Talk:Colombian conflict

• Archives Jan/Feb 2006

Hypothetical Colombia Peace Plan

This is for my International Conflict Resolution Class.

Assumptions:

DRUGS

• Colombia's violence is not because of drugs. Violence in Colombia existed long before drugs. Drugs only exacerbate the violence, but drugs are not the major root cause of the violence.

POVERTY

• Colombia's violence is rooted in poverty.
• If Colombia's poverty is not reduced, Colombia will never be peaceful.

US

• America's current role in Colombia is far more detrimental then beneficial to peace in Colombia an d the prospects of long-term peace.

FARC and AUC (paramilitaries)

• Instead of attacking the FARC directly, the AUC (paramilitary) are attempting to destroy the support for the FARC and the ELN by massacring and killing the peasant population.
• The right-wing paramilitaries are as culpable (guilty) of drug dealing as much (or more) than the left wing FARC.
• Both the FARC and the paramilitaries are responsible for the high murder rate. Both have committed war crimes.
• The FARC and AUC are the major players in Colombia. The ELN and other smaller groups are minor bit players. The ELN may have a role in the peace process, but others can be dealt with separately.

PRESIDENT AND MILITARY

• The current president's aggressive actions against the FARC, supported by the US, although hurting the FARC, will not lead to long-term peace.
• The FARC will never be completely destroyed with the current military size.
• The government and military actively condones and even supports the right-wing paramilitaries actions in the massacre of peasants and other undesirables in Colombia.

HYPOTHETICAL PEACE PLAN:

1st: Give the FARC a semi-autonomous region of the country (the lowlands), similar to:

• the Kurds in Iraq and
• the Kosovians in Bosnia Herzegovina,
• Palestinians in Israel.

This would be similar to what was given to the FARC in the failed peace process in 2002.

2nd: America's role in the region would change dramatically:

A. Support for the military would be conditional only on the disbanding of the paramilitaries and a drastic lowering of human rights violations—the military would be trained only in police work, not in "counter-insurgency" any longer.

B. Much of the military aid would be diverted to support the rule of law—police training, judicial training, etc.

C. Drug eradication programs would end, the money used on this program would be replaced by financial aid to poor farmers and financial incentives to stop the drug trade on a micro level (similar to successful micro-bank programs in India—the money would be given to the woman, etc.)

D. America would recognize the FARCs status to exist, conditional on the renouncing of kidnapping, similar to the PLO in Palestine.

3rd: A general amnesty would be given to both the FARC and paramilitaries. A truth commission would be set up, similar to what has been established in East Timor (although stronger) and Cambodia.

4th: Send UN (regional South Americans) or NATO troops into the region to act as peace keepers and to guard the borders of the new autonomous regions.

5th: After the general amnesty, any massacre or incursion by either side will be dealt with harshly by ???? (big question)

A. Involvement of US in punishing the groups would be considered "Yankee imperialism"—in addition, America's historical role in the region makes it an unlikely impartial defender of justice

B. UN? Too weak?

C. NATO? Would the US accept NATO troops in its "backyard"

Tell me what you think fellow students in this project and Colombia expert here, Juancarlos2004. Signed: Travb 02:39, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

Is this stamtment correct?

I plan to read your comments in depth this weekend.

Juancarlos2004 does this statment sound correct? One student brought it to my attention:

"The conflict is not a civil war, where the major competitor to state authority represents a coherent political program and a substantial base of popular support.50 In fact, the FARC, the largest force making war against the state and society, forcibly recruits and enjoys, at best, only 2 to 4 percent of popular support, the ELN about the same, and the AUC slightly more at 6 percent. The FARC does not have a large base, unlike the AUC which has a higher level of support in some areas."

This is from a US military site: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB10.pdf

Thanks in advance!Travb 09:42, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

There are actually at least two separate issues being addressed in that statement. The first is whether Colombia's armed conflict is a civil war, and the second deals with the size and nature of the suppor that the FARC/ELN/AUC would enjoy.

