worked very hard to find a place to properly address the 9/11 commission credibillity issue. Shouldn't you be courteous enough to at least acknowledge the addressing of the issues that you claim I haven't done. Please search on "mere" and "speculation" above. I know that I did not violate the 3RR in spirit because I know my spirit, and I wouldn't have made that last edit, if I thought it was a violation in fact or spirit. In fact, I still don't think it was a violation, I have a clear conscience.--Silverback 19:48, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Oh come on Silverback. We went over all this stuff about rehashing the 9/11 Commission's credibility on this page a while ago. It just isn't the place for it. This article references the CIA too, are we going to hash out their credibility on this page too? 69.121.133.154 19:58, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The proper place to discuss the 9/11 Commission is the page on the 9/11 Commission. The propoer place to discuss Able Danger is, oddly enough, called Able Danger.--csloat 20:42, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Are you implying that it is improper to discuss the 9/11 commission and Able Danger in this article?--Silverback 21:59, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Are you really this dense? I'm not implying it; I am stating it, for the reasons outlined above and ignored by you. This article is about Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Information pertinent to that topic belongs here. Information about Able Danger belongs on this page rather than here. Stop pretending you don't understand this.-csloat 22:19, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

It was a trick question. The 9/11 commission is discussed in this article. It's sole reason for existance was this investigation, so credibility and completeness issues are relevant to the reliability of its conclusions. They seem to have drawn conclusions early and then started rejecting evidence that didn't fit. Your fear of the Able Danger text would seem to be a confirmation of its relevance, otherwise it wouldn't be a big deal, there are lots of articles where some seemingly irrelevant material has slipped in. But this Able Danger is relevant isn't it? All the more so, because the 9/11 commission's credibility is relied upon so heavily. You want to cite not just evidence presented to the commission, but the commission's conclusions, which of course, rely up its judgement, thoroughness and objectivity. They showed lack of thoroughness by not persuing the Able Danger information, they showed lack of objectivity by committing to a timeline before all the evidence was in, and they showed lack of judgement by not reconsidering when contrary evidence came in. If we get rid of the 9/11 commissions conclusions in this article, then the Able Danger information would not be relevant at this time.--Silverback 23:01, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The 911 Commission was not formed to investigate Saddam's connection to AQ - I did not realize you were that misinformed. It was formed to investigate 9/11 (hence the name "9/11 Commission" as it is commonly called). Able Danger has found nothing relevant to the Saddam/AQ connection, and until it does, it is not relevant here. Your speculation about the 911 Commission's reasoning process is totally irrelevant to this page. I have no "fear" of the Able danger material; I just don't want it on a page where it is not relevant. The supposed lack of thoroughness of the Commission is not relevant here unless you can show that Able Danger revealed they were not thorough on this issue. You have not done so. Your speculation that it will have an impact on this issue is original research and does not belong here.--csloat 01:17, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

As the many cites in this article indicate, Saddam's connection to AQ was within its pervue, and its conclusions (not just evidence and testimony presented to it) are actually FEATURED in this article, including the introduction, I thought you knew that, I didn't realize you were misinformed. Note, that my speculation was not part of my postings to the article. If you read the supporting material, you will see that it is a summary of some of Weldon's concerns. I place that material where its relevance is apparent.--Silverback 18:24, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Your claim -- that Able Danger has any implications for the Commission's handling of the Saddam-AQ connection -- is original research, pure and simple. How much more clearly can I state this?--csloat 20:10, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Selective gathering of evidence based on prematurely reaching conclusions definitely is relevant to the Commisions handling. I totally understand your assertion. If you think you are correct, you don't need to make it more clearly, just more persuasively. Your idea of persuasion appears to be assert and revert.--Silverback 20:15, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Talk about the pot and the kettle. If you are not persuaded, then you ought to be able to think of a counter-argument. Unfortunately you don't seem to be able to, so you keep repeating yourself. The point is that it is not relevant to this article, and if it were, someone in the real world outside wikipedia would have noticed. It is not wikipedia's place to make original claims such as this.--csloat 21:02, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The "Questions about the plausibility of the link" section should be redistributed

Too much emphasis is given to bin Laden statements that never amounted to any action against Saddam. This section should be removed, and those statements and all evidence of any overtly hostile acts toward Saddam should just be put into the timeline like other evidence. The 9/11 conpiracy theory stuff should be demphasized, since it adds little to the key question of the article, which is whether Saddam should have been trusted not to collaborate with al Qaeda in the future in an attack on the US or UK. Of course, Saddams character and history would lead one to conclude he shouldn't be trusted at all, too bad for Saddam, that character actually matters. If bin Laden's statements did not result in acts, then a whole section on them definitely overemphasizes them.--Silverback 06:19, 25 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The statements by OBL and other AQ members are quite relevant since they speak to the plausibility of conspiring. You keep saying nonsense like "the 9/11 conspiracy should be deemphasized" but you never spell out what you mean specifically. Obviously the possibility of a connection between Saddam and 911 was a big issue in the debate about this "connection", and it was cited by many in the leadup to war. One of the biggest claims made by the conspiracy theorists is that Atta met al-Ani in Prague in April 2001. The "key question" of the article is not "whether Saddam should have been trusted not to collaborate with AQ" which is a silly question anyway. The key question is whether Saddam did collaborate with AQ, and that question is addressed adequately by this article. Whether Saddam can be trusted is a different question entirely, and I don't think anyone involved in editing this page believes that he could be. Finally, Silverback, please stop tinkering with this page - you are constantly trying to restate the case in ways that fabricate the appearance of cooperation. If you have legitimate claims to add, great, but stop fine-tuning the language to favor your POV. For example, when the CIA says Saddam "might" work with terrorists in the future, they are speculating, not "concluding." I am trying to assume good faith here but it is very difficult when every change you make is driven by this agenda, and truth seems to be a secondary concern for you at best.--csloat 20:36, 25 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Upon rereading the article, I found that I am still concerned about this section. A lot of it is duplicated in the timeline, and it appears to overemphasize some statements by Osama that must not have been much more than bluster, because he never followed up on them. Yes these statements appear to be whole support there is for any implausibility of future collaboration over a decade later.--Silverback 23:41, 26 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

What are you talking about? This article is not about Osama bin Laden threats against Saddam. That stuff is included in that section because bin Laden's documented opposition to Saddam makes a link to Saddam implausible. This is not about whether he "followed up on" statements. I am not even sure what statements you are referring to -- we're not investigating threats made against Saddam. But, again, the fact is that AQ's ideological opposition to Saddam makes cooperation highly unlikely. This is independent of any "threats" made. --csloat 01:29, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

It would make them unlikely, if it had prevented the contacts and sanctuary, since it didn't, their value is reduced to mere historical curiosities, unworthy of duplicative references and a nearly dedicated section. The implausibiity section is argumentative and duplicative and its information which is not already present in the timeline should be placed there or elsewhere in the article.--Silverback 18:05, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The "contacts" and "sanctuary" you cite are just as much "historical curiosities" as the hostility between AQ and Saddam. Certainly the latter was deemed significant by every government agency and intelligence analyst that seems to have looked at this question. And the hostility has been expressed by OBL at least as recently as 2003, and we find it expressed as early as 1988, so this is a consistent theme.

I am not the one who created the "Implausibility" section but I do think it is reasonable, since the timeline is so filled with speculation of various types that it is important to underline the main conclusions that have been drawn -- such a link is implausible at best. I would be amenable to rewriting or even redistributing this section if its main points are made clear in the redistribution, but I can tell you for sure I am likely to resist any rewriting by Silverback, who has made clear that his intention is to steamroll everyone else with massively POV edits propagandizing for (in his words) a "wonderful coalition bringing democracy to its people."--csloat 20:17, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I think there should be a good faith summary of the case for those who think collaboration would never have occurred in the future, but it doesn't need to be made three times, and bin Laden's expressions are not conclusive. If Saddam did anything to assist with 9/11, we will probably never have conclusive evidence of it. The the possibility that he might have had some knowledge or somehow provided some assistance does not need to be the focus of this article. At the same time, I think few of us doubt that he would have loved to have contributed to that and other successful attacks on the US if he could escape the concequences, and bin Laden despite his antipathy, does not appear to be so morally pure that he would refuse to attack the US if such attack were tainted with Saddam's assistance.--Silverback 20:33, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Interesting speculations. Maybe you could start a newsletter. In any case as I said I would not be opposed to redistributing the section but I do not trust you to do it, so I would likely be resist your changes, if they are as POV as your previous contributions to this page. But I do invite others to look at this question and would help reorganize that section if we can do so without distorting the information.--csloat 21:06, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Anon comment

Anonymous User:68.84.232.72 wrote:

What is written here about the passage preceding the list discovered by Judge Gilbert Merritt is not true. The passage that preceded the list said,"We publish this list of great men for the sons of our great people to see." (Refer to this website http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:Fs7_LzIy43wJ:www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/889jldct.asp+Stephen+Hayes+Gilbert+Merritt&hl=en) The passage you cite was AFTER the list and may have even referred to a different list.

Might be a legitimate point; I don't know. But this is the place for it, not the article. Mr. Billion 01:35, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

There is no evidence or even speculation that the comment referred to a different list. The Hayes article from the Weekly standard even calls the newspaper article "interesting but inconclusive." The passage was not after the list but on top of the list, after the other part that is quoted. The whole thing is bizarre, but there is no evidence that it has any significance whatsoever. As the DIA guy said, it's just a list; there are lots of lists.

One big problem on all of the claims on this page is that real concrete evidence of cooperation -- e.g. a money trail -- has never materialized. Conspiracy theorists make a big deal out of small things like a newspaper article that seems to refer obliquely to something, but cannot find the real evidence that would substantiate actual cooperation (e.g. a money trail or evidence that orders were given by Saddam to do something, or whatever). There is much more evidence of Saudi cooperation with AQ than there is of Iraqi, yet there is no Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda article.--csloat 03:53, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, and Saudi Arabia also supported payments to suicide bomber families and funded radical mosques with the Wahabi. I suspect there isn't a page, because Saudi Arabia didn't have UN sanctions and WMD programs and a history of using WMD and wasn't invaded by a wonderful coalition bringing democracy to its people.--Silverback 18:57, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Well you've certainly made my point for me. There is way more evidence of Saudi support of AQ terrorism than there is of Iraqi support. The problem is that this page makes it seem like there is more information about Iraqi support. Hell, there is more evidence of Pakistani, Kuwaiti, Qatari support for al-Qaeda. There is even more evidence of John Ashcroft supporting al Qaeda (directly through contributions to MEK) than there is of Saddam doing so!--csloat 20:21, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Sure, but which government would be more likely to give al Qaeda WMD at some point in the future? Only Pakistan and Iraq had credible capability. Mussarif quickly saw how serious the US was and where his own interests lay, should the US have attacked Pakistan anyway? Saddam will still under UN sanctions, tying down coalition forces enforcing the no fly zone. The no fly zones were themselves already acts of war, and he didn't allow inspectors back in until there was a buildup of forces. Saddam certainly managed the situation poorly, completely missing the best options available to him. He must have really loved oppressing.--Silverback 20:45, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

