Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, is a military and political organization that has waged a violent secessionist campaign against the Sri Lankan Government since the 1970s in order to secure independence for the Tamil region of Sri Lanka. The LTTE is primarily a military organisation, consisting of an army, a navy and a recently created air wing, but it also exercises civilian functions -- including legislative, judicial, police, financial, and cultural functions -- in the territory it controls.

The LTTE is headed by its reclusive founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran. It accuses the Sri Lankan government of orchestrating ethnic cleansing and genocide against its Tamil minority, and proclaims itself as the sole representative and protector of Sri Lankan Tamils. However there is no proof that Sri Lankan government has engaged in ethnic cleansing or genocide. The LTTE has also eliminated most democratic Tamil alternatives thus emerging as the main representative of the Tamils. Although it is generally seen as being the main body with whom the government must negotiate in the long-running conflict, its tactics, notably its treatment and killings of non-Tamil civilians and Tamil political opponents, have drawn sharp criticism internationally and led to it being proscribed as a terrorist organisation by a number of countries.

The military LTTE

The LTTE's fighters are noted for their loyalty to the organization. Recruits are instructed to be prepared to die for the cause, and are issued with a cyanide capsule to be swallowed in the case of capture.[1] The LTTE also has a special squad of suicide troops, called the Black Tigers, which it deploys for critical missions. [2]

The LTTE gets its main funding from contributions by Tamils residing in Western countries, although there is controversy about the extent to which such contributions are voluntary rather than the result of extortion.

The beginnings of the LTTE

Until the 1970s, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka had largely taken the form of a demand for autonomy for the Tamil-speaking regions under an overall federal framework. The lack of results after twenty-five years of negotiations, and the rise of Sinhala nationalism as represented by the 1972 constitution, led to a significant section of young Tamils, particularly in Jaffna, adopting a more radical position which favoured the use of violent means. A large number of militant organisations were set up, one of which was the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), formed in 1972 by a small group of young Tamils and university students led by Velupillai Prabhakaran. Many students joined the TNT thereafter due to the fact that they were not given equality in the grading systems and admission to post-graduate schools. The TNT's first military operation was the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, the SLFP mayor of Jaffna, in 1975, followed by a few successful bank robberies to fund their activities and the assassination of a number of minor police officials. The success of these early acts gave them confidence, and in 1976 they teamed up with the militants headed by S. Subramanian to form the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In 1979, Anton Balasingham joined the LTTE as their main ideologue. Balasingham added depth to the LTTE's politics. Whereas they had earlier been committed to the single idea of Tamil independence, Balasingham added a new layer of social policies, inspired by Marxism and anti-casteism, which profoundly shaped the LTTE's worldview.

The LTTE continued the TNT's campaign of low-intensity violence against state agents, particularly policemen, and quickly became the most efficient and ruthless of the many Tamil militant groups. In 1978, they wiped out a police patrol which had discovered one of their training camps, the first major military victory for a separatist Tamil group. After martial law was imposed in Jaffna in 1979, the LTTE began targeting the military. They were responsible for the attack which provoked the anti-Tamil riots of 1983. These riots and the government's crackdown on Tamil separatism produced a steady stream of volunteers for the LTTE, which they shaped into a militia. In 1984, they began launching higher intensity attacks against Sri Lankan troops. The same year they also formed a naval unit, the Sea Tigers.

Rise to dominance

The LTTE's discipline and efficiency, coupled with Prabhakaran's leadership and its strong ideological base, made the group much more effective than the other Tamil militant groups. As a result, for the next three years the LTTE was the main Tamil force in the civil war. The LTTE was militarily very successful against the Sri Lankan Army. In 1987 the Black Tigers was established; an elite unit of LTTE members responsible for conducting suicide attacks against political, economic and military targets.

Initially, the LTTE's operations were carried on in cooperation with other militant groups. In April 1984, it had formally joined a common militant front, the Eelam National Liberation Front, or ENLF, which had been formed by the TELO, the EROS and the EPRLF.