The first issue is addressed more extensively in another .PDF file, as you may possibly know already: [1]. Basically, the term civil war is correct as far as it describes an internal war among opposing armed factions within a nation-state, but many of the implications of a classical civil war (ie: according to models such as the American Civil War or the Spanish Civil War) don't strictly apply here. Whether that makes the term more or less useful is still up to debate.

The second issue is a different matter, so to speak. I believe the statement is correct in that neither the FARC, ELN or AUC currently enjoy substantial levels of popular support (ie: most of the population of the country isn't split into two or three distinct "warring support bases" over the conflict). But whether the support that each of them may enjoy is 2,4 or 6 percent is practically a matter of complete speculation, IMHO (though some of those figures might come from polls, most polls fundamentally reflect the opinion of Colombians in the largest and most populated cities, underrepresenting that of small, isolated and underpopulated areas...which, truth be told, won't radically change the mathematical result because it doesn't have the statistical potential to do so, but it still would alter the numbers to an extent).

Another thing worth mentioning is that the FARC and ELN do still have a "coherent political program"...but whether it is actually one that fully, coherently and accurately justifies all of their actions, especially in the eyes of most of the population, is another matter. It currently doesn't seem to work that way.

This doesn't mean that the government has a huge level of support, of course, in absolute terms. It may be significantly higher in relative terms (say, 25% to 45% or more, depending on exactly what you want to measure...one can well support the state without supporting the government, and maybe even vice versa), but probably still a plurality, not necessarily a majority. Personally, I'd say that most of the population, especially the urban poor, is undecided and uninterested, and doesn't really want/need to take a stand until they are individually forced to do so, on a case by case basis.

The war has become part of the status quo, especially for the later generations, so it's not really seen as an ever-present "contest for power" whose result will determine the fate of Colombia, but more like an ever-present "risk of death or injury" that needs to be avoided as much as possible. This may change depending on how circumstances develop from now on...

Never apologize for the length of the info you provide, you are a godsend.Travb 22:54, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

Btw, I am truly sorry for the length, but sometimes it's necessary to be more explicit rather than less. I've also replied to your other message on my talk page. Juancarlos2004 19:12, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

Comments on the Plan

• DRUGS

I fundamentally agree. The importance of the drugs trade in the conflict has been increasing every passing decade, but it definitely is not the main cause of the problem.

• POVERTY

I'd say that poverty is very important as a prerequisite that allowed the conflict to flourish. But it was not the only catalyst, nor a sufficient one. Without the existence of political intolerance and the resulting political violence (initially a Conservative Party vs. Liberal Party affair, but later more openly revealed as an Establishment vs. Anti-establishment one, after the Conservative and Liberal elites formed the National Front in 1958), poverty alone would not have led to the current conflict. See the rest of the region for examples of that.

I'd also add to your assumptions that poverty cannot be effectively reduced in the middle of the conflict. A political solution to the conflict, or at least a negotiation that seeks to gradually reduce its violence and intensity, is necessary in order for poverty to be even begin to be properly addressed.

• US

I'd agree with its being more detrimental than beneficial in its current form.

• FARC and AUC (paramilitaries)

I agree with most of the above. I'd specify that the paramilitaries have been seeking to kill what they identify as real or assumed supporters of the guerrillas (they even make lists of who needs to be eliminated, in their views), which makes sense as part of their perverse logic. They usually don't try to kill the peasant population at large for no apparent reason (again, from their point of view).

• PRESIDENT AND MILITARY

The last point can be seen as superficially correct in most situations, but would need a couple of additional details for it to be more realistic: Local power brokers (politicians, businessmen, large landowners, local military commanders etc.) are the ones that are the main driving force behind the paramilitaries, not the central government as a whole or even uniformly.

The government itself has traditionally been weak and isolated, and thus has been both historically incapable and unwilling to actually rein in local powers (including those that are formally part of the government itself, but have quite a lot of freedom in practice). The military itself, given the individualistic nature of its command structure in practice, would actually have more direct responsibility (the security forces have often been discriminated in one sense or another, and haven't always maintained good relations with the successive central administrations. The military establishment has had more reasons and opportunities to covertly support the paramilitaries than anyone else in the government at large).

