Campaign history of the Roman military

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File:Roman Camp Arges reconstruction.jpg

Roman military camp reconstruction

Rome was a militarized state whose history was often closely entwined with its military history over the roughly 13 centuries that the Roman state existed. The core of the Military history of ancient Rome is the account of its land battles, from the conquest of Italy to its fights against the Huns and invading Germanic tribes.

Introduction

"The Roman Army" is the name given by English-speakers to the soldiers and other military forces who served the Roman Kingdom, the Roman Republic and later the Roman Empire. The military forces in general were the militia, and a commander of military operations, magister militiae. In the republic, a general might be called imperator, "commander" (as in Caesar imperator), but under the empire, that term became reserved for the highest office.

The Romans only called themselves "Roman" in very formal circumstances, such as senatus populusque Romanus (SPQR), "the senate and people of Rome" or when they needed to distinguish themselves from others, as in civis Romanus, "Roman citizen." Otherwise, they used less formal and ethnocentric terms, such as nostri viri, "our men", also in mare nostrum, "our sea", for the Mediterranean. The state was res publica, "the public thing", and parallel to it was res militaris, "the military thing", which could have a number of connotations.

Miles (Latin for soldier) has no clear etymology. It is believed by many historians that Rome was originally an Etruscan city, Ruma, and the Etruscans were known as a war-like people. Many of the early families of Rome, including some of the most aristocratic families, were originally Etruscan. It would be surprising, then, if miles had an Indo-european etymology. We don't know enough Etruscan language to rule it in or out as Etruscan.

The Army came to dominate much of the land surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, including the provinces of Britannia and Asia Minor at the Empire's height. Little is known of the army under the monarchy. Even before the monarchy was overthrown in 509 BC, the army had become a citizen army. It remained a citizen army throughout most of the Republic, until becoming a professional army following the reforms of Gaius Marius c. 100 BC.

Rome became what we would call a military dictatorship. The army began to play a part in selecting emperors, removing them typically by assassination. Imperator became a very risky office to hold. At last the senate refused to nominate any more candidates and left the selection totally up to the army, but the decision to do that did not bring stability in government. In the end the empire broke in two and then splintered into rival, warring armies. By that time there were but few Romans in the Roman army. It consisted mainly of provincial troops, due to the practice of placating enemies by letting them serve in the army, which exerted military discipline over them.

Roman citizen army

Pre-Republican military evolution

Much like many other ancient cities of the time, the Roman Kingdom under the Etruscan kings had a citizen based army, a militia called up in times of war. Servius Tullius Rex (King) was the first to create an organized census of his citizens to better facilitate the creation of armies, a system that would last until the end of the Roman Republic. Sometime during this period, the army adopted equipment similar to that used by the Greek hoplite, a soldier who provided his own armour and was armed with a long spear, and used the Phalanx formation. This development most likely came through Etruria, and it lasted well into the Republican era. The king was the overall commander of the army, but members of the patrician families also had significant authority. It was also during the Kingdom that the army began to be organized into very specific and rigid sections, with the entire army being called the legio (legion).

The Republican Army

Some time during the late Roman Kingdom or early Roman Republic the Roman army was split into two administrative units. Following the overthrow of the monarchy, executive authority rested in the annually elected consul position. There were two consuls, and each commanded one legion. This could lead to competitiveness, and in the mid-Republican years when larger armies began to be raised, such as during the early years of the Second Punic War, command often went to one consul on alternate days for the entire army.

The troops of a Republican legion

Every soldier bought and maintained his own equipment and there was no uniform dresscode. The younger, less experienced of recruits were called Hastati, who were armed with a sword (changed from the xiphos and kopis to the gladius), a javelin with throwing straps, a heavy javelin (pilum) and a large oval shield called a scutum. The more experienced men of a legion were called Principes, they were similary armed but were more heavily armored than Hastati. The backbone of the Republican Army were called the Triarii, armed with long spears (hasta) and swords. They were the wealthy in Roman society and bought their own equipment. The Roman cavalry (equites) was in between light and heavy cavalry and relied less on ranged combat with javelins, than close combat in the Greek fashion. Native Roman resources of cavalry were limited, so this branch consisted mostly of alae. Allied Italian states (alae) would send troops to fight alongside the legions in their own formations, but were escorted and commanded by Romans.

