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NSC 68

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Template:Unencyclopedic NSC-68 was a 58-page classified report written in February-April 1950 by Paul Nitze and issued by the United States National Security Council on April 14, 1950 during the presidency of Harry Truman. The report, written in the aftermath of the decision to build a hydrogen bomb, was declassified in 1977 and has become one of the classic historical documents of the Cold War era.

The document, inspired by George Frost Kennan and his "long telegram" in 1946, "portrayed the Soviet Union in the most aggressive light possible and called, among other things, for a massive American rearmament," in the words of historian Michael J. Hogan. "Perhaps more than any other document of the period, NSC-68 can claim to be the bible of American national security policy and the fullest statement to that point of the new ideology that guided American leaders" (A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], p. 12). The document outlined the National Security Strategy of the United States for that time and analyzed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America from military, economic, political, and psychological standpoints.

The report argued that the Soviet Union had a systematic strategy aimed at the spread of Communism across the entire world, and it recommended that the United States government adopt a policy of containment to stop the further spread of Communism. NSC-68's principal thesis was that the Soviet Union intended to become the single dominant world power and remake international society through Communist expansion of Soviet authority. NSC-68 would shape government actions in the Cold War for the next 20 years and has subsequently been labeled the "blueprint" for the Cold War.

NSC-68 called for a massive buildup of and an increase in funding for the armed forces in an effort to contain the Soviets. NSC-68 outlined a drastic foreign policy shift from defensive to active containment and advocated aggressive military preparedness. While the writers of NSC-68 provided no financial recommendations on how to implement policy, the policy paper encouraged peacetime military spending.

But there was a problem. NSC 68's rhetoric did not square with reality. Using phrases like the "Kremlin's design for world conquest," it painted the Soviet Union as driven solely by such a design, in the process dismissing evidence that did not fit that image. Written in the bowels of the State Department by Nitze and a small staff, with Acheson and Truman being updated regularly, it reflected the desires of Acheson and Nitze for more military spending, not reality. When the report was sent to top officials in the Truman administration for review before its official delivery to the President, many of them scoffed at its arguments. Willard Thorp questioned its contention that the "USSR is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the United States." Thorp stated: "I do not feel that this position is demonstrated, but rather the reverse. . . . The actual gap is widening in our favor." He pointed out that in 1949 the US economy had increased twofold over that of the Soviet Union. Steel production in the US outpaced the Soviet Union by 2 million tons, and stockpiling of goods and oil production far exceeded Soviet amounts. As for Soviet military investment, Thorp opined: "I suspect a larger portion of Soviet investment went into housing." William Schaub of the bureau of the budget was particularly harsh. In every arena--the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the stockpiling of atomic bombs, the economy--the US was far superior than the Soviet Union. Kennan, although "father" of the containment policy, also disagreed with the document, particularly its call for massive rearmament (FRUS, 1950, Vol. I). But foremost in opposition was President Truman himself. Long after the Soviets had detonated an atomic device Truman had sought to cut military spending (begging the question of whether NSC 68 can truly be laid at the feet of that achievement by the Soviets). It would appear that NSC 68 did not change his mind. He returned it to circulation and wanted an estimate of the costs involved. In the ensuing two months little progress was made on the report. By June, Nitze had practically given up on it. But on June 25, 1950 North Korean forces moved across the 38th parallel in their attempt to unify the two Koreas. The Korean War had begun. In light of this, NSC 68 took on new importance. As Acheson later remarked: "Korea . . . created the stimulus which made action" (Princeton Seminars, October 10, 1950, reel 2, track 2, p. 15, Acheson Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri). The Korean War had come to the rescue of those seeking to increase military spending.

Truman officially signed NSC 68 on September 30, 1950, but by then the massive rearmament program was already being implemented. In subsequent months and years, "[t]he new ideology . . . dominated the national security discourse. Indeed, national security concerns became the common currency of most policy makers, the arbiter of most values, the key to America's new identity" (Hogan, A Cross of Iron, pp. 311-13).

This is a bad explanation for NSC-68. It is extremely bias and does not give an appropriate representation of the content of the document.

Sources

  • Hogan, Michael J. A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
  • Nitze, Paul H. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989.
  • Talbott, Strobe. The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988.
  • Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume I.
  • Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
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