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Hugo Chávez

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Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (born July 28, 1954) is the 53rd[1] and current President of Venezuela. As the leader of the "Bolivarian Revolution", Chávez is known for his democratic socialist governance, his promotion of Latin American integration, and his heavy criticism (which he terms anti-imperialism) of neoliberal globalization and United States foreign policy.[2]


A career military officer, Chávez founded the leftist Fifth Republic Movement after a failed 1992 coup d'état. Chávez was elected President in 1998[3] on promises of aiding Venezuela's poor majority, and reelected in 2000.[4] Domestically, Chávez has launched massive Bolivarian Missions to combat disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, poverty, and other social ills. Abroad, Chávez has acted against the Washington Consensus by supporting alternative models of economic development, and has advocated cooperation among the world's poor nations, especially those in Latin America.

A poll carried out between Feb 19 and March 2, 2005 put Chavez 's approval rating at 70.5% (Peter Millard Dow Jones Newswires).

Early life (1954–1992)

Main article: Early life and military career of Hugo Chávez
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In the military, Chávez rapidly rose through the ranks while developing his political philosophy of "Bolivarianism" with associates.

Chávez was born on July 28 1954 in the town of Sabaneta, Barinas. The second son of two schoolteachers, Hugo de los Reyes Chávez and Elena Frías de Chávez, he is of mixed Amerindian, African, and Spanish descent. Chávez was raised with his five siblings in a thatched palm leaf house near Sabaneta. At an early age, Chávez was sent to Sabaneta with his older brother to live with his paternal grandmother, Rosa Inés Chávez. There, Chávez pursued hobbies such as painting, singing, and baseball, while also attending elementary school at the Julián Pino School. He was later forced to relocate to the town of Barinas to attend high school at the Daniel Florencio O'Leary School, graduating with a science degree (Government of Venezuela).

At age seventeen, Chávez enrolled at the Venezuelan Academy of Military Sciences. After graduating in 1975 as a sub-lieutenant with master's degrees in military science and engineering, Chávez entered military service for several months. He was then allowed to pursue graduate studies in political science at Caracas' Simón Bolívar University, but left without a degree. Over the course of his college years, Chávez and fellow students developed a fervently left-nationalist doctrine that they termed "Bolivarianism", inspired by the Pan-Americanist philosophies of 19th-century Venezuelan revolutionary Simón Bolívar, the influence of Peruvian dictator Juan Velasco, and the teachings of various socialist and communist leaders. Chávez engaged in sporting events and cultural activities during these years as well. Notably, Chávez played both baseball and softball with the Criollitos de Venezuela, progressing with them to the Venezuelan National Baseball Championships in 1969. Chávez also authored numerous poems, stories and theatrical pieces (Government of Venezuela).

Upon completing his studies, Chávez initially entered active-duty military service as a member of a counter-insurgency battalion stationed in Barinas. Chávez's military career lasted 17 years, during which time he held a variety of post, command, and staff positions, eventually rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Chávez also held a series of teaching and staffing positions at the Military Academy of Venezuela, where he was first acknowledged by his peers for his fiery lecturing style and unusually radical critique of Venezuelan government and society.[5] At this time, Chávez established the Bolivarian Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 (MBR-200). Afterward, he rose to fill a number of sensitive high-level positions in Caracas and was decorated several times (Government of Venezuela).

Coup attempt of 1992

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Reporters interview Chávez following his 1994 release from prison. Although the coup Chávez was imprisoned for failed, it also rocketed him into the national spotlight.
Main article: Venezuelan coup attempt of 1992

After an extended period of popular dissatisfaction and economic decline (Schuyler 2001, p. 10) under the neoliberal administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez, Chávez made extensive preparations for a military-civilian coup d'état (Guillermoprieto 2005). Initially planned for December, Chávez delayed the MBR-200 coup until the early twilight hours of February 4, 1992. On that date, five army units under Chávez's command barreled into urban Caracas with the mission of assaulting and overwhelming key military and communications installations throughout the city, including the Miraflores presidential palace, the defense ministry, La Carlota military airport, and the Historical Museum. Chávez's ultimate goal was to intercept and take custody of Pérez before he returned to Miraflores from an overseas trip.

Chávez held the loyalty of some 10% of Venezuela's military forces (Gott 2005, p. 64); still, numerous betrayals, defections, errors, and other unforeseen circumstances soon left Chávez and a small group of other rebels completely cut off in the Historical Museum, without any means of conveying orders to their network of spies and collaborators spread throughout Venezuela (Gott 2005, p. 63). Worse, Chávez's allies were unable to broadcast their prerecorded tapes on the national airwaves in which Chávez planned to issue a general call for a mass civilian uprising against Pérez. As the coup unfolded, Pérez eluded capture, fourteen soldiers were killed, and 130 soldiers and civilians were injured in the ensuing violence (Gott 2005, p. 69). Nevertheless, rebel forces in other parts of Venezuela made swift advances and were ultimately able to take control of such large cities as Valencia, Maracaibo, and Maracay with the help of spontaneous civilian aid. Chávez's forces, however, had failed to take Caracas (Gott 2005, pp. 66–67).

Chávez, alarmed, soon gave himself up to the government. He was then allowed to appear on national television to call for all remaining rebel detachments in Venezuela to cease hostilities. When he did so, Chávez famously quipped on national television that he had only failed "por ahora"—"for the moment".[6] Chávez was immediately catapulted into the national spotlight, with many poor Venezuelans seeing him as a figure who had stood up against government corruption and kleptocracy (Gott 2005, p. 67).[2] Afterwards, Chávez was sent to Yare prison; meanwhile, Pérez, the coup's intended target, was impeached a year later. While in prison, Chávez developed a carnosity of the eye, which spread to his iris. Despite treatments and operations, Chávez's eyesight was permanently weakened.[7]

Political rise (1992–1999)

Further information: Venezuelan presidential election, 1998

Template:ChavezElections1998 After a two-year imprisonment, Chávez was pardoned by President Rafael Caldera in 1994. Upon his release, Chávez immediately reconstituted the MBR-200 as the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR—Movimiento Quinta República, with the V representing the Roman numeral five). Later, in 1998, Chávez began to campaign for the presidency. In working to gain the trust of voters, Chávez drafted an agenda that drew heavily on his philosophy of Bolivarianism. Chávez thus campaigned on an anti-corruption and anti-poverty platform, while pledging to dismantle puntofijismo, the traditional two-party patronage system (Guillermoprieto 2005).[8] Controversially, foreign banks—including Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) and Banco Santander, each the owner of one of Venezuela's largest banks—illicitly funneled millions of dollars into Chávez's campaign (Marcano 2005, p. 50)(Toro 2004).