The Republican period

The first Roman wars were wars of expansion and defence, aimed at protecting Rome itself from neighbouring cities and nations by defeating them in battle. This sort of warfare characterized the early Republican Period when Rome was focused on consolidating its position in Italy, and eventually conquering the peninsula. Rome first began to make war outside the Italian peninsula in the Punic wars against Carthage. These wars, starting in 264 BC saw Rome become a Mediterranean power, with territory in Sicily, North Africa, Spain, and, after the Macedonian wars, Greece. One important point that must be understood is that the Rome did not conquer most nations outright, at least at first, but instead forced them into a submissive position as allies and client states. These allies supplied men, money, and supplies to Rome against other opponents.

Professional legions and auxiliaries

As the Republic developed, the need for reform was evident. The available manpower began to dwindle as the numbers of landholders decreased and the number of men required to defend Rome's increasing territory increased. The popular and successful consul Gaius Marius put forward the so-called Marian reforms, or perhaps more appropriately began to ignore the mos maorum (established order of things), and recruited soldiers who were not landowners; a growing segment of the Roman population. This lead to a more professional army, but started a long trend that could be viewed as a negative one, as the army stopped being representative of the population, and became something entirely separate with goals and desires quite different from the average citizen of Rome. Another important reform was the command structure of the army. In order to police the growing amount of territory outside of Italy, Rome organized it into provinces commanded by a military governor called a proconsul or propraetor. The proconsul had absolute authority in the province he governed, and even had the power to raise legions. Although this could be said to be a requirement for policing their growing territory, ambitious proconsuls could easily abuse their power not only in their province, but use their forces to undermine the Republic itself. The consuls could still only raise one legion each, while proconsuls often had two or three under their command, a fact not missed by men like Gaius Julius Caesar Divus.

The Imperial Army

Between the reigns of Augustus and Trajan the army became a professional one. Its core legionaries were Roman citizens who served for a minimum of twenty-five years. Augustus in his reign tried to eliminate the loyalty of the legions to the generals who commanded them, forcing them to take an oath of allegiance directly to him. This policy was continued by later emperors. While the legions remained relatively loyal to Augustus during his reign, under others, especially the more corrupt emperors or those who unwisely treated the military poorly, the legions often took power into their own hands. Legions continued to move farther and farther to the outskirts of society, especially in the later periods of the empire as the majority of legionaries no longer came from Italy and were instead born in the provinces. The loyalty the legions felt to their emperor only degraded with time, and led in the 2nd Century and 3rd Century to a large number of military usurpers and civil wars. By the time of the military officer emperors that characterized the period following the Crisis of the Third Century the Roman army was just as likely to be attacking itself as an outside invader.

Both the pre- and post-Marian armies were greatly assisted by auxiliary troops. A typical Roman legion was accompanied by a matching auxiliary legion. In the pre-Marian army these auxiliary troops were Italians, and often Latins, from cities near Rome. The post-Marian army incorporated these Italian soldiers into its standard legions (as all Italians were Roman citizens after the Social War). Its auxiliary troops were made up of foreigners from provinces distant to Rome, who gained Roman citizenship after completing their twenty-five years of service. This system of foreign auxiliaries allowed the post-Marian army to strengthen traditional weak points of the Roman system, such as light missile troops and cavalry, with foreign specialists. This was particularly important as the richer classes began to take less and less part of military affairs, and the Roman army lost much of its domestic cavalry.

At the beginning of the Imperial period the number of legions was 60, which Augustus more than halved to 28, numbering at approximately 160,000 men. As more territory was conquered throughout the Imperial period, this fluctuated into the mid-thirties. At the same time, at the beginning of the Imperial period the foreign auxiliaries made up a rather small portion of the military, but continued to rise, so that by the end of the period of the Five Good Emperors they probably equalled the legionnaires in number, giving a combined total of between 300,000 and 400,000 men in the Army.

