1973 Chilean coup d'état
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The Chilean coup d'état of 11 September 1973 was a watershed event in the history of Chile. Historians and partisans alike have wrangled over its implications ever since.
In Chile's 1970 presidential election, in accordance with the constitution, Congress resolved the 3-way split — between Salvador Allende (with 36.3% of the vote), conservative (and former president) Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (35.8%), and the Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic (27.9%) — by voting to approve Allende's narrow plurality. Various sectors of Chilean society still opposed his presidency, and on September 11, 1973 the Chilean armed forces overthrew him. It is widely believed the United States helped bring this about.
A junta led by Augusto Pinochet assumed power. This military dictatorship lasted until 1990 when Pinochet stepped down in favor of Patricio Aylwin who had won a majority in the presidential election of 1989.
Opposing views
For those who favored the coup d'état, it was essential for preserving democracy and prosperity in Chile. They see the forcible removal of Salvador Allende as saving the country from a Cuba-style dictatorship, which in their view would have destroyed both basic human rights as well as the prosperity facilitated by free market economics.
For those who opposed the coup, it represents an unprecedented and inexcusable outrage against democracy. They cite several thousand documented cases of torture as well as "disappearances". Equally bad in their view is that a "democratically elected leader" was overthrown despite having a clear mandate from the people.
Situation before the coup
Allende becomes president
See main article 1970 Chilean presidential election.
There are generally two views of the voting in 1970. Those who opposed Salvador Allende point out that he received only a plurality of 36.3% of the vote. Those who supported him point instead to the fact that leftist forces clearly won a majority: in addition to Allende, running with the Unidad Popular (UP or Popular Unity) coalition, Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic won 27.9% with a very similar platform to Allende's. Conservative former president Jorge Alessandri received slightly under 35.8% of the vote.
| Candidate | Votes | % |
|---|---|---|
| Allende | 1,066,372 | 36.29% |
| Alessandri | 1,050,863 | 35.76% |
| Tomic | 821,350 | 27.95% |
| Total | 2,943,561 | Source: PDBA |
According to the constitution, Congress had to decide between the two candidates who had received the most votes. The precedent set on the three previous occasions this situation had arisen since 1932 was for Congress simply to choose the candidate with the largest number of votes; indeed, former president Alessandri had been elected in 1958 with 31.6% of the popular vote.
In this case, however, there was an active campaign against Allende's confirmation by Congress, and his presidency was ratified only after he signed a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees".
It has been argued than given that less than the majority of the voters voted for him, Allende did not have a clear "mandate" to embark in the wide reforms put forward on his program. But the legality of the election itself is not in dispute.
The Allende years
In office, Allende pursued a policy he called "La vía chilena al socialismo" ("The Chilean Way to Socialism"). This included nationalization of certain large-scale industries (notably copper), reform of the health care system, a continuation of his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva's reforms of the educational system, a program of free milk for children, and an attempt at agrarian reform. [1]
These government's efforts to pursue these reforms, led to strong opposition by landowners, some middle-class sectors, the National Party (right), the Roman Catholic Church (who were displeased with the direction of the educational reforms [2]), and eventually the Christian Democrats.
In the first year of Allende's term, the short-term economic results of Minister of the Economics Pedro Vuskovics expansive monetary policy were unambiguously favorable: 12% industrial growth and an 8.6% increase in GDP, accompanied by major declines in inflation (down from 34.9% to 22.1%) and unemployment (down to 3.8%). However, these results were not sustained and in 1972 the Chilean escudo had runaway inflation of 140%. The combination of inflation and government-mandated price-fixing led to the rise of black markets in rice, beans, sugar, and flour, and a "disappearance" of such basic commodities from supermarket shelves. [3]
Towards the end of 1971, Fidel Castro toured Chile extensively during a four-week visit. [4] This gave credence to the belief of those on the right that "The Chilean Way to Socialism" was nothing more than an effort to put Chile on the same path as Cuba.
