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Windows Metafile vulnerability

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The Windows Metafile vulnerability is a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows which was first disclosed on Bugtraq on 27 December 2005 [1], and subsequently used in a variety of exploits. The vulnerability, located in gdi32.dll, arises from the way in which Windows operating systems handle Windows Metafile (WMF) vector images, and permits arbitrary code to be executed on affected computers without the permission of their users. Windows versions from Windows 98 to Windows Server 2003 R2 are known to be vulnerable to the exploit, while versions as old as Windows 3.0 are probably also vulnerable. Exploits of this vulnerability are thus among the very few examples of genuine drive-by download.

Propagation and infection

Computers are mostly being affected via the spread of infected e-mails which carry the hacked WMF file as an attachment, but infection can also result from:

Other vectors may also be used to propagate infection.

McAfee, an anti-virus software provider, claims that the first generation of such exploits had infected more than 6% of their customer base by 31 December 2005. According to Secunia, "The vulnerability is caused due to an error in the handling of Windows Metafile files (".wmf") containing specially crafted SETABORTPROC "Escape" records. Such records allow arbitrary user-defined function to be executed when the rendering of a WMF file fails."

Workaround

As of 2 January 2006, Microsoft has not released an official patch to address the problem. As a workaround [2], on 28 December 2005 Microsoft advised Windows users to unregister the dynamic-link library file (shimgvw.dll) which invokes previewing of image files and is exploited by most of these attacks. However, while unregistering this file may reduce the vulnerability of systems, attacks could also exploit similar vulnerabilities in gdi32.dll.

Although a third party patch [3] by Ilfak Guilfanov removes the flawed functionality in gdi32 (see External links), the scope of the WMF vulnerability is still growing and a defence in depth approach is required to mitigate the risk of infection. The steps that users should consider taking include:

  • Making Data Execution Protection [4] effective for all applications.
  • Set the default WMF application to be something innocuous such as notepad.
  • Turn off downloads in Internet Explorer by setting the default security settings to HIGH.
  • Be vigilant in keeping all anti-virus products up-to-date. Consider frequent manual updates.
  • Block all WMF files at your network perimeter by file header filtering.
  • Utilize users accounts that are configured with as few user rights as necessary.
  • Use an alternative browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Opera. This reduces, but does not eliminate, risk of infection.
  • Disable Google Desktop indexing until the problem is corrected.
  • Do not click on any links in emails or instant messages this week.
  • Do not open any attached files this week.
  • Do not visit any new web sites this week.

Notes

  1. ^ http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/420288/30/30/, first mention of vulnerability on security mailing list Bugtraq.
  2. ^ Microsoft Security Advisory (912840) - Vulnerability in Graphics Rendering Engine Could Allow Remote Code Execution, Microsoft Official Advisory on the vulnerability.
  3. ^ http://www.hexblog.com/2005/12/wmf_vuln.html, unofficial patch by Ilfak Guilfanov.
  4. ^ How to Configure Memory Protection in Windows XP SP2, software-enforced Data Execution Prevention (DEP) feature in Microsoft Windows XP SP 2.