Under Augustus and Trajan, the army had become a highly efficient and thoroughly professional body, brilliantly led and staffed. To Augustus fell the difficult task of retaining much that Caesar had created, but on a permanent peace-time footing. He did so by creating a standing army, made up of 28 legions, each one consisting of roughly 5300 men. Additional to these forces there was a similar number of auxiliary troops. Augustus also reformed the length of time a soldier served, increasing it from six to twenty-five years. The standard of a legion, the so-called aquila (eagle) was the very symbol of the unit's honour. The aquilifer was the man who carried the standard; he was almost as high in rank as a centurion. It was this elevated and honourable position which also made him the soldiers' treasurer in charge of the pay chest. A legion on the march relied completely on its own resources for weeks. In addition to his weapons and armour, each man carried a marching pack that included a cooking pot, some rations, clothes and any personal possessions. Furthermore, to make camp each night every man carried tools for digging as well as two stakes for a palisade. Weighed down by such burdens it is little wonder that the soldiers were nicknamed 'Marius' Mules'.

There has over time been much debate regarding how much weight a legionary actually had to carry. Now, 30 kg (ca. 66 lb) is generally considered the upper limit for an infantryman in modern day armies. Calculations have been made which, including the entire equipment and the 16 day's worth of rations, brings the weight to over 41 kg (ca. 93 lb). And this estimate is made using the lightest possible weights for each item, it suggest the actual weight would have been even higher. This suggests that the sixteen days rations were not carried by the legionaries. the rations referred to in the old records might well have been a sixteen days ration of hard tack (buccellatum), usually used to supplement the daily corn ration (frumentum). By using it as an iron ration, it might have sustained a soldier for about three days. The weight of the buccellatum is estimated to have been about 3 kg, which, given that the corn rations would add more than 11 kg, means that without the corn, the soldier would have carried around 30 kg (66 lb), pretty much the same weight as today's soldiers.

The necessity for a legion to undertake quite specialised tasks such as bridge building or engineering siege machines, required there to be specialists among their numbers. These men were known as the immunes, 'excused from regular duties'. Among them would be medical staff, surveyors, carpenters, veterinaries, hunters, armourers - even soothsayers and priests. When the legion was on the march, the chief duty of the surveyors would be to go ahead of the army, perhaps with a cavalry detachment, and to seek out the best place for the night's camp. In the forts along the empire's frontiers other non-combatant men could be found, for an entire bureaucracy was necessary to keep the army running. These would be scribes and supervisors in charge of army pay, supplies and customs. There were also military police present.

As a unit, a legion was made up of ten cohorts, each of which was further divided into six centuries of eighty men. Each century was commanded by a centurion. The commander of the legion, the legatus, usually held his command for three or four years, usually as a preparation for a later term as provincial governor. The legatus, also referred to as general in much of modern literature, was surrounded by a staff of six officers. These were the military tribunes, who - if deemed capable by the legatus - might command an entire section of a legion in battle. Another man, who could be deemed part of the general's staff, was the centurio primus pilus. This was the most senior of all the centurions, commanding the first century of the first cohort, and therefore the man with the greatest experience (in Latin, "primus pilus" means "first file", presumably describing where he stood in battle). The primus pilus also oversaw the everyday running of the forces.

Together with non-combatants attached to the army, a legion would count around 6000 men. The 120 horsemen attached to each legion were used as scouts and dispatch riders. They ranked with staff and other non-combatants and were allocated to specific centuries, rather than belonging to a squadron of their own.

The senior professional soldiers in the legion was likely to be the camp prefect, praefectus castrorum. He was usually a man of some thirty years service, and was responsible for organization, training, and equipment.

Centurions, when it came to marching, had one considerable privilege over their men. Whereas the soldiers moved on foot, they rode on horseback. Another significant power they possessed was that of beating their soldiers. For this they would carry a staff, perhaps two or three foot long. Apart from his distinctive armour, this staff was one of the means by which one could recognise a centurion.

Each centurion had a second in command called an optio who worked closely with the centurion in the day to day running of the century. The optio was considered to be a centurion candidate, in that he would in time be promoted to that rank. He was expected to be capable of taking over command of the century temporarily should the centurion be wounded or overwise unavailable. The optio would normally be chosen from the ranks of legionaires by the centurion himself.