What are you talking about? This is not the WMD article and that speculation has also turned out to be false. Also, we know that the biggest worry in terms of distributing WMD to terrorists was not a state but an individual, the Pakistani AQKhan. The fact that Saddam was a bad guy has nothing to do with this article. The question here is whether Saddam worked with Al Qaeda, and we know now the answer is no.-csloat 21:08, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The "speculation" as you call it, was confirmed, Iraq had every intention of starting up the WMD programs after sanctions were lifted.--Silverback 23:05, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

It's amazing what lengths you will go to in order to defend a war that you claim is being fought based on mind-reading -- both here with WMD and elsewhere on this page with your claim that Saddam "might" get involve with terrorists if he gets desperate some day (presumably, a US invasion and occupation of his country while he rots in jail was not sufficient to make him "desperate"?) Anyway, all of that is nice but totally irrelevant to this page. Wake me up when you have something relevant.-csloat 00:36, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

What you call mind reading, I call risk assessment, and the CIA evidently thought there was a risk. I defend the war only to point out the hypocrisy of the non-pacifists who oppose, because it is one of the most defensible and justifiable wars in history. I can respect the pacifist position. Frankly, we are dealing with rather peripheral justifications for the war here, freeing the conscripts from Saddam's oppression would be reason enough.--Silverback 03:52, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I have to agree with Silverback, this is probably one of the most legal cases for war I have ever seen. The spin on this fable of no connection with Saddam and Al Queda is amazing. - Anon

That's nice. It's also irrelevant to this page. As for the "spin on the fable", if you have relevant evidence to add to this discussion, I'm all ears.--csloat 22:29, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The Administration is getting creamed for nothing

I find it so odd that for every paragraph that indicates a link to Al Queda in the 90's is contradicted by a retraction from the same person in 2002 and up. This is ridiculous. What other information did the Bush Administration have to go on then, if the the previous one kept denying the claims they made in the first place? I am going to restructure alot of this page and show information that was supported by the Clinton Administration only. I am going to show stuff that was not contradicted, because I am sick of the spin on this page. Its obvious that there are plenty in here that would want to deny just one Al-Queda link to Saddam because a GOP Texan Prez said so, but no one was saying otherwise when Clinton and team were making the same claims. Also, the administration never said that there was a direct operational relationship but that there were ties and if suffiecently desperate he could contact those ties.- Anon

I would resist rewriting this page in ways that suggest such massive POV. I think it is fine to include info that people in the Clinton administration said there was a link -- the difference is, Clinton did not go to war and get 2,000 American soldiers killed over this idea that there was a link. So it is obvious why people bash Bush more than Clinton about this. The fact is, our intelligence was not ideal prior to 9/11, and we (I mean America, not any particular administration) made a lot of assumptions that were incorrect. The Clinton and Bush Administrations both had every reason to doubt Saddam's intentions and to question whether he would work with al-Qaeda. But when they investigated this -- some in the 1990s but much more after 9/11 -- they found that they had been wrong. The problem is that many people who were not involved in looking at the intelligence directly continued to believe that the connection existed, so they got ahold of the raw intel and re-interpreted it to make their case. But that did not change the fact that they were basing their reinterpretation on intel that had been mostly deemed unreliable or inconclusive. This is not a democrat or republican thing; the Clinton advisors were wrong about this too. The difference is they were willing to change their conclusions by 2001 or so when confronted with evidence and information that cast doubt on their previous conclusions, whereas the small group of neocons who promote this theory instead chose to stick to their conclusions and manipulate their data to support them, while ignoring information that contradicted their theory of conspiracy.--csloat 20:43, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

It is due for a rewrite, just look at the redundancies among the "Questions about the plausibility of the link", "background" and "timeline" sections.--Silverback 19:24, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The crazy part lies in the fact that while there are claims from people that reject the operational relationship, there are ones that dont even care about the cooperational relationship. People in here simply dont care if Saddam's men were trying to contact Al-Queda operatives, but more so that Bin Laden rejected the offers or that no money or weapons were passed on! Dont they realize that Iraq was not supposed to contact any international gangsters? The senate report concluded that there were numerous contacts between the two groups. What other nations in an illegitimate stance with the UN do you know that have the right to even try to contact international terrorists? Saddam sponsored dozens of other terrorist fronts, even funneling money from the Oil for Food program to Palestinian suicide bombers. So the Senate Report was right in concluding that if desperate Saddam might employ terrorists including Al Queda. Also has anyone answered just why the Bush team would fabricate evidence that was given by the previous administration? Was everything that was given by the Clinton CIA just a complete joke? I mean it seems like people are working night and day to clear out the intellegence gathered in the 90's. What about all the Newspaper reports, CNN, NY Times, LA Times, Agence-France, AP articles that kept clamoring about a possible Al-Queda/Saddam alliance back in the 90's! I mean the news is making it seem as if the Bush team were the first to put Al Queda and Saddam in one sentence. - Anon

The question is not whether Iraq was "supposed to" contact these terrorists -- the fact is that all governments establish such contacts regularly; that is what is established in the Richard Clarke quote early on in the article. It isn't that people don't care if Saddam tried to contact AQ; such facts are noted here when they occur. But it is more accurate to point out what the result of such contacts were when they occurred. This is not about having "the right" to contact terrorists; that such contacts happen regularly is a matter of realpolitik. This article is not about whether the UN banned Iraq from contacting terrorists; it is about whether there was cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda. It does not seem as if there was any such cooperation. This page is also not about Saddam's contacts with other terrorist groups. This is also not about speculation about what Saddam might do if he were desperate (speculation, by the way, that we know to be false, since Saddam was certainly desperate before being caught at the end of 2003). It is about possible collaboration between Saddam and al-Qaeda. Your last comments about Bush fabricating evidence are nonsense; nobody is making that claim. I do not claim that Bush or the OSP "fabricated" anything; the evidence shows that they misinterpreted evidence - whether intentionally or not is a different question, not relevant here. There were some fabrications by members of the INC (who we now are aware were working for Iran); those are noted in the article when we know about them. As far as news reports from the 1990s -- great; there are some of these cited in the article; the fact is, however, that people have now had an opportunity to investigate these things much further than we did ten years ago, and have come to different conclusions. Thus newspapers no longer speak of a "pact" or "alliance" as another wikipedia editor is so fond of quoting in these discussions. You say "the news is making it seem as if the Bush team were the first to put Al Queda and Saddam in one sentence" -- that may be true, but it is not relevant here. We know that officials from the Clinton administration thought there was a connection here too; we also know now that they were wrong.--csloat 20:43, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Keep fighting Silverback. Some of the timeline paragraphs keep starting off well but then end with one sentence that says that this or that has failed to be confirmed. As if it has to be emprically solved in a test tube. Then they make it seem as we have to take the terrorist's word for it when they deny the charge! Most of the evidence was around for ages without being disputed until GWB came along and now all of a sudden its unchecked, needs more sources, the terrorist denied the claim so we have to take HIS word for it. I mean the anti-war crowd should change its name from No Blood for Oil to No Quarell with Saddam. - Anon

If you have specific complaints about specific entries, those can be discussed, otherwise you are just ranting and raving. Please do not try to paint me as any kind of defender of Saddam. I can guarantee you I have opposed Saddam ever since I first learned about him, during the 1980s, when the US government supported both Saddam and al-Qaeda (who at the time were Islamic "freedom fighters" that Reagan celebrated). This is not about supporting or opposing a miserable tyrant. This is about whether there was any evidence that said tyrant was working with a specific terrorist group.--csloat 20:43, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

No, it is not about whether "said tyrant was working with a specific terrorist group". It is about something far more amorphous that we will never know, it is about whether he would possibly have worked with them in the future, and whether it should be risked. It was a judgement call. Certainly, evidence that he was already working with them would be good evidence that he would in the future, although he probably could have overcome even that if he demonstrated a clear change of heart. The best evidence that he would work with them in the future is his own character (or rather, lack of it). His past actions did little to dispell the notion, and instead tended to confirm it.--Silverback 20:52, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

This article is not about "something far more amorphous that we will never know"; it is called Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, not Amorphous Speculation about what Saddam might do if he gets really mad. I think if we took a vote most people would prefer that it remain about Saddam's ties to al-Qaeda.--csloat 21:11, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I am not here to quarell over whether you personally disprove of Saddam or not. I am here to say that this page is so bias that its not even funny. Most of the hard concrete stuff on Saddam and Al Queda was after Operation Desert Fox and Saddam's calling for Bin Laden to safe haven in Iraq. The point is that a tyrant under UN sanctions and resolutions had ties to Bin Laden. I dont care if Laden rejected him or what not, Saddam was consorting with terrorists. If Al Queda rejected him than oh well, there were other terrorists under his belt, like Abu Nidal. What I am trying to get at is that I dont do not understand what kind of relationship you are looking for? During the bombing of the Al Shifa chemical plant, the Clinton administration's rational was that it was a chemical weapons factory with ties to Al Queda and that it was also sponsored by Saddam's channeling of Oil For Food money. Why must there be speculation on the accuracy of evidence substantiated in the 90's twice over simply because its rehashed by the Bushies? I mean to overtly counter thier claims is to say that Clinton intellegence was so horrible and that no intellegence exists to validate anything. Its all up in the air. That would also mean that all the news agencies were mislead during the 98-99 scandal of a possible Bin Laden/Saddam alliance. So either Clinton is lying or had false intellegence or the Bush's are lying with Clintons intel. or what? - Anon

There was no cooperation between Saddam and AQ - your concern that they had meetings is all very nice, but none of that is denied here. What is biased about pointing out that meetings that took place led to nothing? The increased attention to this question during the Bush administration took place for two reasons -- (1) 9/11 obviously spurred people to investigate who OBL was connected to, and (2) Bush's preventive war against Iraq was justified partially on the basis that there was substantial cooperation between Iraq and AQ. Had Clinton launched the war, or been pres when 9/11 happened, his admin would have been scrutinized as well. This just has nothing to do with Bush or Clinton. It also has nothing to do with anyone lying. The point is that there wasn't that much intel about AQ connections in 1998. By 2003 we had much better intel. Why must you focus on trying to figure out whether to blame Bush or Clinton -- that is not the point of this article, nor should it be.--csloat 22:43, 27 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Would you mind then if I debunk your claim with evidence from just the Clinton administration? - Anon

As far as I'm concerned, do what you like, but if you want to pull out quotes from 1998 to "prove" something that has been refuted in 2002, don't expect to have "debunked" anything. The fact is that Clinton officials changed their minds by 2002 as a result of looking at additional evidence.-csloat 18:36, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

How odd to change thier minds so fast in '02 after "reviewing the evidence when documents found in Iraq after the invasion prove thier own claims they are now refuting? - Anon

Nothing odd about it at all. They reviewed the evidence much more carefully after 9/11 with good reason. And the evidence now suggests the opposite of what they thought originally. We saw this earlier than 9/11 with the red team NSA study in 1998 (I think that's the date - it should be in the timeline). Anyway this article is not about your anonymous speculation that some people in the Clinton Administration made something up for bizarre unarticulated political reasons. It is about Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, so that is what we should be focusing on. I don't understand why you are still obsessing about the 2004 election, or about Clinton v. Bush - it seems a little pointless.--csloat 20:52, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Wrong. Clarke, Berger, and Cohen simply contradict themselves every step of the way. They werent going over thier last intell with good reason. Most of the stuff coming out of Iraq is proving them right in the first place. And stop trying to be sarcastic by saying that the article isnt this or that. This is all relevant. You keep thinking that you could just toss whatever you want aside because it doesnt fit your paradigm. This is a discussion board. - Anon

I should've known better than to click on a link to Common Dreams. Anyways, the article says that there were proven contacts between Al Queda and Iraq but that these amounted to no operational relationship. the same thing the 9/11 Commission is spilling out. But that still explains contacts, and talks on weapons. And plus theres the issue with which former PM Allawi unreleased to the public that he was in Iraq in 99. If Saddam was directly involved with Al Queda, he was certainly involved with Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Abu Sayeef, two groups with ties to Al Queda.- Anon

As I said above, if you have relevant evidence to add to this discussion, I'm all ears. As far as I can tell based on your comments here, you are just talking out of your *ss. Most of your statements don't even make sense - Allawi unreleased? Let us know if you have some research to share that isn't already covered.

