Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

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The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Tamil: தமிழீழ விடுதலைப் புலிகள், Thamileela Vidutalaip Pulikal), also known as the Tamil Tigers, is a guerilla organisation fighting to establish an independent Tamil state, to be called Tamil Eelam, in the north-east of Sri Lanka. The organisation is headed by Velupillai Prabakharan. It currently controls significant portions of northern and eastern Sri Lanka and run civil services in these areas. Civil Administration in these areas include judicial, police, financial, and cultural services, and defence units including army, navy and a recently created air wing.

The LTTE is believed to have significant support from Sri Lankan Tamils. It claims to be the only legitimate representative of the Tamils in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, and is generally seen as being the main body with whom the Sri Lankan government must negotiate. However, its tactics, and particularly its treatment of non-Tamil civilians and Tamil political opponents, have drawn sharp criticism from the international community and led to it being proscribed as a terrorist organisation by several countries.

The military LTTE

The LTTE as an organisation is very centred around the personality of Prabhakaran, who has dominated it almost continuously since it was formed. Recruits owe a strong personal loyalty and obedience to him as their leader, which has helped instill a strong sense of discipline in the organisation, and keep it operationally efficient. Recruits are instructed to be prepared to die for the cause, and are issued with a cyanide capsule to be swallowed in the case of capture. The LTTE also has a special squad of suicide troops, called the Black Tigers, which it deploys for critical missions. The LTTE advocates equality for women, and has a large number of female recruits.

The beginnings of the LTTE

Until the 1970s, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka had largely taken the form of a demand for autonomy for the Tamil-speaking regions under an overall federal framework. The lack of results after twenty-five years of negotiations, and the rise of Sinhala nationalism as represented by the 1972 constitution, led to a significant section of young Tamils, particularly in Jaffna, adopting a more radical position which favoured the use of violent means. A large number of militant organisations were set up, one of which was the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), which was formed in 1972 by a small group of young Tamils led by Velupillai Prabhakaran. The TNT's first military operation was the assassination of Alfred Duriappah, the SLFP mayor of Jaffna, in 1975, followed by a few successful bank robberies to fund their activities and the assassination of a number of minor police officials. The success of these early acts gave them confidence, and in 1976 they teamed up with the militants headed by S. Subramanian to form the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In 1979, Anton Balasingham joined the LTTE as their main ideologue. Balasingham added depth to the LTTE's politics. Whereas they had earlier been committed to the single idea of Tamil independence, Balasingham added a new layer of social policies, inspired by Marxism and anti-casteism, which profoundly shaped the LTTE's worldview.

The LTTE continued the TNT's campaign of low-intensity violence against state agents, particularly policemen, and quickly became the most efficient of the many Tamil militant groups. In 1978, they wiped out a police patrol which had discovered one of their training camps, the first major military victory for a Tamil group. After martial law was imposed in Jaffna in 1979, the LTTE began targeting the military. They were responsible for the attack which provoked the bloody anti-Tamil riots of 1983. These riots and the government's crackdown on Tamil separatism produced a steady stream of volunteers for the LTTE, which they shaped into a proper army. In 1984, they began launching higher intensity attacks against the Sri Lankan troops. They also formed a naval unit, the Sea Tigers, that year. The LTTE's discipline and efficiency made their attacks much more deadly than the other Tamil militant groups, and for the next three years the LTTE was the main antagonist in what was in effect a civil war. The LTTE was militarily very successful, and by 1986 it controlled large portions of Jaffna. The year after, in 1987 the Black Tigers was established; an elite unit of LTTE members responsible for conducting suicide attacks against political, religious, economic and military targets. In 1985 the LTTE established the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation, a humanitarian organisation providing relief and aid for Tamils struck by the internal fighting in Sri Lanka.

The IPKF period

During this period, the various Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, had received varying degrees of support from India. In 1987, India intervened directly in the conflict by air-dropping food parcels on Jaffna in what was interpreted as a show of strength. After negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement whereby Sri Lanka agreed to a federal structure which would grant autonomy to the Tamils. India was to send a peacekeeping force, the IPKF, to Sri Lanka to enforce the agreement.