Chávez utilized his charisma and flamboyant public speaking style—noted for its abundance of colloquialisms and ribald manner—on the campaign trail to win the trust and favor of a primarily poor and working class following. By May 1998, Chávez's support had risen to 30% in polls, and by August he was registering 39%. Chávez went on to win the Carter Center-endorsed 1998 presidential election on December 6 1998 with 56.2% of the vote, or a little over 30% of the electoral population (Guillermoprieto 2005).[9]

Presidency (1999–present)

Chávez's first presidential inauguration in 1999 led to widespread transformation and turmoil. Venezuelan society under Chávez has seen sweeping and radical shifts in social policy, moving away from the government officially embracing a free market economy and neoliberal reform principles and towards quasi-socialist income redistribution and social welfare programs. Chávez has just as radically upended Venezuela's traditional foreign policy. Instead of continuing Venezuela's past support for U.S. and European strategic interests, Chávez has promoted alternative development and integration paradigms for the Global South.

Chávez's reforms have drawn both critical acclaim and bitter condemnation. He has alienated many Venezuelans, especially in the upper middle and upper classes, who have reported widespread political repression and human rights violations under his rule. The severe controversy surrounding Chávez's policies spawned a transitory 2002 overthrow of Chávez, a 2004 recall attempt, and rumors and allegations regarding foreign conspiracies to overthrow Chávez via additional military coups, assassination attempts, and even military invasions. Nevertheless, Chávez remains a powerful figure in modern politics and a focal point for growing international resistance to the Washington Consensus and United States foreign policy.

1999: Economic crisis and new constitution

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Chávez meets with French President Jacques Chirac at the Élysée Palace in Paris on January 12, 1999 (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Photographic Service).

Chávez took the presidential oath of office on February 2, 1999 with a mandate to reverse Venezuela's economic decline and strengthen the role of the state in ensuring distributive social justice. Chávez's first few months in office were dedicated primarily to dismantling puntofijismo via new legislation and constitutional reform, while his secondary focus was on immediately allocating more government funds to new social programs.

However, as a recession triggered by historically low oil prices and soaring international interest rates rocked Venezuela, the shrunken federal treasury provided very little of the resources Chávez required for his promised massive anti-poverty measures. As a result, in April 1999 Chávez was forced to set his eyes upon the military, which was costly for the government but did little for the systematic social development that he desired. Chávez ordered all branches of the military to devise programs to combat poverty and to further civic and social development in Venezuela's vast slum and rural areas. This civilian-military program was launched as Plan Bolivar 2000, and was heavily patterned after a similar program enacted by Cuban President Fidel Castro during the early 1990s, while the Cuban people were still suffering through the Special Period. Projects within Plan Bolivar 2000's scope included road building, housing construction, and mass vaccination. These programs were widely criticized by Chávez's opposition as corrupt and inefficient. Chávez defended them by stating that these programs were some of the only ways he had to effect his social agenda in the face of a state bureaucracy that he saw as stubbornly opposed to his reforms.[10]

Chávez sharply diverged from previous administrations' economic policies, terminating their practice of extensively privatizing Venezuela's state-owned holdings, such as the national social security system, holdings in the aluminum industry, and the oil sector.[11] However, Chávez faced a profound dilemma in that, while he wished to improve living standards through redistribution, increased regulation, and social spending, he did not wish to discourage foreign direct investment (FDI). In keeping with his predecessors, Chávez attempted to shore up FDI influxes to prevent an economic crisis of chronic capital flight and monetary inflation.

Chávez also worked to reduce Venezuelan oil extraction in the hopes of garnering elevated oil prices and, at least theoretically, elevated total oil revenues, thereby boosting Venezuela's severely deflated foreign exchange reserves. He extensively lobbied other OPEC countries to cut their production rates as well. As a result of these actions, Chávez became known as a "price hawk" in his dealings with the oil industry and OPEC. Chávez also attempted a comprehensive renegotiation of 60-year-old royalty payment agreements with oil giants Philips Petroleum and ExxonMobil.[12] These agreements had allowed the corporations to pay in taxes as little as 1% of the tens of billions of dollars in revenues they were earning from the Venezuelan oil they were extracting. Afterwards, a frustrated Chávez stated his intention to complete the nationalization of Venezuela's oil resources. Although unsuccessful in his attempts to renegotiate with the oil corporations, Chávez succeeded in improving both the fairness and efficiency of Venezuela's formerly lax tax collection and auditing system, especially for major corporations and landholders. Template:ChavezElections1999

Nevertheless, by mid-1999, Chávez was thoroughly incensed by his administration's setbacks in enacting his much-promised anti-poverty initiatives. The National Assembly's opposition members were forestalling his allies' legislation. Chávez moved to bypass such opposition by approving the scheduling of two fresh national elections for July 1999—just months after Chávez's presidential election. The first was a nationwide referendum to determine whether a national constitutional assembly should be created. The assembly was tasked with framing a new Venezuelan constitution that hewed more closely to Chávez's own political ideology. A second election was held that elected delegates to this constitutional assembly. Chávez's widespread popularity allowed the constitutional referendum to pass with a 71.78% "yes" vote; in the second election, members of Chávez's MVR and select allied parties formed the Polo Patriotico ("Patriotic Pole"). Chávez's Polo Patriotico went on to win 95% (120 out of the total 131) of the seats in the voter-approved Venezuelan Constitutional Assembly.

However, in August 1999, the Constitutional Assembly established a special "judicial emergency committee" with the power to remove judges without consulting with other branches of government—over 190 judges were eventually suspended on charges of corruption. In the same month, the Constitutional Assembly declared a "legislative emergency", resulting in a seven-member committee that was tasked with conducting the legislative functions ordinarily carried out by the National Assembly. Legislative opposition to Chávez's policies was immediately disabled. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Assembly prohibited the National Assembly from holding meetings of any sort.[13]

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Chávez holds up a miniature copy of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution at the 2005 World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

The Constitutional Assembly itself drafted the new 1999 Venezuelan Constitution. With 350 articles, the document was, as drafted, one of the world's lengthiest constitutions. It first changed the country's official name from "Republic of Venezuela" to "Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela". It also increased the presidential term of office from five to six years, introduced a presidential two-term limit, and introduced provisions for national presidential recall referenda—that is, Venezuelan voters gained the right to remove the president from office before the expiration of his presidential term. Such referenda can only be activated by a petition to do so with the required number of signatures. The presidency was also dramatically strengthened, with the power to dissolve the National Assembly upon decree. The new constitution converted the formerly bicameral National Assembly into a unicameral legislature, and stripped it of many of its former powers. Provisions were also made for a new position, the Public Defender, an office with the authority to check the activities of the presidency, the National Assembly, and the constitution. Chávez characterized the Public Defender as the guardian of the "moral branch" of the new Venezuelan government, tasked with defending public and moral interests. Lastly, the Venezuelan judiciary was reformed. Judges, under the new constitution, were now to be installed after passing public examinations and were not, as in the old manner, to be appointed by the National Assembly.