• HYPOTHETICAL PEACE PLAN:

• 1st: Give the FARC a semi-autonomous region of the country (the lowlands)

Two things should be said here: First off, this proposal would actually be rather different, since the FARC wasn't "given" the land, strictly speaking. In practice they did act as if that had been the case, but the conditions and terms under which the demilitarized zone was created were not those of, say, a secession (not everybody in the area was pro-FARC, especially in the urban counties. Their support has often been much more rural than urban, even in the lowlands). Perhaps implementing some sort of representative mechanism in order to decide which areas should be assigned to the FARC, such as through local referendums for example, would actually be a more reasonable alternative that simply unilaterally deciding on the size and shape of the newly created semi-autonomous regions.

And the other point to keep in mind is that the current members of FARC are not fighting for local autonomy or independence, like the Kurds or the Palestinians, but rather in order to force social change by their obtaining political power over the entire country if adequate reforms are not agreed and acted upon, at least that's how the theory goes. Some of their leaders might be willing to compromise and accept autonomy alone, but the most ambitious and orthodox ones might not. It would take quite a lot of convincing in order for them to accept such a proposal, as is. However, if this proposal was only meant to be a semi-temporary stage, not a permanent resolution, it might work within the framework of a wider agreement between the parties (such as, but not limited to, the rest of the details of the plan being discussed here).

2nd: America's role in the region would change dramatically:

Point A sounds reasonable, but "disbanding" the paramilitaries per se, at this point in time, is not within the military's capabilities, since they have taken on a life of their own and actually act like yet another of the local powers, rather than merely an extension of the military that can be "disbanded". The military should cut off all existing links with them and actively pursue and dismantle those that are still active (which will be many, in the context of this plan, though the number may vary in real life).

Expanding a bit on points B and C, the reasoning is that U.S. aid shouldn't be merely cut off or conditioned to a severe human rights certification without any other modifications, IMO, but rather fundamentally restructured as a whole. Yes, large amounts would have to be removed from counter-narcotics and military aid per se (especially the earlier), and instead used for the other purposes already mentioned. Point D is a logical conclusion, though the FARC would have to be willing to reject or at least discuss the status of several past wrongs and unfortunate incidents that have worsened its relationship with the U.S. government (ie: the three U.S. citizens murdered in 1999, and the three U.S. contractors currently in FARC custody, so to speak).

3rd: A general amnesty would be given to both the FARC and paramilitaries. A truth commission would be set up, similar to what has been established in East Timor (although stronger) and Cambodia.

I'd stress the creation of a truth commission, and especially one that, directly or indirectly, also helps to provide the necessary reparations to at least a representative amount of the victims of the conflict.

4th: Send UN (regional South Americans) or NATO troops into the region to act as peace keepers and to guard the borders of the new autonomous regions.

The idea seems ok, but some sort of financing scheme would have to be developed in order to maintain such an expensive peacekeeper system, even within a UN framework. The U.S. itself and other countries would have to be involved in the financing and in the logistics, even if they won't assign any peacekeepers at all.

5th: After the general amnesty, any massacre or incursion by either side will be dealt with harshly by ???? (big question)

The UN might be too weak, but it seems like a better alternative than any of the other two options. The most effective way for massacres or incursions to be prevented, in theory at least, would be for a gradual yet massive demobilization and/or disarming process to take place, and the installation of a sizable corps of international observers in specially vulnerable areas (in addition to the peacekeepers themselves). Obviously, the thing is that all of this is going to be rather a expensive and bureaucratic affair. Juancarlos2004 05:16, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

Poor maps

The map link I added are pretty poor maps. If you have a better site that you know of, with better maps, please add them.Travb 23:22, 19 February 2006 (UTC)

Modified Peace Plan

New additions are in bold

Assumptions:

DRUGS

• Colombia's violence is not because of drugs. Violence in Colombia existed long before drugs. Drugs only exacerbate the violence, but drugs are not the major root cause of the violence.

