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Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011)

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The Iraqi resistance is a collective term denoting the various Iraqi guerillas battling the U.S.-led military alliance forces and Iraqi security forces in the Occupation of Iraq that followed the Iraq war on May 1, 2003.

Members of the insurgency
Iraqi militants
Members of the insurgency

Composition of the Resistance

The Iraqi resistance is composed of over a dozen major insurgent organizations and countless smaller cells. It can be subdivided into four main ideological strands: Ba'athism, nationalism (adherents of which are mainly Sunni), Sunni Islamism or Wahabiism, and followers of Shiite Islamist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

The Ba'athists are composed of former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence and security services. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power.

The nationalists are composed of former members of the Iraqi military as well as some ordinary Iraqis. Their reasons for opposing the occupation vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to U.S failure to quickly hand over power. Many Iraqis who have had relatives killed by American soldiers may also be involved in the nationalist resistance as part of the Iraqi code of tribal revenge. Beyond the expulsion of U.S troops from Iraq, there is no coherent political goal being pursued by the Iraqi guerillas fighting under the banner of nationalism.

The Sunni Islamist resistance is composed of two main groups. The first is composed of Iraqis belonging to the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, which advocates a return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Mohammed and opposes any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs of Salafi Islam are roughly similar to the Wahabi sect of nearby Saudi Arabia (of which Osama bin Laden is a member), one difference being that Salafis in Iraq do not usually condone intolerance towards Shiites. The second group is composed of foreign fighters who have entered the country and see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam may be involved. The United States points to Jordanian born suspected al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. The Islamists have steadily gained in influence within the Iraqi resistance since the insurgency began and were poised following the capture of Saddam Hussein to take the leading role in the insurgency from the dwindling Ba'athists.

Size and Scope of Resistance

File:Sunniinsurgentcapt.bag10404071350.jpg
Sunni rebels patrolling Fallujah, Iraq. (April 7, 2004)

Sunni insurgency

Estimates on the total number of Iraqi guerillas varies. The U.S military estimates that around 5,000 fighters form the core of the movement, along with many other active sympathizers and part-time insurgents who altogether may total 50,000 strong (according to a CIA report). The most intense insurgent activity takes place in Baghdad and a triangle stretching west from the capital to the town of Ramadi and north to Tikrit in an area known as the Sunni Triangle. Guerilla activity also takes place around al-Qaim in western Iraq and around the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk to the north, as well as some other areas of the country. In the western regions of the Sunni Triangle, including the area of Fallujah and Ramadi, the insurgents had progressed to asserting their control over most of the urban areas by April.

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Jaish-i-Mahdi militants, Radical Shiites loyal to cleric Moqtada al-Sadr scouting U.S military positions in Sadr City (April 7, 2004)

Shiite uprising

Up until the beginning of April, 2004, the southern portion of Iraqi was relatively free of the guerilla violence that had stricken the Sunni Arab regions of central Iraq (with the notable exception of a string of suicide bombings suspected to have been perpetrated by Sunni Islamist radicals). This changed when the radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr directed his followers to launch an armed revolt on April 4, 2004. This move came as a result of the closure of Mr. Sadr's newspaper, al-Hawza, by coalition forces and after the arrest of one of his aides on murder charges. Mr. Sadr's political viability and standing had also decreased in the previous months. This pushed Sadr, an ardent opponent of the occupation and an proponent of a Shiite theocracy in Iraq, to move to armed revolt. The revolt came at a time of increasing Shiite dissatisfaction with the occupation, driven by the same perception that the coalition had failed to deliver and the same nationalist beliefs as had motivated many Sunni Arabs. The Mahdi Army, Sadr's private militia, launched coordinated assaults on coaltion forces throughout the south and had seized control of Najaf, Kufa, Kut, and parts of Baghdad and other southern cities by April 7. Jaish-i-Mahdi, or al-Mahdi Army, is estimated to have fighters numbering between 3,000 and 10,000.

Iraqi Guerilla Tactics

Iraqi guerilla attacks against coalition targets typically take the form of attacks on convoys and patrols using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. These bombs, formed from former Iraqi military armaments and/or homemade materials, are camouflaged on main roads and detonated either by remote control or by wire when a convoy or patrol passes. Another common form of attack involves hit-and-run mortar strikes on bases of the U.S-led forces. Insurgents fire a few mortar rounds or rockets and quickly escape before their position can be identified and effective counter-fire directed. Since the beginning of November, helicopters have also been increasingly targeted. The insurgents, often concealed in palm groves, lie in wait for the helicopters and then, usually, attack the helicopter from the rear. The weapons used include rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder fired missiles such as the SA-7, SA-14, and in one case the SA-16. Suicide bombers are used in larger attacks to gain maximum media attention. Most attacks formerly took the form of ambushes involving rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire, but these type of attacks have been reduced in favor of strikes involving no direct contact to reduce the chance of insurgent casualties.

