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Democratic peace theory

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File:DP CHART V19.JPG
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Democratic Peace Charts by professor emeritus and early researcher R. J. Rummel, frequently nominated for the Nobel Prize for Peace.[dubious – discuss][1]. He believed that Israel was barely free in 1967. High resolution PDF files can be found here [2][3].

A democratic peace theory or simply democratic peace (often DPT and sometimes democratic pacifism) is a theory in international relations, political science, and philosophy which holds that democracies—specifically, liberal democracies—never or almost never go to war with one another. A more general version is that all kinds of systematic violence is rare in and by liberal democracies. It can trace its philosophical roots to Immanuel Kant.

History

Main article: Perpetual peace
Immanuel Kant

At least partly because of the low frequency of democratic governments, and of sociologists, before the 19th century, democratic peace theory is a relatively new development. No ancient author seems to have considered it true.

In early modern times, the word democracy usually meant direct democracy, which was treated with suspicion. Even the idea that republics tend to be peaceful is recent; Nicolo Machiavelli believed that republics were by nature excellent war-makers and empire-builders, citing Rome as the prime example. Interesingly, Islamic tradition holds that peace will prevail within the dar al-Islam or "house of submission" to the faith, but war, including jihad, beyond that zone.

Immanuel Kant, in his essay Perpetual Peace (1795),[1] affirmed that responsible governments would not lightly go to war with each other, although he thought that this was only one of several necessary conditions for a perpetual peace. The hope of a democratic peace was the content of the First World War slogans: "a war to end all war" [dubious – discuss] (originated by H.G. Wells) and "a world safe for democracy". "Woodrow Wilson expressed the same vision [as Kant] for the twentieth century. This normative political basis of Wilson’s vision of world order, evident as early as 1894, grew naturally from his progressive inclinations in domestic politics; and his Fourteen Points sound almost as though Kant were guiding Wilson’s writing hand. They included Kant’s cosmopolitan law and pacific union." The third of the Points specified the removal of economic barriers between peaceful nations; the fourteenth for the League of Nations. [2]

In 1964, Dean Babst, a Wisconsin criminologist, published the first theory of democratic peace; his two papers, which appeared in obscure journals, were ignored. The first prominent DPT was stated by R. J. Rummel, of the University of Hawaii, beginning in the mid-seventies. Thereafter an increasing amount of research has been done on the theory and related subjects. (For the numerous researchers on the subject, see Rummel's bibliography, under External links.)

Presidents of both the major American parties have expressed support for the theory. Former President Bill Clinton of the Democratic Party: "Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other." [3] Current President George W. Bush of the Republican Party: "And the reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with each other. And the reason why is the people of most societies don't like war, and they understand what war means.... I've got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that's why I'm such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy." [4] However, such use of democratic peace theory to justify a foreign policy that includes military action, such as the 2003 Iraq War, has proved controversial [5]

Michael Doyle wrote a lengthy paper, in 1983, attempting to analyse and reconcile three schools of policy analysis: the conservative liberals, the welfare liberals, and the realists. In the process of this, he asserted that no two liberal regimes have ever gone to war, with a couple of marginal exceptions. He reintroduced Kant into the subject, and began the present surge of papers on the subject. [6]

There have been numerous studies in the field since. (See the bibliography linked to under External links, below, which cites more than a hundred authors, and omits some noteworthy and some recent papers.) Most studies have found some form of democratic peace exists; although neither methodological disputes nor doubtful cases are entirely resolved. [7]. Many of these papers are discussed elsewhere in this article.

Types of Theories

Monadic theories claim that democracies tend to conduct their affairs more peaceably, whether with other democracies or not. A recent paper claims that democracies fight fewer wars, start fewer wars and lesser conflcts, and reach more negotiated settlements. [8]

Dyadic theories claim that democracies are more peaceable with each other; but make various assertions about their relations to other states. Separate peace theories claim that democracies are more likely to go to war with non-democracies than non-democracies are with each other[dubious – discuss]. The militant democracy theory divides democracies into militant and pacifist types. Militant democracies have a tendency to distrust and use confrontational policies against dictatorships; which could actually make war more likely between a democracy and a non-democracy than in the case of relations between two non-democracies[dubious – discuss]. Moreover, a democratic crusade corollary suggests that the belief in the validity DPT itself could become a cause of war. [9] In the case of the United States intervention in World War I and recent invasion of Iraq, the promise of democratization bringing an end to war was used as a justification for war.