Also this is not a "discussion board"; it is an encyclopedia. This discussion is a part of the entry on Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. At another time and place I might be interested in debating our different opinions about the Iraq war, but here and now I am interested in discussion whose goal is to improve this article. The bottom line is that this article should be an acceptable encyclopedia entry to readers whether or not they voted for Bush; whether or not they support the Iraq war. I personally think many of your claims about the war are totally ignorant, but I am not going to engage them here because it is a waste of my time. I am not going to convince you that you're wrong, nor will you convince me. So we need to agree to stick to the facts in this article as much as possible. The facts have shown that the Saddam-al Qaeda "link" did not amount to much of anything. And we don't even need to agree about that -- we just need to report the facts that that is what every intel agency and investigative body that has looked into it has concluded. --csloat 22:33, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I'm holding you to your words Csloat. Because I am about to begin my changes. Feel free to correct them if you must, but I am trying to get as much out of you as I can. - Anon

This shouldn't be about "trying to get as much out of me" as you can. If you choose to make changes, please have truth and improving the page as your goal. Based on your comments it is clear to me that your goal is to debate the 2004 election -- that really is not the purpose of this page. So yes, I will correct whatever changes you make, especially if they are about Democrats and Republicans rather than about Saddam and al Qaeda.-csloat 20:11, 29 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Also, why not sign in and take credit for your work rather than continuing to post anonymously? You've been here long enough to get a userid.--csloat 20:12, 29 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

harboring Yasin

I'm not going to start an edit war over what Silverback called "argumentative commentary," but I wanted to respond to his edit summary -- the fact that Iraq offered up Yasin indicates that they were not "harboring" him. The term implies an offer of protection -- ironically, it was the Clinton administration, not Saddam, who refused the deal.csloat 00:33, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Life is cheap to Saddam, just because he offerred Yasin for something he wanted, doesn't mean he wasn't harboring him. Do you ever admit you were wrong? It was just a week ago that you wrote: "First, there is no reason to believe Saddam knew Yasin's location". Letting a wanted al-Qaeda terrorist stay in Iraq, is harboring him. Evidently he wasn't concerned this al-Qaeda member was a threat despite all bin Laden's bluster.--Silverback 03:29, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I admit I was wrong a week ago about Saddam not knowing where Yasin was; the link I added was the first time I saw the claim that he was offered as extradition. What's funny is you appear to have known that, yet you kept quiet about it when you were making the (now indefensible) argument that Saddam offered Yasin "sanctuary". This has nothing to do with whether life is cheap to Saddam or any other dictator - the issue is that if he offered to give the guy up he was not "harboring" him, since to harbor is to hide in order to protect, usually from the law. Offering to give someone up pretty much ends the illusion that you are "protecting" him. The more important issue here is that there has never been any question of Saddam actually having cooperated with Yasin in any meaningful way (such as preparing a terrorist attack with him). Even if it were true that Saddam "harbored" Yasin, there is no basis to claim based on that that Saddam cooperated with al Qaeda. There is, in fact, no evidence that Yasin had anything to do with al Qaeda or terrorism after he got to Iraq - and it is unlikely he would, assuming he wanted to stay alive at that point, since of course the US knew who he was. I'm not sure what you mean about bin Laden's "bluster" - I don't know that I've ever made the claim that bin Laden threatened to use Yasin to attack Saddam. Face it - Yasin moved to Iraq because he was Iraqi, not because of any nefarious plot by Saddam to work with al Qaeda. There's a guy named Occam you should see about a razor here. --csloat 06:29, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Refusing to give someone up unless you get what you want is continuing to harbor him. I didn't know about this offer of Saddams, but I did know our article already stated Clarkes assessment that Iraq was gave him sanctuary, and I also knew that Saddams secret police generally knew most of what was going on. Saddam was known for using people as pawns. If he didn't know where Yasin was, when informed that he was probably in the country, he probably tried to find him ASAP, so that he would have another pawn. By "bluster", I mean his talk never amounted to any action. After all, he had also said negative things about the Saudi Royal family, yet during Gulf War 1, he offered to defend the country. Absent any other evidence, he statements really don't contribute much to the implausibility argument.--Silverback 07:29, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Clarke's assessment was that it was not unusual for an Iraqi to want to flee to Iraq. Again, the razor. To "harbor" is to hide or protect -- Saddam was not protecting him. This article is not about what in your estimation Saddam "probably tried" to do. I am not sure which talk you are referring to that never amounted to action - bin Laden made threats against the US, and we have thousands of dead Americans (and others) from the 1990s on suggesting that his bluster did amount to something. I am not aware of threats ever made against Saddam by OBL, although we have AQ-related terrorist groups in northern Iraq who were Saddam's sworn enemies and actively working for his overthrow. But it's unlikely these people knew Yasin. And, like I said, it's unlikely (and there is certainly no evidence) that Yasin had anything to do with terrorism after 1993. Obviously you know very little about OBL (another reason you should not be editing this page as aggressively as you do). He made many negative comments about the Saudi royals -- after 1991, when they rejected his offer to defend them. Since then, of course, he has been a consistently staunch foe of the regime and has murdered many in terrorist attacks against the regime dating back to the early 1990s. You throw in the last sentence above as if it meant anything here - I've refuted that point above and you ignored the refutation. Bin Laden's statements, and other indications of hostility towards Saddam, do in fact render the conspiracy theory implausible (and in fact that is what every intelligence agency on earth has concluded when examining that particular claim, so whether or not you are convinced of it is completely immaterial).--csloat 08:16, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Apologies, I was wrong about bin Laden--Saudia Arabia. I thought he had made early statements critical of the Saudi and other governments of the time for their corruption and failure to impose Sharia law. On the Yasin issue, perhaps I should have used the term "sanctuary" like Clarke did.--Silverback 09:28, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

So Saddam played host to internatioal terrorists and gangsters. Oh well. Who cares? It wasnt as if he was affiliated with Al Queda or anything. I mean thats the only litmus test for being a state sponsor of terrorism, right? - Anon

1. Saddam did not "play host" to anyone. Yasin moved there of his own accord. Saddam offered to give him up. Which means he wasn't much of a "host" anyway. 2. This page is not about Saddam Hussein and all terrorists but it is about Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Therefore the al Qaeda connection is not a "litmus test"; it is simply the topic of the page. That's what belongs here. 3. Saddam did not get attacked for "playing host" to terrorists. He was attacked (in part) because the US Government convinced Americans that Saddam was collaborating with al Qaeda terrorists who were considered a direct threat to the United States. Connections to terrorists in Israel, in Egypt, in Iran may be troubling but they would not have justified the war to the American public. That is why this is considered a bigger deal than, say, the money Saddam offered Palestinian suicide bomber families. Substantial evidence of ties to al-Qaeda would be troubling. I do not fault Bush for suspecting such ties, but I do fault those around him who insisted on the existence of such ties when the agencies charged with investigating those ties were concluding that they didn't exist. This, in the end, is why as you say "the Administration is getting creamed" on this issue. But again I don't think this page should be about whether the war was justified or about the 2004 election campaign. This is (and ought to be) a historical account of Saddam's ties (or lack thereof) to al-Qaeda. --csloat 18:46, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Connections to terrorist groups in Iran, Palestine and Egypt would not be justified to the American people? Especically, Egyptian Islamic Jihad who partnered up with Al Queda? People were ready for a strike on Iraq back in '98 when Clinton was just mentioning UN Resolutions. Saddam's ties with Al Queda are recorded the strongest after Operation Desert Fox and Saddam was reaching out to Laden. The ties were not strong but they kept on til the late 90's. And its especially alarming that the Philipines kicked out an Iraqi diplomat who was caught making a connection to a radical Islamist group in the area with ties to Al Queda. - Anon

I'm not sure what you want. The connections to al-Qaeda affiliated groups are already mentioned in the timeline. This article is not about whether Clinton wanted to attack Iraq. It is about Saddam's connections to al-Qaeda, which have turned out to be a lot less than some people thought.--csloat 20:47, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

No there is a spin on the ties between Al Queda and Saddam. The media is making it seem as if you couldnt even mention Saddam and Al Queda in the same sentence. But thier contacts go way back and they could've restarted at any given moment. And look at what you are typing...which have turned out to be a lot less than some people thought All I am saying is that it is strange that before Saddams removal there was a retract of the info provided in '98 by Clinton officials in '02. then after the war, many of the evidence found in Iraq is being validated and backs up the claims made in '98. There was an indirect tie with Iraq, the Al Shifa plant and Bin Laden. He offered him safe haven and there is an evidence that there were talks of weapons and training. All are backed up by information found in Iraq after the invasion. Just because there was no "operational collaborative relationship", doesnt mean there was not a tie. - Anon

"The media" is not making it seem like this or that; they are reporting the information they are getting from the CIA, FBI, NSA, 911 Commission, etc., ad nauseum. I don't think it is strange at all that there were people who changed their minds between 1996 and 2002 -- we learned a lot more about al Qaeda in the intervening years. Some of those officials - e.g. Daniel Benjamin - even changed their minds about this long before 2001. You are not making any sense -- the al Shifa plant and Saddam offering OBL "safe haven" are separate issues; there is no Saddam/AQ connection to the plant that has been demonstrated here, and there is no evidence of weapons and training being transferred. You can say there is a "tie" if you consider it a tie that Saddam's government asked OBL if he wanted "safe haven" and OBL said "no." By that reasoning, there are ties between the US and the Taliban, since the US asked the Taliban to give bin Laden up and they said "no." The argument is just stupid and I can't believe we have to keep debating it -- al Qaeda had "contacts" with governments around the world, their contacts with Iraq were nothing special and nothing that led to cooperation. Most importantly, all of the "contacts" are already reported here in the timeline, so I don't understand what you are complaining about.-csloat 22:45, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

"Statements" section

Should this section be divided into sections indicating what side of the conspiracy theory they are on? Or in any other way? There are some interesting quotes here, but I don't think they do anything for the piece right now because they are all just one long string of quotes. Anyone have any suggestions?--csloat 18:50, 28 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

It does seem a rather catchall section, with lower standards, much like the external links section. Still, I'm not feeling particularly deletionist and don't see an obvious organization.--Silverback 06:13, 29 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Frankly, is the following statement interesting "as this" ?

The Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq reviewed the intelligence community's conclusions and found that it was reasonable for the CIA to conclude that "Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach – al-Qaida – to conduct terrorist attacks".

I mean, we are talking of "Pre-war Intelligence" which dreamed fully operational stategic weapon systems. That they merely say "if sufficiently desperate" somehow strikes me as a proof that they really had nothing to say to incriminate him based on facts.

And what does "if sufficiently desperate" mean anyway ? What do other nations do, when "sufficiently desperate" ? Frankly, this has zero informative value. Rama 06:49, 29 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I think sufficiently desperate was a poor choice of words, "frustrated" might be a better word, after his failed attempt to assassinate the former President Bush. The statement appears to mean that Saddam would prefer to act through his own agents, and would have to be desperate to use al Qaeda, probably because of the risk of discovery.--Silverback 07:29, 29 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

That was not a CIA conclusion and you know it -- it is pure speculation. It belongs on the page but not as a "conclusion" and not in the intro. It is already in the section on the Senate committee and that is all the prominence it deserves. I am also reverting the rest of your changes, which you have given up the arguments about. You cannot simply ignore these arguments and still make changes to the page -- when you concede significant points in discussion the assumption is that you agree with them. Please cut this crap out SB - you are making it impossible to assume good faith. Either discuss the changes directly or stop making them.

The passage you are citing is from conclusion 97 of the senate report, which says that the CIA's "judgement" to that effect was "reasonable." It's all ridiculous; as Rama points out, "if sufficiently desperate" is hardly a reasonable standard to hold anyone to. The really absurd thing about this logic is that what would make someone like Saddam "sufficiently desperate" other than, say, an American invasion and occupation? But that's neither here nor there - we're not here to debate the war. This article is about Saddam and al Qaeda; my sense is that Silverback wants to change this article so it is about justifying the war. Again, this is not an article about CIA speculation about what a murderous dictator might do if sufficiently desperate.--csloat 07:47, 29 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I welcome correction of the attribution. As much as we might not have used the words in a quote ourselves, I think we are stuck with them, and they still get a point across. You still are completely reverting everything instead of trying to contribute. Despite your assertions and protestations, the other changes are clearly relevant. Information does not have to explicitly mention al Qaeda or Saddam to be relevant. Quotes from bin Laden for instance are assumed to be related to al Qaeda. Information about Iraq from Saddam's reign is relevant. It is considered relevant to question the credibility of the Iraqi National Congress, even though we probably shouldn't paint them all with the same broad brush. Similarly, it is relevant to question the credibility of the 9/11 commission, even if the words al Qaeda and Saddam are not mentioned, since the credibility being questioned in relevant its conduct of the investigation being relied upon for the conclusions.--Silverback 20:34, 29 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Stop the crap Silverback this is beyond annoying. The changes you made have been CLEARLY refuted above (the arguments are even numbered, for heaven's sake) and in all the discussion following you have barely addressed those points at all. The questioning of INC credibility took place in the context of this issue. The 911 Commission has not been questioned on this issue. If it is so obvious to you Able Danger is connected, why is there not a single journalist who sees fit to mention it? You have never answered this argument. --csloat 21:00, 29 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You should review the citations.--Silverback 00:50, 1 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

That doesn't even make sense and it certainly doesn't justify your massive revert. I have reverted back, now please cut the crap. You are simply reverting without engaging in the discussion. Every single one of these changes have been clearly refuted, and you have not responded. Now all you can say is check the citations? Please find something else to do besides steamrolling over this page with edits that have been refuted! --csloat 01:21, 1 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry you are the one doing the massive reverting. And I direct you to the citations, because your immediately preceeding statements about "a single journalist" are contradicted by the citations. Although it is a politician that is the ultimate source, it is a journalist reporting that.--Silverback 10:35, 2 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I am only reverting when you have made massive deletions or edits that have been refuted. For the umpteenth time, there is no politician or journalist that you have made anyone aware of who supports your assertion that Able Danger has some specific implication for the Saddam/AQ connection. You can twist words all you want but you haven't responded to that bottom line fact.--csloat 10:49, 2 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You don't appear to know what a refutation is, you just like the seeming strength of the term. The Able Danger relevance is to the credibility of the 9/11 commision, let's see your "refutation" of that.--Silverback 07:51, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Stop pretending to be so dense. My refutation of that is above. The credibility of the 911 Commission has not been questioned on this issue by any credible journalist, spokesperson, or anyone else but you. How many times do you need this to be said before you get it?--csloat 08:14, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

csloat, that conclusion was a CIA conclusion the Senate Report said was reasonable. I don't see what the fuss is about. All you have to do is read the page. The conclusions from the Senate Report appear on the page already. -RonCram 04:13, 1 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

It was the Senate that "concluded" that the CIA "judgement" (speculating that Saddam "might" use terrorists if sufficiently desperate) was reasonable. The CIA did not "conclude" that; the CIA speculated. I don't object to the information being there, but I do object to it being hilighted in the intro as a "CIA conclusion." And I agree - it is already there on the page.--csloat 04:19, 1 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

csloat, you are arguing semantics. A "conclusion" is pretty much the same thing as a "judgment." It is not a speculation, however. Since it is already on the page and speaks directly to the subject of the article, I see no reason why it should not be in the Intro. -RonCram 15:45, 1 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, the semantics are relevant here. If someone says "someone might do something if sufficiently desperate" they are speculating as to what might happen. (In this particular case, we know it is something that didn't happen, so it is not just speculation; it is speculation that turned out to be false when tested). It should not be in the intro because it is being hilighted there as an important conclusion; it is not. It is a relevant speculation, so it is fine to be on the page, but it is not an important conclusion (and in fact you and silverback put it in the intro in order to mislead readers into thinking that was the main CIA conclusion, somehow superceding their conclusion that there was no evidence whatsoever of such collaboration). It is already on the page and does not need to be there twice. As Rama pointed out above, the qualifier "if sufficiently desperate" pretty much indicates the judgement has no meaning. What wouldn't any country do "if sufficiently desperate"? The United States would probably work with terrorists "if sufficiently desperate." (Was my last sentence a "conclusion" or "speculation"?) Such speculation is meaningless and is hardly a conclusion based on evidence.--csloat 20:01, 1 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

What the heck do you think the pre-emptive nature of removing Saddam was all about CSloat? It was always about the fact that Saddam could not be trusted with the WMD factor he kept hidden and his ties to terror. That is why the US went under a legal authority to oust Saddam with his failed compliance of 17 UN Resolutions. The whole premise was not to remove him because there was an actual smoking gun that directly connected him to Bin Laden or the Al Queda group or 9/11. And your assertion about the US or any other country being desperate is ridiculous. The US was not on trial nor any other nation, but Iraq and its ties to Islamist networks, secluar radicals, and its own IIS that would commit acts of violence on US and western targets. Take the Chomskyesque logic elsewhere with your drifting off into straw men. - Anon

I am not sure it's relevant to this page at all, but as far as answering your question why did the US launch a preventive (not preemptive, look it up) attack on Saddam Hussein, I am just going by the claims actually made by the administration, not speculating about what was really in their heads as you seem to be. The issues relevant to this page are whether there was any evidence of actual collaboration between Saddam and AQ, not about what the dictator might do if he got sufficiently "desperate." My point comparing other countries was not to indict them but simply to point out that speculation about what a country might do if "desperate" is totally irrelevant to reality. You're the one creating straw men -- I do not want to argue with you about the decision to invade Iraq. That is simply not the issue on this page. If you want to argue about that I will gladly do so another time and place - preferably a bar or coffeeshop, not in front of a computer. What is relevant to this page is the question of whether there was evidence that Saddam conspired with AQ. Also, look, I did not remove the quote in question here. It is still there, where it belongs. I just removed the second copy of it that one abusive user kept putting in the intro and mischaracterizing as a "conclusion" of the CIA.--csloat 18:43, 4 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

'I am just going by the claims actually made by the administration, not speculating about what was really in their heads as you seem to be.' Um, so am I Csloat. I think it is you thats misrepresenting the issue.

Or perhaps it's a misunderstanding? The administration pretty clearly made comments that Saddam was working with AQ, over and over; some of these are in the "statements" section; you can easily research this yourself. You may be right that the war was justified to prevent something Saddam "might" have done -- I don't think so but I don't want to debate that here -- but that was not the main argument forwarded by the Bush administration. (With good reason; it's unlikely a war would have been so popular with the American public if it was sold as the kind of speculative venture you are portraying it as). IMHO, of course. We likely both have different understandings of the issue, but there is no reason those different understandings cannot coexist on wikipedia. --csloat 05:36, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Anyways, I think there is sufficient evidence enough in the Al Shifa plant bombing of '98, Sudan's request for Saddam to grant safe haven to Bin Laden and the meetings between Iraqi diplomats and Al Queda in Afghanistan. If you follow the timeline of events between 98-99, it will tell you more than you need to know. Also Csloat, what would you believe the conclusion made by the Senate Report to mean then? - Anon

What is the evidence about the Al Shifa plant bombing? I realize there is evidence of OBL's connection but I have yet to see or read anything actually indicating what evidence there is of Saddam's. But I am not standing in the way of you adding any relevant information to the timeline, as I have pointed out before. The only questions at issue for me in the recent edit war are the ones being voted on below. Sudan requesting Saddam to offer OBL safe haven is hardly a connection but again if you have evidence of this put it in the timeline, assuming it's not already there (you are aware that OBL reportedly refused the offer, no?) As for the meetings between Iraqi diplomats and AQ, I assume you refer to the Hijazi meetings; these are widely reported to have led nowhere (and there was probably only one meeting in 1994; possibly another in 1998 but that one is heavily disputed). These are just the facts as they have been reported, and this territory has been covered by CIA, DIA, NSA, etc. Anyway as for your other question - I have already answered that above. The Senate Report concludes that the CIA's judgment speculating about what Saddam might do if sufficiently desperate was reasonable. That is what the conclusion says, and that is what is reported in the section on the senate report. (By the way, you ask below why conclusion 92 isn't in there - I have no idea; please feel free to add it. It is certainly relevant in that section).--csloat 05:56, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

"Statements" and "Sources" segments

I agree with csloat that the "Statements" segment needs attention. I think that one particular "statement" should go. It is long (more of a dialogue really) and the person cannot back up the statements he is making. It is not informative at all. I am not certain if the statements should be divided as "for" and "against" the link. The reason is that some of the statements skeptical of Iraq being involved in 9/11 are spoken by people who see the relationship but do not see Iraq involved in 9/11. I think it would be best if we could find the dates these were all spoken and put them in chronological order. Do you agree?

I just completed doing that to the "Sources" segment. I am certain someone will find fault with the way I did it. If it can be wikified into better conformity with wikipedia's standards, I am all for that. I did find one dead link and pulled it down to an area that is not readily seen. If someone can find the same article on another website and restore it, that would be fine by me. Having Sources and Statements in chronological order at least puts them in some context. -RonCram 15:45, 1 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I agree with putting the statements and sources in chronological order. I am not sure about the dialogue with Hayes but the quotes at the end of that dialogue should probably stay. I agree we should find the dates and the sources of these quotes. As for the sources, there is no rhyme or reason why they are here. I think we should just have important articles from the mainstream press and links to such things as the Senate report, the 9/11 Commission, etc. There is no need for every Weekly Standard piece on the issue - perhaps one representative article from Stephen Hayes, since he has been a major voice here, but we should in general avoid having the list dominated by such openly partisan (and, in this case, demonstrably inaccurate) sources. --csloat 20:08, 1 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

if sufficiently desperate

This part

(...) conclude that "Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach – al-Qaida – to conduct terrorist attacks".

