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Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011)

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File:Baqubahmilitant.jpg
Iraqi militants : Members of the insurgency on a street corner during clashes with U.S troops in Baquba, north of Baghdad, on July 25, 2004.

The Iraqi resistance is a collective term usually denoting the various guerillas battling the American-led coalition forces and Iraqi security forces (before and under the Allawi government) in the 2003 occupation of Iraq that followed the Iraq war on May 1, 2003. Not all resistance to the occupation is violent, however, and some Iraqi parties and other political groups resist it through non-violent means.

Resistance composition

The armed Iraqi resistance is composed of over a dozen major insurgent organizations and countless smaller cells. It can be subdivided into four main ideological strands, some of whom can overlap:

The Ba'athists are composed of former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special Security Organization. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power. Following Hussein's capture, it is believed that the motivation of what the Coalition terms "former regime elements" switched to either nationalism and/or an attempt to gain leverage in order to establish a future political foothold in Iraq for former Ba'athists. Many former Ba'athists have even adopted an Islamist facade in order to attract more credibility within the country and perhaps funding from outside Iraq.

The nationalists are composed of former members of the Iraqi military as well as some ordinary Iraqis. Their reasons for opposing the occupation vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to Coalition's failure to keep its promises to restore public services and quickly restore complete sovereignty. Many Iraqis who have had relatives killed by American soldiers may also be involved in the nationalist resistance as part of the Iraqi code of tribal revenge. Beyond the expulsion of Coalition troops from Iraq, there is no coherent political goal being pursued by the Iraqi guerillas fighting under the banner of nationalism, only references to self-rule and even elections. It is believed that the majority of the insurgency's foot soldiers and low-level members fall within this broad camp.

File:Sadrprotest.jpg
Iraqi Shi'ites arrive in Najaf in a show of support for Moqtada al-Sadr in August 2004

Moqtada al-Sadr followers, adherants to the commands of the Shiite cleric (following, reportedly, Islamist politics), are mostly members of Jaish-i-Mahdi, Sadr's militia, composed chiefly of young, unemployed men from impoverished urban areas in the Shiite south. They are motivated by a combination of religious zealotry and a desire to establish a Shiite Islamic state and the belief that Coalition forces are foreign occupiers and oppressors that have failed to live up to their promises. The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches from Basra in the south to Sadr City in central Iraq (some scattered Shiite militia activity has also been reported in Baquba and Kirkuk, where Shiite minorties exist). The Mahdi Army uprising involved several thousand fighters; almost 1,000 participated in one assault alone in Sadr City on a Coalition convoy.

The Sunni Islamists are composed of Iraqis belonging to the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, which advocates a return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Mohammed and opposes any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs of Salafi Islam are roughly similar to the Wahabi sect of nearby Saudi Arabia (of which Osama bin Laden is a member), one difference being that Salafis in Iraq do not usually condone intolerance towards Shiites. Hard-line clerics and remaining underground cells of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq have helped provide support for the indigenous militant Islamist movement. Emerging as the most public face of this faction of the Iraqi insurgency, and the most influential of the hard-line Salafi clerics, is the founder of the ultra-conservative Association of Islamic Scholars, Sheik Hareth al Dhari, who has been described as the "Mullah Omar" of Iraq.

Foreign Fighters are Islamists who have entered the country, mostly through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, and see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against Coalition forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam may be involved. The Coalition points to Jordanian born suspected al-Qaeda terrorist operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi is believed the head of an insurgent group called Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy Struggle). The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of controversy. If the Coalition military is to be believed, however, he is the single most dangerous and capable insurgent operative working against the U.S-lead coalition and its Iraqi allies, responsible for a large number of major attacks. There are signs that an increasing rift is developing between supporters of Zarqawi, which includes both foreign guerillas and Iraqis that have adopted a hardline Salafi philosophy, and the nationalists and more moderate religious elements of the insurgency. The main source of the divide is over the suicide bombings that have inflicted heavy Iraqi civilian casualties. Whether or not linked to Zarqawi, their influence has risen considerably within the resistance since the capture of Saddam Hussein.