In 1986, the LTTE launched a military attack on the TELO, the largest of the other Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka. Over the next few months, the entire TELO leadership and several hundred volunteers were hunted down, and the group ceased to be a potent force. A few months later, they attacked training camps of the EPRLF, forcing it to withdraw entirely from the Jaffna peninsula.

The reasons for the LTTE's internecine attacks on other Tamil groups are much debated. The reason they themselves gave at the time was the other groups' connection with India. All the Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, had received varying degrees of support from India. However, while other groups such as the TELO wholeheartedly embraced Indian support, the LTTE remained wary of India particularly after Rajiv Gandhi came to power, fearing that India was seeking primarily to advance its own interests, which were not the same as those of the Sri Lankan Tamils, and would therefore force the Tamils to accept an unfavourable settlement. They were particularly suspicious of the Indian intelligence agency, the RAW, which they said had completely infiltrated the TELO and EPRLF, and was using them to eliminate the LTTE. Some commentators have suggested that the LTTE were also unhappy that the most of the funding from expatriates went to the TELO, rather than to them (Jeyaratnam Wilson, 1999). It has also been suggested that they believed the struggle would only be effective if the other groups, who were much more willing to compromise, were not around (Narayan Swamy 2002). The effect of the attacks was that the LTTE consolidated the position their successful attacks had already established, as the main military group fighting for the cause of Tamil Eelam, with no credible rivals.

The IPKF period

In 1987, the Sri Lankan Army launched a new assault to recapture Jaffna. In the Indian press, the attack was depicted as being brutal and leading to disproportionately large civilian casualties. Faced with growing anger amongst its own Tamils, India intervened directly in the conflict by air-dropping food parcels on Jaffna in what was interpreted as a show of strength. After negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement whereby Sri Lanka agreed to a federal structure which would grant autonomy to the Tamils. India was to send a peacekeeping force, the IPKF, to Sri Lanka to enforce the agreement.

Although most Tamil militant groups accepted this agreement, the LTTE only did so very grudgingly and very soon rejected it on the grounds that the reforms were only illusory. The result was that the LTTE now found itself engaged in military conflict against the Indian army. The army fought a bitter month-long campaign to win control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. This campaign and the army's subsequent anti-LTTE operations were ruthless, and made it extremely unpopular amongst the Tamils. The LTTE exploited this sentiment and, by painting themselves as the only group opposing the IPKF's "anti-Tamil aggression", as they termed it, they became increasingly popular. In addition, the implementation of the autonomy provisions under the agreement was perceived by the Tamils as giving them little or nothing, and the entire structure collapsed very quickly. As the only group to have held itself aloof from this process, the LTTE was able to portray this development as a vindication of their stance.

The post-IPKF LTTE

The IPKF's intervention was also unpopular amongst Sinhalese Buddhists, and it was forced to withdraw in 1990 after the Sri Lankan government asked India to withdraw its troops. During this period, the LTTE absorbed the remnants of the other rival militant groups, including the TELO and EPRLF, which had tried to regroup with the help of the IPKF and RAW. In a series of military operations in 1995 and 1996, the army re-captured the Jaffna peninsula and the town of Kilinochchi from the LTTE leaving the LTTE resources crippled and manpower depleted. The LTTE proposed peace talks in 1996, which the government rejected. Starting from 1997, the LTTE suffered a number of reverses, and lost control of large portions of the Vanni, the town of Kilinochchi and many smaller towns. However, from 1998 onward the LTTE reversed these losses, culminating in the capture of the strategically vital Elephant Pass base complex in 2000 after hard and long fighting against the Sri Lankan army [3].

The peacetime LTTE

The 2001 ceasefire

In 2001, the LTTE unexpectedly dropped its demand for a separate state, which had never been accepted by the government or the island's Sinhala majority. Instead, they stated a form of regional autonomy would meet their demands. The government invited Norway to mediate in the dispute. Norway brokered a ceasefire agreement, which remains precariously in effect.