This new constitution was presented to the national electorate in December 1999 and approved with a CNE-audited 71.78% "yes" vote. Over a span of a mere 60 days, the Constitutional Assembly thus framed a document that enshrined as constitutional law most of the structural changes Chávez desired. Chávez stated that such changes were necessary in order to successfully and comprehensively enact his planned social justice programs. He planned to enact sweeping changes in Venezuelan governmental and political structure, and, based on his 1998 campaign pledges, to dramatically open up Venezuelan political discourse to independent and third parties. In the process, Chávez sought to fatally paralyze his AD and COPEI opposition. All of Chávez's aims were, in one move, dramatically furthered.

2000–2001: Reelection and reform

Further information: Venezuelan presidential election, 2000

Template:ChavezElections2000

Elections for the new unicameral National Assembly were held on July 30, 2000. During this same election, Chávez himself stood for reelection. Chávez's coalition garnered a commanding two-thirds majority of seats in the National Assembly while Chávez was reelected with 60% of the votes. The Carter Center monitored the 2000 presidential election; their report on that election stated that, due to lack of transparency, CNE partiality, and political pressure from the Chávez government that resulted in unconstitutionally early elections, it was unable to validate the official CNE results.[14]

Later, on December 3, 2000, local elections and a referendum were held. The referendum, backed by Chávez, proposed a law that would force Venezuela's labor unions to hold state-monitored elections. The referendum was widely condemned by international labor organizations—including the International Labour Organization—as undue government interference in internal union matters; these organizations threatened to apply sanctions on Venezuela.[15]

After the May and July 2000 elections, Chávez backed the passage of the "Enabling Act" by the National Assembly. This act allowed Chávez to rule by decree for one year. In November 2001, shortly before the Enabling Act was set to expire, Chávez enacted a set of 49 decrees. These included the Hydrocarbons Law and the Land Law, which are detailed below. Fedecámaras, a national business federation, opposed the new laws and called for a general business strike on December 10, 2001. The strike failed to significantly impact Chávez's policies, however.

By the end of the first three years of his presidency, Chávez's main policy concerns had successfully challenged the Venezuelan oligarchy's control over Venezuela's land, and introduced reforms aimed at improving the social welfare of the population by attempting to lower infant mortality rates, introducing land reform, and implementing a cursory government-funded free healthcare system and education up to university level.[24] By December of 2001, Chávez's policies had reduced inflation from 40% to 12% while generating 4% economic growth. His administration also reported an increase in primary school enrollment by one million students.[24]

2002: Coup and worker strike

Further information: Venezuelan coup attempt of 2002
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Chávez makes a dramatic return to power on April 13, 2002 following a two-day coup d'état.

On April 9, 2002, CTV leader Carlos Ortega called for a two-day general strike. Approximately 500,000 people took to the streets on April 11 2002 and marched towards the headquarters of Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), in defense of its recently-fired management. The organizers decided to redirect the march to Miraflores, the presidential palace, where a pro-Chávez demonstration was taking place. Chávez took over the Venezuelan airwaves several times in the early afternoon in what is termed a cadena, or a commandeering of the media airwaves to broadcast public announcements, asking protesters to return to their homes, playing lengthy pre-recorded discourses, and attempting to block coverage of the ensuing violence. Gunfire and violence erupted between two groups of demonstrators, Caracas's Metropolitan Police (under the control of the oppositionist mayor), and the Venezuelan national guard (under Chávez's command), and snipers were reported from the areas where Chavistas (supporters of Chávez) were concentrated. By the end of the outbreak of violence, more than 100 casualties and 17 deaths had been documented.

Then, unexpectedly, Lucas Rincón Romero, commander-in-chief of the Venezuelan armed forces, announced in a broadcast to a stunned nationwide audience that Chávez had tendered his resignation from the presidency. While Chávez was brought to a military base and held there, military leaders appointed the president of the Fedecámaras, Pedro Carmona, as Venezuela's interim president. Carmona's first decree reversed all of the major social and economic policies that comprised Chávez's "Bolivarian Revolution", including loosening Chávez's credit controls and ending his oil price quotas by raising production back to pre-Chávez levels. Carmona also dissolved both the National Assembly and the Venezuelan judiciary, while reverting the nation's name back to República de Venezuela.

Carmona's rapid reforms generated pro-Chávez uprisings and looting across Caracas. Responding to these disturbances, Venezuelan soldiers loyal to Chávez called for massive popular support for a counter-coup. These soldiers later stormed and retook the presidential palace, liberating Chávez from his captivity. The shortest-lived government in Venezuelan history was thus toppled, and Chávez resumed his presidency on the night of Saturday, April 13, 2002. Following this episode, Rincón was reappointed by Chávez as commander-in-chief, and later as Interior Minister in 2003.[16]

Chávez waves to supporters after disembarking at Salgado Filho Airport on January 26, 2003 while on route to the World Social Forum convened in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Agência Brasil).

Chávez resumed his presidency in April 2002 amidst popular outrage at his overthrow. He ordered several investigations to be carried out, and their official results supported Chávez's assertions that the 2002 coup was sponsored by the United States.[17] On April 16, 2002, Chávez reported that a plane with U.S. registration numbers had visited and been berthed at Venezuela's Orchila Island airbase, where Chávez had been held captive. On May 14 2002, Chávez alleged that he had definitive proof of U.S. military involvement in April's coup. He claimed that during the coup Venezuelan radar images had indicated the presence of U.S. military naval vessels and aircraft in Venezuelan waters and airspace. Chávez also repeatedly claimed during the coup's immediate aftermath that the U.S. was still seeking his overthrow. On October 6, 2002, for example, Chávez stated that he had foiled a new coup plot, and on October 20, 2002, Chávez stated that he had barely escaped an assassination attempt while returning from a trip to Europe.[24]

Chávez quickly took steps to prevent future coup attempts and stabilize the government. First, Chávez fired sixty generals and completely replaced the upper echelons of Venezuela's armed forces, substituting them with more pro-Chávez personnel. Chávez also sought to deepen his emotional bond with rank and file soldiers who, like Chávez himself, came from neglected segments of Venezuelan society. He boosted support programs, employment, and benefits for veterans, while promulgating new civilian-military development initiatives.