POVERTY

• Colombia's violence is rooted two issues: poverty and political tolerence (But see question below.)
• If Colombia's poverty is not reduced, Colombia will never be peaceful.
• Violence only exubates the poverty. Poverty cannot be effectively reduced until the violence is stopped.

US

• America's current role in Colombia is far more detrimental then beneficial to peace in Colombia and the prospects of long-term peace. American meddling in Colombia occured before the war on drugs. America is in Colombia to enforce political stability and the status quo.

FARC and AUC (paramilitaries)

• Instead of attacking the FARC directly, the AUC (paramilitary) are attempting to destroy the support for the FARC and the ELN by massacring and killing the activist members of the peasant population.
• The right-wing paramilitaries are as culpable (guilty) of drug dealing as much (or more) than the left wing FARC.
• Both the FARC and the paramilitaries are responsible for the high murder rate. Both have committed war crimes.
• The FARC and AUC are the major players in Colombia. The ELN and other smaller groups are minor bit players. The ELN may have a role in the peace process, but others can be dealt with separately.

PRESIDENT AND MILITARY

• The current president's aggressive actions against the FARC, supported by the US, although hurting the FARC, will not lead to long-term peace.
• The FARC will never be completely destroyed with the current military size.
• Local power brokers, including politicians, businessmen, land owners, right wing drug barons and the military actively condones and even supports the right-wing paramilitaries actions in the massacre of activist members of the peasants and other undesirables in Colombia.

HYPOTHETICAL PEACE PLAN:

1st: Temporarily give the FARC a semi-autonomous region of the country. Set a future time table for local referendums overseen by the UN, in all regions. These referendums will allow for each region to determine if people of each region want to continue to be part of the FARC or continue to be part of the Colombia government. Strict monitoring by international observers is crucial, it is essential that these elections are considered free and fair by both parties. Give strong security assurances that the same fate of the UP will not befall the FARC. (See question below)

2nd: America's role in the region would change dramatically:

A. All American aid would be funneled through the UN.

B. The US would pull out all American troops, except Embassy personal.

C. America would recognize the FARCs status to exist, conditional on the renouncing of kidnapping, and the return of current captives (similar to the PLO in Palestine).

D. In return, the FARC would not attack American Multi-nationals in the country.

E. Drug erradication programs will cease immediatly.

3rd: A general amnesty would be given to both the FARC and paramilitaries. A truth commission would be set up, similar to what has been established in East Timor (although stronger) and Cambodia.

4th: UN (regional South Americans) troops would be sent into the region to act as peace keepers and to guard the borders of the new autonomous regions. (See question below)

5th: The money funneled through the UN would be used to:

A. The UN would disband the paramilitaries—the military would be trained only in police work, not in "counter-insurgency" any longer. After a gradual yet massive demobilization and/or disarming process. The military aid would be diverted to support the rule of law—police training, judicial training, etc. (See question below)

B. Drug eradication programs would end, the money used on this program would be replaced by financial aid to poor farmers and financial incentives to stop the drug trade on a micro level (similar to successful micro-bank programs in India—the money would be given to the woman, etc.)

5th: After the general amnesty, any massacre or incursion by either side will be dealt with harshly by the UN and ICJ. International observers would be sent to particulalry vulnerable areas. (Not NGO's, which have been targeted by the FARC, but un international observers). This is a massive new role for the UN, unparalleled in its 50+ year history. It will represent a new dawn for world peace keeping. (It would also never be accepted by the current Bush administration)

Signed: Travb 05:37, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

Questions

Political intolerance

You wrote: Without the existence of political intolerance and the resulting political violence (initially a Conservative Party vs. Liberal Party affair, but later more openly revealed as an Establishment vs. Anti-establishment one, after the Conservative and Liberal elites formed the National Front in 1958), poverty alone would not have led to the current conflict. See the rest of the region for examples of that.

