Biological warfare

Biological warfare, also known as germ warfare, is the use of any organism (bacteria, virus or other disease-causing organism) or toxin found in nature, as a weapon of war. It is meant to incapacitate or kill an adversary. It may also be defined as the employment of biological agents to produce casualties in man or animals and damage to plants or material; or defense against such employment.

The creation and stockpiling of biological weapons was outlawed by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), signed by over 100 countries. The BWC remains in force. The rationale behind the agreement is to avoid the devastating impact of a successful biological attack which could conceivably result in thousands, possibly even millions, of deaths and cause severe disruptions to societies and economies. Oddly enough, the convention prohibits only creation and storage, but not usage, of these weapons. However, the consensus among military analysts is that, except in the context of bioterrorism, biological warfare is of little military use.

As a tactical weapon, the main military problem with a biological warfare attack is that it would take days to be effective, and therefore, unlike a nuclear or chemical attack, would not immediately stop an opposing force. As a strategic weapon, biological warfare is again militarily problematic, because it is difficult to prevent the attack from spreading, either to allies or to the attacker, and while an attack is taking effect, the opponent can undertake massive retaliation.

History Of Biological Warfare

The use of biological agents is not new, but before the 20th century, biological warfare took three main forms:

deliberate poisoning of food and water with infectious material
use of microorganisms, toxins or animals, living or dead, in a weapon system
use of biologically inoculated fabrics

Biological warfare has been practiced repeatedly throughout history. During the 6th Century B.C., the Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with a fungus that would make the enemy delusional. In 184 BC, Hannibal of Carthage had clay pots filled with venomous snakes and instructed his soldiers to throw the pots onto the decks of Pergamene ships.

Historical accounts from medieval Europe detail the use of infected animal carcasses, by Mongols, Turks and other groups, to infect enemy water supplies. Prior to the bubonic plague epidemic known as the Black Death, Mongol and Turkish armies were reported to have catapulted diseased corpses into besieged cities.

During the Middle Ages, victims of the bubonic plague were used for biological attacks, often by flinging their corpses and excrement over castle walls using catapults. The last known incident of using plague corpses for biological warfare occurred in 1710, when Russian forces attacked the Swedes by flinging plague-infected corpses over the city walls of Reval (Tallinn).

The Native American population was decimated after contact with the Old World due to the introduction of many different fatal diseases. The British army at least once used smallpox as a weapon, when they gave contaminated blankets to the Lenape during Pontiac's War. It is suspected but not confirmed that biological warfare was used against the Indians at other times as well.

Native peoples in Aptos gave Spaniards gifts of freshly cut flowers wrapped in leaves of poison oak.

During the United States Civil War, General Sherman reported that Confederate forces shot farm animals in ponds upon which the Union depended for drinking water.

Use of such weapons was banned in international law by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention extended the ban to almost all production, storage and transport. However, the Soviet Union continued research and production of offensive biological weapons in a program called biopreparat, despite having signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The United States was unaware of the program until Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, the first deputy director of biopreparat defected in 1992. It is, however, believed that since the signing of the convention the number of countries capable of producing such weapons has increased.

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World War II, Unit 731 of the Imperial Japanese Army conducted human experimentation on thousands, mostly Chinese. In military campaigns, the Japanese army used biological weapons on Chinese soldiers and civilians. This employment was largely viewed as ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems. However, new information has surfaced within the last decade, which alleges a more active Japanese usage. For example, firsthand accounts testify the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of plagued foodstuffs, such as dumplings and vegetables. There are also reports of contaminated water supplies. Such estimates report over 580,000 victims, largely due to plague and cholera outbreaks. In addition, repeated seasonal outbreaks after the conclusion of the war bring the death toll much higher.

In response to suspected biological weapons development in Germany and Japan, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada initiated a BW development program in 1941 that resulted in the weaponization of anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism toxin. The center for U.S. military BW research was Fort Detrick, Maryland. Some biological and chemical weapons research was also conducted at "Dugway Proving Grounds" in Utah. Research carried out in the United Kingdom during World War II left Gruinard island in Scotland contaminated with anthrax for the next 48 years. US war objectors were injected with biological agents during WWII known as Operation Whitecoat [1]

Considerable research on the topic was performed by the United States, the Soviet Union (see Biopreparat), and probably other major nations throughout the Cold War era, though it is generally believed that such weapons were never used. This view was challenged by China and North Korea, who accused the United States of large-scale field testing of biological weapons against them during the Korean War (1950-1953). Their accusation is substantiated by Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman in 'The United States and Biological Warfare: secrets of the early Cold War and Korea' (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1998). In 1972, the U.S. signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, which banned "development, production and stockpiling of microbes or their poisonous products except in amounts necessary for protective and peaceful research." By 1996, 137 countries had signed the treaty.

In 1986, the U.S. government spent US$42 million on research for developing defenses against infectious diseases and toxins, ten times more money than was spent in 1981. The money went to 24 U.S. universities in hopes of developing strains of anthrax, Rift Valley fever, Japanese encephalitis, tularemia, shigella, botulin, and Q fever. When the Biology Department at MIT voted to refuse Pentagon funds for biotech research, the Reagan administration forced it to reverse its decision by threatening to cut off other funds.

There have been reports that the United States Army has been developing weapons-grade anthrax spores at Dugway Proving Ground, a chemical and biological defense testing facility in Utah, since at least as early as 1992. Under the BWC, nations are permitted to develop small amounts of BW agents for the purpose of defensive research. The United States maintains a stated national policy of never using biological weapons under any circumstances since November 1969 President Nixon.

