Abkhazia conflict

Georgian residents of Sukhumi defend their city, 1993

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, or the Abkhazian war, refers to the ethnic conflict between Georgians and Abkhaz in Georgia’s Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (“Abkhazeti” in Georgian) in 1992–1993. During this 13-month long war between Georgia government forces and Russian-backed Abkhaz separatists, approximately 30,000 Georgians were killed and more than 250,000 Georgian refugees were forced out from their homes. Numerous war crimes were committed during the conflict, including the Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia. Close to 3,500 Abkhaz were killed and another 20,000 were forced to flee. Post-Soviet Georgia was heavily affected by the war and suffered considerable financial, human and psychological damage. Despite Russian and international mediation, the conflict remains unresolved. Abkhazia has been devastated by the war and subsequent continued sporadic conflict. The region, de facto independent from Georgia, suffers huge economic and social problems and is entirely dependent on Russia.

History of the Conflict

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The situation in the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia has been tense since 1989. The first armed clashes between the representatives of the Abkhazian and Georgian populations took place on July 15–July 17, 1989. The Soviet government contributed to the separatist movement in Abkhazia and did nothing to prevent inter-ethnic conflict. The situation was further deteriorated by rising nationalism among Georgians and Abkhaz, ethnic violence in former South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast and military confrontation after coup d’etat in Tbilisi in December 1991 – January 1992.

The tensions in the autonomy approached the dangerous edge in June 1992, when Abkhaz boevyks attacked the government buildings in Sokhumi. On July 23, 1992, separatist members of the Abkhazian government declared independence of the region, though this was not internationally recognized. The situation was further deteriorated by anti-governmental diversions made by several so-called “Zviadist” armed groups (supporters of overthrown President Zviad Gamsakhurdia) in Abkhazia. On August 14, 1992, Georgian police and National Guards units were dispatched to protect railways and restore an order in Abkhazia. The fights broke out the same day. On August 18, 1992, a secessionist government left Sokhumi. Georgian government forces managed to take control of most of Abkhazia. Atrocities were committed by both sides, however more intensively by Abkhaz separatists in Gagra and Gudauta. On September 3, 1992, a ceasefire was negotiated in Moscow. According to the agreement, Georgian forces were withdrawn from Gagra district. The ceasefire was soon violated by Abkhaz. Thousands of volunteer paramilitaries, mainly Chechens and Cossacks from the self-styled Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) joined the Abkhaz separatists to fight the Georgian troops. Abkhaz and CMPC forces attacked the town of Gagra on October 2. With the fell of the town, the majority of the Georgian population was either executed, or expelled. The rebels largely supported by Russian military presence in the region established their control over Gagra, Gudauta (the town where former Soviet/Russian military base remains) and Tkvarcheli and approached Sokhumi. During the conflict, Moscow officially maintained neutrality; the Russian government condemned human rights violations and established sanctions against both sides. Russian forces situated in the conflict zone from the beginning provided unofficial support for the Abkhaz formations. Numerous eyewitness accounts testify to the bombardment of Georgian forces by Russian aircraft and the use of the Russian navy to transport Abkhaz fighters. Official statements by the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that Russian forces were only acting in self-defence and were only returning fire when attacked.

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Georgian fighters defending bridge near Gulripshi, 1992

In December 1992, rebels began shelling of Georgian-held Sokhumi. On March 4, 1993, Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the State Council of Georgia, arrived in the capital of the region to take control over the defensive operations in the city. On March 14, 1993, Abkhaz and the Confederation forces launched a full-scale attack on Sokhumi resulting in large destruction and casualties among the civilians. However, the government forces repelled the attack. Both sides accused each other in ethnic cleansing and genocide. Georgian government stated Russia was conducted “an undeclared war” against Georgia. The statement was strengthened by capturing several Russian officers by Georgians. On March 19, 1993, Georgian forces shot down a Russian aircraft SU-27.