Some dyadic theories, such as those forwarded by Babst, Rummel, and Doyle claim that democracies, properly defined, have never made war on each other. For example, Rummel classifies 155 of the wars since Waterloo as between democracies and non-democracies, 198 as between non-democracies. Given the limited number of democracies he acknowledges, democracies -in his sense of the word- have gone to war more often than other states, but not with each other[dubious – discuss]. Doyle argues that this is only to be expected: the same ideologies that cause liberal states to be at peace with each other inspire idealistic wars with the illiberal, whether to defend oppressed foreign minorities or avenge countrymen settled abroad. [10] These theorists then argue that there are special reasons why wars between democracies do not occur.

Claims

A democratic peace theory has to define what it means by "democracy" and what it means by "peace" (or, more often, "war"), and what it claims as the link between the two.

Democracy

Democratic peace theorists have used different terms for the class of states they consider peaceable; Babst called them elective, Rummell liberal democracies, Doyle liberal regimes. In general, these usually require not only that the government and legislature be chosen by free and actually contested elections, but more. Studies claiming absolute [dubious – discuss] democratic peace require variously that two-thirds of adult males, or half the whole adult population, be able to vote (requiring universal suffrage including women would mean no war between democracies was even possible before 1894; also secret ballot (Babst), or a waiting time for the democracy to stabilize.

Doyle has a much looser standard for suffrage: either 30% of the adult males were able to vote or it was possible for every man to acquire voting rights, as by buying a freehold. He requires that women's suffrage be granted within a generation of it being demanded. He also allows greater power to hereditary monarchs; for example, he counts the reign of Louis-Philippe of France as a liberal regíme. He describes Wilhelmine Germany as "a difficult case....In practice, a liberal state under republican law for domestic affairs...divorced from the control of its citizenry in foreign affairs."[11]

Researchers often use Ted Gurr's Polity Data Set which scores each state on two scales, one of democracy and one for autocracy, for each year since 1800; as well as others. [12] The use of this has varied. Some researchers have done correlations between the democracy scale and belligerence; others have treated it as a binary classification by (as its maker does) calling all states with a high democracy score and a low autocracy score democracies.

Some recent papers have found that proportional representation is associated with less external and internal systematic violence.[13]

War

Many theorists have used the convenient list at the Correlates of War Project [14] at the University of Michigan, which compiled the wars from 1816 to 1991 with at least a thousand battlefield deaths. This data is particularly convenient for statistical analysis, and the large-scale statistical studies cited below have generally used this definition. (Also the Falklands War, although it killed only 910 (or 936, or 960) soldiers, satisfied most other criteria to be a full-scale war, and a few dozen deaths should not exclude it.)

Doyle excluded one possible exception from his theory on the grounds that both sides had recently been subject to illiberal regimes, and so the culture of liberalism was not yet established. Other peace theorists, especially of an absolute peace, extend this to excluding all wars in which either side has been a democracy for less than three years. [15]

Kantian peace

Kant's plan for a perpetual peace included more than a government answerable to the people. He proposed a League of Nations to keep the peace; and a right to "hospitality" which should be recognized everywhere. This latter was a freedom of international travel and commerce, which in some ways resembles the European Union, including the Schengen Agreement. (He also proposed preliminary confidence-building measures, including disarmament; but these were a means rather than an end.)

Michael Doyle reintroduced Kant's three articles into democratic peace theory. He argued that a pacific union of liberal states has been growing for the past two centuries. He denies that a pair of states will be peaceful simply because they are both liberal democracies; if that were enough, liberal states would not be aggressive towards weak non-liberal states (as the history of American relations with Mexico shows they are). Rather, liberal democracy is a necessary condition for international organization and hospitality (which are Kant's other two articles) — and all three are sufficient to produce peace. [16]

Several theorists, led by Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal have found multiple causes for such general peace as we have seen; quite often three which resemble Kant's. Several of these theorists call their result the Kantian peace.[17]

The modern kantian theory argues that democracy, more trade causing greater economic interdependence, and membership in more intergovernmental organizations are positively related to each other but each has an independent pacifying effect.