Strikes me as totally made of tendencious non-information. I am sorry to break this to you, chaps, but famous other countries with did use terrorism when "sufficiently desperate" include the USA, the UK, the USSR, China, France, Italy, Spain, ... Any country will and often has used terrorist measure in extreme predicaments. Suggesting that Saddam Hussein's Iraq is somehow special in this is extremely misleading. Rama 08:16, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Silverback's reversions

Silverback please stop reverting. The two things you keep reverting -- the Able Danger and the speculation that Saddam "might" use terrorists "if sufficiently desperate" have been discussed and rejected above. You have not responded to the arguments against their inclusion like this. Your reversions are testing the limits of good faith. I have asked you to stop this stuff both here and on your user page. The arguments against these changes are very clear and spelled out over and over above, in painstaking detail, and neither you nor Ron has responded to their substance.--csloat 08:19, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The "rejections" are in name only and fail to meet wikipedia standards. I am making good faith edits and you are reverting. I am not asking you to do anything, lets not make this personal.--Silverback 09:04, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

As I have stated several times, I regard the way that this "if sufficiently desperate" is used by Silverback as very misleading. If csloat's version is not perfect, it can be worked upon, obviously, but I do not find Silverback's version acceptable. Rama 09:08, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The "if sufficiently desperate" is in a quote, so it is as used by the sources. I happen to disagree with them, it should really read "if sufficiently secret", because the Saddam's threshold would not be as high as "desperate". Instead of being repetitive, can you give a wikipedia reason for opposing this relevant, sourced, and fairly presented passage?--Silverback 09:17, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

SB your reverts are not in good faith. Your summaries are even misleading; you are trying to hide the fact that you are reverting to versions of the page that have been disputed here. The wikipedia problem with this passage is not the passage itself (which is already below on the page) but its inclusion in the intro and its being characterized as a "conclusion." This passage already exists where it is supposed to on the page. You are adding it in the intro to mislead that there was some CIA "conclusion" that Saddam was about to get "desperate." This has been pointed out over and over and the claim is unrefuted by you or Ron. Also you are reverting the Able Danger passage yet you have conceded the arguments there as well and you no longer seem to be defending that edit.--csloat 09:45, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You are lying about my intent, and mischaracterizing the edits. What about the passage implies that Saddam was "about to get desparate"? I don't even believe that. If you think that is what is suggested by the wording, then show good faith, by balancing it or suggested better wording. There should be a way we can do this without corrupting the quote itself, since it is a conditional, without such implications.--Silverback 10:09, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I do not know your intent but you are the one lying about the number of reverts. Your first edit since midnight was a revert. As I noted in my edit summary. I have shown good faith by leaving the quote in, completely, where it belongs. I have not corrupted the quote at all - your putting it in the intro as a "conclusion" is corrupting it. And you have no explanation why it should be in there twice, or why you would delete the CIA's actual conclusion and the Senate Report's comment on it, as you keep doing in your revert. Also you are reverting another entire section without responding to the arguments against it. -csloat 10:34, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I leave the quote in its original location for completeness, as part of the original list, it would be clumsy to refer people up to the intro for this missing conclusion. I hope this puts your mind at ease. It was called a conclusion also in its original location, why didn't you contest it there? You may find wikipedias counting rules unfairly favoring editors over deletionists, but that issue has been discussed and is the community's decision.--Silverback 10:48, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You know the answer to these points Silverback. First, that was your fourth revert today. I ask that someone else revert so I don't have to violate the 3RR reverting your fourth revert. Second, it is a "conclusion" of the Senate -- not of the CIA. This has been pointed out over and over above but you refuse to acknowledge these points. Third, how does it add to "completeness" to have the same quote twice?? Fourth, your edit summary is a lie; it was your fourth revert, and I have persuaded on the merits; you are the one who refuses to actually engage the merits of the issue here. Fifth, the intro is not the quote's "original location"; that is a lie. The intro is where it was contested all along. Please stop lying and distorting things Silverback.--csloat 18:21, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I never stated that the intro was the original location. You are not a careful reader or thinker.--Silverback 05:14, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Personal attacks like this are unnecessary Silverback. They also are non-responsive to the arguments, which is why I assume you are conceding them.--csloat 05:53, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion of Silverback's proposed changes

I have filed a complaint about Silverback violating the 3RR. I have asked him to stop this behavior on his talk page, as have others. I would also like to ask others to intervene on this page; someone should revert his changes, but we should also establish what the consensus is about these changes so we don't have to keep dealing with this. I am listing below the two changes SB is making along with a summary of my arguments against these changes. Please indicate whether you support or oppose these changes below.

SB's change #1

SB proposes that we include a second copy of the quote from Senate Conclusion 97 in the introduction, in italics, as follows: "The Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq reviewed the intelligence community's conclusions and found that it was reasonable for the CIA to conclude that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach – al-Qaida – to conduct terrorist attacks."

Oppose. First, this quote is already in the section on the Senate conclusions where it belongs. There is no need to duplicate it here. Second, it is not a CIA conclusion. It is speculation by CIA that the Senate made a conclusion about, so it is misrepresented there. This is really the Senate concluding that the CIA's speculation was reasonable. Third, it misrepresents the actual CIA conclusion, which was that there was no evidence of collaboration between Saddam and AQ. By including this line the article seems schizophrenic, as the sentence before it states the real conclusion of the CIA and other intel agencies. Fourth, it is included to mislead readers that the intelligence community believed that Iraq and al Qaeda collaborated. This is the exact opposite of the intelligence community's belief, as copious evidence will prove. Fifth, he includes it in italics to make its emphasis even more misleading. Sixth, as Rama points out above, the whole thing is meaningless -- it is sheer speculation about something a country might do in the direst of circumstances. As I pointed out above in this discussion, this page is not about CIA speculation about what Saddam might do if sufficiently desperate - it is about Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, and its main focus is actual links, not fantasies about what might occur.--csloat 18:59, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I'm OK with removing the quote from its original location. Although I don't see the issue with having it both places.--Silverback 16:58, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Less readable, less informative. That's not the conclusion, nor the point of that paragraph. It exists elsewhere, so it needn't modify this point unless it's crucial to the thesis - which it is not. -- RyanFreisling @ 22:54, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Oppose. For the reasons clearly stated by csloat above. For what it's worth, I have found SB's approach to editing unhelpful elsewhere and have suggested he1tread more lightly both at Talk:Iraq_war and his own talk page. There is an unfortunate tendency for him to simply restate his position and ignore other users' opinions and, if that does not win through, degenerate to a personal level with accusations of lies (see above) and lack of experience and/or judgment on the part of those who disagree (see those other pages I mention). 195.157.197.108 08:42, 4 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
oppose agree with Ryan's points. Derex 11:48, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Ryans points were not about the current version. What if she changes her points?--Silverback 11:59, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

point 1: i didn't revert based on this, but on the other. point 2: my goodness, aren't you the clever debater. Derex 12:02, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Thanx, I just try to get people to think for themselves instead of following the crowd.--Silverback 12:12, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

you know, i really appreciate that. i still haven't quite got the hang of using my brain yet. all that has changed now, thanks to your intervention. Derex 12:26, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

My answer was absolutely related to the current version. You may want to change the 'frame' of the debate to the reliability of the 9/11 commission - however, I see the debate as whether or not the cites you provide shed light on the Saddam/Qaeda relationship (the actual one, not the imagined one). So far, you've not spoken to that point... -- RyanFreisling @ 12:44, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

It couldn't have. That version didn't exist when you made your answer. As for the relationship point, you should read the discussion in the sections below.--Silverback 12:59, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

That's patently false. -- RyanFreisling @ 13:28, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Let SB keep it. I dont see what the fuss is about if the Senate Report concluded that if sufficently desperate, Saddam would try and employ terrorists to conduct attacks globally and might use Al Queda. It was a reasonable approach especially considering that Saddam did employ two of his IIS guards to commit acts of terror during the first Gulf War on US targets in Southeast Asia. Then within days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi diplomats were expelled from the Philipines for having contacts with Al Queda affiliate, the Abu Sayyaf organization, and using thier embassy as a way to contact terror groups, like the Communist opposition group in the Phillipines. - Anon — Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.95.219.15 (talk • contribs) Derex (UTC)

The approach by the Bush Administration has always been that there were contacts with Al Queda and Saddam and that there were ties. We're not supposed to be looking for a smoking gun, but the fact that IF Saddam wanted to, he could give out WMD's to terrorists. Sorry Csloat but your constant sarcasm about the title of the wikipage is wearing thin. We could present to you ample evidence and it still would just be smoke and mirrors because you want a tape of Bin Laden and Saddam in a room together plotting out doom, when you know this is not what the administration claimed in the first place. - Anon — Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.95.219.15 (talk • contribs) Derex (UTC)

Again, Anon, let me point out two things, without debating whether the war against Iraq was "reasonable": One, the quote is already on the page. We are not discussing whether to keep it at all; we are discussing whether it should be there a second time, at the top of the page, in italics, hilighted as a conclusion of the CIA. It was speculation by the CIA mentioned in a Senate Committee conclusion. This distinction should not be erased like Silverback proposes. Second, I am not demanding a videotape; I am just demanding that the CIA (and every other intel agency that looked into this question) have their conclusions accurately represented on this page. The stuff you mention about Abu Sayyaf is already there in the timeline; the question at hand is just about this misrepresentation of the CIA's conclusions.--csloat 18:50, 4 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Why isnt conclusion #92 mentioned in the senate report section? - Anon — Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.95.219.15 (talk • contribs) Derex (UTC)

