Wilhelm II

William II
German Emperor, King of Prussia
In this photo of William, his right hand is holding the withered one, concealing it.
Reign	1888-1918
Predecessor	Frederick III
Successor	None (monarchy abolished)
Issue	Crown Prince Wilhelm Prince Eitel Friedrich Prince Adalbert Prince August Wilhelm Prince Oskar Prince Joachim Princess Viktoria Luise
House	House of Hohenzollern
Father	Frederick III
Mother	Victoria, Princess Royal

William II or Wilhelm II (born Frederick William Albert Victor; German: Friedrich Wilhelm Albert Victor) (27 January, 1859–4 June 1941), was the last German Emperor and King of Prussia (German: Deutscher Kaiser und König von Preußen), ruling both the German Empire and Prussia from 15 June 1888 to 9 November 1918.

The role of William II in German history is controversial in historical scholarship. He was initially seen as an important but embarrassing figure in German history until the late 1950s. In subsequent years, the dominant view held he had little influence on German policy that led up to the First World War. The former view resurfaced in the late 1970s espoused by scholars like Professor John C. G. Röhl who saw William II as the key figure in understanding the recklessness and subsequent downfall of Imperial Germany.

Early years

William II of Germany

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William was born in Berlin to Prince Frederick William of Prussia and his wife, Victoria, Princess Royal of the United Kingdom. As the son of the Crown Prince of Prussia, William was, from 1861, second in the line of succession to Prussia, and the German Empire, after 1871.

Birth trauma

A traumatic breech birth left him with a withered left arm due to Erb's palsy. A breech birth occurs when the baby's head is near the top of the uterus instead of the usual head-down position. In adulthood, he tried to conceal his left arm with some success. He is seen in many photos carrying a pair of white gloves in his left hand to make the arm seem longer. In others, he places his crippled arm on the hilt of a sword or a cane. Recent analysis of records of his birth in the Imperial Archives have also suggested that he may have experienced some brain trauma, possibly leading to damage. Historians are divided on whether such brain damage may have contributed to his frequently aggressive, tactless, headstrong, and occasionally bullying approach to problems and people, which was evident in both his personal and political life. Such an approach marred German policy under his leadership, most notably in his dismissal of the cautious Otto von Bismarck.

Upbringing

Victoria called her sons by their Anglicised names. Thus William was used instead of Wilhelm. Growing up, William had a difficult relationship with his mother, who was cold towards him. She felt guilty for his deformity, and tried to eliminate it through rigorous exercise. William's relationship with his father was ambigious. Although he admired his father's role in German unification, lack of close emotional contact with this father prevented a proper relationship. As result, William had ambivalent feelings towards his father.

William was educated at the Friedrichsgymnasium and the University of Bonn. He was intelligent, but his temper overshadowed this trait. William also took an interest in science and technology of the age. Though sophisticated in conversation, he held absolute monarchy in higher esteem. He was accused of megalomania as early as 1894, by German pacifist Ludwig Quidde. From early age, William was exposed to and influenced by Prussian militarism. This exposure shaped his political ideals and his public life.

Ascension to the thrones

William I, his grandfather and German Emperor, died in Berlin on March 9 1888, and his father assumed the title as Frederick III. Frederick was suffering from an incurable throat cancer and spent three months on the throne before his death. On 15th June 1888, William became the German Emperor and King of Prussia as William II.

Although in his youth he had been a great admirer of Otto von Bismarck, William's characteristic impatience soon brought him into conflict with the "Iron Chancellor", the dominant figure in the foundation of his empire. The new Emperor opposed Bismarck's careful foreign policy, preferring vigorous and rapid expansion to protect Germany's "place in the sun." Furthermore, the young emperor had come to the throne with the determination that he was going to rule as well as reign, unlike his grandfather, who had largely been content to leave day-to-day administration to the brilliant Bismarck.

Early conflicts between William II and his chancellor soon poisoned the relationship between the two men. Bismarck believed that William was a lightweight who could be dominated, and he showed scant respect for William's policies in the late 1880s. Following an attempt by Bismarck to implement a far-reaching anti-Socialist law in early 1890, the final split between monarch and statesman occurred soon after.