Today, several countries have or are developing biological warfare programmes. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, more than ten countries are suspected to have continuing biological warfare programs, including Russia, Israel, China, Iran, Libya, Syria and North Korea. Offensive programs in Iraq were disbanded after the first Gulf War.

References for this section include (Eitzen & Takafuji, 1997)

Biological weapons characteristics

Ideal characteristics of biological weapons are high infectivity, high potency, availability of vaccines, and delivery as an aerosol.

Diseases most likely to be considered for use as biological weapons are contenders because of their lethality (if delivered efficiently), and robustness (making aerosol delivery feasible).

The biological agents used in biological weapons can often be manufactured quickly and easily. The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent but delivery in an infective form to a vulnerable target.

For example, anthrax is considered an effective agent for several reasons. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, pneumonic (lung) infections of anthrax usually do not cause secondary infections in other people. Thus, the effect of the agent is usually confined to the target. A pneumonic anthrax infection starts with ordinary "cold" symptoms and quickly becomes lethal, with a fatality rate that is 80% or higher. Finally, friendly personnel can be protected with suitable antibiotics.

A mass attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1.5 to 5 micrometres. Too large and the aerosol would be filtered out by the respiratory system. Too small and the aerosol would be inhaled and exhaled. Also, at this size, nonconductive powders tend to clump and cling because of electrostatic charges. This hinders dispersion. So, the material must be treated with silica to insulate and discharge the charges. The aerosol must be delivered so that rain and sun does not rot it, and yet the human lung can be infected. There are other technological difficulties as well.

Diseases considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized include anthrax, Ebola, Bubonic Plague, Cholera, Tularemia, Brucellosis, Q fever, Machupo, Coccidioides mycosis, Glanders, Melioidosis, Shigella, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Typhus, Psittacosis, Yellow Fever, Japanese B Encephalitis, Rift Valley Fever, and Smallpox. Naturally-occurring toxins that can be used as weapons include Ricin, SEB, Botulism toxin, Saxitoxin, and many Mycotoxins. The organisms causing these diseases are known as select agents. Their possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Select Agent Program.

Attacking crops and animals

Biological warfare can also specifically target plants to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators (i.e., herbicides) during the Second World War, and initiated a Herbicidal Warfare program that was eventually used in Malaya and Vietnam in counter insurgency. Though herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped with biological warfare as bioregulators in a similar manner as biotoxins.

The United States developed an anti-crop capability during the Cold War that used plant diseases (bioherbicides, or mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. It was believed that destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart Sino-Soviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy water sheds in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotics (epidemics among plants). When the United States renounced its offensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of these plant diseases.

Attacking animals is another area of biological warfare intended to eliminate animal resources for transportation and food. In the First World War German agents were arrested attempting to inoculate draft animals with anthrax, and believed responsible for outbreaks of glanders in horses and mules. The British tainted small feed cakes with anthrax in the Second World War as a potential means of attacking German cattle for food denial, but never employed the weapon. In the 1950s the United States had a field trial with Hog Cholera.

Protective measures

The primary civil defense against biological weaponry is to wash one's hands whenever one moves to a different building or set of people, and avoid touching door knobs, walls, the ground and one's mouth and nose. Washing literally sends the germs down the drain.

More exotic methods include decontamination, usually done with household chlorine bleach (.5% solution of sodium hypochlorite for personnel, 5% solution for equipment/clothing). One useful decontamination is to leave shoes in an entranceway and make people wade and handwash in a footbath of bleach. Another useful technique is to periodically decontaminate floors and door knobs.

Medical methods of civil defense include stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines, and training for quick, accurate diagnosis and treatment. Many weaponized diseases are unfamiliar to general practitioners.

Positive pressure shelters are possible but not cost-effective except for the most important installations. This is because in most attacks, the agent will disperse in a long narrow ellipse downwind from the release point. Persons outside the ellipse will not be affected except by secondary infection. Persons within the release ellipse cannot be helped by civil defense measures. They need medical diagnosis and treatment as soon as possible.

The role of public health departments and disease surveillance

It is important to note that all of the classical and modern biological weapons organisms are animal diseases, the only exception being smallpox. Thus, in any use of biological weapons, it is highly likely that animals will become ill either simultaneously with, or perhaps earlier than humans. Indeed, in the largest biological weapons "accident" known -- the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1979, sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city (known as Compound 15 and still off limits to visitors today).

Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill. For example in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24 - 36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). By making this data available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the high mortality of the disease.

References

Orent, Wendy (2004). Plague, The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, NY. ISBN 0-7432-3685-8.
Zelicoff, Alan and Bellomo, Michael (2005). Microbe: Are we Ready for the Next Plague?. AMACOM Books, New York, NY. ISBN 0-8144-0865-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
Eitzen, Edward M., Jr., M.D., M.P.H., FACEP, FAAP; and Takafuji, Ernest T., M.D., M.P.H.; Brigadier General Russ Zajtchuk, MC, U.S. Army. (ed.) (1997). Historical Overview of Biological Warfare. In Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, pp. 415-423. Office of The Surgeon General, Washington, DC.
Keith, Jim (1999). Biowarfare In America. Illuminet Press. ISBN 1881532216.
Mangold, Tom and Goldberg, Jeff (1999). Plague Wars: a true story of biological warfare. Macmillan, London. ISBN 0-333-71614-0.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

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