Statistical Studies

Each theory of democratic peace has had its statistical studies, which have found confirmation for it and sometimes denied others; there have also been studies which denied democratic peace theories without affirming another. [18] However, democratic peace theories are highly controversial, and the findings of individual studies are often vigorously disputed.

Studies have also argued that lesser conflicts (Militarized Interstate Disputes in the jargon) have been more violent, but less bloody, and less likely to spread.[19] Most such disputes involving democracies since 1950 have involved only four nations: the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and India.[20]

The Human Security Report, released in October 2005 by the Human Security Centre, documents the improved peace since the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It chiefly credits the end of the struggles of the Cold War and decolonization; but asserts also the underlying force of all the articles of the Kantian triad, which it calls interdependent. [21] The improvement in the peace of the world since the end of the Cold War has been tabulated here.[22]

There are also some difficulties in the application of statistical methods to the problem, especially to question of causation.[23]

A statistical association such as correlation does not establish causality. However, supporters of the DPT do not deny that other factors affect the risk of war but argue that many studies have controlled for such factors and that the DPT is still validated. Examples of factors controlled for are economic interdependence, membership in international organizations, contiguity, power status, alliance ties, militarization, economic wealth and economic growth, power ratio, and political stability.[4][5][6] Studies have also controlled for reverse causality from peace or war to democracy[7][8][9].

Research also shows that wars involving democracies are less violent and that democracies have much less internal political violence. [10] The most democratic and the most authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes the most. The probability for a civil war is also increased by political change, regardless whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Intermediate regimes continue to be the most prone to civil war, regardless of the time since the political change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the process of democratization.[11]

Never at War

Main article: Never at War

Never at War, by the historian Spencer R. Weart, is unlike most studies on the subject, which only look at the last two centures, the book examines political and military conflicts throughout all of human history; including any conflict causing at least 200 deaths in organized battle. It also extends the theory by finding a separate oligarchic peace. If democracies or oligarchies have tolerated dissent for at least three years, he finds that oligarchies have rarely fought one another; democracies never; but democracies have fought oligarchies often.

The book argues that the pattern is sharply evident in for example 300 years of Ancient Greek history, the Swiss Cantons since 1300s, in the County of Flanders during 1300s, in the three and a half centuries of the Hanseatic League, and in Renaissance Italy.

Weart's explanation for the democratic and the oligarchic peace is the human tendency to classify other humans into ingroup and outgroup, documented in many psychological studies. Members of the outgroup are seen as inherently inferior and thus war against and exploitation of them is justified. Democracies includes other democracies in the ingroup; the elites of oligarchies similarly include the elites of other oligarchies. However, the oligarchic elites and the democratic citizens view each other as outgroup, the democratic citizens viewing the elites as exploiting the rest of the population, the oligarchic elites viewing democracies as governed by inferior men and are afraid that the democratic ideals may spread to their state. The democratic and oligarchic peace are also strengthened by the culture of arbitration and the respect for the ingroup opposition in both democracies and oligarchies. Similar policies are applied to foreign policy when dealing with states belonging to the ingroup.

Weart's use of his data has been severely critized: He excludes the earlier wars of Rome, including the Punic Wars, on the grounds that the sources are dubious; yet he uses Xenophon, who has also been doubted. Also, modern classicists agree (and we have non-Roman evidence in Aristotle) that Rome and Carthage were oligarchic republics, "which suggests that excluding them was a largely arbitrary judgment that just happened to leave Weart's central claim intact." [24]

Weart does have a fallback position to save his claim for a democratic Syracuse: that the Athenians perceived Syracuse as an oligarchy. [25] There is no ancient evidence for this perception, and our major source on Syracusan democracy is Thucydides, the Athenian. [26] Weart conjectures, however, that Aristotle intentionally avoids calling Syracuse a democracy; this argument ex silentio is particularly weak, since the long tyranny of Dionysius and his family lay between the Sicilian Expedition and Aristotle. One of the main reason for the Sicilian Expedition was that Syracuse was reported to have violent factional strife; although the democratic party was then in control, as the extract cited from Thucydides shows. Weart argues that help from an inside group was essential since the Greeks lacked effective siege machinery; this argument ignores the usual tactic of the Peloponnesian War: march up to a city, burn its crops, prevent it from importing grain by sea, and wait for it to surrender to starvation. This was the actual approach used at Syracuse; the Spartans broke the leaguer. [27] (In every other known case when cities were betrayed to an Athenian army, it was by a democratic faction.)