Apart from the armed resistance, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The National Foundation Congress set up by Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi includes a broad range of religious/ethnic and political currents united by their opposition to the occupation. Although it does not reject armed resistance which it regards as any nation's right, it favours non-violent politics and criticises the formation of militias. It opposes "institutions designed to implement American plans" such as the Allawi government and the US-organised national conference designed as the antecedent to a parliament.[1]

Although banned by the CPA, trade unions such as the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq’s Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective anti-occupation opposition. [2] Some believe that the major division in Iraq is not between religious/ethnic groups nor between the general population and violent groups, but between those who collaborate with the foreign occupation and those who resist it. Though the divisions in Iraq between religious and ethnic groups (and, inparticular, between the general population and various violent groups) have became more appearant.

Iraqi guerilla tactics

Until April of 2004, the Iraqi guerillas typically operate in small squad sized formations of 5-10 men. Fighters were rarely concentrated in larger numbers in order to escape detection. Occasions where fighters were concentrated in larger numbers included a battle near the town of Rawa on June 13, 2003 near the Syrian border and a large coordinated ambush of a convoy in the town of Samarra on November 30.

Assaults combining the following weapons and tactics, involving IED's, RPG's, mortars, and car bombs all at once, have increasingly appeared. There are various weapons of the Iraq war and resistance used during the combat.


IEDs

Iraqi guerilla attacks against coalition targets typically have taken the form of attacks on convoys and patrols using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. These bombs, formed from former Iraqi military armaments and/or homemade materials, are concealed by camouflage along main roads and detonated either by remote control or by wire when a convoy or patrol passes. The devices come in a wide variety of forms, but usually take the form of 155mm artillery shells, usually rigged with plastic explosives, and attached to a detonator that is triggered by cell phone signal or through a garage-door opener.

They are hidden behind roadise rails, on telephone poles, buried in the ground, disguised as rocks or bricks, and even placed inside dead animals. This has emerged as the most lethal method the insurgents have developed to attack coalition forces. Ambushes on Coalition forces with small arms and/or RPG fire also occurs, and both suicide and non-suicide car bombs have also been used. (see below)

File:Sabotage.jpg
An Iraqi policeman guards a blazing oil pipeline after a sabotage attack in southern Iraq on July 3, 2004.

Sabotage

Insurgent saboteurs have also repeatedly assaulted the Iraqi oil industry. Guerillas, using either rocket-propelled grenades or explosives, regularly destroy portions of oil pipeline in northern Iraq. Attacks had expanded to southern Iraq by April of the beginning occupation. This sabotage has set back reconstruction efforts by the Iraqi nation with assistance from the Coalition and United Nation. Coalition officials contend the sabotage is intended to set back reconstruction efforts and to push back progress in Iraqi society towards democracy.

There have also been allegations of attacks on water pipelines and the electrical grid by the Iraqi insurgents, although there is controversy as to whether the incidents in question did indeed represent intended sabotage. Among the reasons the resistance gives for the sabotage is to prevent an alliance seizure of Iraqi oil, which opponents of the occupation believe is one of the main reasons for the invasion.

Mortar strikes

Another common form of attack involves hit-and-run mortar strikes on coalition bases. Insurgents fire a few mortar rounds or rockets and quickly escape before their position can be identified and effective counter-fire directed. Insurgents use urban areas heavily populated by civilians as firing positions to discourage counter-fire, and in the countryside, palm groves and orchards are used for concealment. This method is very inaccurate and rarely hits the intended target, but casualties are periodically inflicted by incoming mortar rounds and rockets.

The daily IED, RPG, and mortar attacks usually rely on squad-sized teams of 5-10 men. There have been isolated cases of larger ambushes, such as an attack on a Coalition convoys in Samarra on November 30 that involved 100 fighters and a massive ambush of a Coalition convoy in Sadr City on April 4 by Mahdi Army militiamen numbering over 1,000 men.

Helicopter attacks

Since the beginning of November, helicopters have also been increasingly targeted. The insurgents, often concealed in palm groves, lie in wait for the helicopters and then, usually, attack the helicopter from the rear. The weapons used include rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder fired missiles such as the SA-7, SA-14, and in one case the SA-16. Countermeasures taken by helicopter pilots, such as flying very low at a high velocity, have considerably reduced the amount of helicopter downings by reducing the accuracy the heat-seaking missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.