Another officer in the century was the tesserarius, who was mainly responsible for small sentry pickets and fatigue parties, and so had to receive and pass on the watchword of the day. Finally there was the custos armorum who was in charge of the weapons and equipment.

The first cohort of any legion were its elite troops. So too the sixth cohort consisted of "the finest of the young men", the eighth contained "selected troops", the tenth cohort "good troops". The weakest cohorts were the 2nd, 4th, 7th and the 9th cohorts. It was in the 7th and 9th cohorts one would expect to find recruits in training.

Equipment changes

The popular depiction of Roman equipment consisting of a Lorica segmentata and a Montefortino helmet was used for some time among the Italian infantry units and their successors, but not by all of them. About half of the Roman military consisted of foreign specialists (Auxiliaries) with their own national clothing and equipment. Around 5AD, the lorica hamata (chainmail) became less common as lorica segmentata was much cheaper and quicker to make - an important fact when there were so many men to arm. However, some African and Asian legions are thought to have kept it until it became standard issue again in 250 AD. The cavalry stayed with Roman standard equipment since the Second Punic War, the lorica hamata and Greek style helmets.

Events during the late Republic

It was not until the late Republic that the expansion of the Republic started meaning actual annexation of large amounts of territory, however in this period, civil war became an increasingly common feature. In the last century before the common era at least 12 civil wars and rebellions occurred. These were generally started by one charismatic general who refused to surrender power to the Roman Senate, which appointed generals, and so had to be opposed by an army loyal to the Senate. This pattern did not break until Octavian (later Caesar Augustus) ended it by becoming a successful challenger to the Senate's authority, and was crowned emperor.

The Imperial period

The centralization of authority under the emperor with power focused in Rome was both a help and a hindrance to expansion under the Roman Empire. Under powerful and secure emperors such as Augustus and Trajan, great territorial gains were possible, but under weaker rulers such as Nero and Domitian, weakness resulted in nothing more than usurpation. One thing that all successful emperors had to accomplish was the loyalty of the legions throughout the empire. Weak emperors such as those relied upon generals to carry out their direct actions along the border, especially considering their requirement to stay in Rome to maintain power. This meant that often expansion in the empire came in leaps and bounds rather than a slow march. Another important point to remember is that many of the territories conquered in the imperial period were former client states of Rome whose regimes had degraded into instability, requiring armed intervention, often leading to outright annexation.

Unfortunately, the weakness of some emperors meant that these generals could wrest control of those legions away. The Crisis of the Third Century developed with the murder of the emperor Alexander Severus in 235AD, starting a series of civil wars similar to those that characterized the end of the Republic. Much like then, generals were wresting control of power based upon the strength of the local legions under their command. Ironically, while it was these usurpations that led to the break up of the Empire during that crisis, it was the strength of several frontier generals that helped reunify the empire through force of arms.

Limitanei and Comitatenses

The last major reform of the Imperial Army came under the reign of Diocletian in the late 3rd Century. During the instability that had marked most of that century, the army had fallen in number and lost much of its ability to effectively police and defend the empire. He quickly recruited a large number of men, increasing the number of legionnaires from between 150,000 and 200,000 to between 350,000 and 400,000, although at the expense of the quality of these troops.

The Limitanei or Riparian were border units in the armies of the late Roman Empire. They were light troops and served to hold off invaders until heavier troops could arrive. They are historically significant in that their appearance, as part of a plan of military reforms of the late third century A.D. was able to extend the life of the Roman Empire by holding back barbarian invasions.

Limitanei

The Limitanei or Riparian were border units in the armies of the late Roman Empire. They were light troops and served to hold off invaders until heavier troops could arrive. They are historically significant in that their appearance, as part of a plan of military reforms of the late third century A.D. was able to extend the life of the Roman Empire by holding back barbarian invasions.

Historians believe that military reforms in the Roman Army were begun in the late third century by Diocletian. It was Constantine I, however, under whom the reforms began to take root and have widespread effect. The first written reference to "Limitanei" was in 363 A.D.