Break with Bismarck

It was during this time that Bismarck, after gaining a favorable absolute majority toward his policies in the Reichstag, decided to make the anti-socialist laws permanent. His Kartell majority of the amalgamated Conservative Party and the National Liberal Party was favorable to make the laws permanent with one exception: the police power to expel socialist agitators from their homes, a power used excessively at times against political opponents. Hence, the Kartell split on this issue, with the National Liberal Party unwilling to make the expulsion clause of the law permanent. The Conservatives supported only the entirety of the bill and threatened to and eventually vetoed the entire bill in session because Bismarck wouldn't give his assent to a modified bill. As the debate continued, William became increasingly interested in social problems, especially the treatment of mine workers who went on strike in 1889, and keeping with his active policy in government, routinely interrupted Bismarck in Council to make clear his social policy. Bismarck sharply disagreed with William's policy and worked to circumvent it. Even though William supported the altered anti socialist bill, Bismarck pushed for his support to veto the bill in its entirety, but when Bismarck's arguments couldn't convince William, he became excited and agitated until uncharacteristically blurting out his motive to see the bill fail: to have the socialists agitate until a violent clash occurred that could be used as a pretext to crush them. William replied that he wasn't willing to open his reign with a bloody campaign against his subjects. The next day, after realizing his blunder, Bismarck attempted to reach a compromise with William by agreeing to his social policy towards industrial workers, and even suggested a European council to discuss working conditions, presided by the German Emperor.

Despite this, a turn of events eventually led to his distance from William. Bismarck, feeling pressured and unappreciated by the Emperor and undermined by ambitious advisors, refused to sign a proclamation regarding the protection of workers along with William, as was required by the German Constitution, to protest William's ever increasing interference to Bismarck's previously unquestioned authority. Bismarck also worked behind the scenes to break the Continental labor council William had set so dearly to his heart. The final break came as Bismarck searched for a new parliamentary majority, with his Kartell voted from power due to the anti socialist bill fiasco. The remaining powers in the Reichstag were the Catholic Centre Party and the Conservative Party. Bismarck wished to form a new block with the Centre Party, and invited Ludwig Windthorst, the parliamentary leader to discuss an alliance. This would be Bismarck's last political maneuver. William was furious to hear about Windthorst's visit. In a parliamentary state, the head of government depends on the confidence of the parliamentary majority, and certainly has the right to form coalitions to ensure his policies a majority, but in Germany, the Chancellor depended on the confidence of the Emperor alone, and William believed that the Emperor had the right to be informed before his minister's meeting. After a heated argument in Bismarck's estate over imperial authority, William, stormed out, both parting ways permanently. Bismarck, forced for the first time into a situation he could not use to his advantage, wrote a blistering letter of resignation, decrying William's interference in foreign and domestic policy, which was only published after Bismarck's death.

Bismarck resigned at William II's insistence in 1890, at age 75, to be succeeded as Chancellor of Germany and Minister-President of Prussia by Leo von Caprivi, who in turn was replaced by Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst in 1894.

The New Course

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In appointing Caprivi and then Hohenlohe, William was embarking upon what is known to history as "the New Course", in which he hoped to exert decisive influence in the government of the empire. There is debate amongst historians as to the precise degree to which William succeeded in implementing "personal rule" in this era, but what is clear is the very different dynamic which existed between the crown and its chief political servant (the chancellor) in the "Williamine era". These chancellors were senior civil servants and not seasoned politician-statesmen like Bismarck. William wanted to preclude the emergence of another Iron Chancellor, whom he ultimately detested as being "a boorish old killjoy" who had not permitted any minister to see the emperor except in his presence, keeping a stranglehold on effective political power. Upon his enforced retirement and until his dying day, Bismarck was to become a bitter critic of William's policies, but without the support of the supreme arbiter of all political appointments (the emperor) there was little chance of Bismarck exerting a decisive influence on policy.