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Militant firing sholder rocket. (2004)

Militants typically operations

Until April of 2004 the Iraqi guerillas typically operate in small squad sized formations of 5-10 men. Fighters were rarely concentrated in larger numbers in order to escape detection. Occasions where fighters were concentrated in larger numbers included a battle near the town of Rawa on June 13, 2003 near the Syrian border and a large coordinated ambush of a convoy in the town of Samarra on November 30. Both involved groups of roughly 100 fighters. A flurry of attacks resembling standard frontal infantry assaults involving large numbers of fighters began in April, as the Mahdi Army started a Shiite uprising and Sunni guerillas stepped up activity with the American assault on Fallujah. Over 150 fighters launched assaults on Marine positions in Ramadi, followed by an attack involving a similar number of fighters in al-Qaim. Both assaults were beaten back but only after the U.S forces suffered considerable casualties. Hundreds of insurgents cut the road between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib on the western outskirts of Baghdad. 2,000 fighters participiated in the defense of Fallujah, divided into platoon-sized units and using Soviet style defense-in-depth tactics. The Mahdi Army uprising involved several thousand fighters; almost 1,000 participated in one assault alone in Sadr City on a U.S convoy. The switch to bolder tactics resulted in much heavier casualties for both sides, especially for the insurgents. Small-scale guerilla attacks continued throughout this time. After the seige of Fallujah ended, the Sunni guerillas switched back to small-unit guerilla tactics using improvised mines and mortars or rockets, although at an accelerated rate. Mahdi Army militiamen began utilizing a combination of the infantry tactics they had used before, and which had often proved suicidal, with guerilla tactics in an attempt to preserve their forces.

Insurgent saboteurs

Insurgent saboteurs have also repeatedly assaulted the Iraqi oil industry. Guerillas, using either rocket-propelled grenades or explosives, regularly destroy portions of oil pipeline in northern Iraq. This sabotage has set back reconstruction efforts. The reason the Iraqi resistance gives for the sabotage is to prevent an alliance seizure of Iraqi oil, which opponents of the occupation believe is one of the main reasons for the invasion. Coalition officials contend the sabotage is intended to set back reconstruction efforts and to push back progress in Iraqi society towards democracy. There have also been allegations of attacks on water pipelines and the electrical grid by the Iraqi insurgents, although there is controversy as to whether the incidents in question did indeed represent intended sabotage.

Non-military and civilian targets

There also have been several attacks on non-military and civilian targets, especially since August of 2003. These include the assassination of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council and suicide bombings targeting the U.N., the Jordanian Embassy, Shiite mosques and civilians, the International Red Cross, the Iraqi police, U.S forces, Kurdish political parties, the president of the Iraqi Governing Council, hotels, and a resturant. Guerillas also target private contractors working for the coalition as well as non-Alliance coalition military personnel. The number of these attacks on "soft targets" has steadily increased. The origin of these devestating bombings remains a mystery. The main suspects are foreign jihadis, former Iraqi intelligence operatives, or perhaps a combination of the two. Coalition officials and some analysts suspect that the aim of these attacks is to sow chaos and sectarian discord. They point to an intercepted letter suspected to be from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which he makes the case for attacking Shiites in order to provoke an anti-Sunni backlash and thereby galavanize the Sunni population in support of the insurgents, as evidence. Besides the hard-core Wahabi jihadists among the resistance, who may indeed desire a sectarian war, the insurgents charge that the Americans themselves are attempting to instill a fear of civil war as part of a "divide and conquer" strategy.

Advanced military tactics

As 2004 progressed, the guerillas seemed to move to more advanced military tactics and demonstrated much more assertiveness and organization. As Alliance forces pulled back and began transfering urban areas to the control of Iraqi security forces, the resistance slowly began to assert itself. By the beginning of April, the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi were entirely under guerilla control. In addition, they also began to operate in much larger numbers and began to hold territory rather than operating in small numbers and just planting IED's and firing mortars. The situation in Fallujah had spun entirely out of coalition control by March 31 when four private contractors working for the Alliance military were killed in an ambush on their vehicle there and their charred bodies dragged through the streets, mutilated, and hung from a bridge by an angry crowd. On April 4, the U.S. Marines and Iraqi security forces launched a major assault in an attempt to regain the city. They faced bloody urban combat from the guerillas, and after three days over 75% of the city was still under insurgent control. Cases have since been reported of widereaching cooperation and planning, such as the destruction of bridges in one part of the country to prevent resupply convoys from reaching troops in another part.

On April 30 the Marines began a withdrawal from Fallujah. Initial reports that Maj. Gen. Jassem Mohammed Saleh, former commander of Saddam's infantry, was left in charge, are disputed after the weekend.[1] [2][3]

Number of Attacks and Coalition Casualties

The total number of guerilla attacks on coalition forces from June 2003 to March 2004 remained steady at between 12 and 20 attacks per day, with the exception of a surge of attacks in November 2003 during which as many as 50 attacks per day were reported on some days. The average number of attacks spiked to 70 a day during April, before going to 50 a day for May as the fighting in Fallujah ended and the Mahdi Army uprising cooled. As of June 2 2004, 913 coalition soldiers have been killed since the war in Iraq began, 810 of them American. Over 5,000 U.S. soldiers have been wounded.