However, only a few months would pass after the April 2002 coup before the Chávez presidency would enter another crisis. Chávez, outraged by the coup and seeking more funds for his social programs, moved in late 2002 to implement total control over the PDVSA and its revenues. As a result, for two months following December 2 2002, Chávez faced a strike from resistant PDVSA workers that sought to force Chávez out of office by completely removing his access to the all-important government oil revenue. The strike, led by a coalition of labor unions, industrial magnates, and oil workers, sought to halt the activities of the PDVSA. As a result, Venezuela ceased exporting its former daily average of 2,800,000 barrels (450,000 m³) of oil and oil derivatives. Hydrocarbon shortages soon erupted throughout Venezuela, with long lines forming at petrol-filling stations. Gasoline imports were soon required. Alarmed, Chávez responded by firing PDVSA's anti-Chávez upper-eschelon management and dismissing 18,000 skilled PDVSA employees. Chávez justified this by alleging their complicity in gross mismanagement and corruption in their handling of oil revenues, while opposition supporters of the fired workers stated that his actions were politically-motivated. Later, allegations arose from anti-Chávez activists that Chávez had authorized the creation of blacklists to prevent the employment of strike participants. A disputed Venezuelan court ruling declared the dismissal of these workers illegal and ordered the immediate return of the entire group to their former posts. Nevertheless, Chávez and his allies have repeatedly stated that the ruling will not be enforced. On December 6, followers of Hugo Chávez murdered two strike supporters at Plaza Altamira. Joao Goveia was accused and condemned for the crimes, but some witnesses claim he wasn't alone.

2003–2004: Recall vote

Further information: Venezuelan recall referendum, 2004
File:HugoChavez1820.jpeg
Chávez waves to a cheering crowd from the high balcony of the Piratini Palace, seat of the government of Rio Grande Do Sul in Brazil, on January 26, 2003 (Agência Brasil).

Chávez made significant strides in his continuing domestic policy efforts in both 2003 and 2004. Namely, Chávez initiated such nationwide programs as Mission Guaicaipuro (launched on October 12, 2003 to protect indigenous peoples' livelihood, religion, land, culture and rights), Mission Robinson (launched in July 2003 to provide free reading, writing and arithmetic lessons to the more than 1.5 million Venezuelan adults who were illiterate prior to Chávez's 1999 election), Mission Sucre (launched in late 2003 to furnish free and ongoing higher education to the two million adult Venezuelans who had not completed their elementary-level education), and Mission Ribas (launched November 2003 in order to provide remedial education and diplomas for Venezuela's five million high school dropouts). The impact of such programs were widely felt throughout Venezuela, to the extent that on the first anniversary of Mission Robinson's establishment, and to an audience of 50,000 formerly illiterate Venezuelans, Chávez stated in Caracas's Teresa Carreño theater that "it was truly a world record: in a year, we have graduated 1,250,000 Venezuelans". Nevertheless, there were also significant setbacks. Notably, the inflation rate rocketed to 31% in 2002 and 27% in 2003, causing a great deal of hardship for the poor.

In May 9 2004, a group of 126 Colombians were captured during a raid of a farm near Caracas. Chávez soon accused them of being a foreign-funded paramilitary force who intended to violently overthrow Chávez.[18] These events merely served to further the extreme and violent polarization of Venezuelan society between pro- and anti-Chávez camps. Chávez's allegations of a putative 2004 coup attempt continue to stir controversy and doubts to this day. In October 2005, 27 of the accused Colombians were found guilty, while the rest were released and deported. [19]

Template:ChavezElections2004 In early and mid-2003, the Venezuelan opposition began the process of collecting the millions of signatures needed to activate the presidential recall provision provided for in the 1999 Constitution. In August 2003, around 3.2 million signatures were presented, but these were rejected by the pro-Chávez majority in the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE; "National Electoral Council") on the grounds that many had been collected before the mid-point of Chávez's presidential term.[20] Reports then began to emerge among opposition and international news outlets that Chávez had begun to act punitively against those who had signed the petition, while pro-Chávez individuals stated that they had been coerced by employers into offering their signatures at their workplaces. In November 2003, the opposition collected an entirely new set of signatures, with 3.6 million names produced over a span of four days. Riots erupted nationwide as allegations of fraud were made by Chávez against the signature collectors.

Reports again emerged that Chávez and his allies were penalizing signers of the publicly posted petition. Charges were made of summary dismissals from government ministries, PDVSA, the state-owned water corporation, the Caracas Metro, and public hospitals controlled by Chávez's political allies. Finally, after opposition leaders submitted to the CNE a valid petition with 2,436,830 signatures that requested a presidential recall referendum, a recall referendum was announced on June 8, 2004 by the CNE. Chávez and his political allies responded to this by launching a massive grassroots effort to mobilize supporters and encourage rejection of the recall with a "no" vote. The recall vote itself was held on August 15 2004. A record number of voters turned out to defeat the recall attempt with a 59.25% "no" vote.[21][8] A jubilant Chávez pledged to redouble his efforts against both poverty and imperialism, while promising to foster dialogue with his opponents. The election was overseen by the Carter Center and certified by them as fair and open.[22] However, the opposition challenged the validity of the results, calling them fraudulent. Claims of fraud were backed by documents, reports of irregularities in polling centers and even one study that challenged the results using statistical analysis [citation needed]. Further complaints were voiced over the delay between the voting and recount process, which took place three days later, as well as footage that showed what appeared to be members of the FAN, the National Armed Forces, handling voting boxes in an undisclosed location.

2004–present: Focus on foreign relations

Chávez embraces Argentinian President Néstor Kirchner during the closing of a July 2004 joint press conference held in Venezuela (Office of the Argentine Presidency).

In the aftermath of his referendum victory, Chávez's primary objectives of fundamental social and economic transformation and redistribution accelerated dramatically. Chávez himself placed the development and implementation of the Bolivarian Missions once again at the forefront of his political agenda. Sharp increases in global oil prices gave Chávez access to billions of dollars in extra foreign exchange reserves. Economic growth picked up markedly, reaching double-digit growth in 2004 and a projected 8% growth rate for 2005.

Many new policy initiatives were advanced by Chávez after 2004. In late March 2005, the Chávez government passed a series of media regulations that criminalized broadcasted libel and slander directed against public officials; prison sentences of up to 40 months for serious instances of character defamation launched against Chávez and other officials were enacted. When asked if he would ever actually move to use the 40-month sentence if a media figure insulted him, Chávez remarked that "I don't care if they [the private media] call me names.... As Don Quixote said, 'If the dogs are barking, it is because we are working.'"[23] Chávez also worked to expand his land redistribution and social welfare programs by authorizing and funding a multitude of new Bolivarian Missions, including Mission Vuelta al Campo, the second and third phases of Mission Barrio Adentro, both first initiated in June 2005 to construct, fund, and refurbish secondary (integrated diagnostic center) and tertiary (hospital) public health care facilities nationwide, and Mission Miranda, which established a national citizen's militia. Meanwhile, Venezuela's doctors went on strike, protesting the siphoning of public funds from their existing institutions to these new Bolivarian ones, run by Cuban doctors.

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Chávez meets with Republican U.S. Senator Norm Coleman in March 2005.

Chávez focused considerably on Venezuela's foreign relations in 2004 and 2005 via new bilateral and multilateral agreements, including humanitarian aid and construction projects. Chávez has engaged, with varying degrees of success, numerous other foreign leaders, including Argentina's Nestor Kirchner, China's Hu Jintao, Cuba's Fidel Castro and Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. On March 4 2005, Chávez publicly declared that the U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was "dead." Chávez stated that the neoliberal model of development had utterly failed in improving the lives of Latin Americans, and that an alternative, anti-capitalist model would be conceived in order to increase trade and relations between Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil. Chávez also stated his desire that a leftist, Latin American analogue of NATO be established.

