Kargil War

Kargil War
Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars
File:Kargil Bofors.jpg An Indian Bofors 155 mm howitzer field gun being repositioned for aiming at Pakistani positions during the war.
Date May-July 1999 Location Kargil district, Kashmir Result India regains possession of Kargil
Belligerents
India	Pakistan, Kashmiri secessionists
Strength
30,000	5,000
Casualties and losses
Indian Estimates:Template:Fn ~600 killed, ~1400 wounded Pakistani Estimates: 800 killed, 2200 wounded	Estimates:Template:Fn 4000+ killed Pakistani Estimates: 700-3000 killed

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflictTemplate:Fn, was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between April and June 1999 in Kashmir. The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control, which serves as the de facto border between the two nations. Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents; however, documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Army Chief showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces. The Indian Army, supported by the air force, attacked the Pakistani positions and, with international diplomatic support, eventually forced a Pakistani withdrawal across the Line of Control (LoC).

The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare, in mountainous terrain, and posed significant logistics problems for the combating sides. This was the first ground war between any two nuclear armed countries. (India and Pakistan both test-detonated fission devices in May 1998, though the first Indian nuclear test was conducted in 1974.) The conflict led to heightened tensions between the two nations and increased defense spending on the part of India. In Pakistan, the aftermath caused instability to the government and the economy, and on October 13 1999, a coup d'etat by the military, placed army chief Pervez Musharraf in power.

Location

Location of conflict.

Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was part of Gilgit-Baltistan, a region of many diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, due in part to the many isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The First Kashmir War (1947-48) resulted in most of the Kargil region remaining an Indian territory; then after Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the remaining areas, including strategic military posts, also passed into Indian territory. Notably, Kargil is the only district in the Ladakh subdivision that has a Muslim majority. The town and district of Kargil is now in what is called Jammu and Kashmir. The town lies on the Line of Control (LOC), the defacto border for the two nations, located 120 km (75 miles) from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas of Pakistan. Like other areas in the Himalayas, it has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and cold with temperatures often dropping to −40 °C. A national highway connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil.

The area which witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch on the border of the LOC, overlooking a vital highway on the Indian side of Kashmir. Apart from the district capital, Kargil, the frontline in the conflict encompassed the tiny town of Drass as well as the Batalik sector, Mushko Valley and other nearby areas along the de facto border. The military outposts on these ridges were generally around 5,000 metres (16,000 feet) high, with a few ones as high as 5,600 metres (18,000 feet). One of the main reasons why Kargil was specifically targeted for incursions was its terrain lent itself to a pre-emptive seizure. With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, it provided an ideal high ground for a defender akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge the enemy and reclaim high ground in a mountain warfare would require a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, which is further exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures. Additionally, Kargil was just 173 km (108 mi) from the Pakistan town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to the Pakistani combatants. All these tactical reasons, plus the Kargil district being a Muslim majority, were probably contributing factors to why Kargil was chosen as the location to attack.

Background

After the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, there had been a long period of relative calm among the two neighbours. But during the 1990s, escalating tensions and conflict with separatists in Kashmir as well as nuclear tests by both countries in 1998 changed the scenario. Despite the belligerent atmosphere, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999 to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmiri issue. However, elements in the Pakistani government covertly trained and sent troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of mujahideens, into the Indian territory. The aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian-held Kashmir by taking a proactive role.

According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash Malik, the infiltration was code named "Operation Badr", and much of the background planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On more than one occasion, the army had given past Pakistani leaders (namely Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for an infiltration in the Kargil region in the 1980s and 1990s. However the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war. Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated when Pervez Musharraf was appointed chief of army staff in October 1998.

Course of the war

There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan captured several strategic high points in the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir. India responded by first capturing strategic transportation routes, then militarily pushing Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control.

Initial occupation by Pakistan

Because of the extreme winter weather in Kashmir, it was common practice for the Indian and Pakistan Army to abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. That particular spring the Pakistan Army reoccupied the forward posts before the scheduled time.

Infiltration and military build-up.

In early May 1999, the Pakistan Army decided to occupy the Kargil posts, numbering around 130, and thus control the area. Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. Initially, these incursions were not spotted due to the heavy artillery fire by Pakistan across the Line of Control, which provided cover for the infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambushing of an Indian patrol team acting on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the encroachment, the Indian troops in the area initially claimed that they would evict them within a few days. However, soon reports of infiltration elsewhere along the LoC made it clear that the entire plan of attack was on a much bigger scale.