Although most Tamil militant groups accepted this agreement, the LTTE only did so very grudgingly and very soon rejected it on the grounds that the reforms were only illusory. The result was that the LTTE now found itself engaged in military conflict against the Indian army. The army fought a bitter campaign for one month to win control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. This campaign and the army's subsequent anti-LTTE operations were ruthless, and made it extremely unpopular amongst the Tamils. The LTTE exploited this sentiment and, by painting themselves as the only group opposing the IPKF's "anti-Tamil aggression", as they termed it, they became increasingly popular. In addition, the implementation of the autonomy provisions under the agreement was perceived by the Tamils as giving them little or nothing, and the entire structure collapsed very quickly. As the only group to have held itself aloof from this process, this was portrayed by the LTTE as a vindication of their stance.

The post-IPKF LTTE

File:LTTECoin.jpg

A coin issued by the LTTE in 1990.

The IPKF's intervention was also unpopular amongst Buddhists, and it was forced to withdraw in 1990 after the Sri Lankan government asked India to withdraw its troops. The LTTE quickly occupied most of the areas from which the IPKF had pulled out. By 1991, it controlled nearly all the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni. During this period, it either absorbed or forcibly eliminated most other rival militant groups, particularly the TELO. In a series of military operations in 1995 and 1996, the army re-captured the Jaffna peninsula and the town of Kilinochchi from the LTTE. The LTTE proposed peace talks in 1996, which the government rejected. Starting from 1997, the Sri Lankan army suffered a number of reverses, and lost control of large portions of the Vanni, the town of Kilinochchi and many smaller towns. In 2000, the LTTE overran the strategically vital Elephant Pass. The following year, the government invited Norway to mediate in the dispute. Norway brokered a ceasefire agreement, which is presently in effect.

The peacetime LTTE

The LTTE-GoSL ceasefire

File:Tamil-elam.gif

flag of Tamil Eelam

As part of the Norway-brokered ceasefire in effect since late 2001, the LTTE has indicated its willingness to give up its call for a separate state, seeking political and economic autonomy for Tamils within a one-state solution. Norway and the other Nordic countries jointly monitor the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. Since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers, the Tigers have carried out over 3,100 violations compared to about 140 by the government forces [1].

Talks on an interim solution have currently stalled due to political uncertainty. The President Chandrika Kumaratunga suspended the government of the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe in 2004, accusing him of being too soft on the LTTE. Mrs. Kumaratunga herself then took a more conciliatory line towards the LTTE, but the current president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who took office in November 2005, campaigned on a plank of being tougher on the LTTE. His prime minister, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake has also previously advocated taking a tougher line. The LTTE has recently stated that the gap between its position and the position of the new Sri Lankan government is vast, and has threatened to "intensify" its campaign if the government does not soon propose a reasonable political framework [2]. The reason for the current president, Mahinda Rajapaksa being in power is due the the fact that few tamils voted in the election as the LTTE declared a boycott [3].

From army to quasi-governmental entity

Even though the LTTE was formed as a military group, it also carries out a number of civilian duties. The LTTE controls sections in the north and east of the island, especially the regions lying outside the major cities. It runs the government and provides public services in these areas, including schools, hospitals, police stations, courts and municipal administration.

Most of the structures supporting these functions developed during the period immediately after the IPKF's withdrawal, when the LTTE controlled Jaffna without significant opposition. During this period, it transformed itself from a purely military body to a quasi-government, complete with administrative organs. Between 1991 and 1993, it created the Tamil Eelam Police Force (including traffic policemen), the Education Development Board of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil Eelam Military Academy a broadcasting authority called the Voice of Tigers,National Television of Tamil Eelam(NTT)- (satellite TV station) programs can be viewed in South Asia,Middle East & Europe(relayed in Europe by Paris based Tamil Television Network-www.tvttn.com) , a Law College of Tamil Eelam and a Tamil Eelam Judicial Department including a court service and a public prosecution system. Although it no longer controls Jaffna, these structures continue to form the basic blueprint on the basis of which it runs the areas it controls. The LTTE's administrative agencies are integrated into the organisation's overall chain of command. It claims that this makes them better equipped to respond to emergencies.

The LTTE's quasi-government was and continues to be run on socialist principles. For example, all litigants before a civil court are required to pay a fine for failing to settle their dispute amicably. Policemen and other employees of the administrative agencies are paid according to the number of dependants they have, rather than their position.