Norway and the other Nordic countries jointly monitor the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. Since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers, the Tigers have carried out more than 3,100 reported violations compared to about 140 by the government forces [4].

Talks on an interim solution have currently stalled through political uncertainty. The President Chandrika Kumaratunga suspended the government of the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe in 2004, accusing him of being too soft on the LTTE. Kumaratunga herself then took a more conciliatory line towards the LTTE, but the current president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who took office in November 2005, campaigned on a plank of being tougher on the LTTE. His prime minister, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake has also previously advocated a tougher line. The LTTE has recently stated that the gap between its position and the position of the new Sri Lankan government is vast, and has threatened to "intensify" its campaign if the government does not soon propose a reasonable political framework [5]. The LTTE ordered a boycott of the 2005 presidential elections, which was won by Mahinda Rajapakse, amongst Tamil voters in the East and North of Sri Lanka. This action was condemned by the United States, who cited that "a significant portion of Sri Lanka's people were unable to express their views", and by opponents of Rajapakse who claim that the boycott played an important role in his victory. [6].

Negotiations resumed briefly in February 2006, but were indefinitely postponed again in April after the parties were unable to agree on a mode of transport for LTTE commanders from the east of Sri Lanka to travel to the LTTE headquarters. Violent incidents increased, and by summer 2006 there was growing talk of a "Final War" for Tamil Eelam independence.

From army to quasi-governmental entity

Even though the LTTE was formed as a military group, it also carries out a number of civilian duties. The LTTE controls sections in the north and east of the island, especially the regions lying outside the major cities. It runs a de facto government and provides public services in these areas, including schools, hospitals, police stations, courts and municipal administration.

Most of the structures supporting these functions developed during the period immediately after the IPKF's withdrawal, when the LTTE controlled Jaffna without significant opposition. During this period, it transformed itself from a purely military body to a quasi-government, complete with administrative organs. Between 1991 and 1993, it created the Tamil Eelam Police Force (including traffic police), the Education Development Board of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil Eelam Military Academy a broadcasting authority called the Voice of Tigers, National Television of Tamil Eelam(NTT) -- a satellite TV station[7], a Law College of Tamil Eelam and a Tamil Eelam Judicial Department including a court service and a public prosecution system. Although it no longer controls Jaffna, these structures continue to form the basis on which it runs the areas it does control. The LTTE's administrative agencies are integrated into the organisation's overall chain of command. It claims that this makes them better equipped to respond to emergencies.

The LTTE's quasi-government was and continues to be run on socialist principles. For example, all litigants before a civil court are required to pay a fine for failing to settle their dispute amicably. Police and other employees of the administrative agencies are paid according to the number of dependents they have, rather than their position.

In recent years, the LTTE has sought wider recognition for its administrative organs. After the Boxing Day tsunami, it has sought to ensure that aid to the areas under its control is routed through its own administrative agencies. It entered into an agreement, called the P-TOMS, with the government of Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga which recognised this principle to some extent. However, the agreement was bitterly opposed by hardliners in the Sri Lankan government and never saw implementation, the present administration of Mahinda Rajapakse has announced that it will not be considering it anew.

Political activities

The LTTE also has a political wing, but despite the ceasefire it has not tried to formally create a political party. Instead, in the 2004 parliamentary elections, it openly supported the TNA[8] (also called Thamizh Arasu Katchi or Federal Party), which won over 90% of votes in the electoral district of Jaffna, in the Northern Province.

The LTTE's commitment to multi-party democracy has also been questioned. In an interview in 1986, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, said that Tamil Eelam would be a one-party state rather than a multi-party democracy, because that would help it develop faster (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994, 183). He has not repeated this proposal, and the LTTE's main ideologue, Anton Balasingham, publicly repudiated this position in 1992, stating that it was irrelevant after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the LTTE's critics state that it indicates their way of thinking, and point out that it has not organised, and shows no signs of organising, local elections in the areas it controls. The LTTE's supporters say that conditions make elections impossible, but that they will be held once Tamil Eelam is fully independent.