The Government of India responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, plus several thousand from the Indian Paramilitary Forces and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. The total number of Indian soldiers that were involved in the military operation on the Kargil-Drass sector was thus close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those providing logistical backup, has been put at approximately 5,000 at the height of the conflict. This figure includes troops from Pakistan administered Kashmir that were involved in the war providing additional artillery support.

Protection of National Highway No. 1A

The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway No. 1 (NH 1) from Leh to Srinagar, are only two-lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1A (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line of sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1A. This was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route. The Pakistani shelling of the arterial road posed the threat of Leh being cut off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh.

The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later recovering nearly 9,000 anti-personnel mines according to ICBL. The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1A, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war. Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war.

Indian recapture of remaining occupied territory

Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH 1A, the Indian Army turned to driving the invading force back across the Line of Control, but elected not to pursue forces further into the Pakistani-controlled portion of Kashmir. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favor. However, some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks – most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them – and witnessed fierce hand to hand combat. As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line of sight. The Bofors field howitzer (infamous in India due to the Bofors Scandal) played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun. It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were introduced. The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar but was limited by the high altitude, which in turn limited bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used. The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft due to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter and one Mi-8 helicopter to Stinger SAMs. During attacks the IAF used laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces.

File:Indflg.jpg

Indian army soldiers wave the Indian flag on a mountain peak after securing the mountain from Pakistani forces.

In some vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the outposts manned by the Pakistan soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to be made on peaks as high as 18,000 feet. Since any daylight attack was suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for the wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as −11 to −15 °C near the mountain tops. Based on military tactics, much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege. Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LOC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an escalation of the theatre of war and reducing international support for its cause.

Meanwhile, the Indian Navy also readied itself for an attempted blockade of Pakistani ports to cut off supply routes. Later, the-then Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-fledged war had broken out. As Pakistan found itself entwined in a prickly position, the army had covertly planned a nuclear strike on India, the news of which alarmed U.S. President Bill Clinton, resulting in a stern warning to Nawaz Sharif. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly flushed out most of the foreigners, and according to official count, an estimated 75%–80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control. Following the Washington accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw the Pakistan-backed troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt. However, some of the militants still holed up did not wish to retreat, and the "United Jihad Council" (an umbrella for all extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on. Following this, the Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the last of these "Jihadists" in the Drass subsector had been cleared, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in December 1972 as per the Shimla Accord.

World opinion

Pakistan was initially criticised in world opinion for allowing insurgents to cross the Line of Control. Pakistan's diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the incursion to what it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", was in the end not successful. Veteran analysts argued that the battle was fought at heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped "freedom fighters" would neither have the ability nor the wherewithal to seize land and defend it. Moreover, while the army had initially denied the involvement of its troops in the intrusion, two soldiers were awarded the Nishan-E-Haider (Pakistan's highest military honour). Another 90 soldiers were also given gallantry awards, most of them posthumously, confirming Pakistan's role in the episode. India also released taped phone conversations between the Army Chief and a senior Pakistani general where the latter is recorded saying: "the scruff of [the militants] necks is in our hands," although Pakistan dismissed it as a "total fabrication".

As the Indian counter-attacks picked up momentum, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet U.S. president Bill Clinton on July 4 to obtain support from the U.S. Clinton rebuked Sharif, however, and asked him to use his contacts to rein in the militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian territory. On the other hand, he applauded Indian restraint for not crossing the LoC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war. The other G8 nations, too, supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LoC at the Cologne summit. The European Union was also opposed to the violation of LOC. China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, did not intervene in Pakistan's favour, insisting on a pullout of forces from the LOC and settling border issues peacefully. Faced with growing international pressure, Sharif managed to pull back the remaining soldiers from Indian territory. The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the need to respect the Line of Control and resume bilateral talks as the best forum to resolve all disputes.

Impact and influence of media

File:Kargil Pinaka.jpg

A Star TV news footage shows the BM-21 Grad MRL system being fired in the background. The rocket barrage was aimed at Tiger Hill. The reporter is Barkha Dutt. Images like these were relayed on most networks in India.