Over the course of 2004 and 2005, the Venezuelan military under Chávez also began in earnest to reduce weaponry sourcing and military ties with the United States. Chávez's Venezuela is thus increasingly purchasing arms from alternative sources, such as Brazil, Russia, China and Spain. Friction over these sales escalated, and in response Chávez ended cooperation between the militaries of the two countries. He also asked all active-duty U.S. soldiers to leave Venezuela. Additionally, in 2005 Chávez announced the creation of a large "military reserve"—the Mission Miranda program, which encompasses a militia of 1.5 million citizens—as a defensive measure against foreign intervention or outright invasion.[24] Additionally, in October 2005, Chávez banished the Christian missionary organization "New Tribes Mission" from the country, accusing it of "imperialist infiltration" and harboring connections with the CIA.[25] At the same time, he granted inalienable titles to over 6,800 square kilometers of land traditionally inhabited by Amazonian indigenous peoples to their respective resident natives, though this land could not be bought or sold as Western-style title deeds can. Chávez cited these changes as evidence that his revolution was also a revolution for the defense of indigenous rights, such as those promoted by Chávez's Mission Guaicaipuro.

Chávez makes a speech at the signing ceremony inaugurating the Brazil-Venezuela Trade Relations Acts on September 29, 2005 (Agência Brasil).

During this period, Chávez placed much greater emphasis on alternative economic development and international trade models, much of it in the form of extremely ambitious hemisphere-wide international aid agreements. For example, on August 20, 2005, during the first graduation of international scholarship students from Cuba's Latin American School of Medicine, Chávez announced that he would jointly establish with Cuba a second such medical school that would provide tuition-free medical training—an ex gratia project valued at between $20 and 30 billion—to more than 100,000 physicians who would pledge to work in the poorest communities of the Global South. He announced that the project would run for the next decade, and that the new school would include at least 30,000 new places for poor students from both Latin America and the Caribbean.[26]

Chávez has also taken ample opportunity on the international stage to juxtapose such projects with the manifest results and workings of neoliberal globalization. Most notably, during his speech at the 2005 UN World Summit, he denounced development models that are organized around neoliberal guidelines such as liberalization of capital flows, removal of trade barriers, and privatization as the reason for the developing world's impoverishment. Chávez also went on to warn of an imminent global energy famine brought about by hydrocarbon depletion (based on Hubbert peak theory), stating that "we are facing an unprecedented energy crisis.... Oil is starting to become exhausted."[27] Additionally, on November 7, 2005, Chávez referenced the stalling of the FTAA, stating at the Fourth Summit of the Americas, held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, that "the great loser today was George W. Bush. The man went away wounded. You could see defeat on his face." Chávez took the same opportunity to state that "the taste of victory" was apparent with regards to the promotion of his own trade alternative, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA—Alternativa Bolivariana para América), which Venezuela and Cuba inaugurated on December 14, 2004.[28]

Impact of Presidency

Bolivarian Missions

Further information: Bolivarian Missions

Template:Bolivarian Missions Infobox 1 Chávez's domestic policy is embodied by the Bolivarian Missions, a series of social justice programs that have radically altered the economic and cultural landscape of Venezuela. Although recent economic activity under Chávez has been robust under these programs,[29][30] per-capita GDP in 2004 has dropped around 1% from 1999 levels. However, as of September 2005, there have also been significant drops since 1999 in unemployment[31] and in the government's definition of "poverty",[32] and there have been marked improvements in national health indicators between 1998 and 2005.[33][34]

Aims of the Bolivarian Missions have included the launching of massive government anti-poverty initiatives, [35][36] the construction of thousands of free medical clinics for the poor,[37] the institution of educational campaigns that have reportedly made more than one million adult Venezuelans literate,[38][39] and the enactment of food[40] and housing subsidies.[41] The Missions have overseen widespread state-supported experimentation in citizen- and worker-managed governance,[42][43] as well as the granting of thousands of free land titles to formerly landless poor and indigenous communities.[44] In contrast, several large landed estates and factories have been, or are in the process of being, expropriated.

Labor policy

Chávez has had a combative relationship with the nation's largest trade union confederation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), which is historically aligned with the Acción Democrática party. During the December 2000 local elections, Chávez placed a referendum measure on the ballot that would mandate state-monitored elections within unions. The measure, which was condemned by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as undue interference in internal union matters, passed by a large margin on a very low electoral turnout. In the ensuing CTV elections, Carlos Ortega declared his victory and remained in office as CTV president, while Chavista (pro-Chávez) candidates declared fraud.

The Unión Nacional de los Trabajadores (UNT—"National Union of Workers"), a new pro-Chávez union federation, formed in response, and has been growing in membership; it seeks to ultimately supplant the CTV. Several Chavista unions have withdrawn from the CTV because of their anti-Chávez activism, and have instead affiliated with the UNT. In 2003, Chávez chose to send UNT, rather than CTV, representatives to an annual ILO meeting.

At the request of its workers, Chávez nationalized Venepal, a formerly closed paper and cardboard manufacturing firm, on January 19, 2005. Workers had occupied the factory floor and restarted production, but following a failed deal with management and amidst management threats to liquidate the firm's equipment, Chávez ordered the nationalization, extended a line of credit to the workers, and ordered that the Venezuelan educational missions purchase more paper products from the company.

Economic policy

Chavéz attends the Arab-South America Summit held on May 5 2005 in Brasília, Brazil. He is flanked by Qatari Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani and Lebanese Prime Minister Nagib Mikati (Agência Brasil).

Venezuela is a major producer of oil products, which remain the keystone of the Venezuelan economy. Chávez has gained a reputation as a price hawk in OPEC, pushing for stringent enforcement of production quotas and higher target oil prices. He has also attempted to broaden Venezuela's customer base, striking joint exploration deals with other developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China and India. Record oil prices have meant more funding for social programs, but have left the economy increasingly dependent on both the Chávez government and the oil sector; the private sector's role has correspondingly diminished. Despite the high government income, official unemployment figures have remained above 11%.[45]

Chávez has redirected the focus of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Venezuela's state-owned oil company, by bringing it more closely under the direction of the Energy Ministry. He has also attempted to repatriate more oil funds to Venezuela by raising royalty percentages on joint extraction contracts that are payable to Venezuela. Chávez has also explored the liquidation of some or all of the assets belonging to PDVSA's U.S.-based subsidiary, Citgo. The oil ministry has been successful in restructuring Citgo's profit structure,[46] resulting in large increases in dividends and income taxes from PDVSA. In 2005, Citgo announced the largest dividend payment to PDVSA in over a decade, $400 million. Yet despite massive efforts to increase production, daily oil production is still well short of the levels attained under the previous administration.

