Winter War
| Winter War | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Winter War | |||||||
 Finnish ski troops in Northern Finland January 12 1940. | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
| Finland | Soviet Union | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim | Kliment Voroshilov, later Semyon Timoshenko | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 180,000 | 450,000 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
|
22,830 dead 43,557 wounded 2,000 captured |
200,000+ dead or missing 260,000+ wounded 3,100 captured | ||||||
The Winter War (also known as the Soviet-Finnish War or the Russo-Finnish War) broke out when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939, three months after the start of World War II. As a consequence, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations on December 14th. Stalin had expected to conquer the whole country by the end of 1939, but Finnish resistance frustrated the Soviet forces, which outnumbered them three to one. Finland held out until March 1940, when a peace treaty was signed ceding about 10% of Finland's territory, and 20% of its industrial capacity, to the Soviet Union.
The result of the war was mixed. Although the Soviet forces finally managed to break through the Finnish defence, neither the Soviet Union nor Finland emerged from the conflict unscathed. Soviet losses on the front were tremendous, and the country's international standing suffered. Even worse, the fighting ability of the Red Army was put into question, a fact that contributed heavily to Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa. Finally, the Soviet forces did not accomplish their primary objective of conquest of Finland, but gained only a secession of territory south of Lake Ladoga. The Finns retained their sovereignty and gained considerable international goodwill.
Franco-British preparations for support of Finland through northern Scandinavia (the Allied campaign in Norway) were thwarted by the March 15 peace treaty. However, the mission went ahead with the new goal of occupying the northern Swedish iron ore mines, prompting Nazi Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940 (Operation Weserübung).
The Winter War (Talvisota in Finnish, Vinterkriget in Swedish) is considered by some a military disaster for the Soviet Union, and was interpreted by some as indicative of inherent weakness in the Soviet system. However, Stalin did learn from this fiasco and realized that political control over the Red Army was no longer feasible. After the Winter War, the Kremlin initiated the process of reinstating qualified officers and modernizing his forces, a fateful decision that would enable the Soviets to resist the German invasion. It may be noted that even the German Wehrmacht, as it would become apparent in 1941, was not prepared for offensive winter warfare. It could be argued that neither would the armies of France, Britain, or USA have been.
Background
Finland had a long history of being a part of the Swedish kingdom when it was conquered by Russia in 1808 and turned into a autonomous buffer state to protect the Russian capital. Following the revolution that brought a Soviet government to power in Russia, Finland had declared itself independent on December 6, 1917. The German–Finnish ties remained close, although Finnish sympathy for the National Socialists was very sparse. These strong ties were founded when Finland's underground independence movement during the First World War was supported by Imperial Germany. In the subsequent Civil War German-trained Finnish Jäger troops and regular German troops played a crucial role. Only Germany's defeat in World War I hindered the establishment of a Germany-dependent monarchy under Frederick Charles of Hesse as King of Finland.
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland was tense and frosty—both the two periods of forced russification at the turn of the century, and the legacy of the failed socialist rebellion in Finland contributed to a strong mutual distrust. Josef Stalin feared that Nazi Germany would attack sooner or later, and, with Soviet-Finnish border just 32 km away from Leningrad (now: Saint Petersburg), Finnish territory would have provided an excellent base for the attack - something that Stalin was keen to avoid. In 1932, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Finland. The agreement was reaffirmed in 1934 for ten years.
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had signed a mutual non-aggression pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on August 23, 1939. The pact also included a secret clause allocating the countries of Eastern Europe between the two signatories. Finland was agreed to be in the Soviet "sphere of interest". The German attack on Poland, September 1st, was followed by a Soviet invasion from the east. In a few weeks they had divided the country between them.
In April 1938 or possibly even earlier, the Soviet Union started diplomatic negotiations with Finland, trying to improve the mutual defence against Germany. The Soviet Union's primary concern was that Germany would use Finland as a bridgehead for the attack on Leningrad.