Furthermore, Weart's conclusion that universal democracy will mean lasting peace is questionable. If peace depends on perception, democratic leaders may misperceive each other as authoritarian. More seriously, if the outgroup of oligarchs disappears, what will prevent the democracies from dividing into a new ingroup and outgroup? [28]

Causes

One idea is that liberal democracies have a common culture and that this creates good relations. However, there have been many wars between non-democracies that share a common culture. Democracies are however characterized by rule of law, and therefore the inhabitants may be used to resolve disputes through arbitration rather than by force. This may reduce the use of force between democracies.

Another idea is that democracy gives influence to those most likely to be killed or wounded in wars, and their relatives and friends (and to those who pay the bulk of the war taxes). This was Kant's argument; and the mechanism is supported by the example of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which the Sejm resisted and vetoed most royal proposals for war[29], like those of Władysław IV Vasa. This monadic theory must, however, explain why democracies do attack non-democratic states. One explanation is that these democracies were threatened or otherwise were provoked by the non-democratic states.

R. J. Rummel dismisses these as superficial,[30] relying on Kurt Lewin and Andrew Ushenko's proposition that democracy involves a pervasive social mechanism (called a "social field") in which, "The primary mode of power is exchange, [the] political system is democratic, and [the] democratic government is but one of many groups and pyramids of power." In contrast, authoritarian systems involve a "social anti-field", "[which] divides its members into those who command and those who must obey, thus creating a schism separating all members and dividing all issues, a latent conflict front along which violence can break out." Thus, the citizens of a democracy are habituated to compromise, conflict resolution, and to viewing unfavorable outcomes as temporary and/or tolerable.

David E. Spiro points out at some length that much of the democratic peace is in fact peace between allied democratic states, which have (unlike other alliances), not broken down into war between the allies. He regards this effect as the reality of the demcratic peace; ascribing the rest of it to chance. Conversely, Christopher Layne analysed the crises and brinkmanship that took place between non-allied democratic great powers, during the relatively brief period when such existed. He found no evidence either of institutional or cultural constraints against war; indeed, there was popular sentiment in favor of war on both sides. Instead, in all cases, one side concluded that it could not afford to risk that war at that time, and made the necessary concessions. As he observes, most crises do not result in war. [31]

A study argues that democratic states are more likely than autocratic states to win the wars. One explanation is that democracies, for internal political and economic reasons, have greater resources. This might mean that democratic leaders are unlikely to select other democratic states as targets because they perceive them to be particularly formidable opponents. One study finds that interstate wars have important impacts on the fate of political regimes, and that the probability that a political leader will fall from power in the wake of a lost war is particularly high in democratic states. .[32]

On the other hand, Mansfield and Snyder argue that democratizing leaders are more likely to fight wars, whether or not they win, as a means of handling internal tension.[33]

Two of the militant democracies listed above were dominant naval powers, and therefore had greater choice whether and where to fight.[34]

A game-theoretic explanation is that the participation of the public and the open debate send clear and reliable information regarding the intentions of democracies to other states. In contrast, it is difficult to know the intentions of nondemocratic leaders, what effect concessions will have, and if promises will be kept. Thus there will be mistrust and unwillingness to make concessions if at least one of the parties in a dispute is a nondemocracy. [35]

Criticisms

Template:TotallyDisputed-section

There are at least four logically distinguishable classes of criticism of any theory of democratic peace.

  • That the theorist has not applied his criteria, for democracy or war or both, accurately to the historical record.
  • That the criteria are not reasonable. For example, critics may prefer that liberal democracy should exclude or include both of Germany and the United Kingdom at the time of WWI, rather than count one as democratic and the other non-democratic, when they were quite similar societies.
  • That the theory may not actually mean very much, because it has limited its data below the level of significance, or because it promises only a limited peace, involving only a small class of states; for example, democracies have fought many offensive colonial and imperialistic wars.
  • That it is not democracy itself but some other external factor(s) which happened to be associated with democratic states that explain the peace.