Dissension

An LTTE commander named Colonel Karuna (nom de guerre of Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan) broke away from the LTTE in March 2004 amid allegations that the northern commanders were overlooking the needs of the eastern Tamils. This led to clashes between the mainstream LTTE and Karuna's faction. The LTTE has charged that Karuna's group is backed by the government.

Women in the LTTE

The LTTE advocates equality for women, and has a large number of female recruits. The Women's Wing of the LTTE is known as Suthanthirap Paravaikal (or Freedom Birds). The first woman combatant to die was 2nd Lt. Malathi, on 10 October 1987, in an encounter with the IPKF at Kopai in Jaffna peninsula. Women have also been part of the 'Black Tiger' squads. The assassination of the Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, the attempt on President Chandrika Kumaranatunga and the latest attempt by a female suicide bomber on the Sri Lankan Army commander are notable instances.

Human rights and terrorism issues

The LTTE is sometimes labelled "terrorist" as part of a broader allegation that it does not have respect for human rights, and does not adhere to the standards of conduct expected of a resistance movement or what might be called "freedom fighters".

The accusation of terrorism is based in part on claims that the LTTE has been responsible for targeted assassination of political figures and non-military officials, and in part on its use of suicide bombers. Between 1991 and 1994, it has been accused of killing Rajiv Gandhi, Lalith Athulathmudali, Ranasinghe Premadasa and Gamini Dissanayake. It has also been accused of killing moderate Tamils and other Tamils with whose views it disagrees, such as Appapillai Amirthalingam [9], Neelan Tiruchelvam, Sarojini Yogeswaran, Pon Sivapalan, Lakshman Kadirgamar. The LTTE has vehemently denied involvement in several of these incidents. However, Indian courts have issued an international warrant to arrest both Velupillai Prabhakaran[10] and its intelligence chief Pottu Amman[11]in connection with the Rajiv Gandhi [12] killing. Although the LTTE deny any involvement, they did issue a statement in June of 2006 calling the event a "monumental tragedy".In addition, LTTE bombings have been known to cause civilian casualties. The Sri Lankan government has accused the LTTE of targeting non-military and government targets including the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, the Dehiwala train[13]and the Central Bank in Colombo. LTTE supporters have argued that civilian deaths were mainly due to collateral damage and it was not LTTE policy to target civilians. However, it seems clear that some LTTE attacks have been directed against purely civilian targets such as trains, temples, mosques and banks, resulting in large numbers of predictable civilian deaths [14].

The LTTE's supporters justify some of the targeted assassinations by arguing that the people assassinated were either "Tamil traitors" or persons closely associated with Sri Lankan military intelligence. Specifically in relation to the TELO, the LTTE has said that it had to perform preemptive self-defence because the TELO was in effect functioning as a proxy for India. They also draw comparisons between the casualties caused by the LTTE's actions and the actions of European resistance forces against Nazi occupation during the Second World War. However, LTTE victims have included many unarmed Tamil politicians and civilians moderates who sought a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan crisis[15].

The LTTE has been accused of knowingly recruiting and using child soldiers as front-line troops (HRW 2003). Amid international pressure, LTTE announced in July 2003 that it would stop conscripting child soldiers, but both UNICEF[16] and HRW[17] have accused it of reneging on its promises, and of conscripting Tamil children orphaned by the tsunami [18]. Civilians have also complained that the LTTE is continuing to abduct children, including some in their early teens, for use as soldiers[19]. The LTTE, however, strongly denies any responsibility for recruitment of child soldiers. Its official position is that earlier, some of its cadres erroneously recruited volunteers in their late teens. It says that its official policy is now that it will not accept child soldiers. It also says that some underage youths lie about their age and are therefore allowed to join, but are sent back home to their parents as soon as they are discovered to be underaged.