October 1972 saw the first of what were to be a wave of confrontational strikes by some of the historically well-off sectors of Chilean society. A strike by owners of trucks was joined by small businesmen, some (mostly professional) unions, and some student groups. Other than the inevitable damage to the economy, the chief effect of the 24-day strike was to bring the head of the army, general Carlos Prats, into the government as Interior Minister. [5]
In the parliamentary elections of March 1973, Allende's Popular Unity coalition actually slightly increased its vote to 43 percent. However, by this point what had started as an informal alliance with the Christian Democrats [6] was anything but: a proposal Christian Democrats now leagued with the right-wing National Party to form the Confederación Democrática (CODE) in opposition to Allende's government (although the alliance in parliamentary opposition would not become formal until August). The conflict between the executive and legislature paralyzed initiatives from either side. [7]
A failed coup on June 29, 1973 was followed by a further strike at the end of July, joined this time by the copper miners of El Teniente as well. On August 9, General Prats was made Minister of Defense, but this decision proved so unpopular with the military that on August 22 he was forced to resign not only this position but his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army; he was replaced in the latter role by Pinochet. [8]
For some months now, the government had been afraid to call upon the national police known as the caribineros, for fear of their lack of loyalty. In August 1973, a constitutional crisis was clearly in the offing: the Supreme Court publicly complained about the government's inability to enforce the law of the land and on August 22 the Chamber of Deputies (with the Christian Democrats now firmly uniting with the National Party) accused Allende's government of unconstitutional acts and [#The Chamber of Deputies calls on the military|called on the military ministers] to assure the constitutional order. [9]
In early September 1973, Allende floated the idea of resolving the crisis with a plebiscite.
The failed coup of June 1973
On June 29, 1973, a tank regiment under the command of Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded the presidential palace (la Moneda) in a violent but unsuccessful coup attempt. [10]
The Chamber of Deputies calls on the military
As mentioned above, on August 22, 1973 the Christian Democrats and the National Party members of the Chamber of Deputies called on the military to "put an immediate end" to what they described as "breach[es of] the Constitution... with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the constitutional order of our Nation and the essential underpinnings of democratic coexistence among Chileans."
Although this document was invoked to justify the September 11 coup, it is clear that the agenda of the coup was something other than restoration of the constitutional order.
The document [11] accused the Allende government of seeking "...to conquer absolute power with the obvious purpose of subjecting all citizens to the strictest political and economic control by the state... [with] the goal of establishing a totalitarian system," and claimed that it had made "violations of the Constitution" into "a permanent system of conduct." Many of the charges came down to disregarding the separation of powers and arrogating the prerogatives of both the legislature and judiciary within the executive.
Among other particulars, the regime was accused of:
- ruling by decree, thus thwarting the normal system of adopting legislation.
- refusing to enforce judicial decisions against its own partisans and "not carrying out sentences and judicial resolutions that contravene its objectives."
- ignoring the decrees of the independent General Comptroller’s Office.
- various offenses related to the media, including usurping control of the National Television Network and "applying ... economic pressure against those media organizations that are not unconditional supporters of the government..."
- allowing its supporters to assemble even when armed, while preventing legal assembly by its opponents.
- "...supporting more than 1,500 illegal 'takings' of farms..."
- illegal repression of the El Teniente strike.
- illegally limiting emigration.
Last, but certainly not least, it was accused of a "breakdown of the Rule of Law by means of the creation and development of government-protected armed groups which... are headed towards a confrontation with the Armed Forces." Allende's efforts to re-organize the military and police (which he clearly had reason to fear in their then-current forms) were characterized as "notorious attempts to use the Armed and Police Forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks."
Military coup of 1973
General Pinochet came to power in a military coup d'état on September 11, 1973, in which rebels bombed the Presidential Palace with British-made Hawker Hunter fighter jets. Allende remained inside, and committed suicide instead of surrendering. Coup leaders named Pinochet head of the victorious junta's governing council, and he moved to crush Chile's liberal opposition, arresting approximately 130,000 individuals in a three-year period.