Oppose. Unless we are going to include "...and found that it was reasonable for the people to conclude that Jim would have sex with an ugly person if sufficient desperate." Or "would eat a lot at one sitting if suffficiently hungry." You know, we might want to look at the word "sufficient" - because there's this little matter of truth in definition here. (besided the fact that it's fear-mongering speculation, which does not belong in a CIA (albiet OSP) report however "reasonable it may be to find", being a subtle logical circle. If sufficiently hostile, an animal might possibly attack. Scarry, isn't it? Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 16:16, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I think your argument is with the CIA and the administration, not with my text. The administration went to war based on possible future danger from Saddam. Saddam of course was already hostile, so the animal analogy doesn't quite hold. I think he would have acted at a far lower threshold than "desparate", but the quote we have is based on the CIA assessment, and of course the administration was entitled to make its own assessment. --Silverback 16:56, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Firstly, the administration is not entitled to make its own assessment, it is expressly forbidden to withhold material information from the senate that may affect their decision to go to war, and it is expressly forbidden to misrepresent that information. The administration is a channel of information, not a source. The adminstration set up the Office of Special Plans, for the explicit purpose of mining intelligence to find anything that could be used to pursuade support for the war, and that's where the president got all his information from. He wasn't getting what he wanted from the "traditional" CIA, so he set up an office in the Pentagon, starting out with a staff of five sycophants, and technically, that was a new part of the "CIA". They operated under a different philosophy. For example, they wouldn't hesitate to act on intelligence marked "inactionable" - they'd give it to the president and he'd put it in his speeches. (for example, the yellowcake forgery - that was intelligence marked "inactionable", which the "traditional" CIA did not give him precisely because it was marked as such. That is an important part of their job, because there's a very real danger that some illiterate fool might just act on it.) My argument is with your text. No competent member of the CIA would write like that - it goes against everything they're taught. That was from the OSP, and should clearly be marked as such. That is not CIA material, and it is certainly not intelligence. What information does it give you? If I tell you "If I am hungry enough, I'll eat.", does that tell you whether or not i'm hungry? whether or not i'm eating? where the food is? how much there is? how hungry or not hungry i am? what i intend to eat? no, it tells you what was already perfectly obvious, about primitive human instinct. And the only difference between that and what the text says is what instinct it is in regard to. If that's intelligence, then I'd be suprised to not find "When he is horny, he may attempt to arouse another." in the next paragraph. It certainly doesn't tell any officer of government anything interesting or important, and it just as certainlny doesn't tell the reader of the article anything interesting or important. Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 22:33, 7 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The quote is from a senate report and may be a paraphrase of the CIA judgement. I don't have any evidence that it is from the OSP, so the quote is properly sourced. Just as NY City made its own assessment of the evidence, the administration is entitled to. It has nothing to do with withholding or misrepresenting material. The CIA may say that Saddam is unlikely to cooperate with al Qaeda, and would probably do so only if desparate. The administration is entitled to say that level of risk is too great given the possible conseqences. The adminstration is even entitled to disagree with the CIA assessment, and reach different conclusions and apply different assumptions. For instance, the CIA may take a conservative approach and assume that any meetings with al Qaeda are innoccuous, unless they have actual credible evidence that they aren't. The administration is entitled the make its own assessment of Saddams character, and based on the number of bad things Saddam has done in the past, etc., conclude that Iraq instead it is going to make the assumption that the meetings are nefarious, unless there is credible evidence that they aren't. The very reason that the CIA will review and disclose the evidence and its assumptions, and NOT just report its conclusions, is so that the decision makers can make their own independent assessments which they are entitled to do.--Silverback 14:08, 8 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The CIA does not make judgement calls. There job is to gather and organize intelligence, and give it to the legislative and executive branches to make judgement calls. The job of the executive branch is not to sidestep the CIA and gather their own intelligence through John Bolton at the state department (through INC) and the OSP. They are not entitled to throw away the intelligence marked "good" and fear-monger with intelligence marked "bad" - and their is certainly no "assessing" involved in that; a random selection would have resulted in a better "assessment". And although the intelligence marked "inactionable" shouldn't be in the random selection, in either case it would have resulted in a sample of intelligence that was not statistically biased being presented to congress and the american people - i.e. information could not be said to have been deliberately withheld, and in a selection without "inactionable" intelligence, inactionable intelligence could not be said to have been deliberately misrepresented as "actionable".

you said "the administration is entitled the make its own assessment of Saddams character, and based on the number of bad things Saddam has done in the past, etc., conclude that Iraq instead it is going to make the assumption that the meetings are nefarious, unless there is credible evidence that they aren't. " No. This is wrong. Nobody in a position of great responsibility is entitled to think like this. It is slopply, irrational, and outright dangerous. Decision makers are not entitled to their own facts. "Everybody is entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts." Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 14:56, 8 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I never said the CIA made judgement calls, that is your own strawman. The quote from the Senate report does talk about the CIA judgements, perhaps your argument is with them. Assumptions and judgements by the CIA are opinions and not facts. They are separately identified for that very reason. c There is a risk associated with the assuming contacts are innocuous unless there is more specific information. The elected officials are free to consider that risk unacceptable.--Silverback 08:50, 9 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I did not mean to make a strawman. By judgement calls I don't mean executive decisions, I mean judging one way or the other when the information that they have is ambiguous. They don't do that. They gather and organize information. They do not interpret it. They place information side by side according to region, etc. To make their conclusions, they use the same skill a prospective laywer would use to pass their LSAT: reading comprehension+logical reasoning. That is, breaking apart the intelligence into small logical propositions, and then making logical statements about that set of logical propositions, that are neccessarily true (such as set a does not contain b), falsifiable, interesting, and important. In addition, they have to assess the credibility of their sources, and they do so not according to a priori assumptions (each source is assumed a prior to be of equal credibility - the "null hypothesis"), but according to the person's a posteri record, and they double-check and cross-check each piece of intelligence via intelligence agents experienced and familiar with the particular subject area for the given region, with active contacts, who go out on the field to try to confirm or debunk it. (Richard A. Clarke being an example) In respect to the literal results of these surveys, they mark the intelligence accordingly. They might, for example, mark the intelligence "inactionable" in extreme cases. Intelligence marked "inactionable" will not be included in intelligence estimates or conclusions. (if you want to think of it in terms of electronic communication, it's a matter of signal-to-noise ratio) This is not a judgement call in the sense that calling heads or tails on a coin flip is. This is scientific - it is using prior data and on-the-field analysis to determine how the die is most likely weighted. It does not involve assumptions. It does not involve judgement calls. It is scientific and pragmatic.

For instance, "Curveball" was not considered innocuous. The intelligence from curveball was clearly marked "inactionable", and the CIA gave strong warnings to the president that intelligence from him was not reliable. It was the president who made the judgement call - called out tails when the odds were not in his favor - "assumed contacts were innocuous" even when there was "more specific information". It is not acceptable to trumph meticulously gathered facts and carefull calculations with an arbitrary guess - the risks far outweight the benefits. The elected officials are not free to consider that risk acceptable. Their burden of responsibility restricts them.

In order to make an informed decision, an elected official, just like any other person, needs to be, well informed, and to make a decision on the basis of that information. That's the definition of "informed decision". Your statement regarding informed decisions was an oxymoron. Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 16:11, 10 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Support. The best way to write an Intro is to summarize the most reliable information from the article that speaks as directly as possible to the issue at hand. As the Intro points out, President Bush claimed that Iraq might team up with al Qaeda to launch terrorist attacks. Well, the CIA assessed the evidence and came to the same conclusion. The Senate assessed the evidence and decided that the CIA's conclusion was reasonable. If that information is not clear, relevant and reliable, nothing is. Someone may believe the Senate was wrong, but they cannot doubt the Senate made the conclusion. The fact the Senate conclusion is quoted later in the article should not rule it out from being in the Intro. -RonCram 14:58, 7 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

SB's change #2

SB proposes the following paragraph be included under the 911 Commission section: "The 9/11 Commission may not have heard all the evidence possibly available to it because it rejected information that did not agree with its preconceived conclusions. For instance it failed to include some Able Danger information. Fox News reported that former 9/11 commission spokesman Al "Felzenberg said the information about Atta was considered suspect because it didn't jibe with many other findings. For example, the intelligence officer said Atta was in the United States in late 1999, but travel records confirmed that he did not enter the country until late 2000."[1]"

Oppose. As I pointed out again and again, there is no article here that specifically addresses the Commission's credibility on the issue of Saddam/AQ connections. To make that inference constitutes WP:NOR original research. If SB thinks this is such an obvious point, why have no mainstream journalists scholars or politicians bothered to mention it in the public sphere? If you take a look at the discussion over the past few days, you can see that Silverback has even stopped defending this proposed change but he nonetheless keeps reverting it. It is time to put a stop to it. I know there is at least one other user who supports including this information but he seems to have backed off too. I wonder what others think. It seems to me the Commission's credibility has not been questioned on this particular issue, and that the Able Danger revelations, while interesting, do not have anything to do with a Saddam connection. If they did, why is there nobody speculating about it in the mainstream media? --csloat 18:59, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Please cite noteworthy sources that speak directly to this issue -correlating the Able Danger reports to the issue of Saddam's relationship with Al Qaeda. It's a juicy point - there should be some coverage somewhere if it's valid and noteworthy. -- RyanFreisling @ 22:56, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
"preconceived conclusions", etc. ridiculously POV. not even close. if you want to mention the able danger nonsense somewhere, this is definitely not how to go about it. Derex 11:53, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Can you think of something more NPOV descriptive of "information about Atta was considered suspect because it didn't jibe with many other findings". As usual, I am open to suggestions.--Silverback 11:57, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Qualified oppose. I do think this is noteworthy, however it may be best kept out of the article for the moment. If references can be found, it should definitely go in. There is, in my view, some basis for keeping it in anyway. I expect that SB will be able to provide support for the statement, if not then it should be kept out. For now, it is on the talk page so is not lost and can be reinserted later. 195.157.197.108 08:50, 4 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The only source I have seen connecting the two things in any way at all was the Weekly Standard article cited by RonCram. It was discredited even by Ron himself, and the article does not even coherently speculate about what Able Danger might tell us about Saddam and AQ. I am open to putting it in the article if it is relevant (and I have not bothered the edits Ron made over at 9/11 Commission about this), but I still have seen no evidence or even a coherent theory as to what Able Danger might tell us that would illuminate the Saddam/AQ story. The only connection that SB seems to be drawing is a sort of generic indictment -- that because Able Danger proves the 9/11 Commission was sloppy in discussing Atta's timeline in 2000, and because the 9/11 Commission concluded that there was no Saddam/AQ evidence, SB seems to think that it therefore follows that there is some Saddam/AQ evidence that the Commission, in their sloppiness, overlooked. That is the best I can make of Silverback's otherwise nonsensical sputtering about Able Danger -- and to be frank it's a rather generous reading. It's a strange version of the fallacy of composition, methinks. If SB had any articles that support the statement he would have produced them by now.csloat 09:11, 4 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You have made your case and asked for input towards a consensus, which I have given. I will not be drawn into the slanging match. If you continue to argue your side in response to others' opinions, you risk SB jumping back in too and this will drag. I have said "qualified oppose" and am sticking with it: it should stay out unless SB can support it. The onus is on him to provide a proper basis. 195.157.197.108 09:24, 4 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Fair enough - I don't mean to start fights here. I'm just trying to lay out the record as accurately as I can. Sorry about that.-csloat 18:53, 4 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

oppose. speculative, logical fallacy (there' no logical support for "preconcieved conclusion" - it's an unqualified attack) and I'd be surprised and concerned if the commission didn't do that. Thus, from my perspective, it doesn't meet interesting and important criteria. If the opposite was true, it would though. Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 16:15, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You and Derex were the first to attack the "preconceived conclusion" language in detail. It does go a little beyond the cite. I have removed the whole phrase related to this.--Silverback 16:51, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The compromise Able Danger passage

The compromise Able Danger passage is being inserted because it calls into question the oft cited 9/11 commissions credibility, not because it supports some Saddam 9/11 conspiracy theory. csloat has mischaracterized it, and thus invalidated the poll above. Ryan appears to have especially been mislead. The Able Danger text has not been about the conspiracy theory for quite some time, look back at the original pre-compromise text which RonCram was proposing.--Silverback 05:21, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I've not been mislead (any more than the rest of us), as far as I am aware - I was asking for press corroboration of an actual link, not the 'if he were desperate enough he might' premise of the text as I interpreted it. Can you help me understand how my request is not appropriate to this issue? Thx. -- RyanFreisling @ 05:25, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