Often, the same theory will be seen as vulnerable to several of these criticisms at the same time.

Specific historical cases

Parenthetical interpolations are the personal opinions and original research of a single editor. Also the standards applied are those of a single theory.
False, see for example Never at War

Any theory of democratic peace must face certain apparent wars between arguable democracies. The theories which claim an absolute[dubious – discuss] democratic peace solve the following problems by restricting the definition of democracy, and sometimes of war; more recent authors observe that a few doubtful cases do not disprove the democratic peace, [36] which is a statistical tendency, and will, in the perversity of human affairs, have exceptions. Correlation studies do not admit exceptions, only outliers.

Kant held that some wars are to be expected; the resulting suffering is what will convince the nations to actually do the reasonable thing, and establish a lasting peace; some Kantian theorists prefer to follow him in this. [37] Other Kantians do not expect the democratic peace to include undeveloped states. [38]

Among those which have been mentioned and brief arguments for not being inter-democratic wars, from the book Never at War:

  • Athenian Sicilian Expedition, 415-413 BC (Oligarchies, at most 50% of males could vote in Athens)
  • Trail of Tears, 1838 (The Cherokee Nation had become increasingly authoritarian and oligarchic, officially dissolved before 3 years had passed, no battle deaths)
  • French Second Republic attack on the Roman Republic, 1849 (Both young borderline democracies less than 3 years old)
  • American Civil War, 1861-1865 (The Confederate States was an oligarchy, no competitive presidential election)
  • War of the Pacific, 1879-1884 (Less than one person in fifty could vote)
  • Boer Wars (The Boer states were oligarchies where only some of the white males could vote)
  • Spanish-American War, 1898 (Spain had the Turno system and the Monarchy retained important powers)
  • World War I, 1914-1918 (Germany was an autocracy where the Emperor controlled foreign and military affairs)
  • The state of war between Finland and the Western Allies, 1941-1944 (Avoided attacking each other except for one bomb raid against German installations before the Declaration of War)
  • The Lebanese aerial participation in the Six Day War against Israel, 1967. (Far less than 1000 battle deaths)
  • The Paquisha War ,1981. (Far less than 1000 battle deaths, both states not democratic)
  • Peru-Ecuador Cenepa War, 1995 (Far less than 1000 battle deaths, Peru not democratic)
  • The Kargil War, 1999 (Pakistan not democratic, Pervez Musharraf had stormed the Supreme Court and used terror tactics against the press)

Limited claims

This has been a persistent class of criticism by realist critics: that "democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries, and thus there have few opportunities where cemocracies were in a position to fight one another." This is particularly cogent against the theories of absolute [dubious – discuss] democratic peace, which claim that no two democracies have ever gone to war, and argue that the Confederate States of America, the Boer republics, the Second French Republic, and so on, were not real democracies for one or another reason; and also with respect to the nineteenth century data. Only half a dosen republics or crowned republics achieved 2/3 male suffrage before the late nineteenth century, and several of those only for a few years. [39]

Jeanne Gowa analyzed the claims of one of these theorists. She finds that there were so few democracies, by his definition, before 1939 that the claims of the theory are not significant.

She also finds that there were only independent, non-allied, Great Powers for a relatively short time before the Entente Cordiale of 1904; and that there were several crises and minor conflicts, between them, in several of which war was popular on both sides. While war was averted in these cases, there was only one war between Powers in that period, and the Spanish-American War was between a democracy and a borderline democracy.) [40] The democratic peace since 1945 she finds significant, but largely explained by the external cause of the Cold War (see below).

Colonial wars and imperialism

One criticism against a general peacefulness for liberal democracies is that they were involved in more colonial and imperialistic wars than other states during the 1816-1945 period. On the other hand, this relation disappears if controlling for factors like power and number of colonies. Liberal democracies have less of these wars than other states after 1945. This might be related to changes in the perception of non-European peoples, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [41]

Related to this is the human rights violations committed against native people, sometimes by liberal democracies. One response is that many of the worst crimes were committed by nondemocracies, like in the European colonies before the nineteenth century, in King Leopold II of Belgium's privately owned Congo Free State, and in Stalin's Soviet Union. England abolished slavery in British territory in 1833, immediately after the First Reform Bill had significantly increased democracy. (Of course, the abolition of the slave trade had begun under the Tories; and many DPT's would disclaim so undemocratic a state as Melbourne's England in other contexts.)