In his memoirs, Pinochet affirms that he was the leading plotter of the coup and used his position as Commander of the Army to coordinate a far-reaching scheme that was coordinated with the other branches of the military. In recent years, however, high military officials from the time have said that Pinochet only reluctantly got involved in the coup a few days before it was scheduled to occur.
Once the Junta was in power, Pinochet soon consolidated his control, first retaining sole chairmanship of the Junta (originally agreed to be rotated among all members), and he was proclaimed the President of the Republic.
US role in 1973 coup
According to declassified U.S. documents, Pinochet came to power with important help from the United States, which had undermined Allende's government through economic pressures and diplomatic isolation, as well as funding and propaganda support to Allende's opponents.
The scope of the U.S. role in the coup itself has not been established, but a document released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2000 titled "CIA Activities in Chile" revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts or agents of the CIA or U.S. military, even though the agency knew that they were involved in systematic and widespread human rights abuses [12]. The CIA was notified by contacts of the impending Pinochet coup two days in advance, but contends it "played no direct role in" the coup. [13]. After Pinochet assumed power, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told U.S. President Richard Nixon that the U.S. "didn't do it" (referring to the coup itself) but had "created the conditions as great as possible". [14]
Documents declassified during the Clinton administration show that the United States government and the CIA had sought the overthrow of Allende in 1970, immediately after he took office ("Project FUBELT"), but claims of their direct involvement in the actual coup are not supported by documentary evidence, although many documents still remained classified. Regarding Pinochet's accession to the presidency, the intelligence community concluded in a 2000 report that the CIA "did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency" and, in fact, many CIA officers shared broader U.S. reservations about Pinochet's single-minded pursuit of power. [15]
The documents produced by various U.S. agencies were provided by the US State Department in October 1999. The collection of 1,100 documents dealt with the years leading up to the military coup. One of these documents establishes that U.S. military aid was raised dramatically between the coming to power of Allende in 1970, when it amounted to USD $800,000 annually, to $10.9 million in 1972. The U.S. government supported Pinochet's government after he came to power.
Documents declassified in 2000 show that after the 1970 election the CIA had supported an attempt to kidnap Chile's army chief of staff, in the hope of preventing the congressional confirmation of Allende as president. U.S. President Richard Nixon expressed his determination to "do everything we can to bring Allende down". The CIA provided funding and propaganda support to Chilean opponents of Allende in the 1964 and 1970 elections, and during the Allende administration.
On September 10, 2001, a suit was filed by the family of General René Schneider, once head of the Chilean general staff, accusing former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of arranging Schneider's 1970 murder because he would have opposed a military coup [16]. However, CIA documents indicate that while the CIA had sought his kidnapping, his killing, which was committed by an insurgent group which had been in contact with the CIA, was never intended.
In a 2003 interview on the U.S. Black Entertainment Television network, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was asked about why the United States saw itself as the "moral superior" in the Iraq conflict, citing the Chilean coup as an example of U.S. intervention that went against the wishes of the local population. Powell responded: "With respect to your earlier comments about Chile in the 1970s and what happened with Mr. Allende, it is not a part of American history that we're proud of." Chilean newspapers hailed the news as the first time the U.S. government had conceded a role in the affair.
Articles about Allende/Pinochet coup d'état in Chile
- Salvador Allende - deposed by 1973 coup
- Augusto Pinochet - took power in 1973 coup
- History of Chile - long article with section on 1970-1973 events
- U.S. intervention in Chile
- 1970 Chilean presidential election
External Links
- La Tercera, newspaper September 11, 1973 (in Spanish)
- La Tercera, El Once, includes news of different newspaper of days previous to the coup (in Spanish)
- An extensive Spanish-language site providing a day-by-day chronology of the Allende era. This is clearly a partisan, pro-Allende source, but the research and detail are enormous.
- The August 22, 1973 document under which the Chamber of Deputies called on the military to overthrow the Allende regime. This is a solid translation of the document, although the introductory note is clearly that of an apologist for the coup.