For a credibility issue, the link needs to be the entity whose credibility is being questioned, the 9/11 commission. The citation supports that, as does the quote. If you want a link to a Saddam/al Qaeda connection, that is more indirect. The citation shows that the objectivity of the 9/11 commisions timeline has been called into question. The commissions conclusions about the timeline are actually cited in this article in relation to the alleged meeting between Atta and an Iraqi official. While that particular part of the commissions timeline has not YET been specifically questioned, the commissions objectivity has, since it apparently reached premature conclusions. If it was already rejected information that didn't fit with it's ideas at the time of the Able Danger meetings, who knows what other evidence it may also have rejected. The Able Danger passage is being offered for this limited purpose, but csloat seems to worship the 9/11 commission and does not want its credibility questioned in anyway.--Silverback 05:42, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

A "more indirect" link to Saddam/AQ is not encyclopedic if the only person making such a link is a Wikipedia editor. The Commission's timeline has been questioned about 2000 -- there is nothing on the Commission's timeline in 2000 that is relevant to the discussion here. The Atta-Prague meeting supposedly took place in April 2001, and the Able Danger people have not called into question that part of the Commission's timeline. You say "YET" as if you have a crystal ball -- perhaps you are right. When it is questioned, that will be the time to include this issue on Wikipedia. Also please show some evidence that I "worship" the 911 Commission -- I have never said any such thing. I am not especially attached to their credibility, and I would agree with you that they missed some important things. But I do not believe the Saddam/AQ connection was one of them, and the evidence available on the public record (as well as the conclusions of every other investigative body that has looked into this) back me up. But again, the bottom line issue here is that if you cannot provide evidence that the experts or the mainstream media is talking about this indirect connection that has not yet materialized, then this claim does not belong in this article.--csloat 05:49, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Silverback, if the Able Danger information does not support the Saddam-AQ connection, then it is not relevant here. The issue is whether this information calls into question the Commission's credibility on that particular issue. Not whether it does so about other issues. As I noted above, you are committing the fallacy of composition, assuming that if the commission's credibility is indicted on one issue it is therefore challenged on other issues. The point I am making here is that the crucial link between the Able Danger controversy and the Saddam-AQ link has not been made anywhere in the mainstream press that I am aware of. Without evidence of such treatment by authorities or journalists, your link between this article and Able Danger is original research. If you can provide such evidence, you will probably win the vote above, and you can include Able Danger here. But if you cannot provide any such evidence, how can you insist on this connection being made for the first time by Wikipedia? --csloat 05:49, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

No, the credibility issue alone is enough to make it relevant. Although it is unnecessary for its relevance, the source cite also questions the timeline and the methodology used to produce the timeline. The timeline is cite in the article here. If the methodology is questioned, all the conclusions are questioned, because the are all tainted by premature reaching of conclusions and the rejection of evidence based on those premature conclusions. Read the cited source, it is a congressman that is questioning the commissions work and timeline.--Silverback 06:13, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I've made my case here and I won't continue to repeat myself. You're simply asserting that evidence is unnecessary, but I've offered reasons why it is. Bottom line is if nobody in the mainstream media is talking about this as linked to the Saddam/AQ issue, then such original research would be out of place here.--csloat 06:37, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

perhaps you should refrain from characterizing other peoples positions until you get better at it, so as to avoid mischaracterizing. The bottom line is that the passage is worded and justified on the 9/11 commission credibility issue. The evidence supports that, and further supports that the credibility of the timeline itself is being questioned. I have been totally honest in admitting that so far, it is a different part of the Atta timeline that is being questioned. How can you argue that the credibility of both the commission and timeline are not relevant here, when both are relied upon so heavily in the article? What is you wikipedia reason?--Silverback 06:44, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Again, please stop personal attacks. I do not wish to continue debating with you since you won't listen to reason. The evidence does not support questioning the Commission's credibility on this issue. You seem to agree with this. The "wikipedia reason" for excluding this material is that the connection you make to this issue constitutes original research. Now please stop reverting. If you have a counter argument, make it in the voting section and stop trying to debate me. We're done arguing; make your case to other editors now please.--csloat 08:44, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You seem rather narrowly focused on one part of the timeline which you narrowly interpret as "this issue", yet the 9/11 commission is cited in the article for several times, and this article is about the more than just that one possible Atta meeting. I am making my case to the others by showing that you have no reason to oppose, other than an extremely narrow view of relevance. If these texts are as irrelevant and off topic as you seem to think, the readers will be able to see that and will be able to continue on with perhaps a moments confusion as to what they are doing there. If you can see that that a different part of the timeline is being questioned and that the 9/11 commission's credibility is being questioned in a different area than the one you consider critical, why don't you think the readers will be able to see that for themselves. Do you have special insight? If so, why not add that insight to the text to balance these passages? Do you have information that the 9/11 commission did a better job on the other topics we cite it, that you can use to bolster its credibility and show that its prejudiced dismissal of the Able Danger information was an anamolie? Such information is welcome. Lets get the evidence into the article.--Silverback 10:35, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Sigh... Once more, slowly now. This page is about Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda; specifically, about whether they worked together. The 911 Commission is one source among many here. Your speculation that Able Danger may lead to questioning of that commission's credibility on the issue of Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda is original research until such time as it is confirmed by experts or reporters (or someone outside of wikipedia). It is your burden to present this evidence; it is not someone else's burden to prove such evidence does not exist. That's all anyone is asking for here, evidence that this is relevant to this page. Otherwise it is just plain off-topic, and the connection to this page that you assert is original research.--csloat 01:38, 6 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Not "may lead", but has already lead to questioning of the job the 9/11 commission did.--Silverback 02:11, 6 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

csloat, you need to retake your introductory logic course. The point Silverback and I have been making is not a fallacy of composition. To quote: "A fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some (or even every) part of the whole." No one has made such an inference. The argument put forward is that because we now know the 9/11 Commission did not investigate the Able Danger claims, we cannot be assured they investigated all of the other pertinent information a rational person would assume they would have investigated. The fact the 9/11 Commission is quoted or referenced extensively in the article without providing the readers with the knowledge that the 9/11 Commission's credibility is being questioned is doing readers a disservice. You are forcing readers to go to the 9/11 Commission article or to the Able Danger to learn the commission did not do a thorough job. That is bogus. The issue relates to this article and has to be included here. -RonCram 15:18, 8 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

RonCram, you need to not make personal attacks, and you should examine the quote that you offered in regard to how it might be applied to the situation in question, specifically in whether or not the thoroughness of a part of the whole of the commission's report being put into question implies that the same is true of the whole, or a different part. As you said yourself, "The argument put forward is that because we now know the 9/11 Commission did not investigate the Able Danger claims, we cannot be assured they investigated all of the other pertinent information a rational person would assume they would have investigated." That's a perfect example of fallacy of composition. (On another note, at no point had we been assured, and a rational person would not make such assumptions.) In any case, this article is not about assurances or opinions about the information, it is about the information as is, particularly in regard to saddam and AQ. And until specifically that part of the 9/11 commission report that is relevant to saddam and AQ is called into question on its own merits (not contingent on any other part), that distinct part of the whole is to be represented here in a manner as unchanged as it, and regardless to any changes to any other part; two parts are not to be "composed" (placed together), in quality or form.

If someone wants to learn about the 9/11 commission report, or other aspects of it, they will go to the respective articles for that information. Reciprocally, if there is information about the 9/11 commission report, or other aspects of it, it shall go to the respective articles for the people who want to learn about it. Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 19:11, 8 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

This is not an example of the fallacy of composition, perfect or otherwise. Noone is making the argument that poor methodology and prejudicial conclusions in one part of the work proves that those existed in other parts of the work. Rather, it is evidence that the presumption that their opinions were based on a thorough and unprejudiced review of all available evidence may not be justified. We don't know whether they messed up elsewhere. This is evidence to impeach the 9/11 commissions objectivity, thoroughness and expertise. This is not a proof, and I am not using the language of logical proofs. The 9/11 commission is being cited as an authority here, and the impeachment of that authority is appropriate here.--Silverback 09:08, 9 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Nope. Sorry RonCram. If it wasn't rude to repeat myself, I would. Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 14:32, 9 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Look, this article is not about the 9/11 commision, in whole or in part. It is not a subpage of that page. There is a clear link to the 9/11 Commission article in this article, and anyone who wants to personally assess the commission's credibility, can follow that link, just as they would were they to personally assess the credibility of any other group or individual, such as the Bush Administration or Richard A. Clarke. If people don't know how to follow links, or it doesn't occur to them that their would be more relevant information there, then they don't know how to do research, and there's nothing we can do to help them. If we really wanted to make this article that discursive, and do a fair and even job of it, this size of this article would be unweildly - it would more like a book. Fortunately, there is no need for such redundancy. Wikipedia already is a book, and the pages are organized in a fashion that makes it easier to answer a train of inquiry than is possible with any physical medium. They can turn the page. It's easier than in a book, and if we stop doing it that way, then we lose the advantages of this medium. There is a clear link to the 9/11 Commission article in this article, and anyone who wants to personally assess the commission's credibility, can follow that link, just as they would were they to personally assess the credibility of any other group or individual, such as the Bush Administration or Richard A. Clarke (whose respective histories in regard to credibility I could write volumes on). Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 17:50, 9 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I have taken a first cut at implementing your standard that the credibility of sources of information should be questioned only in articles on the sources of that information. There is probably questioning of credibility that is more subtle, that did not used the word credible specifically, so this is just a first cut. I have made a special effort to preserve readability.--Silverback 07:06, 10 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I have fixed your change. Making changes like that just to make a point is considered a disruption of Wikipedia; please do not make changes just to make a point. Your reason to make changes should be to improve the page, not to win a debate. As for your change, the INC was specifically disputed on this issue and their info is considered not credible; many argue that the organization manufactured the Saddam-AQ connection in order to drag the US into war with Iraq, and even that these defectors were working for Iran all along. 60 Minutes did a piece on it, and there is a CJR piece cited on the article; there is plenty more information out there on this but I am pretty sure you already know that.--csloat 07:39, 10 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

You expressed the same standard as Kevin Baas, stated more clearly above. Credibility issues should be raised on the page for the entity whose credibility is being questioned. It a clique is going to try to control a page, they should at least try to avoid obvious hypocrisy. I made the changes in good faith as always. When a clique controls a page, their rules replace the wikipedia rules, but at least, in fairness, they should be consistent in the application of their rules. My changes were consistent with the rules and did not harm the page, and I made special effort not to hack the page, but to keep it readable, which took some thought in a couple of places. Do I need to quote back to you your own statements about the appropriate place to question credibility? Were you just pretending when you made those statements or engaging in a case of situational ethics where that was convenient to your purposes?--Silverback 14:35, 10 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

"Were you just pretending?" WP:AGF :) RushLimbaugh 14:43, 10 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I really don't appreciate the childish game-playing Silverback. Esp. when it give me the message "It's not merely that I'm not understanding what you're saying, it's that I'm not even trying to listen." I hope you can see how that is more frustrating than encouraging. I don't believe that it is really that difficult to understand what I wrote. I stated it pretty clearly in many different ways and even repeated and elaborated on the clearest sentence. I don't believe you're that thick, Silverback. And I do think that you speak the same language. So next time you write a response directed at me, please respond to what I wrote, rather than whatever it is that you responded to (something you were reading from somewhere else?). Kevin Baas^{talk: new} 15:23, 10 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Are you blind to your own hypocrisy? Are we allowing the credibility of sources of information to be questioned on this page or not? You're supporting the clique, at least be consistent in your interpretation of the rules, instead of just making them up as we go along.--Silverback 15:45, 10 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The use of senate conclusion 97 in the intro.