The Kargil War was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media in both nations, especially on the Indian side. Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic journalism in India, the Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on TV, and many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. The conflict became the first "live" war in South Asia that was given such detailed media coverage, often to the extent of drumming up jingoistic feelings. The conflict soon turned into a news propaganda war, with the official press briefings of both nations producing claims and counterclaims. It reached such a stage that to an outside observer listening to both Indian as well as Pakistani coverage of this conflict, would not be mistaken in wondering whether both sides were reporting on the same conflict. The Indian government placed a temporary news embargo on information from Pakistan, even banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV and blocked access to online editions of Dawn newspaper. Pakistan media played up this apparent curbing of freedom of the press in India, while the latter claimed it was in the interests of national security. Incidentally, one of the shells fired by Pakistan troops even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil, although coverage continued.

File:Capilot.jpg

PTV news footage shows downed Indian airman Ft Lt Nachiketa of the Indian Air Force being interviewed in Pakistan.

As the war progressed, media coverage was more intense in India compared to Pakistan. Many Indian channels were showing images from the battle zone with their troops in a style reminiscent of CNN's coverage of the Gulf War. One of the reasons for India's increased coverage was the proliferation of numerous privately owned channels vis-à-vis the Pakistani electronic media scenario which was still at a nascent stage. Yet another was the relatively greater transparency in the Indian media. In fact, at a seminar in Karachi, Pakistani journalists agreed that while the Indian government had taken the press and the people into confidence, this was missing on the Pakistan side. The Indian government also ran advertisements in foreign publications like The Times and Washington Post detailing Pakistan's role in supporting extremists in Kashmir in an attempt to garner political support for its cause during the combat. The print media in India and abroad was largely sympathetic to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that Pakistan was largely responsible for the incursions. Analysts believe that the power of the Indian media, which was both larger in number and assumed to be more credible, might have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil, and served as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage, helping India to gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position on the issue.

WMDs and the nuclear factor

One of the main concerns in the international community during the Kargil crisis was that both neighbours had access to weapons of mass destruction, and if the war intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. In fact, the Kargil War has the dubious distinction of being the first and only time two self-declared nuclear nations have engaged in hostilities verging on a full-scale war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability a year before in 1998; India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test. Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. With the outbreak of clashes in Kashmir just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations took notice of the conflict and desired to end the conflict.

The first hint of the possible use of a nuclear bomb was on May 31 when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. This was immediately interpreted as an obvious threat of a nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war, and the leader of Pakistan's senate noted, "The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed." Many such ambiguous statements from officials of both countries were viewed as an impending nuclear crisis. The nature of the conflict took a more sinister proportion when the U.S. received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised of this supposed missile movement and responded that India was probably planning the same. This was later confirmed in an article in May 2000, which stated that India too had readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Sensing a deteriorating military scenario, diplomatic isolation, and the risks of a larger conventional and nuclear war, Sharif ordered the Pakistani army to vacate the Kargil heights.

Additionally, the threat of WMD included a suspected use of chemical and even biological weapons. Pakistan accused India of using chemicals and other incendiary bombs like Napalm against the Kashmiri fighters. India, on the other hand, showcased the cache of gas masks among other firearms as proof that Pakistan may have been ready to use non-conventional weapons. One militant group even claimed to possess chemical weapons but later was found to be a hoax, and even the gas masks were most likely intended to protect themselves against any Indian attack. The Pakistani allegations of India using banned chemicals in its bombs found no proof as per the U.S. administration and the OPCW.

Consequences

India

File:Vajpayee Victory.jpg

Indian PM A.B.Vajpayee flashes the V sign after the Parliament elections in which his coalition emerged the victors. His handling of the Kargil crisis is believed to have played a big part in garnering the votes.

The aftermath of the war saw the rise of the Indian stock market by over 1,500 points. The next Indian national budget included major increases in military spending. From the end of the war until February 2000, the economy of India was bullish. There was a surge in patriotism, with many celebrities pitching in towards the Kargil cause. Indians were also angered by the death of pilot Ajay Ahuja under controversial circumstances, and especially after Indian authorities reported that Ahuja had been murdered and his body mutilated by Pakistani troops. The war had also produced higher than expected fatalities for the Indian military, with a sizeable percentage of them including newly commissioned officers. One month later, the Atlantique Incident - where a Pakistan Navy plane was shot down by India - briefly reignited fears of a conflict between the two countries.

