Battle of Sandepu
| Battle of Sandepu (Battle of Heikoutai) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Russo-Japanese War | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
| Japan | Russia | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Oyama Iwao | Alexei Kuropatkin | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 220,000 ? | 85,000 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 9,000 killed, wounded or captured | 12,000 killed, wounded or captured | ||||||
The Battle of Sandepu, (also known as the Battle of Heikoutai) was a major land battle of the Russo-Japanese War. It was fought within a group of villages about 36 miles southwest of Mukden, Manchuria.
Background
After the Battle of Shaho, the Russian and Japanese forces faced each other south of Mukden until the frozen Manchurian winter began. The Japanese field commanders thought no major battle was possible and assumed that the Russians had the same view regarding the difficulty of winter combat. However, General Oskar-Ferdinand Kazimirovich Grippenberg, the deaf and inexperienced newly arrived commanding general of the Russian Second Army, quickly grasped that the Japanese left wing was in an exposed northern position close to Russian territory near the small village of Heikoutai. Having heard of the fall of Port Arthur on 02 January, 1905 and knowing that the Japanese Third Army under General Nogi was now advancing to the front, Grippenberg felt it imperative to drive Oyama’s armies to back to Korea before the Japanese could join forces.
The Battle
On 25 January 1905, against the strong opposition of Kuropatkin, Grippenberg planned and executed an attack with the Russian 2nd Manchurian Army consisting now of the 8th European Army Corps, a division of the 10th, the 61st Reserve Division, the 5th Rifle Brigade, and the 1st East Siberian Army Corps, besides a large body of cavalry, or approximately, 285,000 men and 350 guns. The Japanese forces, bivouacked in winter quarters, were completely surprised. The Japanese chain of command lost coherence, and some forces fell into chaos, although individual units put up a fierce resistance. Poor weather conditions, with occasional blizzards compounded the confusion.
Suddenly, on 29 January 1905, the Russian Second Army was ordered to stop attacking. Advancing Russian soldiers, their morale extremely high because they knew they were winning, could not understand the reason. Perhaps if Kuropatkin had resolutely committed his main forces against the Japanese center, the results of the entire war may have been different. However, Kuropatkin acted with his usual caution and hesitation, and ordered Grippenberg’s forces back. After the battle, Grippenberg resigned his commission and on his return to Moscow, bitterly blaming Kuropatkin for the debacle in the newspapers, claiming that Kuropatkin withheld crucial support due to jealousy at his success.
Result
Total Russian casualties totaled around 12,000 killed, wounded or captured. Japanese casualties totaled around 9,000 killed, wounded or captured. But the battle ended in a tactical stalemate with neither side claiming victory. The Russian Marxists used the newspaper controversy created by Grippenberg, and by Kuropatkin’s incompetence in previous battles to drum up more support in their campaign against the government.