In recent years, the LTTE has sought wider recognition for its administrative organs. After the Boxing Day tsunami, it has sought to ensure that aid to the areas under its control is routed through its own administrative agencies. It entered into an agreement, called the P-TOMS, with the government of Chandrika Kumaratunga which recognised this principle to some extent. However, the agreement was bitterly opposed by hardliners in the Sri Lankan government, and the present administration of Mahinda Rajapakse has announced that it will not be implemented.

Political activities

The LTTE also has a political wing, but despite the ceasefire it has not tried to formally create a political party. Instead, in the 2004 parliamentary elections, it openly supported the TNA[4] (also called Thamizarasuk Katchi), which won over 90% of votes in the electoral district of Jaffna, in the Northern Province. However, the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (Lanka Academic) accused the LTTE of being involved in this election illegally, and using violence and impersonation to support TNA members. [5] Centre for Monitoring Election Violence also stated that the election was not a "free and fair" one due to voter intimidation and violence by both of the major parties. [6]

Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?

Despite their support amongst Tamils, the LTTE is accused of terrorism. It is proscribed as a terrorist organisation by several countries, including USA, Britain, India, Australia and Malaysia, and LTTE delegations are barred from the European Union [7]. Sri Lanka itself has lifted its ban on the LTTE to facilitate peaceful negotiations.

Part of the reason for the accusation is its targeting of political figures and non-military officials, and its use of suicide bombers. Between 1991 and 1994, it allegedly assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, Lalith Athulathmudali, Ranasinghe Premadasa and Gamini Dissanayake. It has also assassinated moderate Tamils and other Tamils with whose views it disagrees. The LTTE is suspected of involvement in the assassinations of Appapillai Amirthalingam, Neelan Tiruchelvam, Sarojini Yogeswaran, Pon Sivapalan, Lakshman Kadirgamar and others, even though it officially denies involvement in several of these. The LTTE has also actively eliminated other Tamil militant groups, most notably the TELO, whose leadership and cadre were killed by the LTTE in May 1986. In addition, the LTTE's bombing attacks have caused a large number civilian casualties and, in instances such as the attack on the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy , Dehiwala train or the Central Bank in Colombo, did not have any military target.

The LTTE's supporters justify these attacks by saying that the people assassinated are either Tamil traitors or persons closely associated with the Sri Lankan military action. Specifically in relation to the TELO, the LTTE has said that it had to attack them because the TELO was in effect functioning as a proxy for India. They also draw comparisons between the casualties caused by the LTTE's actions and the actions of European resistance forces against Nazi occupation during the Second World War. Most countries and international bodies do not accept that the situations are analogous.

The LTTE and human rights

The allegation of terrorism against the LTTE is part of a broader allegation that the LTTE does not have respect for human rights, and does not adhere to the standards of conduct expected of a resistence movement.

In particular, the LTTE has been accused of knowingly recruiting using child soldiers as front-line troops (HRW 2003). Amid international pressure, LTTE announced in July 2003 that it would stop conscripting child soldiers, but both UNICEF[8] and HRW[9] have accused it of reneging on its promises, and of conscripting Tamil children orphaned by the tsunami [10]. The LTTE's official position is that earlier, some of its cadres erroneously recruited volunteers in their late teens. It says that its official policy is now that it will not accept child soldiers. It also says that some underage youths lie about their age and are therefore allowed to join, but are sent back home to their parents as soon as they are discovered to be underaged.

The LTTE has also been accused of forcibly removing (or "ethnically cleansing") Sinhalese and Muslim inhabitants from areas under its control, including through the use of violence against those who refuse to leave. Most notably, the LTTE forcibly expelled the entire Muslim population of Jaffna on 48 hours notice in 1990. The LTTE are also accused of organising massacres of Sinhala villagers who settled in the Northeast under the dry lands policy. Whilst the LTTE's supporters do not deny these allegations, they argue that it is misleading to look at the LTTE's allegations in isolation. They say that their actions are no worse than those of the Sri Lankan government, and are therefore an entirely proportionate response to human rights violations by the Sri Lankan government, and are the only way to make the government stop violating the rights of the Tamils even if they are condemned in international law.

It has also been alleged that the LTTE coerces Tamil expatriates to give it money, by threatening them as to the safety of their relatives or property in areas of Sri Lanka under its control. This involves pressuring them to directly give it money, or to indirectly fund its activities by patronising businesses connected with it (La 2004). Although intelligence services have raised concerns about such activities, few formal complaints have been made to the authorities

Notable Attacks

(Information derived from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, selected for inclusion based on lethality or notability.)