The creation of the limitanei saw at the same time the creation of "comitatenses" units. The limitanei were the lighter of these two groups. They would be stationed directly at the borders of the Empire, with the mission of holding off invaders until the heavier troops, the comitatenses, could arrive on scene.

Although these military reforms brought a more effective defensive army, than the previous arrangement had, it did have its downsides. The quality of the troops declined because the limitanei had to live in poor conditions along the borders, mostly garrisoned in camps, while the Comitatenses lived in cities in very good conditions. This affected the discipline and morale of the late Roman army.

However, partly due to these reforms the Western Roman Empire lived for another 130 years.

Comitatenses

Comitatenses is the Latin plural of comitatensis, originally the adjective derived from comitatus ('company, party, suite'; in this military context it came to the novel meaning of 'the field army'), itself rooting in Comes ('companion', but hence specific historical meanings, military and civilian).

However, historically it became the accepted (substantivated) name for those Roman imperial troops (legions and auxiliary) which were not merely garrisoned at a limes (fortified border, on the Rhine and Danube in Europe and near Persia and the desert tribes elsewhere) — the limitanei or ripenses, i.e. 'along the shores' — but more mobile line troops; furthermore there were second line troops, named pseudocomitatenses, former limitanei attached to the comitatus; palatinae, elite ('guard') units typically assigned to Magistri militum; and the scholae of actual palace guards, notably under the magister officiorum, a major court official of the Late Empire.

Feuderati

Germanic tribes serving as allied forces. Were allowed to settle on Roman territory after it was impossible to pay them for their service. Federati were for example the Visigoths or Franks, establishing their own Empires from the provinces Rome had given them.

Events during the late Imperial period

Eventually, the dynastic structure of the imperial office returned due to the centralization of loyalty and control of the military once more in 284AD by Diocletian, and then collapsed again for the same reasons as before some 40 years later, eventually leading to the destruction of the Western Half of the Empire. At this point, Roman military history becomes Military history of the Byzantine Empire.

Roman navy

Both in prestige and capability, the Roman navy was the smaller arm of the Roman military. Before the First Punic War in 264 BC there was no Roman navy to speak of as all previous Roman war had been fought in Italy. But the war in Sicily against Carthage, a great naval power, forced Rome to quickly build a fleet and train sailors. The first few naval battles of the First Punic War were disasters for Rome, and it was not until the invention of the Corvus, a grappling engine which made it easier for Romans to board the Carthaginian vessels, that Rome was able to win the war. This meant that Rome could use her superior army in naval combat, and was a significant shift away from the tactics of all other navies at the time.

Rome was able to use her superior army in preference to her navy in most of the wars she fought afterwards. Indeed, Rome's last major naval battle was fought between Romans, Octavian and Marc Antony, at Actium.

The Roman navy was from the outset, despite depictions in films such as Ben-Hur, comprised completely of volunteers. All seamen, be they rowers/sailors or marines joined up of their own volition and received regular pay and leave.

By the time of the early empire, Roman control over the Mediterranean coast meant that there were no non-Roman navies to fight and the marines and sailors of the fleet spent their time policing the mediterranean against the threat of pirates and patrolled the various major rivers in the empire.

Although the quality of the navy did degrade into the later imperial period, emperors such as Diocletian put significant effort into rebuilding the navy. The average estimate of manpower strength of the navy ranges from 50,000-100,000.

Appraisal and Assessment of the Roman military

What made the Romans effective versus so many skilled opponents?

The basic structure and operation of the Roman military is generally well known from countless books, writings and films, particularly the legion, its officers, fortified camps and other features. Less well known is what made the Romans so effective a force over almost 1,000 years, particularly since the Romans encountered several other able opponents and lost so many battles over the course of their hegemony. The popular film "Gladiator" (2000) presents a typical picture of Roman invincibility, complete with wild Germanic hordes that were quickly crushed. Though true in most cases, such as the defeat of vast Gallic hordes under Julius Caesar, Rome suffered a number of embarassing setbacks against such barbarians. One of Rome's greatest military defeats, (the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest) saw the liquidation of three imperial legions to Germanic warbands, and was to spark a limit on Roman expansion in the West. And it was these Germanic hordes in part (most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture) that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West.