The LTTE has been blamed for forcibly removing (or "ethnically cleansing") Sinhalese and Muslim inhabitants from areas under its control, including through the use of violence against those who refuse to leave. Most notably, the LTTE forcibly expelled the entire Muslim population of Jaffna on 48 hours notice in 1990. The LTTE are also accused of organising massacres of Sinhala villagers who settled in the Northeast under the dry lands policy[20]. Whilst the LTTE's supporters do not deny these allegations, they argue that it is misleading to look at such allegations in isolation. They say that the LTTE actions are no worse than those of the Sri Lankan government, and are therefore an entirely proportionate response to repeated human rights violations by the Sri Lankan government[21], and are the only way to make the government stop violating the rights of the Tamils even if they are condemned in international law. However two thirds of Sri Lankas Tamils choose to live under government rule in the south of Sri Lanka, thereby raising serious doubts as to the rationale for the ethnic cleansing in areas under its contral by the LTTE.

There are also charges that the LTTE coerces Tamil expatriates to give it money[22], by threatening the safety of their relatives or property in areas of Sri Lanka under its control. This involves pressuring them to directly give it money, or to indirectly fund its activities by patronising businesses connected with it (La 2004). Although intelligence services have raised concerns about such activities, which are particularly controversial in Canada, few formal complaints have been made. During raids by the RCMP the LTTE front organisation, World Tamil Movement was found coordinating a number of illegal activities in order to control the tamil diaspora in Canada[23]. A report by Human Rights Watch outlines the intimidation and extortion Tamil expatriates experience from the LTTE [24]. However, several Tamil associations, from various countries mentioned in the report, have called in to question the veracity and accuracy of the Human Rights Watch report [25][26]HRW Response. Most of the organisations which question the HRW report are known to have pro-LTTE leanings.

Proscription of the LTTE as a terrorist group

A number of countries have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. As of July 2006, these include India (since 1992), the United States of America (since 1997)[27], Malaysia ^{[citation needed]}, the United Kingdom (since 2000)[28], Canada (since 2006)[29], and the European Union (since 2006). Additionally, Australia has included the LTTE on its consolidated list of terrorist groups, thus freezing its assets and making it an offence to provide it assets, although it has not banned it completely (Hansard 2006, p. 99).

The first country to ban the LTTE was its early ally, India. The Indian change of policy came gradually, starting with the IPKF-LTTE conflict, and culminating with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. In the following years a number of other countries also listed the LTTE as a terror organisation, often after lobbying from the Sri Lankan diplomatic service under Lakshman Kadirgamar. The EU with its 25 member nations is the most recent entity to ban the LTTE. This was done explicitly to encourage them to participate in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government, under threat of having their international assets seized and other repercussions if they did not.

Sri Lanka itself lifted the ban on the LTTE before signing the ceasefire agreement in 2001. The LTTE is not on the UN's list of terror organisations.

References

Balasingham, Adele. (2003) The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance, Fairmax Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. ISBN 1-903679-036
Balasingham, Anton. (2004) 'War and Peace - Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers', Fairmax Publishing Ltd, ISBN 1-903679-05-2
de Votta, Neil. (2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford University Press, ISBN 0804749248
Gamage, Siri and I.B. Watson (Editors). (1999) Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka - 'Pearl of the East' or 'Island of Tears'?, Sage Publications Ltd, ISBN 0-7619-9393-2
Hansard Australia (2006), Senate Transcript for 16 June 2006[30]
Hellmann-Rajanayagam, D. (1994) "The Groups and the rise of Militant Secessions". in Manogaram, C. and Pfaffenberger, B. (editors). The Sri Lankan Tamils. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0813388457
Human Rights Watch (2003) Child Soldier Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict[31]
La, J.. 2004. "Forced remittances in Canada's Tamil enclaves". Peace Review 16:3. September 2004. pp. 379-385.
Narayan Swamy, M. R. (2002) Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas, Konark Publishers; 3rd ed. ISBN 8122006310
Pratap, Anita. (2001) Island of Blood: Frontline Reports From Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Other South Asian Flashpoints. Penguin Books, ISBN 0142003662
Sri Kantha, Sachi.(2005) "Pirabhakaran Phenomenon", Lively COMET Imprint, ISBN 1-57087-671-1

External links