The reason I want to quote the Senate conclusion about the CIA's "judgement", is that it directly and authoritatively relates to the opening sentence of this article and this articles subject matter, that Saddam and al Qaeda "might conspire to launch terrorist attacks ". I also leave it in its original location because it is in context there. This would not be the first time that a quote has been repeated more than once in an article, and this is the type of situation where that is appropriate. I will try to address csloats concerns in the new text.--Silverback 05:29, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Please participate in the vote above on this and the other issue. I believe I have responded to your concerns above.-csloat 05:51, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

No, that would give it legitimacy. You have been given a fair chance to make your points and they don't hold up. You are seeking to impose some standard of relevance that you cannot rigorously communicate or defend, and you have repeatedly spent more time mischaracterizing my position, my proposed text and my sources than you have spent fleshing out and explaining the principles of your own position. You supported the premature archiving of active discussions, which the other voters probably have not read. If you want votes to be valid you must fairly characterize the positions because voters will assume good faith, and you purposely sought to get the vote started before I would have a chance to correct your mischaracterizations, taking advantage of the fact that I was blocked. You have been opposing my posts for the slimmest of reasons, your own more limited view of relevance and restrictive view of the scope of credibility issues. I have corrected your judgement vs conclusion concern about the introduction, although I think that was a nit of a point.--Silverback 06:26, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Please Silverback - I proposed the vote precisely because you would not respond to my points and you kept changing things anyway. I offered my arguments above for my vote and I will accept whatever consensus emerges. You have a fair opportunity to make whatever arguments you have here as well. Everyone is welcome to read the archives. And you are welcome to direct their attention to particular quotes from there if you like too. If you disagree with my characterization of your changes please address that too. Please do not tell me what my motives are. If you have arguments to make relevant to the vote, please make them there. I really don't want to continue debating you like this when you don't respond to my arguments and you make changes anyway -- this way, you can make your case to others, and if your case is persuasive, you will win the vote. It's really quite simple. The alternative is an endless edit war, and I really don't have time to participate in that.--csloat 06:35, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I don't care about winning votes, I am seeking the truth, what you characterize as "changing things" are my attempts to address your concerns. One thing about truth, is that just because it doesn't agree with your POV, doesn't make it any less true. What is untrue or unsupported about any of the text that I have proposed? What compromise text have you proposed that addresses your concerns in a way that I apparently haven't been able to? --Silverback 06:53, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The text is not "untrue" or "unsupported"; it does not belong there and you deleted the text that does belong there. My arguments opposing these changes are above, and repeated over and over on this page and the archive. Please review them if you like but I am not going through it again. Please consult my arguments above by the vote and offer your vote there too. I don't see the point of continuing to argue with you - you ignore my arguments, and I'm not likely to convince you anyway.--csloat 07:59, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I've no objection to the deleted text being added back in. I thought with my more specific text, it was redundant. You are welcome to append that text in the appropriate paragraph, I was unaware that it was even an issue. Have you made any argument other than that you consider the Able Danger text irrelevant on both the timeline and credibility issues and that you consider the text in the intro to give a misleading impression (somehow?)?--Silverback 08:16, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I've restored the text that you were concerned about. Apologies, I had not considered it a significant deletion, and certainly had no objection to it. It was a reasonable text.--Silverback 08:26, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you. Now please participate in the voting process and stop reverting this page. Should your arguments be convincing to others, you can make your changes. In the meantime please do not continue a silly revert war. Can someone else consider protecting this page? Thank you. --csloat 08:41, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

you certainly haven't satisfied my objections. how about genuinely working towards consensus on talk instead of continual steamrolling of the article

What is your evidence of this? csloat's only work towards "consensus" has been to revert and solicit votes. I've responded to his arguments and made changes, just as I would to your suggestions. Are you being fair? Are you proposing any compromise text? Soliciting votes is an attempt to steamroll, you haven't seen me doing that. I have stuck to the merits.--Silverback 12:09, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

since the merits are all stacked against you, i find this difficult to swallow. no, looking back through the talk history, i find csloat to have been astoundingly patient and accomodating. you will find me less so. i run more your speed, SB. Derex 12:22, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

It would be easier to believe you are being thoughtful rather than willful, if you actually discussed the merits. BTW, can you name one accomodation that csloat has made on this issue? I have made several.--Silverback 13:00, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

see my comments in the poll. i believe those qualify as "discussing the merits". it would be awful sporting of you to name these several accomodations. then, csloat can speak for himself if he so chooses. it would also be easier to believe that you are being thoughtful rather than willful if i hadn't read the talk page and archives. Derex 13:11, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Here is the original Able Danger text. Not only have I produced a much trimmed down version, aimed at only at the credibility of the commission and timeline issue. I have edited that trimmed down version and relocated it 1st out of the timeline, 2nd out of the introduction to the timeline and then finally to the 9/11 commission section, all in response to feedback. Similarly for my modifications to the introduction. Most recently I restored some deleted text when he pointed it out. I assume, since you characterized csloats participation in this, that you must have spotted at least one accomodation?--Silverback 13:35, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

2005, August 7 -- Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer disclosed that a highly classified U.S. Army data-mining project known as Able Danger had identified Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as potential al Qaeda operatives inside the U.S. in January 2000. [2] The military unit prepared a chart with photos of the four men and recommended to US Special Operations Command that the information be shared with the FBI. The request was denied due to a memo written by Deputy Attorney General Jamie S Gorelick, who was also a member of the 9/11 Commission. A former spokesman for the 9/11 Commission confirmed that information regarding Able Danger was presented to the Commission.[3] The 9/11 Commission subsequently issued a statement saying that Able Danger was not considered “historically significant” and the information was “not sufficiently reliable” to warrant further investigation.[4] On August 22, US Navy Captain Scott J Phillpott and former contractor James D Smith confirmed that Able Danger had identified Mohamed Atta as al Qaeda as early as January 2000. [5] The Able Danger travel timeline puts Atta in the U.S. in January 2000. To travel to the U.S., Atta must have used an alias and a fake passport. Establishing that Atta used an alias is significant. The 9/11 Commission Report claimed Atta could have traveled to Prague in April 2001, but he could only have done so if he traveled using an alias. Since the Commission believed this was not his practice, it concluded that it was not likely Atta made the trip to Prague. (Page 229) [6] However, the information from Able Danger indicates that Atta did travel using an alias and now the only logical hurdle to the trip to Prague is removed. Upcoming Congressional inquiry into Able Danger and possibly other information provided by the 9/11 Commission is expected to shed light on Mohamed Atta's travels. [7] [8]

If you actually read the April 2001 entry here on this page you would see that the issue of Atta using an alias is not the main reason that this story has been shown to be false. Atta was in the US. Al-Ani was nowhere near Prague. Al-Ani was meeting with someone else who looked like Atta. The entire story is half-baked; it came from a single unreliable source in Prague. The Czechs have backed off the story. No intel agency in the world believes it happened. Even the 911 Commission found numerous reasons it could not have happened. The above paragraph picks up one of their reasons - the alias thing - and blows it out of proportion, as if the entire case against the Atta Prague meeting was based on the silly assumption that Atta would never use an alias. That is simply and utterly false. Also there are no mainstream analysts who have published this argument. The only source for this claim is from the Weekly Standard article (cited twice above to make it look like two sources?), and if you actually read the article you can see it is sheer speculation. The subtitle makes it sound really damning -- it specifies and April 2001 discrepency in the timeline -- but then reading the article it is clear the discrepancies are over a year earlier and there is no April 2001 discrepancy at all! The author never even speculates about an April 2001 discrepancy so the subtitle is either an intentional distortion to sell more copies of the rag or it was written by an editor who didn't actually read the article him/herself. Ron found other problems with the article as well. The point is it sensationalizes Able Danger in order to insinuate a connection to Atta in Prague but never makes the connection explicit. This piece does not rise to the level of encyclopedic notability. You trimmed this entry down significantly, but in trimming it down you also deleted any connectin between Able Danger and this page. While I applaud your taking material out of the entry that was dubious at best, what remains is not at all notable on this page. There is no mention at all of Saddam in your new text! It is simply and utterly irrelevant. The connection to Saddam/AQ is one you feel is obviously implied by the questioning of the Commission timeline, but such speculation on your part does not belong in the wikipedia.--csloat 18:32, 5 October 2005 (UTC) PS - you have made your arguments clear, now please participate in the vote above and stop reverting the page.--csloat 18:34, 5 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I made no attempt to keep the connection to Iraq, because I think the stronger point is 9/11 commission credibility issue, although the connection to the timeline is still strong. I think the text itself can be strenghtened again based on some of the Able Danger testimony at the hearings that specifically questioned the 9/11 commissions handling of evidence. I will be working on that, I will be interested to see what the consensus will be on the new texts.--Silverback 01:02, 6 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Again, until you actually do make a connection to Iraq (specifically, to Saddam's connection to al-Qaeda), this passage is simply not relevant here. Your point about the Commission's credibility belongs on the Commission page (where it already is), not here.--csloat 01:33, 6 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

csloat, your argument is bogus. Lots of information is available on more than one page. The credibility of the 9/11 Commission is relevant here because the Commission is quoted as an authority here. Your POV is showing. -RonCram 01:40, 8 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Ron I don't want to argue with you - you placed your vote and I don't think either of us will convince the other. My argument is not about information being on more than one page; it is about the info being on the pages where it is relevant. Once again, and I reguse to keep going back and forth here, Able Danger has not indicted the commission's credibility on the issue of Saddam and al-Qaeda and nobody is making such an argument in the mainstream press so I consider it original research. If you are comfortable with such original research in an encyclopedia article, that is your POV. Mine is that such speculation should first be published in books, articles, newspapers, etc. before it makes it into an encyclopedia.--csloat 01:59, 8 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Senate Conclusion

I don't have the Senate document in front of me. Can someone add Conclusion 92? SB has added the (barely) tangentially relevant #91, so now we have skipped 92 without explanation -- I assume he left it out because it doesn't fit with his conspiracy theory (IIRC the conclusion was about the CIA having reasonably reviewed the evidence, but I could be wrong). In either case it is silly to have 91 and then 93-8 without 92. --csloat 01:51, 6 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I don't have the document in front of me, but I got to it with by following the link on this page to another page, and then to the document. The skipped conclusion was about the reasonableness of the CIA methodology or something. I've no problem with it being added. It was just a more peripheral conclusion.--Silverback 02:14, 6 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

SB, please don't "clean up" direct quotes

Sorry, I hadn't noticed that one. I did leave in an instance or two that were in quotes. And I think I did remove a whole quote that did not have a redeeming qualities other than questioning credibility. That quote should have been on the appropriate page.--Silverback 15:50, 10 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]