As far as cavalry opponents, Roman performance was also sometimes less than sterling. The core of the Roman Army was infantry and when they faced armies heavy with cavalry, they often encountered problems. One classic case of course is Hannibal's army, but both the horse reliant Parthians and heavy Sarmatian cavalry gave the legions more than a run for their money.

Several of Rome's other military campaigns hardly show sustained invincibility or dazzling genius. Indeed Roman performance in many battles was unimpressive or disastrous. As far as ambushes for example, (such as the debacle in the Teutoburg) Roman forces seemed to have a penchant for falling into them repeatedly, as proved centuries earlier at Lake Trasimene. Over the course of the empire, they were out-generaled by Hannibal (during the early years of the Second Punic War) and suffered a number of other severe defeats by opponents like the Parthians. And yet, over time, the Romans not only bounced back, but for the most part eventually crushed or neutralized their enemies. How then did they do it against a variety of enemies that were, at various times and places, more numerous, more skilled or better led?

Central factors in Roman success

Some elements that made the Romans an effective military force, both tactically and at higher levels, were:

The Romans were able to copy and adapt the weapons and methods of its opponents more effectively. Some weapons, such as the gladius, were adopted outright by the legionaries. In other cases, especially formidable enemies units of their forces were invited to serve in the Roman army as auxiliaries after peace was made. In the naval sphere, the Romans dropped their ineffective designs and copied and adapted the Punic warship, producing their own versions with battering rams and employed for a short time the corvus boarding mechanism. With these they were not only to dominate Carthage, but the most of the Mediterrean. (See "The Punic Wars", Adrian Goldsworthy.)

Roman organization was more flexible than that of many opponents. Tribal peoples for example often attacked en-masse with little coordination, using standard tactics traditional to their culture that varied relatively little. There were exceptions, notably by leaders who had previously been extensively exposed to Roman military methods, but this was the general rule. By contrast, the legions, through their training and discipline could more quickly adopt a number of methods and formations depending on the situation- from the testudo during siege warfare, to a hollow square against cavalry atack, to mixed units of heavy foot, horse and light infantry against guerrillas in Spain, to the classic "triple line" of the early Republic. Against more sophiscated opponents the Romans also showed great flexibility at times. The brilliant adjustments Scipio made against Hannibal at Zama illustrate this. Facing the shrewd opponent that had inflicted some of Rome's worse defeats, his advance planning left huge gaps in the ranks to trap and dispose of Hannibal's charging elephants, freeing both infantry and cavalry to engage the Carthaganians with confidence. At the end, Scipio made another significant adjustment, recalling, repositioning and consolidating his remaining fighters into single battle line that advanced to the final death struggle against the veterans of the war in Italy.

Roman discipline, organization and systemization sustained combat effectiveness over a longer period. Notably, the Roman system of castra, or fortified camps, allowed the army to stay in the field on favorable ground and be rested and resupplied for battle. Well organized Roman logistics also sustained combat power, from routine resupply and storage, to the construction of military roads, to state arms factories and arsenals, to well organized naval convoys that helped stave off defeat by Carthage. The death of a leader generally did not cause the legions to lose heart in battle. Others stepped to the fore and carried on. In the defeat by Hannibal at the River Trebia, 10,000 Romans cut their way through the debacle to safety, maintaining unit cohesion when all around was rout, a testimony to their tactical organization and discipline. (See "The Punic Wars", Adrian Goldsworthy.)

The Romans were more persistent and more willing to absorb and replace losses over time than their opponents. Unlike other civilizations, the Romans kept going relentlessly until typically their enemies had been completely crushed or neutralized. The army acted to implement policy and were not allowed to stop unless they received a command from the emperor or a decree from the senate.

Against the tribal polities of Europe Roman tenacity eventually wore down most opposition. The tribes of Europe did not have a state or economic structure able to support lengthy campaigns and therefore could often (but not always) be made to change their minds about opposing Roman hegemony. The defeat in the Teutoburg Forest might seem like an exception, but even here, the Romans were back on the warpath 5 years later with major forces against their Germanic opponents. That there is an obvious limit to endless persistence does not negate the general pattern.