Suicide bombers

Suicide bombers are used in larger attacks to gain maximum media attention. Since August of 2003, as Coalition forces gradually hardened their targets, suicide car bombs have been used increasingly as weapons by guerilla forces. The car bombs, known in the military as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, have emerged as one of their most effective weapons, along with the roadside improvised explosive devices. They have a number of benefits for the rebels: they deliver a large amount of firepower and inflict large amounts of casualties at little cost.

File:Suicidebombcarnage.jpg
Relatives mourn over the bodies of victims of a massive suicide car bomb in Baquba, north of Baghdad, that left a scene of carnage in it's wake, mostly among civilians.

Non-military and civilian targets

There also have been several attacks on non-military and civilian targets, especially since August of 2003. These include the murder of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council and suicide bombings targeting the U.N., the Jordanian Embassy, Shiite mosques and civilians, the International Red Cross, the Iraqi police, Coalition forces, Kurdish political parties, the president of the Iraqi Governing Council, hotels, and a resturant.

Militants also target private contractors working for the coalition as well as non-Alliance support military personnel. The number of these attacks on "soft targets" has steadily increased. The origin of these devestating bombings remains a mystery. The main suspects are foreign jihadis, former Iraqi intelligence operatives, or perhaps a combination of the two. Coalition officials and some analysts suspect that the aim of these attacks is to sow chaos and sectarian discord.

Coalition officials point to an intercepted letter suspected to be from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which he makes the case for attacking Shiites in order to provoke an anti-Sunni backlash and thereby galavanize the Sunni population in support of the insurgents, as evidence. Besides the hard-core Wahabi jihadists among the resistance, who may indeed desire a sectarian war, the insurgents charge that the Coalition is attempting to instill a fear of civil war as part of a "divide and conquer" strategy.

Assasinations and kidnappings

Assasination of local officals, translators for Coalition forces, employees at Coalition bases, and other (so-called) "collaborators" has been a regular occurence. Assasinations have taken place in a variety of ways, from close-range small arms fire and drive-by shootings to suicide car-bombers ramming convoys.

Kidnapping, and in some cases, beheadings, have emerged as another insurgent tactic since April. Foreign civilians have borne the brunt of the kidnappings, although Coalition military personel have also been targeted. After kidnapping the victim, the insurgents typically make some sort of demand of the government of the hostage's nation and give a time limit for the demand to be carried out, often 72 hours. Beheading is often threatened if the government fails to heed the wishes of the hostage takers. At least two individuals, an American civilian (Nicholas Berg) and a South Korean (Kim Sung Il), have been beheaded. Other hostages may have also been killed, although it is uncomfirmed as no evidence as emerged. In both cases, tapes of the beheadings were distributed for propaganda purposes. The goal of the kidnappings mainly appears to be to terrify foreign civilians into immobilization and to attract media attention and possibly inspire recruits.

Attacks on the police

Another insurgent tactic that has been increasingly used since April of 2004 consists of assaults and raids on police stations and compounds of Iraqi security forces involving platoon-sized elements or larger, sometimes up to 150 men. The insurgents do this in order to increase their control over the population and punish, in the militant's view, "collaborators". This tactic has been used both by Sunni insurgents in cities such as Fallujah, Ramadi, and Baqubah and by Shiite Mahdi Army militamen in Baghdad, Najaf, Kufa, al-Kut, Nasiriyah, and other central and southern cities. These attacks are usually coordinated and are meant to kill "soft targets", to throw the Iraqi security forces into dissaray, to conduct psychological warfare, and to draw out the Coalition occupation forces.

Population resistance support

A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning "hearts and minds." It appears as though the Iraqi resistance retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition counterinsurgency operations have resulted in the harsh opinions many Sunni Arabs have for the occupation.

Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is for a number of reasons: many residents received employment and oppurtunity from the former regime, the area has a history of strong tribalism and suspicion of outsiders, it is religiously conservative, and it has seen civilian casualties from coalition counterinsurgency operations.

Outside the Sunni Triangle and in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, violence is mostly eschewed. Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, are displeased with various aspects of the Alliance occupation. Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there is a great deal of pro-American sentiment and an almost unanimous distaste for anti-coalition violence. The situation is more complicated in the Shiite regions. Support for the Moqtada al-Sadr has also grown dramatically among the Shiites. There is sizeable support for Moqtada al-Sadr, a radical cleric who has advocated violent resistance, from about 1/3 of the Shiite community, mainly young and unemployed men in urban areas. However, support for violent resistance is notably less enthusiastic in the Shiite community, who like the Kurds saw persecution under the Ba'ath regime, then among the Sunnis.

Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the occupation. The Shiite intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, believe in cooperation with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and peaceful protest instead of violence. Many Shiites and Kurds, however, suffered heavy persecution under the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime and are much more reluctant to use violence against coalition forces. The opinions of many Arab Iraqis, however, have hardened against the occupation to the point, according to some, of now being overwhelming.

Polls

A polls in late 2003 showed that about one-third of all Sunni Arabs are staunch supporters of the guerillas and consider armed attacks on American forces acceptable. In al-Anbar province, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, solid support for the Iraqi resistance stood at 70%. Only about 10% of the Shiite Arab population supported violent resistance. Support was very minimal for attacks on Alliance forces among the Kurds. Curiously, the poll (which was supposed to cover an even distribution of the Iraqi population) showed more people stating that they are Sunnis (44%) than Shiites (33%), leading to speculation that the poll's sample was badly skewed. [3]. The poll was also conducted before the spring 2004 US crackdown on the insurgency in Fallujah which was widely condemned by Iraqis, including normally pro-US members of the governing council. The siege of Fallujah and the fighting in the Shiite heartland turned many Iraqis even more against the U.S-led occupation.

In late January and early February 2004 a joint statement was distributed in leaflet form by a dozen resistance organisations vowing to take control of Iraqi cities after Alliance occupation forces withdraw, and portraying the US-led coalition's planned withdrawal as a defeat. Iraqi civilians' reaction to the statement are reported to vary widely, from being "hailed as the manifesto for a legitimate resistance movement" to being dismissed "as mere bravado".

Insurgency flashpoints

The flashpoints have certain factors in common that make them very volatile for Iraqi and Coalition forces: they are inhabited by a large number of veterans of the elite former military and security services, they are traditionally religiously conservative, and they have histories of strong tribalism.

Estimates on the total number of Iraqi guerillas varies. The Coalition military estimates that around 5,000 fighters form the core of the movement, along with many other active sympathizers and part-time insurgents who altogether may total 50,000 strong (according to a CIA report). A recent estimate said that the number of fighters can swell to as many as 20,000. The number of guerilla fighters in Fallujah, which has become a focus for the insurgency, is estimated at 2,000.

There are believed to be 1,000 indigenous insurgents in Baquba, another flashpoint, and in December the U.S military put the figures at over 1,000 in Baghdad and 2,000 in Samarra. It's unclear how those figures have changed. The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in Baghdad and a triangle stretching west from the capital to the town of Ramadi and north to Tikrit in an area known as the Sunni Triangle. Guerilla activity also takes place around al-Qaim in western Iraq and around the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk to the north, as well as some other areas of the country.

Attacks and Coalition casualties

The total number of guerilla attacks on coalition forces from June 2003 to March 2004 remained steady at between 12 and 20 attacks per day, with the exception of a surge of attacks in November 2003 during which as many as 50 attacks per day were reported on some days. Two involved groups of roughly 100 fighters launced a flurry of attacks resembling standard frontal infantry assaults involving large numbers of fighters began in April, as the Mahdi Army started a Shiite uprising and Sunni guerillas stepped up activity with the American assault on Fallujah.

The average number of attacks spiked to 70 a day during April, before stabilizing to 35-50 a day after the beginning of May as the fighting in Fallujah ended and the Mahdi Army uprising cooled. As of August 22, 2004, 1,094 coalition soldiers have been killed since the war in Iraq began, 963 of them American. From the beginning of the war to August 14, 2004, 6,497 U.S soldiers were wounded in action, with many more wounded in non-hostile incidents such as vehicle accidents.

Fallujah

On April 4, the U.S. Marines and Iraqi security forces launched a major assault in an attempt to regain the city. They faced bloody urban combat from the guerillas, and after three days over 75% of the city was still under insurgent control. In the defense of Fallujah during the April 2004 siege by U.S marines, it was noted that insurgent forces used Soviet-style defense-in-depth tactics (this suggests that former members of the Iraqi Army, who were schooled in such tactics, organized the guerilla forces rather than foreign jihadis who would use tactics more akin to the mujehedin in Afghanistan).