Some democratic peace theories implicitly or explicitly exclude the first years of democracies; either explicitly, or, for example, by requiring that the executive result from a substantively contested election. ("For all intents and purposes, George Washington was unopposed for election as President, both in 1789 and 1792";[42] therefore any theory that has this requirement would exclude the entire Washington Administration from the category of democracy.)

External causes

As Doyle notes, the theory of a Kantian peace contradicts the absolute[dubious – discuss] theories of democratic peace: If three factors are required for a perpetual peace, no one of them can be the only thing needed.

There has also been a confluence of the old theory (dating back to Richard Cobden and Benjamin Constant) that Free Trade will produce and ensure peace,[43] with the modern theory that trade will produce democracy, or at least spread it to the non-democratic trading partner, as argued by Houshang Amiramahdi and others. According to this, democracy and peace are indeed correlated, because they arise from a common cause.

One study on this indicates that independently of trade, democracy is not a significant factor unless both of the democracies have a GDP/capita of at least 1400 USD. This level is quite low and 91% of all the democratic pairs passed this criteria during the 1885–1992 period and all in 1992. Still, higher economic development than this makes the effect of democracy stronger. Low economic development may hinder the development of liberal institutions and values.[12]

Other critics again argue that any apparent association between democracy and peace is an illusion, due in part to chance, and in part to peace being induced by other and transient causes. In particular, the presence of a common foe has frequently induced states, which happen to be democracies, to ally.

Joanne Gowa observes that much of the data used to infer an absolute democratic peace consists of Western democracies not going to war with each other while allied against the Soviet Union, and argues that this offers limited hope that non-allied democracies will remain at peace[dubious – discuss]. This again overlaps with the third category above, since there is also an argument that the relative peace of the twenty-first century (so far), is due to the completion of decolonization. (John Mearsheimer offers a similar analysis of the Anglo-American peace before 1945, caused by the German threat.) David Spiro would reply that these stable alliances are the democratic peace [44]

Gowa's use of statistics has been criticized, with several other studies finding opposing results. One overview of the literature also notes: "On a more intuitive level, one might reasonably infer that if the opposition of the communists was sufficient to create common interests guaranteeing peace among the democratic ( or anticommunist) states of the world, then the opposition of the "Free World" (even more formidable, by most measures) should have been sufficient to guarantee peace among the communist states. Yet during the Cold War the Soviet Union invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well as Afghanistan, and experienced serious border clashes with communist China. Meanwhile, Vietnam attacked and occupied most of Cambodia, provoking a retaliatory attack by communist China.

The "opposition leads to common interests leads to peace" idea would also be hard-pressed to account for the fact that peace did not prevail uniformly on the anticommunist side of the Cold War divide. For example, El Salvador fought a war with Honduras in 1969, Turkey and Greece became embroiled in a war over the fate of Cyprus in 1974, and Great Britain clashed with Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas islands in 1982. These cases are not anomalies for advocates of the democratic peace proposition; each of those wars involved at least one undemocratic state."[13]

Other critics have ascribed the democratic peace to the relative isolation of democratic states (particularly those not part of the Western alliance).

As often on academic matters, these criticisms are disputed. Papers have been done claiming significant correlation, even after controlling for such variables. [45]