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Georgians captured by Abkhaz militants and later executed, fall of Sukhumi 1992

On May 14, 1993, a short-lived ceasefire was signed. On July 2, a strong force of Abkhaz and North Caucasian mercenaries landed with the support of Russian navy near the village Tamishi. The battle was one of the bloodiest in the war. Several hundreds were killed and wounded from all sides, but Georgian forces succeeded to regain the positions. However, Sokhumi was virtually besieged by the end of July. Russian-mediated ceasefire was again agreed in Sochi on July 27, 1993 and lasted until September 16, when separatist forces launched a large-scale offensive against Sokhumi, which fell after a fierce fighting on September 27. After the capture of the city for about two week most horrific massacres of this war have been committed against remaining and trapped Georgian civilians in Sokhumi. Eduard Shevardnadze left the city narrowly escaping death. Soon Abkhaz forces and the Confederates overran the whole territory of Abkhazia, except small region of the Kodori Gorge (which more or less remains under the control of the Tbilisi government). The total defeat of government forces was followed by ethnic cleansing of Georgian population with all horrors of humanitarian catastrophe. More than 250.000 refugees (mainly Georgians, also Greeks and others) were forced out from Abkhazia. In September 1994, several reports indicated ethnic clashes between Abkhaz and Armenians, significant part of which supported the former during the war. Chechen militants of CMPC soon left Abkhazia to take part in the “Chechen Resistance War” against Russia.

Conflict mediation

During the war the peace mediation was done first by the Russian Federation and second by the UN. From 1993 onwards, the pressure for a peace settlement mounted from UN, Russia and the then Group of Friends of Georgia (Russia, U.S., France, Germany and UK). In December 1993, an official ceasefire was signed by Georgian and Abkhaz leaders under the aegis of the UN and with Russia as intermediary.The venues shifted from Geneva to New York and finally to Moscow. On April 4, 1994, the "Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict" was signed in Moscow. Instead of the deployment of a traditional UN peacekeeping force, the deployment of a CIS, mainly Russian peacekeeping force was agreed in Moscow on May 1994. In June 1994, CIS peacekeeping forces comprising only the Russian soldiers were deployed along the administrative border between Abkhazia and the remaining Georgia. The UN mission (UNOMIG) also arrived. However, these could not prevent further atrocities against the Georgians in the following years (around 1.500 deaths have been reported by the Georgian government in the post-war period). On September 14, 1994, Abkhaz leaders appeared on local TV to demand that all ethnic Georgians depart from the region by September 27 (the anniversary of the capture of Sokhumi). On November 30, 1994, Abkhazia promulgated a new constitution declaring independence of the breakaway region. However, none of the foreign governments recognized this. On December 15, 1994, the US State Department condemned Abkhazia’s declaration of independence. On March 21, 1995, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees accused Abkhaz militias of torturing and murdering dozens of returning ethnic Georgian refugees in the Gali District. Despite an official economic blockade imposed on Abkhazia by Russia and CIS in 1995 (virtually ended by the Russian government in 1997), the breakaway region has been enjoying both military and economic support by the Russian Federation.

Resumption of hostilities

In April–May, 1998, the conflict escalated once again in the Gali District when several hundreds of Abkhaz forces entered the villages still populated by Georgians support the separatist-held parliamentary elections. Despite the criticism from opposition, Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia, refused to deploy troops against Abkhazia. A ceasefire was negotiated on May 20. The hostilities resulted in hundreds of casualties form both sides and additional 20.000 Georgian refugees.

In October 2001, around 400 Chechen fighters and 80 Georgian guerillas appeared in the Kodori Valley in extremely controversial conditions. The Chechen-Georgian paramilitaries advanced as far as Sokhumi, but finally were repelled by Abkhaz and Gudauta based Russian "peacekeeper" units. There have been some concerns (in both Tbilisi and Sokhumi) that Chechen attacks in the Kodori Gorge were a military escapade organized by certain Georgian authorities.

Current status

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A UN mission in Georgia map of the conflict zone.

The conflict, one of the bloodiest in the post-Soviet area, remains unresolved. The Georgian government offered a large autonomy to Abkhazia several times. However, both Abkhaz government and opposition refuse any forms of union with Georgia. Abkhaz consider their independence as a result of liberation war against Georgian aggression, while Georgians believe the conflict to be a patriotic war to retain sovereignty and integrity of Georgia. Many accuse Eduard Shevardnadze’s government in initiation of a senseless hostilities, and then in ineffective conduction of the war and post-war diplomacy. The new Georgian government of President Mikhail Saakashvili promises not to use force and to resolve the problem only by diplomacy and political talks.

Profile of the parties

The Abkhaz side

For the Abkhaz side collective memories of suppression from Georgian during the Soviet rule, cooperation of Georgian elements with Russian oppressions in 19th century and more importantly the element of fear that has survived after the Stalinist policies of Georgianization justify a tendency for demands of full independence.

