Bosnian Crisis
The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 was caused by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in October, 1908. It increased tensions amongst the Great Powers and led to a controversy between the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, Russia and Ottoman Empire. It also led to an international complications, which for several weeks in early 1909 threatened to end in a general European war and helped sow the seeds for World War One.
Background
By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. This arrangement was made as the consequence of an understanding between Russia and Austria-Hungary, entered into on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and of the support given to the Austro-Hungarian claims by Britain and Germany at the Congress of Berlin. This was not popular with Serbia, as the provinces were also inhabited by Serbs. Serbia also long desired a route across the region that would afford convenient access to the Adriatic. Consequentially, Serbian agents at the Congress of Berlin tried to protest the arrangement, but the congress would not even hear the protest.
From the beginning of the occupation, Austria-Hungary counted upon ultimately obtaining permanent possession of the province, thus increasing its powers in the Balkans. Serbia continued to hope that the provinces (or at least enough territory to give access to the Adriatic) would some day be given to her.
The secret negotiations
The annexation of Bosnia became a highly important matter for Austria-Hungary when, in 1908, the Young Turk Revolution convinced many that the Ottoman Empire could very well regain his former power in the Balkans. For the Austrian foreign minister, Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, it was obvious that it was now or never. But first he had to convince Serbia's biggest ally, Russia, not to interfere with the annexation plans.
Under the Treaty of Berlin, the Dardanelles strait, controlled by Turkey, would not allow the passage of warships of any country to or from the Black Sea, thus blocking a portion of the Russian fleet. Russia's foreign minister, Alexander Izvolski, wanted to change this by allowing only Russian warships to cross the strait, thus giving Russia an active presence in the Mediterranean and recover some of the lost Russian morale after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.
The two ministers held a meeting on September 19, 1908 at the Buchlau castle of Count Leopold von Berchtold where they agreed on the following plan: Izvolski would ignore the annexation and, in turn, Aehrenthal would back the opening of the Dardanelles to Russian warships. At the same time, Bulgaria would declare its independence from Turkey, and both would allow this. The Austrians would also give up some territory in the Balkans to keep Serbia quiet. The key to the plan was timing - their plans would have to be announced simultaneously if the ploy was to be successful.
The annexation
However, Aehrenthal moved faster than Izvolski. On October 3, he announced the annexation, under the premise that Austria-Hungary was taking control of Bosnia so that the people there could enjoy the benefits of the Empire. Serbia could hardly believe in the action, and demanded a Russian intervention, calling for either a return to the status quo or compensations calculated to assure the independence and material progress of Serbia. Serbian newspapers demanded a strip of territory extending across Novi-Bazar and Bosnia to the Adriatic. Austria-Hungary refused to receive the Serbian protest.
Attitude of the Great Powers
Following the plans, Izvolski then announced his plans for the free passage of Russian warships through Dardanelles. But even before Austria-Hungary could back their plans, every other signatory of the Treaty of Berlin refused the plan, especially Britain. The British said they would consider opening up the straits to all warships but would not limit it to Russian ships alone. This is hardly what Izvolsky had in mind since this had the potential of letting belligerent ships into the Black Sea.
Germany, at first, viewed the whole tangle with disdain taking the Turkish side. The Kaiser had been working on strengthening relations with Turkey and, now with the chance of Ottoman recovery, he wished to stay this course.
However, with the exception of Germany, whose attitude at first was extremely reserved, all of the powers objected to the action of Austria-Hungary, but apparently more to the form than to the fact of annexation. As the controversy developed Germany came quickly and decidedly to the support of its Austro-Hungarian ally. In Russia public opinion expressed itself strongly in support of Serbia. The Russian Government responded by supporting the demand first made by Turkey for an international conference to consider the matter. The British and Italian governments supported this demand with considerable vigor, while France sought to play a conciliatory role.
Negotiations for a conference
The Austro-Hungarian government declared that it was not opposed on principle to a conference, but made its acceptance dependent upon the program for the conference, which it insisted must be agreed upon in advance (and that it would allow the annexation).
It took the position that the conference ought not to discuss the validity of the annexation, but should confine itself to registering the measure as a fait accompli. Russia, after considerable exchange of opinion with the other powers, submitted a project for a program, which included an item dealing with advantages to be accorded to Serbia and Montenegro. Austria-Hungary, in reply, did not flatly reject the Russian proposal, but suggested that the advantages for Serbia and Montenegro should be economic only. While the discussion was in progress, the Austro-Hungarian government was endeavoring to prevent the calling of the proposed conference by settling its controversy with Turkey. Such a settlement was arranged in principle on January 12, 1909. After that Austria-Hungary claimed that there was no longer any occasion for the convening of a conference.
The end of the crisis
Popular feeling in Serbia did not abate, as its people demanded that opposition to the annexation should be pushed strongly. By early November the Serbian army was mobilized. Immediately Germany declared full support to any action from Austria-Hungary, while Serbia called for a full support from Russia. Clearly not prepared for a war against both Germany and Austria-Hungary, Russia proposed to the powers a collective démarche at Vienna and at Belgrade. Germany promptly refused to take part, while Austria-Hungary hastened to make known that it would refuse to receive any such proposition. Learning that France and England were not inclined to lend their support, Russia quickly dropped the proposal. When the Austria-Hungary government threatened to publish the details of the secret agreement with Russia, the Russian government was forced to leave their Serbian allies alone. Without Russian support, the Serbians were forced to agree with the annexation.
Consequences
The crisis was brought to a close in a manner which involved a triumph for Austria-Hungary over Serbia and for Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russia - a triumph which left behind it much bitterness in the states which were forced to yield. The humiliation that Russia and Serbia were compelled to endure was a very considerable factor in determining the course of events which led eventually to the World War. Russia saw itself being forced to leave an ally alone, while Serbia saw their wishes of an access to the Adriatic been buried. The German Kaiser subsequently asserted that he stood beside his ally, Austria-Hungary, "in shining armor", while Prince von Bülow declared that the "German sword had been thrown into the scale of European decision". Even then Serbia yielded only under constraint from all the powers. Her humiliation was recorded in the declaration she was forced to send to Vienna (March 31, 1909):
- "Serbia recognizes that the situation created in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not involve any injury to the rights of Serbia. In consequence, Serbia will conform to the decision which the powers are going to take in regard to article 25 of the treaty of Vienna. Serbia, conforming to the advice of the powers agrees to renounce the attitude of protest and opposition which she has taken since the month of October of last year. She agrees to modify the line of her political conduct in regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in the future on good terms with it. In conformity with this declaration and confident of the pacific intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia will bring back her army, in the matter of organization, distribution, and of state of activity, to the situation existing in the spring of 1908. She will disband the volunteer bodies and will prevent the formation of irregular bands upon her territory."
Sources
- Anderson, Frank Maloy and Amos Shartle Hershey; Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa 1870-1914. Prepared for the National Board for Historical Service; Government Printing Office, Washington; 1918.