After the war the Indian government severed ties with Pakistan and increased defence preparedness. Since the Kargil conflict, India raised its defence budget as it sought to acquire more state of the art equipment; however, a few irregularities came to light during this period of heightened military expenditure. There was also severe criticism of the intelligence agencies like RAW, which failed to predict neither the intrusions nor the identity/number of infiltrators during the war. An internal assessment report by the armed forces, published in an Indian magazine, showed several other failings, including "a sense of complacency" and being "unprepared for a conventional war" on the presumption that nuclearism would sustain peace. It also highlighted the lapses in command and control, the insufficient troop levels and the dearth of large-calibre guns like the Bofors.;

The Kargil victory was followed by the 13th Indian General Elections to the Lok Sabha, which gave a decisive mandate to the NDA government. It was re-elected to power in Sept–Oct 1999 with a majority of 303 seats out of 545 in the Lok Sabha. On the diplomatic front, the conflict was a major boost to Indo-U.S. relations, as the United States appreciated Indian attempts to restrict the conflict to a limited geographic area. These ties were further strengthened following the 9/11 attacks and a general shift in foreign policy of the two nations. Relations with Israel – which had discreetly aided India with ordnance supply and military hardware such as unmanned aerial vehicles, laser-guided bombs, as well as satellite imagery – also were bolstered following the end of the conflict.

Pakistan

File:KargilPak.png

In 1999 TIME reported from the front line of the battle and provided one of the few images of a Pakistan soldier at his post

Faced with the possibility of international isolation, the Pakistani economy tumbled. The morale of its forces after early gains was damaged as many units of the Northern Light Infantry were destroyed, and refusing to even recognize the dead bodies of its soldiers.. Pakistan initially did not acknowledge many of its casualties, but Sharif later said that over 4,000 Pakistani troops were killed in the operation and that Pakistan had lost the conflict. However, in a rare reference to Kargil, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf said, "It hurts me when an ex-premier undermines his own forces," when questioned about Sharif's comments on Pakistan's losses in Kargil and added that Indian casualties were more than that of Pakistan.

Many in Pakistan had expected a victory over the Indian military but were dismayed by the turn of events and questioned the eventual retreat. The military leadership felt let down by the prime minister's decision to withdraw the remaining fighters. And with Sharif placing the onus of the Kargil attacks squarely on the army chief Pervez Musharraf, there was an atmosphere of uneasiness between the two. On October 13, 1999 General Musharraf staged a bloodless coup d'état, ousting Nawaz Sharif.

Benazir Bhutto, an opposition leader and former prime minister, called the Kargil War "Pakistan's greatest blunder". Many ex-officials of the military and the ISI (Pakistan's principal intelligence agency) also were of the view that "Kargil was a waste of time" and "could not have resulted in any advantage" on the larger issue of Kashmir. Despite calls by many for a probe, no public commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the people responsible for initiating the conflict. Though it had brought the Kashmir dispute into international focus – which was one of the aims of Pakistan – it had done so in negative circumstances that eroded its credibility, since the infiltration came just after a peace process between the two counties was underway. The sanctity of the LoC too received international recognition.

A few changes were made to the army. In recognition of its part in the war, the Northern Light Infantry regiment was incorporated into the regular army. The war showed that despite a tactically sound plan that had the element of surprise, little groundwork had been done to gauge the politico-diplomatic ramifications. And like previous unsuccessful infiltrations attempts like Operation Gibraltar that sparked the 1965 war, there was little coordination or information sharing among the branches of the Pakistan military. All these factors contributed to a strategic failure for Pakistan in Kargil.

Kargil War in the arts

The brief conflict has provided considerable material for both filmmakers and authors alike in India. Some documentaries which were shot on the subject were even used by the ruling party coalition, led by BJP, in furthering its election campaign that immediately followed the war. The following is a list of the major films and dramas on the subject.

File:LOC Kargil.jpg

A movie poster of LOC Kargil which had the largest cast of stars in an Indian film.