These insurgent forces were divided into platoon-sized elements for the battle and practiced standard infantry tactics, such as using indirect fire support, cover fire, and phased withdrawal. Cases have since been reported of widereaching cooperation and planning, such as the destruction of bridges in one part of the country to prevent resupply convoys from reaching troops in another part.

Over 150 fighters launched assaults on Marine positions in Ramadi, followed by an attack involving a similar number of fighters in al-Qaim. Both assaults were beaten back but only after the Coalition forces suffered casualties. Hundreds of insurgents cut the road between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib on the western outskirts of Baghdad. 2,000 fighters participiated in the Fallujah rebellion, divided into platoon-sized units and using Soviet style defense-in-depth tactics.

On April 30 the Marines began a withdrawal from Fallujah. Initial reports that Maj. Gen. Jassem Mohammed Saleh, former commander of Saddam's infantry, was left in charge, are disputed after the weekend.[4] [5][6] After the seige of Fallujah ended, the Sunni insurgents switched back to small-unit guerilla tactics using improvised mines and mortars or rockets, although at an accelerated rate. Mahdi Army militiamen began utilizing a combination of the infantry tactics they had used before, and which had often proved suicidal, with guerilla tactics in an attempt to preserve their forces.

Small-scale guerilla attacks continued throughout this time. The switch to bolder tactics have resulted in much heavier casualties for both sides, with a slight larger extent for the insurgents. Fallujah is presently, as of 2004, considered the geographic and symbolic center of the insurgency, having become a major guerilla sanctuary and a symbol for resistance. Ramadi, west of Fallujah and the capital of rebellious al-Anbar province, has seen the heaviest and most skilled insurgent activity, with the Marines in that area haven taken over 20% casualties. Another major insurgent flashpoint is the agricultural village of Buhriz near Baqubah in Diyala province north of Baghdad, where U.S troops have come under heavy attack almost every single time they enter the area.

Shiite uprising

Up until the beginning of April, 2004, the southern portion of Iraqi was relatively free of the guerilla violence that had stricken the Sunni Arab regions of central Iraq (with the notable exception of a string of suicide bombings suspected to have been perpetrated by Sunni Islamist radicals). This changed when the radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr directed his followers to launch an armed revolt on April 4, 2004. This move came as a result of the closure of Mr. Sadr's newspaper, al-Hawza, by coalition forces and after the arrest of one of his aides on murder charges. Mr. Sadr's political viability and standing had also decreased in the previous months. This pushed Sadr, an ardent opponent of the occupation and an proponent of a Shiite theocracy in Iraq, to move to armed revolt.

The revolt came at a time of increasing Shiite dissatisfaction with the occupation, driven by the same perception that the coalition had failed to deliver and the same nationalist beliefs as had motivated many Sunni Arabs. The Mahdi Army, Sadr's private militia, launched coordinated assaults on coaltion forces throughout the south and had seized control of Najaf, Kufa, Kut, and parts of Baghdad and other southern cities by April 7. Jaish-i-Mahdi, or al-Mahdi Army, is estimated to have fighters numbering between 3,000 and 10,000.

By June 6, the Mahdi Army had essentially been militarily defeated, having been largely driven out of all of the cities it had seized and having suffered hundreds of casualties. However, checkpoints manned by unarmed Sadr loyalists still remain in Sadr City and Najaf and the milita remains a potential threat. In addition, Moqtada al-Sadr appears to have won considerable political leverage.

Military tactics

As 2004 progressed, the guerillas seemed to move to more advanced military tactics and demonstrated much more assertiveness and organization. As Alliance forces pulled back and began transferring urban areas to the control of Iraqi security forces, the resistance slowly began to assert itself. By the beginning of April, the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi were entirely under guerilla control. In addition, they also began to operate in much larger numbers and began to hold territory rather than operating in small numbers and just planting IED's and firing mortars. The situation in Fallujah had spun entirely out of coalition control by March 31 when four private military contractors (who some consider mercenaries) working for the Alliance military were killed in an ambush on their vehicle there and their charred bodies dragged through the streets, mutilated, and hung from a bridge by an angry crowd.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency

The coalition counterinsurgency began on June 9, 2003, in response to an increase in guerilla attacks that began in late May. 2,000 soldiers from Task Force Iron Horse launched a sweep through the Sunni Triangle peninsula of Thuluiya, detaining 397 Iraqis in Operation Peninsula Sweep. Almost all of the detainees were later released. This operation was quickly followed by Operation Desert Scorpion, which expanded the sweeps into guerilla flashpoints such as Baghdad, Tikrit, Fallujah, and Kirkuk. An encampment of over seventy foreign fighters near the town of Rawa, close to the Syrian border, was also destroyed during the offensive. Over the course of the summer, other operations such as Operation Sidewinder, Operation Soda Mountain, and Operation Ivy Serpent were conducted.