More than a year passed without considerable progress and the political situation in Europe worsened. In autumn 1939 after Germany's attack on Poland, the Soviet Union finally demanded that Finland agree to move the border 25 kilometres back from Leningrad, which was at that time only 32 kilometres from Finland. It also demanded that Finland lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for 30 years for the creation of a naval base there. In exchange, the Soviet Union offered to Finland a large part of Karelia (twice as large, but less developed).
The Finnish government refused Soviet demands. On November 26 the Soviets staged the Shelling of Mainila, an incident in which Soviet artillery shelled areas near the Russian village of Mainila, then announced that a Finnish artillery attack had killed Soviet troops. The Soviet Union demanded that Finns should apologise for the incident and to move their forces 20-25 km from the border. The Finns denied any responsibility for the attack and refused to give in to the demands. The Soviet Union used it as an excuse to withdraw from the non-aggression pact. On November 30 Soviet forces attacked with 23 divisions, totalling 450,000 men, which quickly reached the Mannerheim Line.
A puppet regime was created in the occupied Finnish border town of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk) on December 1, 1939, under the auspices of the Finnish Democratic Republic and headed by Otto Ville Kuusinen for both diplomatic purposes (it immediately became the only government for Finland that was recognized by the Soviet Union) and for military ones (they hoped it would cause socialists in Finland's Army to defect). It was not particularly successful. This republic existed until March 12, 1940, and was eventually incorporated with the Russian Karelo-Finnish SSR.
The War
Initially Finland had a mobilized army of only 180,000 men, but the Finnish troops turned out to be fierce adversaries employing guerrilla tactics, fast-moving ski troops in white camouflage suits, and capitalizing on their local knowledge. A certain improvised petrol bomb adapted from the Spanish Civil War was used with great success, and gained fame as the Molotov cocktail. The conditions of the winter 1939/40 were harsh; temperatures of -40°C were not unusual, and the Finns were able to use this to their advantage. Often, the Finns wisely opted not to engage the enemy in conventional warfare, instead targeting food kitchens (which were crucial for Soviets survival) and picking off Soviet troops huddled around camp fires.
In addition, to the surprise of both the Soviet leadership and the Finns, it turned out that the majority of the Finnish Socialists did not support the Soviet invasion but fought alongside their compatriots against the common enemy. Many Finnish Communists had moved to the Soviet Union in the 1930s to "build Socialism," only to end up as victims of Stalin's Great Purges, which led to widespread disillusion and even open hatred of the Soviet regime among Socialists in Finland. Another factor was the advancement of Finnish society and laws after the civil war that helped to decrease the gap between different classes of society. This partial healing of the wounds and rifts after the Civil War in Finland (1918), and Finland's language strife, is still referred to as "the Spirit of the Winter War," although it should also be noted that many communists were not allowed to fight in Finland's conscripted army because of their political background.
Soviet arrogance and incompetence was an important factor. The attackers were not expecting much of a struggle and even started the invasion with marching bands in anticipation of quick victory. Historical accounts abound of Russian soldiers advancing towards Finnish lines arm-in-arm, voices joined in rousing Soviet anthems. Due to Stalin's purges, the commanders of the Red Army had suffered 80% peacetime losses. These were commonly replaced by people less competent but more pleasing or "loyal" to their superiors, since Stalin had supervised his commanders with Commissar or political officers. Tactics which were obsolete by World War I were sometimes employed. Tactics were strictly "by the book," as a failed initiative carried a high risk of execution for its leadership. Many Soviet troops were lost simply due to their commander refusing to retreat or being disallowed from doing so.
The Soviet army was also poorly prepared for winter warfare, particularly in forests, and heavily used vulnerable motorized vehicles. These vehicles were kept running twenty-four hours a day so their fuel would not freeze, but still there were reports of engines breaking down and fuel shortages. The so-called "Raatteentie Incident," during the month-long Battle of Suomussalmi, where the Soviet 44th Infantry Division was almost completely destroyed after marching on a forest road straight into an ambush and being encircled by vastly outnumbered Finnish soldiers, is still used in military academies as an example of what not to do.