Support for resistance among the Population

A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning "hearts and minds." It appears as though the Iraqi resistance retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense Alliance counterinsurgency operations have resulted in the harsh opinions many Sunni Arabs have for the occupation. Outside the Sunni Triangle and in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, violence is mostly eschewed. Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, are displeased with various aspects of the Alliance occupation. Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the occupation. Many Shiites and Kurds, however, suffered heavy persecution under the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime and are much more reluctant to use violence against coalition forces.

Polls

A polls in late 2003 showed that about one-third of all Sunni Arabs are staunch supporters of the guerillas and consider armed attacks on Alliance forces acceptable. In al-Anbar province, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, solid support for the Iraqi resistance stood at 70%. Only about 10% of the Shiite Arab population supported violent resistance. Support was very minimal for attacks on Alliance forces among the Kurds. Curiously, the poll (which was supposed to cover an even distribution of the Iraqi population) showed more people stating that they are Sunnis (44%) than Shiites (33%), leading to speculation that the poll's sample was badly skewed. [4]. The poll was also conducted before the spring 2004 US crackdown on the insurgency in Fallujah which was widely condemned by Iraqis, including normally pro-US members of the governing council.

In late January and early February 2004 a joint statement was distributed in leaflet form by a dozen resistance organisations vowing to take control of Iraqi cities after Alliance occupation forces withdraw, and portraying the US-led coalition's planned withdrawal as a defeat. Iraqi civilians' reaction to the statement are reported to vary widely, from being "hailed as the manifesto for a legitimate resistance movement" to being dismissed "as mere bravado".

Coalition Counterinsurgency operations

The Alliance counterinsurgency began on June 9, 2003, in response to an increase in guerilla attacks that began in late May. 2,000 soldiers from Task Force Iron Horse launched a sweep through the Sunni Triangle peninsula of Thuluiya, detaining 397 Iraqis in Operation Peninsula Sweep. Almost all of the detainees were later released. This operation was quickly followed by Operation Desert Scorpion, which expanded the sweeps into guerilla flashpoints such as Baghdad, Tikrit, Fallujah, and Kirkuk. An encampment of over seventy foreign fighters near the town of Rawa, close to the Syrian border, was also destroyed during the offensive. Over the course of the summer, other operations such as Operation Sidewinder, Operation Soda Mountain, and Operation Ivy Serpent were conducted.

Alliance forces conducted cordon-and-search operations and launched mass detentions throughout regions where attacks on coalition forces were common. Soldiers were instructed to be aggressive in returning fire during ambushes and orchards and palm groves were cleared to deprive insurgents of cover. These operations were accompanied by humanitarian missions, in a "carrot and stick" strategy. Analysts fault the operations for being too blunt and not carefully targeted, causing more resentment and resulting in the recruitment of more guerillas than it netted. As a result, the Alliance military began to focus on more targeted operations with greater intelligence gathering by the beginning of August of 2003. This resulted in mixed success. Although some regions saw a decrease in attacks as Iraqi informants guided Alliance troops towards guerilla hideouts, such as in Tikrit, most other regions either saw a steady stream of rebel activity or a continued increase.

Ramadan Offensive

At the end of October of 2003, Iraqi guerillas launched what was later termed the Ramadan Offensive, beginning with four simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on the Iraqi police and the International Red Cross in Baghdad. This was quickly followed by a sharp surge in guerilla attacks on U.S forces throughout Iraq and an increased targeting of helicopters. 82 U.S troops were killed and 332 wounded in November. Coalition forces responded with much more aggressive tactics. Villages were sealed with barbed wire and the flow of Iraqis in and out carefully monitored, artillery and air strikes were directed at insurgent mortar positions and ambush sites, and patrols and raids were stepped up. High tech surveillance of roads to spot insurgents planting IED's was increased. These new tactics were unleashed in Operation Iron Hammer, which began the second week of November.

Insurgency destabilization

The insurgency was far from defeated, however. The attacks on Alliance forces have continued at a steady pace, while the insurgency is turning to bombing attacks in an attempt to destabilize the country ahead of the transfer of power. Attacks on Iraqi security forces have increased both in brazeness, number, and lethality. In the spring of 2004, Iraqi security forces refused to fight against the insurgency and, in cases, joined them in their uprising against the occupation.

On June 6, 2004, Brigadier General Mark Hertling, a top US commander in charge of Najaf, Iraq, states "The Moqtada militia is militarily defeated. We have killed scores of them over the last few weeks, and that is in Najaf alone. [...] The militia have been defeated, or have left." US Coalition patrols and checkpoints are still active around Najaf and its twin city of Kufa, Iraq.

Iraqi Resistance Organizations

Major Iraqi guerilla groups include, but are not limited to, the following:


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