• This begs the question, why is their political intolerence?
• What is the underlying cause of the political intolerence? It isn't poverty, what is it?
• You say see the rest of the region, you mean other countries in the region have poor people and their is not the political upheavel like Colombia?
• Why hasn't Colombia had any longer term dictators like most other south american and central american countries? (I understand their was one military dictator in all of the history of Colombia, but he stepped down after less than a decade.) Why is Colombia different?

Demilitarized zone

I was shocked by how small the Demilitarized zone was.

Is it viable to make the Demilitarized zone an atonomous region when it is in the middle of the country, is very small, and shares no borders with other countries? The FARC would be at the mercy of the Colombia government.

Nationality of UN peacekeepers

• In regards to UN peace keepers, what regional South Americans does Colombia not get along with Colombia historically? Panamanians? Venezualians? Would UN soldiers from other non-European, non-North American countries be better as UN peace keepers? Like Asians or Africans?

Role of the military

• Is the possibility of a Costa Rica plan viable in the foreseeable furture? Costa Rica disbanded their military. Since then they have been the most peaceful country in the region, nicknamed the "Switzerland" of Central America. This idea is probably not ever possible.

"Soft" Spanish version of Plan Colombia

I keep reading that there was a "Soft" Spanish version of Plan Colombia and that America "hijacked" it.

nevermind, got my answer The original format of Plan Colombia (written by President Pastrana) was focused primarily on economic development, human rights and judicial reform. It was a prospect of change for Colombian civil society and an ambitious attempt to dig to the root of Colombian’s strife. http://www.cjpf.org/drug/prospectsforpeace.pdf

Signed Travb 05:22, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

It is pretty much for sure, I dug up a million sources see plan colombia I will comment on your ideas soon. thank you again.Travb 08:23, 23 February 2006 (UTC)

Yes, I've seen your edits. Btw, Pastrana has authored a recent book "La Palabra Bajo Fuego" ("The Word Under Fire") in which he gives his version of the events that happened during his presidency, obviously including this subject among other things, so I'll try to get a few quotes from there as well (though they might not agree 100% with the other existing interpretations). Juancarlos2004 19:35, 23 February 2006 (UTC)

Thats okay, I am not looking for the "correct" answer--I know their are different opinions on such a complex issue.Travb 20:32, 23 February 2006 (UTC)

---

Comments on Modified Plan

Assumptions:

• DRUGS

Agreed.

• POVERTY

Agreed.

• US

Mostly agreed. Maybe I would specify that America enforces political stability and the status quo because, as obvious as it may be, it tends to be favorable to current US political and economic strategy/interests.

• FARC and AUC (paramilitaries)

Agreed.

• PRESIDENT AND MILITARY

Mostly agreed. I have problems with the term "right wing drug barons" as drug barons aren't necessarily "right wing", believe it or not. They are relatively apolitical as a group, in the sense that their personal political ideologies differ, and they are secondary to the needs of their business, if not irrelevant, which allows them to engage in relationships of joint partnership, bribery and/or intimidation with individuals of all political colors.

Take Pablo Escobar, for example. He came from a poor background and was far more of a populist than a right-winger, given his tendency to use sizable sums of money for what could be termed "good works" in and around Medellín, many of which did provide considerable benefits to the poor. He also resented the "ruling oligarchy" and was also politically linked to part of the Liberal Party (which isn't precisely "the left", but has usually been closer to it than the alternative). Even later drug lords have also occasionally spoken about their supposed personal desire to use their fortunes for "social justice", as long as they are left alone and are allowed to continue their work without suffering persecution/extradition.

In other words, I'd differentiate the right-wing element (which, of course, has been involved in paramilitarism in its own right) from that of the drug barons.

HYPOTHETICAL PEACE PLAN:

• 1st:

Agreed.

• 2nd:

Point D could be better worded as referring to "American nationals and enterprises in the country", don't you think?