As a result of both arrogance and incompetence, the Soviets also failed to achieve a decisive superiority at the start of the war. Finland massed 130,000 men and 500 guns in the Karelian isthmus, the main theater of the war, and the Soviets attacked with only 200,000 men and 900 guns. The Soviets massed 1,000 tanks on the front, but they were poorly utilized and took massive losses.
The Finnish equipment shortage is also worth noting. At the beginning of the war, only those soldiers who had received basic training had uniforms and weapons. The rest had to make do with their own clothing with a semblance of an insignia added. These mismatched "uniforms" were nicknamed "Model Cajander" after the Prime Minister Aimo Cajander. The Finns alleviated their shortages by making extensive use of equipment, weapons and ammunition captured from the enemy. Fortunately, the army had not changed the caliber of its weapons after independence and was able to use Soviet ammunition. Ironically, sending out poorly trained and badly led Soviet troops played right into the hands of the Finns, allowing the latter ample opportunities to capture war booty.
Foreign support
World opinion at large supported the Finnish cause. The World War had not really begun yet and it was known by the public as the Phony War; at that time the Winter War was the only real fighting besides the German and Soviet invasion of Poland, and thus was a major focus of the world's interest. The Soviet aggression was generally deemed totally unjustified. Various foreign organizations sent material aid, such as medical supplies. Finnish immigrants in the United States and Canada returned home, and many volunteers (one of them actor-to-be Christopher Lee) travelled to Finland to join Finland's forces: 1,010 Danes, 895 Norwegians, 372 Ingrians, 346 Finnish expatriates, and 210 volunteers of other nationalities made it to Finland before the war was over. Foreign correspondents in Helsinki wrote, and even greatly exaggerated, reports of supposed Finnish ingenuity and successes in combat.
Sweden, which had declared itself to be a non-belligerent rather than a neutral country (as in the war between Nazi Germany and the Western Powers) contributed with military supplies, cash, credits, humanitarian aid and some 8,700 Swedish volunteers prepared to fight for Finland. Perhaps most significant was the Swedish Voluntary Air Force, in action from January 7, with 12 fighters, 5 bombers, and 8 other planes, amounting to a third of the Swedish Air Force of that time. Volunteer pilots and mechanics were drawn from the ranks. The renowned aviator Count Carl Gustav von Rosen, related to Hermann Göring, volunteered independently. There was also a volunteer work force, of about 900 workers and engineers.
The Swedish Volunteer Corps with 8,402 men in Finland — the only common volunteers who had finished training before the war ended — started to relieve five Finnish battalions at Märkäjärvi in mid-February. Together with three remaining Finnish battalions, the corps faced two Soviet divisions and were preparing for an attack by mid-March, which was inhibited by the peace agreement. 33 men died in action, among them the commander of the first relieving unit, Leutenant Colonel Magnus Dyrssen.
The Swedish volunteers remain a focus of dissonance between Swedes and Finns. The domestic debate in Finland had in the years immediately before the war given common Finns hope of considerably more support from Sweden, such as a large force of regular troops, that could have had a significant impact on the outcome of the war — or possibly caused the Russians not to attack at all.
Franco-British plans for a Scandinavian theatre
Within a month, the Soviet leadership began to consider abandoning the operation, but Finland's government was approached with a preliminary peace feeler (via Sweden's government) first on January 29. Until then, Finland had factually fought for its existence. When credible rumours reached the governments in Paris and London, the incentives for military support were dramatically changed. Now Finland fought "only" to keep as much as possible of its territory in Leningrad's neighbourhood. But of course the public could know nothing about this — neither in Finland, nor abroad. For public opinion, Finland's fight remained a life and death struggle.
(Borders as of 1920–1940.)
In February 1940 the Allies offered to help: The Allied plan, approved on February 5 by the Allied High Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and support Finland via Sweden while securing the supply routes along the way. The plan was agreed to be launched on March 20 under the condition that the Finns plead for help. It was hoped this would eventually bring the two still neutral Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden to the Allied side — by strengthening their positions against Germany, although Hitler in December had already declared to the Swedish government that Western troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.