The Abkhaz side juridically justified Abkhaz independence with mainly two lines of thought:

Soviet law [1] actually granted entities such as Abhazia, sovereignty upon Georgian declaration of independence. When Georgia did so, Abkhazia decided to stay inside the Soviet Union, as a full union republic, and when the SU was disbanded, Abkhazia automatically became independent.
The Georgian parliament declared that all treaties, laws and agreements made during Soviet rule were null and void. Abkhazia, however, was not subordinated to Georgia until 1931, it had previously been of the same status as Georgia. Thus Georgia's cancelling of all Soviet laws automatically left Abkhazia legally outside Georgia.

The maximal—and the only expressed—claim of the Abkhaz people is secession or full independence. The solution they propose is that of two sovereign states. The status of the relations with Georgia, are not clear in their proposals, but the minimum requirement of any solution is the guarantee of independence (Cornell, 2002). Back in 1991, in one of the last attempts for power sharing before the armed clashes begun, a new electoral law on the allocation of seats in the Abkhaz parliament was accepted by Abkhaz leaders and Gamsakhurdia, but soon failed. The attempt failed then because both sides never abandoned the aspiration of monopoly of control over the territory of Abkhazia. Georgians justified their claims as that of the democratic majority; Abkhazians used the argument of autochthony and the need to correct the historical injustice, to justify their claims. Gamsakhurdia never truly believed in the arrangement but accepted it in order to close an open front and concentrate his efforts on the conflict with South Ossetia. The Abkhaz authorities accepted it is a concession giving further rights to their ethnic group (Coppieters, 2001).

Both Abkhaz government and opposition oppose any reunification with Georgia under any circumstances. To them the only plausible solutions would be either full independence or at other times associate membership of the Russian Federation. Since October 1999 when they declared their independence they haven’t moved from that position. In unofficial discussions reported by Coppieters, Kovziridze and Uwe (2003), Abkhaz leaders expressed their preference for a model of distribution of competences based on the sovereignty of the units, something like the association of the Marshall Islands with the United States, that would provide Abkhazia with full international legal personality and the right to secession. In the discussions, “some Abkhaz expressed the opinion that democratization—not reunification with Georgia—was the first priority for Abkhazia. Such a reunification was viewed as rendering the task of democratization more difficult” (Coppieters, Kovziridze and Uwe, 2003). Some Abkhaz officials supported the idea that declaring independence was the last resort as the Abkhaz proposals before and after the war were met with a counterproductive stance by Georgia.

Footnotes

Coppieters, Bruno, Kovziridze Tamara and Leonardy, Uwe. (2003), “Federalization of Foreign Relations: Discussing Alternatives for the Georgian Abkhaz Conflict, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Caspian Studies Program, Working Paper Series, No. 2.
Coppieters, Bruno. (2001), “Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus”, Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects, Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Cornell, E. S. (2002), “Autonomy as a source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Pespective”. World Politics, p. 245-76

The Georgian side

See above section: History of the conflict

Timeline

1989, Interethnic tension
July 15–July 17, 1989 first armed clashes between the representatives of the Abkhazian and Georgian
December 1991 – January 1992, ethnic violence in former South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast and military confrontation after coup d’etat in Tbilisi
June 1992, Abkhaz boevyks attacked the government buildings in Sokhumi
July 23, 1992, separatist members of the Abkhazian government declared independence of the region, no international recognition followed. Anti-governmental diversions made by several so-called “Zviadist” armed groups in Abkhazia.
August 14, 1992, Georgian police and National Guards units dispatched to protect railways and restore an order in Abkhazia. The fights broke out.
August 18, 1992, a secessionist government left Sokhumi. Georgian government forces managed to take control of most of Abkhazia.
September 3, 1992, a ceasefire was negotiated in Moscow
October 2 Abkhaz and CMPC forces attacked the town of Gagra. With the fell of the town, the majority of the Georgian population was either executed, or expelled.
December 1992, rebels began shelling of Georgian-held Sokhumi.
March 4, 1993, Eduard Shevardnadze, arrived in the capital of the region to take control over the defensive operations in the city.
March 14, 1993, Abkhaz and the Confederation forces launched a full-scale attack on Sokhumi resulting in large destruction and casualties among the civilians.
March 19, 1993, Georgian forces shot down a Russian aircraft SU-27.
May 14, 1993, ceasefire was signed, shortlived
July 2, one of the bloodiest in the war fought near the village Tamishi.
July 27, 1993 Russian-mediated ceasefire was again agreed in Sochi
September 16, ceasefire violated when separatist forces launched a large-scale offensive against Sokhumi,
September 27, fall of Sukhumi after fierce fighting

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