Foreign policy

Further information: Foreign policy of Hugo Chávez
File:Lula Chavez Venezuela 03292005.jpg
Hugo Chávez takes a walk with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on March 29, 2005.

Chávez has refocused Venezuelan foreign policy on Latin American economic and social integration by enacting bilateral trade and reciprocal aid agreements, including his so-called "oil diplomacy" (The Economist 2005).[47] These agreements are put into action by the cooperative multinational institutions Chávez has helped found: PetroCaribe, Petrosur, and Telesur. Bilateral trade relationships with other Latin American countries have also played a major role in his policy, with Chávez increasing arms purchases from Brazil, forming oil-for-expertise trade arrangements with Cuba, funding an approximately $300 million ex gratia oil pipeline built to provide discounted natural gas to Colombia,[48] and creating unique barter arrangements that exchange Venezuelan petroleum for cash-strapped Argentina's meat and dairy products. Additionally, Chávez worked closely with other Latin American leaders following the 1997 Summit of the Americas in many areas—especially energy integration—and championed the OAS decision to adopt the Anti-Corruption Convention. Chávez also participates in the United Nations Friends groups for Haiti, and is pursuing efforts to join and engage the Mercosur trade bloc to expand the hemisphere's trade integration prospects.

Abroad, Chávez regularly portrays his movement's objectives as being in intractable conflict with both "neocolonialism" and neoliberalism. Chávez has, for example, denounced U.S. foreign policy regarding areas such as Iraq, Haiti, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Chávez's public friendship with Castro and significant trade relationship with Cuba have markedly compromised the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba diplomatically and economically.[49] Long-standing ties between the U.S. and Venezuelan militaries were also severed by Chávez. Chávez's stance as an OPEC price hawk has not made him popular in the United States, as Venezuela had long lobbied OPEC producers towards lower production ceilings. When Venezuela held the OPEC presidency in 2000, Chávez made a ten-day tour of OPEC countries in a bid to promote his policies, and in the process became the first head of state to meet Saddam Hussein since the Gulf War. The visit was controversial at home and in the United States, despite Chávez observing the ban on international flights to and from Iraq—he drove from Iran, his previous stop.[50]

Chávez and Argentine President Néstor Kirchner discuss energy and trade integration projects for South America. They met on November 21, 2005 in Venezuela as a gesture of mutual solidarity in their opposition to the Washington Consensus and the FTAA proposal (Office of the Argentine Presidency).

In response to the ousting of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004, Chávez said Bush would be a pendejo ("fool") to try the same with him. In a later speech, he made personal remarks regarding Condoleezza Rice, referring to her as a "complete illiterate" with regards to comprehending Latin America.[51][7][52] Additionally, although Chávez typically enjoys fair to excellent relations with fellow Latin American leaders, there have been examples of heated disputes between them. On November 10, 2005, Chávez, stated regarding Mexican President Vicente Fox in a talk before supporters in Caracas that he was saddened that "the president of a people like the Mexicans lets himself become the puppy dog of the empire" for what he alleged was Fox's obsequience to U.S. trade interests in his promotion of the newly stalled FTAA.[53] Additionally, on the November 13, 2005 episode of his weekly talk show, Aló, Presidente!, Chávez stated that the Mexican president was "bleeding from his wounds" and warned Fox to not "mess" with him, lest he "get stung". Fox threatened to recall the Mexican ambassador to Venezuela if the Venezuelan government did not promptly issue an apology. In response, Chávez recalled Venezuela's own ambassador to Mexico City, Vladimir Villegas. The Mexican ambassador to Caracas was recalled the following day.[54] Although ties between the two countries have been strained, neither country will say that diplomatic ties have been indefinitely severed. Several groups in both Mexico and Venezuela are working to restore the diplomatic relationship between the two countries.

In two highly-publicized episodes, Chávez has attempted to score rhetorical points against the U.S. government with offers of petroleum-related aid. After Hurricane Katrina battered the United States’ gulf coast in late 2005, the Chávez administration was the first foreign government to offer aid to its "North American brothers". Chávez offered tons of food, water, and a million barrels of extra petroleum to the U.S. He has also proposed to sell, at a significant discount, as many as 66,000 barrels of heating fuel to poor communities that were hit by the hurricane, and offered mobile hospital units, medical specialists, and power generators. The Bush administration opted to refuse this aid.[55] Later, in November 2005, officials in Massachusetts signed an agreement with Venezuela to provide heating oil at a 40% discount to low income families through Citgo, a subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela[56]. Chávez has stated that such gestures comprise "a strong oil card to play on the geopolitical stage" and that "[i]t is a card that we are going to play with toughness against the toughest country in the world, the United States."[57]

Chávez and the media

Further information: Media representation of Hugo Chávez

Media gave Chavez full publicity after his coup d'etat in 1992, making him a star media, trying to use him to defeat traditional political parties. Because of Chavez's political agenda asking Venezuelans to not vote in any election, he fell in a low popularity that took off attention from him until he accepted to participate in democratic elections in 1997. Some newspapers that gave him the opportunity to express himself until 1998 are now prosecuted by his government La Razón Newspaper case

Even before the April 2002 coup, many owners, managers, and commentators working for the five major private mainstream television networks and largest mainstream newspapers had stated their opposition to Chávez's policies. These media outlets have accused the Chávez administration of intimidating their journalists using specially-dispatched gangs. Chávez in turn alleges that the owners of these networks have primary allegiance not to Venezuela but to the United States, and that they seek the advancement of neoliberalism via corporate propaganda.

Throughout his presidency, Chávez has hosted the live talk show known as Aló, Presidente! ("Hello, President!").[58] The show broadcasts in varying formats on Venezolana de Televisión (VTV—Venezuelan State Television) each Sunday at 11:00 AM. The show features Chávez addressing topics of the day, taking phone calls and live questions from both the studio and broadcast audience, and touring locations where government social welfare programs are active. Additionally, on July 25, 2005, Chávez inaugurated Telesur, a proposed pan-American homologue of Al Jazeera that seeks to challenge the present domination of Latin American television news by United States-based CNN en Español and Univision. Chávez's media policies have contributed to elevated tensions between the United States and Venezuela.[59]

Bolivarianism and Chavismo

File:Chavez World Social Forum 2005.jpg
Chávez speaks during a visit to an MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra—"Landless Workers' Movement") encampment in Tapes, Brazil on January 30, 2005. The bearded man behind him is MST leader João Pedro Stédile. (Agência Brasil)

Chávez's version of Bolivarianism, although drawing heavily from Simón Bolívar's ideals, was also influenced by the writings of Marxist historian Federico Brito Figueroa. Chávez was also thoroughly steeped in the South American tradition of socialism and communism early in his life, such as that practiced by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and Salvador Allende. Other key influences on Chávez's political philosophy include Ezequiel Zamora and Simón Rodríguez. Although Chávez himself refers to his ideology as "Bolivarianismo" ("Bolivarianism"), Chávez's supporters and opponents in Venezuela refer to themselves as being either for or against "Chavismo", indicating a public perception that Chávez's political philosophy does not originate from Bolívar so much as from his own views. Thus, Chávez supporters refer to themselves not as "Bolivarians" or "Bolivarianists", but rather as "chavistas".