However, only a small fraction of the troops were intended for Finland. Proposals to enter Finland directly, via the ice-free harbour of Petsamo, were dismissed. There were suspicions that the objective of the operation was to capture and occupy the Norwegian shipping harbour of Narvik and the vast mountainous areas of the North-Swedish iron ore fields, from where the Third Reich received a large share of iron ore, critical to war production. If the troops moved to halt export to Germany, the area could become a battleground for the armies of the Allied and the Third Reich. As a result, Norway and Sweden denied transit. Only after the war did it became known that the commander of the Allied expedition force was actually instructed to avoid combat contact with the Soviet troops.
The Franco-British plan initially hoped to capture all of Scandinavia north of a line Stockholm–Göteborg or Stockholm–Oslo, i.e. the British concept of the Lake line following the lakes of Mälaren, Hjälmaren, and Vänern, which would contribute with good natural defence some 1,700–1,900 kilometres south for Narvik. The expected frontier, the Lake line, involved not only Sweden's two largest cities, but its consequence was that the homes of the vast majority of the Swedes would be either Nazi-occupied or in the war zone. Later the ambition was lowered to only the northern half of Sweden and the rather narrow adjacent Norwegian coast.
The Swedish government, headed by Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson, declined to allow transit of armed troops through Swedish territory. Although Sweden had not declared itself neutral in the Winter War, it was neutral in the war between France and Britain on one side and the Third Reich and the Soviet Union on the other. Granting transit rights to a Franco-British corps were at that time considered too great a diversion from international laws on neutrality.
The Swedish Cabinet also decided to reject repeated pleas from the Finns for regular Swedish troops to be deployed in Finland, and in the end the Swedes also made it clear that their support in arms and munitions could not be maintained for much longer. Diplomatically, Finland was squeezed between Allied hopes for a prolonged war and Scandinavian fears of a continued war spreading to neighbouring countries (or of the surge of refugees that might result from a Finnish defeat). Also from Wilhelmstrasse distinct advice for peace and concessions arrived — the concessions "could always later be mended."
While Berlin and Stockholm pressured Helsinki to accept peace also on bad conditions, Paris and London had the opposite objective. From time to time, different plans and figures were presented for the Finns. To start with, France and Britain promised to send 20,000 men to arrive by the end of February, although under the implicit condition that on their way to Finland they were given opportunity to occupy North-Scandinavia.
By the end of February, Finland's Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Mannerheim, was pessimistic about the military situation, which is why the government on February 29 decided to start peace negotiations. That same day, the Soviets commenced an attack against Viipuri.
When France and Britain realized that Finland was seriously considering a peace treaty, they gave a new offer for help: 50,000 men were to be sent, if Finland asked for help before March 12. But actually, only 6,000 of these would have been destined for Finland. The rest was intended to secure harbours, roads and iron ore fields on the way.
Despite the feeble forces that would have reached Finland, intelligence about the plans reached the Soviet Union and contributed heavily to their decision to sign the armistice ending the war. It is argued that without the threat of Allied intervention, nothing would have stopped the Soviets from conquering all of Finland.
Armistice
By the end of the winter it became clear that the Russians had had enough, and German representatives suggested that Finland should negotiate with the Soviet Union. Russian casualties had been high and the situation was a source of political embarrassment for the Soviet regime. With the spring thaw approaching, the Russian forces risked becoming bogged down in the forests, and a draft of peace terms was presented to Finland on February 12. Not only the Germans were keen to see an end to the Winter War, but also the Swedes, who feared a collapse in Finland. As Finland's Cabinet hesitated in face of the harsh Soviet conditions, Sweden's King Gustaf V made a public statement, in which he confirmed to have declined Finnish pleas for support by regular troops.
By the end of February, the Finns had depleted their ammunition supplies. Also, the Soviet Union had finally succeeded in breaking through the previously impenetrable Mannerheim Line. Finally on February 29 the Finnish government agreed to start negotiations. By March 5, the Soviet army had advanced 10–15 kilometres past the Mannerheim Line and had entered the suburbs of Viipuri. The Finnish government proposed an armistice on the same day, but the Soviet side wanted to keep pressure on and declined the offer next day, and the fighting continued up to the day the peace treaty was signed.