Point E should focus on ending fumigations immediately (or as quickly as possible, in practice), since they are the bulk of the current drug erradication policy. However, I don't really see continuing with manual erradication or crop substitution as being equally flawed in this context, and could actually still play a limited role, even as a temporary alternative or a stopgap measure (unless the worlwide issue of the legality of the drug trade were to be resolved at the same time as this peace plan was put into practice...which would be a very good idea, but seems too ambitious).

• 3rd:

Agreed.

• 4th:

Agreed.

• 5th:

A. Agreed.

B. Fundamentally agreed. Some limited programs (which should be vastly expanded) dealing with this already exist, see above.

• 6th:

Changed 5th to 6th (due to typo). Agreed in that giving the UN such a role wouldn't be accepted by the current US administration (plus the UN itself still needs to be reformed in order for it to properly resolve its current problems and many limitations, let alone those of its member states)...but surprisingly enough, it apparently wouldn't be unwelcome by most Colombian administrations (including the present one which, believe it or not, even spoke of bringing / setting up UN peacekeepers early on, but the suggestion pretty much fell on deaf ears, for several reasons...).

Response to Questions

Political intolerance

• This begs the question, why is their political intolerence?
• What is the underlying cause of the political intolerence? It isn't poverty, what is it?

I'd say it's more than one thing, really...but mostly what I'd call a byproduct of the historically high degree of geographical fragmentation and isolation of the country's political and socio-economic structure, together with the weakness and limited reach of the central government, which allowed local disputes/vendettas at all levels to get out of control far too often (even when they weren't being voluntarily supported by national party leaders and politicians, local powers could well fight each other on their own terms with relative impunity, without counting on the state as a positive mediator, except rarely...which made the absence of the state something to be resented, and justified local alliances and "mini-crusades" of all sorts).

I would tend to believe that such a situation made a mentality of "every man for himself" quite widespread in practice, and helped increase the natural fear of change that is inherent to the status quo of most countries in the region (if not all). Over time, as perhaps too much violence has accumulated, it has also led to increased indifference among the urban population as to the fate of their rural peers (those who have been cursed with the shorter end of the stick), as many have gotten used to the current state of affairs and find it perfectly normal.

Those are the fundamental reasons I'd mention, as far as the "big picture" goes. Still, it also seems that even if just a few circumstantial events had developed differently (say, the fate of Gaitán in 1948), even those reasons could well have led to a better (even if only slightly different) outcome, as I don't believe in absolute historical determinism (for me, history isn't set in stone). That's basically my current hypothesis.

• You say see the rest of the region, you mean other countries in the region have poor people and their is not the political upheavel like Colombia?

That was pretty much the point I was trying to make, yes.

• Why hasn't Colombia had any longer term dictators like most other south american and central american countries? (I understand their was one military dictator in all of the history of Colombia, but he stepped down after less than a decade.) Why is Colombia different?

I think that Colombia is different for many reasons, but it would take too much time to attempt to list them here ;).

Suffice to say that the state's all too evident historical weaknesses and the availability of international examples (both in the 50's and 70's) made the top civilian power structure more "sensitive" to the dangers and risks of military rule, which meant that the military was kept on a short leash for most of the 20th century (through the severe limiting of its size and its share of the national budget, more than any other mechanism). The military did plan to make several coups here and there, but most attempts were easily contained.

General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the one dictator you are talking about, could have changed all that and set a new precedent, but it seems he was a bit too naive. Among other things, he trusted the Church and his immediate subordinates too much and didn't seriously manage to carve a "third party" movement to support and defend him (kind of like Juan_Perón's in Argentina, I guess), trusting that his authority and relative personal popularity alone would carry him through if he attempted to continue making the most of his position.

Demilitarized zone

I was shocked by how small the Demilitarized zone was.

Is it viable to make the Demilitarized zone an atonomous region when it is in the middle of the country, is very small, and shares no borders with other countries? The FARC would be at the mercy of the Colombia government.Travb

I wouldn't think that the FARC has any special attachment to the exact "territorial demarcation" of the old demilitarized zone, beyond the fact that most of its internal and surrounding rural area is definitely under its influence. Basically, even inside the former DMZ one could well expect many rural voters to support becoming part of a FARC autonomy, while most urban voters would reject it, so the shape of the resulting autonomous region(s) would definitely be different.