July 23, 1983:13 soldiers killed in LTTE ambush in Jaffna, sparking anti-Tamil riots leading to the deaths of an estimated several hundred Tamils. Conflict develops in north of island between army and LTTE.
August 18, 1989: Suspected LTTE militants invaded a hospital in Colombo and from there subjected a nearby Indian Army post to grenade and small-arms fire, killing 24 soldiers. Because of the location, the Indians were unable to return heavy fire.
May 21, 1991: LTTE-affiliated suicide bomber Thenmuli Rajaratnam assassinated former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi while the latter was campaigning for a parliamentary candidate in Tamil Nadu, also killing an additional 13 bystanders. Following the assassination, seven suspected LTTE activists committed suicide after being surrounded by police.
May 01, 1993: LTTE assasinated the President of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa while he was attending the annual May Day rally.
January 31, 1996: An attack by the LTTE on the Colombo Central Bank killed 90 and injured a further 1,400 people, damaging other buildings in the process. It was the most deadly LTTE attack in the history of the group's operations.
October 15, 1997: An LTTE bomb exploded at the Colombo World Trade Center, killing 13 and injuring hundreds.
January 5, 1998: Four likely members of the Black Tiger squad drove an explosives-laden truck into the Sri Dalada Maligawa (or "Temple of the Tooth"), a major Buddhist shrine, killing 7 and injuring 25. The attack took place just days before foreign dignitaries were expected to attend celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of Sri Lankan independence at the temple.
March 5, 1998: Two LTTE bombs exploded aboard a bus in Maradana, killing thirty-two and injuring 252 passersby.
May 14, 1998: A member of the Black Tiger squad jumped in front of a vehicle carrying Sri Lankan Brigadier Larry Wijeratne and detonated explosives, killing the general and two guards. Wijeratne was the commander of Sri Lankan forces in the Point Pedro area of the Jaffna peninsula in the Tamil-inhabited north of the country. Press reports described the assassination as a "serious blow" to the government's efforts in the area.
July 29, 1999: An LTTE suicide bomber killed Sri Lankan MP Neelan Thiruchelvam along with two others. Six bystanders were injured.
December 18, 1999: A female LTTE suicide bomber exploded herself at a rally in Colombo in an apparent assassination attempt on Sri Lankan president Kumaratunga, who was injured in the blast. Ten people were killed and three injured. Another blast elsewhere killed a United National Party activist and a former army general.
January 7, 2000: A suspected LTTE suicide bomber killed Sri Lankan Industrial Minister C.V. Gooneratne during a holiday march in Rawatne. A further 20 were killed and 60 wounded.
May 18, 2000: A suspected LTTE bomber killed 23 and injured 70 at a Buddhist temple in Battilacoa during celebrations of the Vesak holiday.
October 3, 2000: An LTTE bomb killed parliamentary candidate Mohammed Baithullah and more than twenty others in Muttur. At least 49 others were injured. Baithullah had previously served as an intelligence officer in the Sri Lankan police.

References

Balasingham, Adele. (2003) The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance, Fairmax Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. ISBN 1-903679-036
Balasingham, Anton. (2004) 'War and Peace - Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers', Fairmax Publishing Ltd, ISBN 1-903679-05-2
de Votta, Neil. (2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford University Press, ISBN 0804749248
Gamage, Siri and I.B. Watson (Editors). (1999) Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka - 'Pearl of the East' or 'Island of Tears'?, Sage Publications Ltd, ISBN 0-7619-9393-2
Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (1994) "The Goups and the rise of Militant Secessions". in Manogaram, C. and Pfaffenberger, B. (editors). The Sri Lankan Tamils. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0813388457
Human Rights Watch (2003) Child Soldier Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict[11]
La, J.. 2004. "Forced remittances in Canada's Tamil enclaves". Peace Review 16:3. September 2004. pp. 379-385.
Narayan Swamy, M. R. (2002) Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas, Konark Publishers; 3rd ed. ISBN 8122006310
Pratap, Anita. (2001) Island of Blood: Frontline Reports From Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Other South Asian Flashpoints. Penguin Books, ISBN 0142003662
Ranawaka, Champika. (2003) Koti Vinivideema

External links