See also


Supportive

Critical


Notes

  1. ^ Kant:Perpetual peace 1795
  2. ^ Russett, Bruce M. Grasping the Democratic Peace : Principles for a Post-Cold War World. . p 4.
  3. ^ Clinton, Bill (2006-01-22). "1994 State Of The Union Address".
  4. ^ "President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East". October 3. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= and |year= / |date= mismatch (help)
  5. ^ Owen 2005
  6. ^ Doyle 1983
  7. ^ See Kinsella 2005
  8. ^ Müller and Wulf 2004
  9. ^ Chan 1997p.59 and papers there cited.
  10. ^ Doyle 1983, part 2
  11. ^ Doyle 1983. Quote from footnote 8, pp.216-7. Doyle counts the northern United States as liberal throughout its history, despite the 72 years from the Seneca Convention to the Nineteenth amendment.
  12. ^ Such additional data sources include the "Conflict Data Set". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. October 3. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= and |year= / |date= mismatch (help) and "Data". Peter D. Watson Center for Conflict and Cooperation. October 3. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= and |year= / |date= mismatch (help)
  13. ^ Binningsbø 2000; Leblang and Chan 2003
  14. ^ See the Correlates of War site. Click on Available Data Sets for particular databases.
  15. ^ Doyle 1983; Rummel 2003
  16. ^ This paragraph is entirely from Doyle 1983.
  17. ^ See, among others, Russett & Oneal Triangulating Peace and the preliminary papers Russett et al. (1998); Oneal and Russett (1999)
  18. ^ See Ray (1998) and Gowa Bullets and Ballots below. These are pro and con, respectively. Another critical study is Spiro 1994
  19. ^ See Wayman 2002; Russet and Oneal 2004; Beck et al. 2004; for an argument that military conflicts between any two democracies are rarely repeated, see Hensel et al. 2000. If one defines "war" as more than 1000 battlefield deaths, an "MID" will have less than that number[dubious – discuss].
  20. ^ Müller 2004; Müller and Wolff 2004
  21. ^ For which see Human Security Report 2005
  22. ^ See the Global Confilict Trends page of the Center for Systematic Peace.
  23. ^ The difficulties and disputes involved are discussed at some length in Case studies and theory development in the social sciences by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett.
  24. ^ Template:Journal reference
  25. ^ "The possibility that the Athenians were wrong suggests a qualification to our rule. Instead of saying that well-established democracies do not make war on their own kind, perhaps we should say that they do not make war on other states they perceive to be democracies. This is an important point, to which we shall return." Weart Pp. 33-34.
  26. ^ Template:Journal reference This also includes a list of wars between Greek oligarchies, including the recurrent wars between Sparta and Argos. The chief passage from Thucydides is 6.32-41, particularly 6.39, in which Thucydides has the Syracusan Athenagoras praising the constitution of his country.
  27. ^ Thucydides, passim; Plutarch: Life of Nicias.
  28. ^ Template:Journal reference. Walt's review also asks the second question.
  29. ^ For a description, see {{cite book}}: Empty citation (help) 2000. Especially Pp. 9-11, 114, 181, 323.
  30. ^ See Rummel's The Conflict Helix, 2 for more.
  31. ^ Spiro 1994; Layne 1994. Layne does not discuss the second Venezuela crisis of 1902, or the Siamese crisis of 1893.
  32. ^ [citation needed]
  33. ^ Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War. EDWARD D. MANSFIELD and JACK SNYDER. : MIT Press, 2005, as reviewed in Owen 2005
  34. ^ Compare Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power on History, ad init..
  35. ^ Levy and Razin 2004
  36. ^ For example, Chan 1997; Maoz 1997 explicitly acknowledges the Spanish-American War as the (only) exception. The Six Day War and the Paquisha War come from Doyle 1983
  37. ^ Cederman 2001, p. 18-19, quoting Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784)
  38. ^ See Mousseau et al. 2003, other papers by Mousseau, and Hegre 2003
  39. ^ Quote from Mearshimer 1990, p.50; the argument is supported at length by Spiro 1994, Layne 1994.
  40. ^ See Jeanne Gowa, Bullets and Ballots. Which side of the borderline Spain falls on depends on which edition of Ted Gurr's list you read.
  41. ^ Ravlo and Glieditsch 2000
  42. ^ Quote from the National Archives of the United States.
  43. ^ See John Morley:Life of Richard Cobden and Francois Furet: Passing of an Illusion.
  44. ^ Gowa: Bullets and Ballots. Mearsheimer 1990. For the other side, Spiro 1990 .
  45. ^ For examples, seeRusset and Oneal 2004; Mousseau and Shi 1999;Reiter 2001; Reuveny and Li 2003. Other countercritical papers are cited in Rummel's website below.

References

Many of the following are from Rummel's bibliography, see #External links below.

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