Later in his life, Chávez would acknowledge the role that democratic socialism (a form of socialism that emphasizes grassroots democratic participation) plays in Bolivarianism. For example, on January 30, 2005 at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Chávez declared his support for democratic socialism as integral to Bolivarianism, proclaiming that humanity must embrace "a new type of socialism, a humanist one, which puts humans, and not machines or the state, ahead of everything."[60] He later reiterated this sentiment in a February 26 speech at the 4th Summit on Social Debt held in Caracas.

The central points of Chávez's Bolivarianism are:[18]

1. Total Venezuelan sovereignty (anti-imperialism).
2. Grassroots political participation via popular votes and referendums (participatory democracy).
3. Comprehensive economic self-sufficiency (in food, consumer durables, et cetera).
4. Instilling a national sentiment of patriotic service.
5. Equitable distribution of Venezuela's vast oil revenues.
6. Elimination of corruption.
7. Elimination of puntofijismo by way of constitutional reforms.[61]

Because his Bolivarianism relies on popular support, Chávez has made provision for grassroots and participatory democracy via the so-called "Bolivarian Circles". In 2000, Chávez authorized then-Vice President Diosdado Cabello to financially support such circles. The circles themselves were decentralized and autonomous from any central government or hierarchical overseeing, and were organized on the neighborhood and block level. The circles were charged with such tasks as neighborhood beautification, grassroots organizing and activism, lending support to small businesses, and charity work.[62] The circles reached a peak membership of 2.2 million in July 2003 and were instrumental in, among other things, urging voter approval of the 1999 Constitution and foiling the 2002 coup attempt with mass grassroots mobilization for pro-Chávez demonstrations.[63] However, their significance to Venezuelan politics has trailed off significantly since 2003, as most circles have effectively disbanded. Pro-Chávez Bolivarian circles are not exclusive to Venezuela—similar circles of supporters remain widespread in, for example, Germany, Austria, and France (where circles exist in Vienna, Tübingen, Bielefeld, and Paris). Circles are also found in the U.S., Australia, Canada, and several other nations.

Criticism

Further information: Criticism of Hugo Chávez
File:Chavez and Toledo128122.jpg
Chávez chats with Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo during the First Summit of the South American Community of Nations, held on September 30, 2005 (Agência Brasil).

Chávez is a deeply disputed personality, both in Venezuela and abroad. His most steadfast domestic opponents state that Chávez is a dangerous militarist and authoritarian revolutionary who poses a fundamental threat to Venezuelan democracy. The opposition also reports that both poverty and unemployment figures under Chávez have not seen significant improvements and that official corruption under his government continues to be rampant.[64][65] Critics also point to the 1% drop in Venezuela's per-capita GDP under Chávez, and cite the many public hospitals that lack even basic medicine and hygenic supplies. Still others accuse him of demagogy and fostering a personality cult to attain power and adulation. For example, critics question the motives behind the Bolivarian Missions' regular cash and in-kind payments to the millions of poor Venezuelans enrolling in their social programs; such policy, they argue, is designed primarily to increase Chavez's popularity.

The opposition has also claimed that the Chávez government has engaged in extensive electoral fraud, especially during the 2000 and 2004 elections, and has reported that many anti-Chávez activists are detained as political prisoners.[66] More sympathetic criticisms arise from reports that Chávez is not fulfilling his major campaign pledges with respect to labor and land reform.[67][68][69] Abroad, sources in the Western mainstream news media have reported that Chávez is a confrontational ideologue[70] who willingly harbors, funds, and trains terrorists in Venezuela and insurgents abroad.[71][72]

Human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous human rights violations under Chávez.[5][6] Scores of deaths and hundreds of injuries inflicted during both opposition and pro-Chávez demonstrations have received little attention from Chavez's government. These organizations have also made allegations of ill treatment of detainees, torture, and censorship by Chávez's government. Meanwhile, relatives of victims who were killed in the April 11 2002 clashes have filed a case against Chávez and others at the International Criminal Court, stating that Chávez is legally complicit in crimes against humanity. A ruling has yet to be reached.[73]

Personal life

Further information: Personal life of Hugo Chávez
File:Chavezninas.jpg
Chávez and his three daughters, Rosa Virginia, María Gabriela and Rosa Inés.

Chávez has been married twice. He first wed Nancy Colmenares, a woman from a poor family originating in his hometown of Sabaneta. Chávez and Colmenares remained married for eighteen years, during which time they had three children: Rosa Virginia, María Gabriela, and Hugo Rafael. They separated soon after Chávez's 1992 coup attempt, but have remained good friends since then.[74] During his first marriage, Chávez had an affair with young historian Herma Marksman; their relationship lasted nine years (Guillermoprieto 2005).[75] At present, Chávez is separated from his second wife, journalist Marisabel Rodríguez de Chávez. Chávez had another daughter, Rosa Inés, through that marriage, in addition to a son-in-law, Raúl "Raúlito" Alfonzo. Chávez has one granddaughter, Gabriela.[76]

Chávez was born and raised Roman Catholic, and is currently a practicing Christian. Nevertheless, he has had a series of bitter disputes with both the Venezuelan Catholic clergy and Protestant church hierarchies.[77] Although he has traditionally kept his own faith a private matter, Chávez has over the course of his presidency become increasingly open to discussing his religious views, stating that both his faith and his interpretation of Jesus' personal life and ideology have had a profound impact on his leftist and progressive views:

He [Jesus] accompanied me in difficult times, in crucial moments. So Jesus Christ is no doubt a historical figure—he was someone who rebelled, an anti-imperialist guy. He confronted the Roman Empire.... Because who might think that Jesus was a capitalist? No. Judas was the capitalist, for taking the coins! Christ was a revolutionary. He confronted the religious hierarchies. He confronted the economic power of the time. He preferred death in the defense of his humanistic ideals, who fostered change.... He is our Jesus Christ.[17]

This view is closely aligned with the school of Liberation Theology.

Titles and honors

Over the course of his presidency, Chávez has been awarded a number of honorary degrees (Government of Venezuela).