Btw, the FARC's current demand, in order to restart peace talks with Uribe, is to demilitarize the entire departments of Putumayo and Caquetá, which seems mostly a way to taunt Uribe and would be subject to haggling with other potential presidents, since it is politically suicidal to do that at this point in time.

But even if that specific demand were to become more viable later on, I also doubt that anyobody would agree to demilitarize any land directly connected to the international border, simply due to PR. Therefore, I don't think that point will be too important. Remember that the FARC aren't seeking independence as a state or as a people, and that they basically survived Pastrana's Operation Thanatos mostly unscathed when the Army entered the former DMZ.

What does that tell us? That the FARC already knows (due to this and many other experiences) how to take care of itself in times of grave danger and how not to be "at the mercy of the Colombian government" when the heat's turned on.

It also tells me that the existence of a reasonably large segment of rural land within any proposed demilitarized zone or autonomous region(s), located throughout relatively friendly territory, seems to be the key factor that defines the FARC's perception of safety, in this context, more than any available connection to an international border or the definition of any specific DMZ shape/size.

Nationality of UN peacekeepers

* In regards to UN peace keepers, what regional South Americans does Colombia not get along with Colombia historically? Panamanians? Venezualians? Would UN soldiers from other non-European, non-North American countries be better as UN peace keepers? Like Asians or Africans? Travb

Until relatively recently, and even then any international tension has clearly been almost exclusively due to the ongoing conflict, Colombia has pretty much maintained good diplomatic relations with almost all of its neighbors (most of which keep repeating the mantra that they're willing to do "everything possible" in order to help Colombia reach a negotiated peace), so I don't see an specific need for non-regional peacekeepers (except for obvious cost/manpower reasons, which may likely require additional resources/participation).

Historically we've only had a bit of trouble with Venezuela due a touchy maritime border dispute that still remains open (due to the egoism and foolishness of both sides, IMHO). but even so, the current Venezuelan government has been, surprisingly, less hostile to Colombia (and the current administration) than previous Venezuelan presidents, and has expressed pretty much the same "good will" as most of the others.

Role of the military

Is the possibility of a Costa Rica plan viable in the foreseeable furture? Costa Rica disbanded their military. Since then they have been the most peaceful country in the region, nicknamed the "Switzerland" of Central America. This idea is probably not ever possible.Travb

Unlikely, though I'm clearly not an expert on the history of Costa Rica. Properly answering that question would require understanding exactly why did Costa Rica do so and in which context, before trying to apply such a model to Colombia. The idea itself, however, may be good, but will only be practically applicable after the war itself has begun to be seriously scaled-down, if not already ended. Juancarlos2004 02:20, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

Thank you Juan. I got the photo of the Palace of Justice siege scanned and copied, I had to take too photos and make it one. I am going to post all of the graphs and photos that I copied off. I will let you know a link, and post it here.Travb 05:16, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

President Uribe after AUC too?

Is the president really going after the AUC as stated in this article?

Soon after that, in May 2002, the former liberal politician of conservative leanings Álvaro Uribe Vélez, whose father had been killed by left-wing guerrillas, was sworn in as Colombian president. He immediately began taking action to crush the FARC, ELN, and AUC, including the employment of citizen informants to help the police and armed forces track down suspected members in all three armed groups.

From what I understand, many of the AUC consider Uribe "their man"Travb 08:26, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

Well, IMO, yes and no. The AUC definitely did consider Uribe "their man" in 2002. The fact that they tend to share a common social and ideological background, and the main objective of fighting the guerrillas, is fairly well known and is easy to prove.

But that's where some differences begin to emerge. As far as all public evidence shows, Uribe actually wants to fight the guerrillas by increasing the power of the state and reining in local powers, which is why he wants to demobilize the AUC and bring all counterinsurgency efforts under the control of the central government, in order to make them more effective and, obviously, to secure US aid. If that implies fighting the paramilitaries in the process, then so be it.