Cordon-and-Search Operations

These offensives consisted of cordon-and-search operations and mass detentions throughout regions where attacks on coalition forces were common. Soldiers were instructed to be aggressive in returning fire during ambushes and orchards and palm groves were cleared to deprive insurgents of cover. These operations were accompanied by humanitarian missions, in a "carrot and stick" strategy.

Analysts fault the operations for being too blunt and not carefully targeted, causing more resentment and resulting in the recruitment of more guerillas than it netted. As a result, the occupation forces began to focus on more targeted operations with greater human intelligence gathering by the beginning of August of 2003. This resulted in mixed success. Although some regions saw a decrease in attacks as Iraqi informants guided Alliance troops towards guerilla hideouts, such as in Tikrit, most other regions either saw a steady stream of rebel activity or a continued increase.

The Coalition military failed to develop significant and reliable human intelligence capability, while the insurgents continued to undermine efforts to do so by exploiting Coalition misteps for propaganda and through intimidation.

Ramadan Offensive and Operation Iron Hammer

At the end of October of 2003, Iraqi guerillas launched what was later termed the Ramadan Offensive, beginning with four simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on the Iraqi police and the International Red Cross in Baghdad. This was quickly followed by a sharp surge in guerilla attacks on Coalition forces throughout Iraq and an increased targeting of helicopters. 82 U.S troops were killed and 332 wounded in November. Coalition forces responded with much more aggressive tactics.

The villages of al-Auja and Abu Hishma were sealed with barbed wire and the flow of Iraqis in and out carefully monitored, artillery and air strikes were directed at suspected insurgent mortar positions and ambush sites, and patrols and raids were stepped up. High tech surveillance of roads to spot insurgents planting IED's was increased. These new tactics were unleashed in Operation Iron Hammer, which began the second week of November. The subsequent drop in attacks to 18 a day from 30-40 a day convinced many U.S military officials that they were winning the fight against the insurgency.

File:Fallujahtracer.jpg
A burst of tracer rounds emanate from Marine positions during fighting near Fallujah.

Rebellion and Counter-Offensives

The insurgency in general has not been exterminated. It appears likely that the period from the end of November 2003 to the beginning of March 2004 was a pause, during which the insurgents anaylzed Coalition tactics and planned their offensives. Though this period saw less guerilla attacks, it was fraught with terrorist bombings taken to an entirely new scale. Attacks on Iraqi security forces increased both in brazeness, number, and lethality.

This pause on the part of the insurgency reached its conclusion in the first week of March, after which attacks gradually once again began increasing. On March 31, 2004, 4 American private contractors were ambushed and killed by guerillas as they drove through Fallujah. Following the attack, an angry mob mutilated and cremated the bodies, dragging them through the streets before they were hung on a bridge. This attack took place as the Marines were taking over responsibility for al-Anbar province, in which Fallujah is located, from the U.S Army. The intended Marine strategy of foot patrols, less aggressive raids, humanitarian aid, and close cooperation with local leaders was suspended in favor of a massive military operation to clear guerillas from Fallujah.

In the spring of 2004, Iraqi security forces refused to fight against the insurgency and, in cases, joined them in their uprising against the occupation. Though, on June 6, 2004, Brigadier General Mark Hertling, a top US commander in charge of Najaf, Iraq, states "The Moqtada militia is militarily defeated. We have killed scores of them over the last few weeks, and that is in Najaf alone. [...] The militia have been defeated, or have left." Alliance patrols and checkpoints are still active around Najaf and its twin city of Kufa, Iraq. On June 28, 2004, the occupation was formally ended by the Coalition, which transferred power to a new Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. On July 18, Iraqi militants offered a $285,000 reward for Allawi's assassination.

Iraqi Resistance Organizations

Major Iraqi guerilla groups include, but are not limited to, the following:


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