• LOC: Kargil (2003), a Hindi Bollywood movie which depicts most of the incidents from the Kargil War was one of the longest in Bollywood history running for more than four hours.
• Lakshya (2004), another Bollywood movie portraying a fictionalized account of Captain Vikram Batra, Param Vir Chakra winner. Movie critics have generally appreciated the realistic portrayal of characters. The film also received good reviews in Pakistan because it portrays both sides fairly.
• Mission Fateh - Real Stories of Kargil Heroes, a TV series telecast on Sahara channel chronicling the Indian Army's missions.
• Fifty Day War - A theatrical production on the war, the title indicating the length of the Kargil conflict. This was claimed to be the biggest production of its kind in Asia, involving real aircraft and explosions in an outdoor setting.

Many other movies like Tango Charlie also drew heavily upon the Kargil episode, which still continues to be a plot for mainstream movies with at least one Malayalam movie tentatively titled "Kargil" under production. The impact of the war in the sporting arena was also visible during the India Pakistan clash in the 1999 Cricket World Cup, which coincided with the Kargil timeline. The game witnessed heightened passions and was one of the most viewed matches in the tournament.

Notes

Template:Fnb Names for the conflict: There have been various names for the conflict. During the actual fighting in Kargil, the Indian Government was careful not to use the term "war", calling it a "war-like situation", even though both nations indicated that they were in a "state of war". Terms like Kargil "conflict", Kargil "incident" or the official military assault, "Operation Vijay", were thus preferred. After the end of the war however, the Indian Government increasingly called it the "Kargil War", even though there had been no official declaration of war. Other less popularly used names included "Third Kashmir War" and Pakistan's codename given to the infiltration: "Operation Badr".

Template:Fnb Casualties: The exact count of casulties on the Indian side has often been quoted by various sources as between 500 - 600. The Indian Government officially acknowledges the deaths of 527 soldiers and along with the 5 personnel from the Indian Air Force the total reaches 532. Other authors, both Indian and foreign have put the figure close to 600. The personnel injured in the combat ranges from 1,000 to 1,400. Similar count of Pakistan army losses has been somewhat more difficult to figure out. The US Department of State had made an early, partial estimate of close to 700 fatalities. After the end of the war, this figure was revised upwards by scholars as well as authors. Estimates on Pakistan casualties vary wildly given the problems of assessing the number of deaths in the militant ranks. The only concrete numbers stated were from Nawaz Sharif that there were 4,000+ fatalities. At least one other major Pakistani political party, the PPP, assesses the casualties to be three thousand soldiers and irregulars, as given on their website. The number of people injured in the Pakistan camp is not yet known.

References

• The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil the CCC Kargil Project.
• Kargil Conflict (GlobalSecurity.org)
• Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella (RAND Corporation)
• War in Kargil (Center for Contemporary Conflict) PDF download
• Essay on the outcomes of the Kargil War
• Stephen P. Cohen (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815715021.
• Kargil Review Committee (2000). From Surprise to Reckoning : The Kargil Review Committee Report. SAGE Publications. ISBN 0761994661. (Executive summary of the report, Online)
• Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India’s Interests? Paper by Suba Chandran
• An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999, by Shaukat Qadir, RUSI Journal, April 2002 (PDF)

Further reading

• M. K. Akbar (1999). Kargil Cross Border Terrorism. South Asia Books. ISBN 8170997348.
• Amarinder Singh. A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights. ASIN: B0006E8KKW
• Jasijit Singh (1999). Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. South Asia Books. ISBN 8186019227.

External links

• Indian Armed Forces site on Kargil
• Animated timeline and other Kargil stories - India Today
• Pakistan's view on the Kargil conflict - Pakistan's Dawn (newspaper)
• CSIS South Asia's brief analysis of the Kargil conflict (PDF)
• The Kargil War - Indian Picture Gallery
• Kargil Debacle: Musharraf's Time Bomb, Waiting to Explode
• Impact of the conflict on civilians - BBC
• POSTCARD USA: Kargil, Kargil everywhere - Pakistan's Daily Times
• TIME Magazine article on Pakistan infiltration
• Behind the 'near-war' - Asiaweek report
• The Kargil Crisis: An Overview by Abdus Sabur
• Analysis on Shireen Mazari's Research
• The Day A Nuclear Conflict Was Averted – YaleGlobal
• Kargil War as Ice Capades - Article by Gary Brecher in Moscow based magazine The eXile.