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French invasion of Russia

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Patriotic War (Отечественная война - Otechestvennaya Voyna in Russian) is the Russian term for the war of Russia against the invasion of Napoleonic France in 1812.


The Invasion

In June 1812, Napoleon marched off with his Grande Armée of 610,000 men into Russia, the largest army ever seen, crossing the river Neman towards Moscow. The initially 240,000-strong Russian army sought to avoid open battle, and turned to attrition warfare: scorched earth policy, burning down crop fields and villages before retreating so that the enemy could not use them, and straining the French flanks. The Russian army suffered defeats on the approaches to Moscow in the battles of Smolensk (4-6 August) and in the Battle of Borodino (26 August 1812), but was not decisively destroyed. By the end of August, Napoleon had lost two-thirds of his army but kept marching on towards Moscow. On 1 September, Marshal Kutuzov, in command of the Russian Army since early August, ordered to abandon the city.


The Capture of Moscow

Napoleon moved into an empty city which was stripped of all supplies. Relying on classical rules of warfare aiming at capturing the enemy's capital, he expected the Russian Tsar Alexander I of Russia to offer his capitulation. Russian command did not surrender, however. Instead, fires broke out in Moscow, and raged in the city from 2 to 6 September. Moscow with its mainly wooden buildings burnt down almost completely. It is assumed that the burning of Moscow was a Russian sabotage coup, in line with scorched soil tactics, to deprive the French of shelter in the city.


Retreat

Sitting in the ashes of a ruined city without having received the Russian capitulation, and facing a Russian maneuvre forcing him out of Moscow, Napoleon started his long retreat back home. As Kutuzov blocked the southern flank, the French had to use the very same scorched Smolensk road on which they had earlier moved East. Supply of the army grew increasingly difficult, the desertion rate increased. In addition, Kutuzov, still avoiding open battle, again deployed partisan tactics to constantly strike at the French trail where it was weakest or shattering isolated French units. Starting in November 1812, the Russian winter caused additional hardship to the French army, as soldiers and horses started to die from hunger, frostbite and exhaustion on the march. The crossing of the river Berezina brought about another major defeat, as Kutuzov, deciding that the time was right for an open battle, attacked and crushed the part of the French army that had not yet made it across the bridge. In the following weeks, the remnants of the Grand Army were further diminished, and on 14 December 1812 they were expelled from Russian territory. Only about 10,000 of Napoleon's men survived the Russian campaign. Russian casualties in the few open battles are comparable to the French losses, but civilian losses along the devastated war path were much higher than the military casualties.

Historical Assessment

The Russian victory over the French army in 1812 marked the first blow to Napoleon's ambitions of European dominance, and was the turning-point of the Napoleonic Wars that led to Napoleon's ultimate defeat. For Russia the term Patriotic War formed a symbol for a strengthened national identity that would have a great impact on Russian patriotism in the 19th century. In reference to the war against Napoleon, and invoking patriotic feelings of the population, the Soviet Union proclaimed the struggle against Hitler's invasion in 1941 a Great Patriotic War. Indeed, the parallels between the German invasion and the French campaign are striking. Both invaders attacked in mid-June, advancing towards Moscow as the major Russian city. Both fought bitter battles on the road to Moscow at Smolensk. As they marched deeper into Russian territory, both faced scorched soil ahead, and fierce partisan activity in their backs. Neither Hitler nor Napoleon had anticipated a prolongation of their campaign, so that neither had equipped his armies for winter warfare. Most crucially, both Hitler and Napoleon had underestimated Russian tenacity and determination in defence of their fatherland, and the sheer vastness of Russia.