Where the Romans faced another large state structure, such as the Persian Empire, they found the military road rocky indeed and were sometimes forced to an impasse. Nevertheless the distinct pattern of Roman tenacity holds. Rome suffered its greatest defeats against sophiscated Carthage, notably at Cannae, and was forced to avoid battle for a lengthy period. Yet in time, it rebuilt its forces on land and at sea, and persisted in the struggle, astonishing the Punics who expected it to sue for peace. Against the Parthians, crushing defeats did not stop the Romans, for they invaded Parthian territory several times afterwards, and though Parthia proper was never totally conquered, Rome ultimately secured a rough hegemony in the area. See Wiki article "Parthia."

Roman leadership was mixed, but over time it was often effective in securing Roman military success. Leadership debacles are common in Roman military history, from the routs against Hannibal, to the demise of the unlucky Crassus against the Parthians. The Roman polity's structuring however produced a steady supply of men willing and able to lead troops in battle- men that were held accountable for defeat or malfeasance. It was not unusual for a losing general to be prosecuted by political enemies in Rome, with some having their property confiscated and barely escaping death. The senatorial oligarchy, for all its political maneuvering, interference and other faults, provided the functions of oversight and audit over military matters, that over the course of time, shaped final results. The record is a mixed one, but whether under boisterous Republic or Imperial emperor, Rome produced enough competent leaders to secure its military dominance for over a millennium. Some of the best leaders come from both eras, including Scipio, Caesar and others.

The influence of Roman military and civic culture, as embodied particularly in the heavy infantry legion, gave the Roman military consistent motivation and cohesion. Such culture included but was not limited to the valuing of Roman citizenship, the broad-based muster of free males into mass infantry units (as opposed to widespread use of alien contingents, slaves or mercenaries), and loyalty to those fighting units (the Legion) which remained characteristically Roman in outlook and discipline. The weakening of this culture, through increasing barbarization of the heavy legions, weakened military effectiveness in the long run.

Such practices as permitting the settlement of massive, armed barbarian populations on Roman territory, the watering down of the privilege of citizenship, increasing use of alien contingents and their lighter weaponry, and relaxation or removal of traditional Roman discipline, organization and control, contributed to military decline. "Barbarization" is a common theme in many works on the decline of Rome (See Gibbons, Mommsen, Delbruck, et al), and thus cannot be excluded from any analysis of its military forces.

References and external links

External links

The Military Affairs of Ancient Rome
The Roman Army Page
Exercitus, Article from Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities published at Lacus Curtius.
The Roman Army: A Bibliography
Marius' Mules - The Roman Army before and after the Marian Reforms.

References

"The Punic Wars", Adrian Goldsworthy.

A detailed breakdown of Roman strategy, methods, tactics and those of their opponents. Analyzes strengths and weaknesses of the Roman military and how they were able to beat a sophiscated Carthage.

"Carnage and Culture", Victor Davis Hanson

Analyses "the western way of war" and why Western forces typically have defeated others over the long haul, even when opposing forces are more numerous and better motivated. Notable for its analysis of how a system with popular legislative elements( like that of Rome) can provide useful oversight and audit of military matters. Presentation and conclusions are disputed.

"Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation", by Arther Ferrill, 1988

"Many historians have argued .... that the fall of Rome was not primarily a military phenomenon. In fact, it was exactly that. After 410 the emperor in the West could no longer project military power to the frontiers." (p. 164)

Focuses on military issues leading to the fall of Rome as opposed to theories such as overpopulation, shrinking tax bases, "class struggle" etc.... Reemphasizes the military factors in Rome's final demise. For example did the "mobile reserve" strategy of later decades damage and water down the force, as compared to the earlier "forward" policy of keeping the heavy fighting legions near likely combat zones? Even ancient observers weighed in on the controversy, with one of the most notable condemning the "mobile reserve" approach. Ferrill also tackles the weakening effect of "barbarization", particularly on the core heavy infantry legions.