According to CERAC, between 2002 and 2004 the AUC drastically lowered its attacks (until the first half of 2005, which saw a rapid increase) and fundamentally isn't killing people through massacres as much (increasingly preferring individual murders). In other words, they reduced their violent activities, though they still continued committing crimes. The report also shows that under Uribe government forces would have actually fought the AUC more than under any previous presidents in recent memory (even if its not that much, compared to how much the guerrillas are being fought, it's significantly more than what was being done earlier on). See here: [2].

Uribe, also in part due to US pressure, has recently demanded that several of his political allies sever their ties to the paramilitaries, and some political candidates suspected of such ties have been driven from the "top tier" political parties that support him (fundamentally a political move, since we all know that the justice system in Colombia is so subpar that most of these guys aren't under investigation, only under public suspicion, whether guilty or innocent. In other words, nobody can prevent them from still running for office in lower profile outfits, but the fact that they were publicly exposed as "suspicious" gives the urban electorate more of a choice in the matter).

The recent capture and prosecution of other individuals thought to be close to the paramilitaries isn't exactly making them happy either, as well as the fact that Uribe hasn't been willing to compromise on the issue of extradition (beyond assuring the paramilitaries that they will not be extradited if they fulfill the requirements of the demobilization and reintegration process, they have no legal protection against it). For other details, see here: [3].

So the relationship between Uribe and the AUC isn't a simple one, as you can see. Juancarlos2004 18:47, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

Juancarlos2004 wrote: So the relationship between Uribe and the AUC isn't a simple one, as you can see. Nothing in Colombia is simple. That video I mentioned, was so simplistic it made me gag:

{{cite AV media}}: Empty citation (help) Volume two contains "China," "India," and "Colombia."

Horribly simplistic video, perfect for Americans: you have a bad guy (the FARC and drug dealers) and you have a good guy (America and the Colombian government). So simplistic.Travb 22:45, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

EU Terror List

The FARC were added to the EU's list in June 2002 and the ELN in April 2004, not in 2005. See European policies on Colombia by An Vranckx (2005) here: [4] or [5]. Apparently, the document that you linked to is showing the September 2005 inclusion of other organizations on the list, not the FARC's and ELN's. Juancarlos2004 19:22, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

I guess you are talking to me? I didnt add anything to the article about the EU.Travb 22:40, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

I thought I was, but now I've noticed that I spoke too soon (I wasn't comparing the differences between the latest versions properly). I apologize for the misunderstanding. Juancarlos2004 00:45, 27 February 2006 (UTC)

Peace Plan ideas from Camilo Azcarate

Before negotiations, there should be:

• interactive problem-solving workshops,
• negotions are set up outside of Colombia,
• a strict set of previously agreed ground rules, and
• all parties should be included. (p 4)

(1) Interactive problem-solving workshops (p4)

These workshops will bring together in a confidential, academic environment nonofficial but influential representatives of the parties (level one) or representatives having different perspectives about the conflict (level two).

This group will be overseen by a panel of social scientists.

The goal of these workshops is not to resolve the conflict but to jointly analyze its causes and the basic needs and reasons for the conflict.

Past use of conflict resolution: Conflict Resolution Workshops have been used in conflicts such as Ireland, Cyprus, Somalia, Sri-Lanka, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

(2) Negotions are set up outside of Colombia

Mediators will met the parties in a neutral place outside of Colombia.

Low-profile, nonofficial, non-Colombian mediators can be more fruitful than high profile mediators. The mediators must be respected by both parties and have some form of influence over both parties.

(3) A strict set of previously agreed ground rules

Example of ground rules: ‘freezing’ or threatening to walk away from the process to get a concession from the other is unacceptable and should mean the termination of the process.

Another series of ground rules needs to address the effect of violent events away from the table. All three peace processes in Colombia ended after a violent event by one of the parties (or one of its factions) away from the table.

(4) All parties should be included