However, the Soviet Union's leadership was being informed by its intelligence of the Allied plans to intervene in the war, but not of their details or the actual unpreparedness of the Allies. Therefore the Soviets were forced to seek an end to the war before the Allies intervened and declared war on the Soviet Union.
During four months of fighting, the Soviets had suffered huge losses. One Soviet General famously remarked that the Red Army "gained enough territory just to bury our dead". Casualty estimates vary widely — from 48,000 killed, died from wounds, and missing in action, as quoted by Soviet officials immediately after the war, to 270,000 according to Nikita Khruschev. The official statistics state that the Red Army lost 126,875 men in killed or missing over the course of the war. Sentimental Finnish veterans frequently boast that for every one Finnish soldier who died, ten Soviets lost their lives in the Winter War. It is also to be noted that Soviet losses of equipment were severe, including over 2000 tanks destroyed or captured. Finland's losses had been limited to 22,830 men killed.
Peace of Moscow
In the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 12 Finland was forced to cede the Finnish part of Karelia (with Finland's industrial center, including Finland's second largest city Viipuri, in all nearly 10% of the territory), even though large parts still were held by Finland's army. Some 422,000 Karelians, 12% of Finland's population, lost their homes. Military troops and remaining civilians were hastily evacuated in line with the terms of the treaty demanding the territories be handed over without their population.
Finland also had to cede a part of the Salla area, the Kalastajansaarento peninsula in the Barents Sea and four islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Hanko Peninsula was also leased to the Soviet Union as a military base for 30 years.
The Finns were shocked by the harsh peace terms. It seemed as if more territory was lost in the peace than in the war. Sympathy from world opinion, and from the Swedes in particular, seemed to have been of little worth. For better or worse, the harsh terms drove the Finns to seek support from the Third Reich and made many Finns regard revenge as justified.
Only a year later hostilities continued in the Continuation War.
Post-Soviet demands for return of territory
- Main article Karelia question.
After the war Karelian local governments, parishes and provincial organizations established Karjalan Liitto in order to defend rights and interests of Karelian evacuees and to find a solution for returning Karelia. During Cold war president Urho Kekkonen tried to get the territories back several times by negotiating with the Soviet leadership, but did not succeed. No one openly demanded return. After the breakup of the Soviet Union disputes are revived. Some minor active groups in Finland has been actively demanding the peaceful return to Finland of the ceded territories. The most active group in this field is ProKarelia. In latest polls these demands have met 26% – 38% support in Finland. Although the peaceful return of Karelia has allways belonged to its agenda, Karjalan liitto has, for the most part, stayed away from these demands.
In 1998, the President of Finland stated that Finland should not accept the return of Karelia "if it is offered on a silver tray". The sentiment was that taking advantage of Russian weakness in the 1990s could cause a lot of trouble at some later date.
Major battles
- Battle of Suomussalmi, (December 8, 1939 - January 7, 1940)
- Battle of Tolvajärvi, (December 12, 1939)
- Battle of Honkaniemi, (February 26 1940)
- Battle of Kollaa, (December 7 - March 13, 1940)
See also
- Finnish Army (1939)
- Continuation War
- Finlandization
- List of Finnish wars
- Lotta Svärd
- Mannerheim Line
- Carl Gustav von Rosen
- Antti Johannes Rantamaa
External links
- Furious Front Across Finland
- USSR expulsion from League of Nations from the League of Nations' Official Journal
- Finnish Radio Intelligence during World War II by Matti Yrjölä
- The Battles of the Winter War comprehensively covered by Sami H. E. Korhonen
- The Front Museum on the Hanko Peninsula, documenting the lease of Hanko to the USSR
- Finnish wartime photos and history website Stories by veterans, historians, and wartime pictures.
References
- Engle, Eloise; Paananen, Lauri (1992). The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940. Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-811724-336.
- Ries, Tomas (1988). Cold Will: Defence of Finland. Brassey's. ISBN 0-080335-926.
- Trotter, William R (1991). A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940 (also published as The Winter War). Aurum. ISBN 1-85410-932.
- Van Dyke, Carl (1997). The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939-40. Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN 0-714643-149.