Honorary Degrees and Doctorates

See also

References

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Notes

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File:Chavez CASA127994.jpeg
Chávez attends the 1st annual summit of the South American Community of Nations, held in Brazil on September 30, 2005.
  1. ^ Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. "Cuadro de Presidentes Venezolanos". Retrieved 11 Nov 2005. Template:Es icon
  2. ^ a O'Keefe, Derrick. (Z Communications, 09 Mar 2005). "Building a Democratic, Humanist Socialism: The Political Challenge of the 21st Century". Retrieved 11 Nov 2005.
  3. ^ McCoy and Trinkunas (Feb 1999), p. 49.
  4. ^ McCoy and Neuman (Feb 2001), pp. 71-72.
  5. ^ a Amnesty International. (AI, 2005). "AI Summary Report 2005: Venezuela". Retrieved 01 Nov 2005.
  6. ^ a Human Rights Watch. (HRW, 24 Mar 2005). "Venezuela: Curbs on Free Expression Tightened". Retrieved 05 Nov 2005.
  7. ^ a Diehl, Jackson. (Washington Post, 28 Mar 2005). "Chavez's Censorship: Where 'Disrespect' Can Land You in Jail". Retrieved 10 Nov 2005.
  8. ^ a Carter Center (Sep 2004), p. 7.
  9. ^ Carter Center (Feb 2005), pp. 133-134. "The panel finds that none of the reports examined present evidence that there was significant fraud during the Aug. 15 presidential recall referendum ... none of the claims for evidence of fraud suggested a fraud so great as to change the exit-polled 60/40 opposition win to the official 40/60 government win ... the Venezuelan election authority already has most of the pieces in place for building a trustworthy voting system in which it will be even more difficult to perpetrate any substantial fraud."
  10. ^ Gindin, Jonah. (Canadian Dimension, 11 Oct 2005). "Venezuela and the 'New Democracy'". Retrieved 15 Oct 2005.
  11. ^ Gott, Richard. (The Guardian, 25 Aug 2005). "Two fingers to America". Retrieved 18 Oct 2005.
  12. ^ Gott (2005), p. 67. Chávez spoke thus: "Comrades: unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives that we had set for ourselves have not been achieved in the capital. That's to say that those of us here in Caracas have not been able to seize power. Where you are, you have performed well, but now is the time for a rethink; new possibilities will arise again, and the country will be able to move definitively towards a better future."
  13. ^ a Chávez, Hugo. [Untitled Speech]. Latino Pastoral Action Center. Bronx, New York City. 17 Sep 2005. Downloadable Audio. Retrieved 05 Nov 2005.
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  21. ^ McCoy and Neuman, p. 73.
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  29. ^ BBC Talking Point. (23 Oct 2005). "Transcript of BBC's Robin Lustig interview to Hugo Chavez". Retrieved 15 Nov 2005.
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  31. ^ Alford, Deann. (Christianity Today, 14 Oct 2005). "Venezuela to Expel New Tribes Mission". Retrieved 09 Nov 2005.
  32. ^ Reed, Gail A. (MEDICC Review). "Where There Were No Doctors: First MDs Graduate from Latin American Medical School". Retrieved 16 Nov 2005.
  33. ^ Campbell, Colin J. (Association of the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, Nov 2005). "Newsletter No. 59: President Chavez Recognises Peak Oil". Retrieved 16 Nov 2005.
  34. ^ Parma, Alessandro. (Venezuela Analysis, 07 Nov 2005). "Chavez Claims Victory Over Bush in Argentina Summit". Retrieved 09 Nov 2005.
  35. ^ Latin Business Chronicle. (Latin Business Chronicle, Oct 2005). "GDP Growth: Venezuela Best". Retrieved 18 Oct 2005. "Venezuela will likely end the year with an economic expansion of 7.8 percent, the IMF forecasts. ECLAC's forecast is 7.0 percent. However, both figures mark a slowdown compared with last year's growth rate of 17.9 percent, which was Latin America's best performance last year as well."
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  40. ^ a Venezuela Analysis, "Poverty and Unemployment Down significantly in Venezuela in 2005". Retrieved 18 Oct 2005. " ... Venezuela’s poverty rate is expected to drop to 35% by the end of the year, down from 47% for 2004. During the first half of 2005 poverty was calculated to be at 38.5%. Also, critical poverty, the level at which people cannot afford to cover their basic needs, dropped to 10.1% in the first half of 2005, down from 18% the previous year ... poverty has now dropped to a level below what it was before Chavez came into office, in 1999, when the INE registered the poverty rate to be at 42%."
  41. ^ Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA, 1998). The World Factbook 1998: Venezuela. Retrieved 18 Oct 2005. "Infant mortality rate: total: 27.52 deaths/1,000 live births ... Life expectancy at birth: total population: 72.66 years ... (1998 est.)"
  42. ^ Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA, 2005). The World Factbook 2005: Venezuela. Retrieved 18 Oct 2005. "Infant mortality rate: total: 22.20 deaths/1,000 live births ... Life expectancy at birth: total population: 74.31 years ... (2005 est.)"
  43. ^ Niemeyer, p. 36. "The World Bank asserted on 7th October 2003 that Latin America's biggest issue is the fight against poverty. The Bolivarian Revolution seems to be the only process worldwide which is taking this problem seriously and is effectively tackling poverty with government programs. The financing of these programs by spending a good portion of the Nation's GDP (0.2% in August 2003 alone) ... "
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  46. ^ Niemeyer, pp. 14-15. "With high levels of illiteracy to be found amongst the population the alphabetisation campaign called 'Mission Robinson' was brought into action. It has already taught more than a million people how to read and write and gained widespread support. Older people participate while youngsters enjoy access to University through a program guaranteeing equal access to Universities. This program is referred to as 'Mission Sucre'."
  47. ^ Burbach, Roger. (CounterPunch, 7 Nov 2005). "Bush Versus Chavez". Retrieved 08 Nov 2005.
  48. ^ Niemeyer, p. 15. "Probably the most important achievement can be seen in the state run supermarkets, referred to as 'Mercal' which provide the basic necessities at affordable prices which are in many cases more than 30 percent cheaper than in regular shops."
  49. ^ Venezuela Analysis, "Chavez Disappointed with His Government’s Public Housing Achievements". " ... government is investing $2.8 billion in the housing program ... According to a report that Julio Montes, the Minister of Housing and Habitat, presented, only 43,000 homes had been constructed so far this year, while the government’s goal is to construct at least 120,000."
  50. ^ Albert, Michael ( Z Communications, 06 Nov 2005). "Venezuela's Path". Retrieved 12 Nov 2005.
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  52. ^ Wilpert, Gregory. (Venezuela Analysis, 12 Sep 2005). Venezuela’s Quiet Housing Revolution: Urban Land Reform. Retrieved 18 Oct 2005. " ... the celebration of the handing out of over 10,000 land titles to families living in Venezuela's poorest urban neighborhoods ... As of mid 2005, the National Technical Office has issued over 84,000 titles to 126,000 families, benefiting about 630,000 barrio inhabitants."
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  81. ^ La Semana. "Entrevista Hugo Chavez: Me declaro amigo de Colombia". Retrieved 09 Nov 2005.
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