Something which Bismarck was able to effect was the creation of the "Bismarck myth". This was a view - which some would argue was confirmed by subsequent events - that with the dismissal of the Iron Chancellor, William II effectively destroyed any chance Germany had of stable and effective government. In this view, William's "New Course" was characterised far more as the German ship of state going out of control, eventually leading through a series of crises to the carnage of the First and Second World Wars.

The strong chancellors

Following the dismissal of Hohenlohe in 1900, William appointed the man who he regarded as "his own Bismarck", Prince Bernhard von Bülow. William hoped that in Bülow, he had found a man who would combine the ability of the Iron Chancellor with the respect for William's wishes which would allow the empire to be governed as he saw fit. Bülow had already been identified by William as possessing this potential, and many historians regard his appointment as chancellor as being merely the conclusion of a long "grooming" process. Over the succeeding decade however, William became disillusioned with his choice, and following Bülow's opposition to the Emperor over the "Daily Telegraph Affair" of 1908 (see below) and on other issues, William dismissed him in favour of Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg in 1909.

Bethmann was a career bureaucrat, at whose family home William had stayed as a youth. William especially came to show great respect for Bethmann-Hollweg, acknowledging the latter's superior foresight in matters of internal governance, though he disagreed with certain of Bethmann's policies, such as his attempts at the reform of the Prussian electoral laws. However, it was only reluctantly that he parted ways with Bethmann-Hollweg in 1917, after three years of World War I.

William's involvement in the domestic sphere was more limited in the early twentieth century than it had been in the first years of his reign. In part, this was due to the appointment of Bülow and Bethmann - arguably both men of greater force of character than William's earlier chancellors - but also because of his increasing interest in foreign affairs.

Foreign policy

German foreign policy under William II was faced with a number of significant problems. Perhaps the most apparent was that William, by nature an impatient man, subjective in his reactions and affected strongly by sentiment and impulse, was personally ill-equipped to steer German foreign policy along a rational course. It is now widely recognised that the various spectacular acts which William undertook in the international sphere were often partially encouraged by the German foreign policy elite. There were a number of key exceptions, such as the famous Kruger telegram of 1896 in which William congratulated President Kruger of the Transvaal on the suppression of the Jameson Raid, and thus aggravated British public opinion. Though its full impact was to be felt many years later, his speech of 27 July 1900 exhorting German troops sent to quell the Boxer Rebellion to emulate the ancient Huns is another example of his unfortunate propensity for impolitic public utterances. This weakness also made him vulnerable to manipulation by interests within the German foreign policy elite, as subsequent events were to prove.

Inconsistency

Following his dismissal of Bismarck, William and his new chancellor Caprivi became aware of the existence of the secret Reinsurance Treaty with the Russian empire, which Bismarck had concluded in 1887. William’s refusal to renew this agreement – which guaranteed Russian neutrality in the event of an attack by France – was seen by many historians as the worst offence committed by William in terms of foreign policy. In reality, the decision to allow the lapse of the treaty was largely the responsibility of Caprivi, though William supported his chancellor’s actions. It is important not to overestimate the influence of the Emperor in matters of foreign policy after the dismissal of Bismarck, but it is certain that his involvement helped contribute to the general lack of coherence and consistency in the policy of the German Empire towards other powers.

A typical example of this was his "love-hate" relationship with the United Kingdom and in particular with his British cousins. Open armed conflict with Britain was never what William had in mind—"a most unimaginable thing", so he once quipped—yet he often gave in to the generally anti-British sentiments within the upper echelons of the German government, conforming as they did to his own prejudices towards Britain which arose from his youth. When war came about in 1914 William sincerely believed that he was the victim of a diplomatic conspiracy set up by his late uncle, Edward VII, in which Britain had actively sought to “encircle” Germany through the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and a similar arrangement with Russia in 1907. This is indicative of the fact that William had a highly unrealistic belief in the importance of “personal diplomacy” between European monarchs, and could not comprehend that the very different constitutional position of his British cousins made this largely irrelevant.

Similarly, he believed that his personal relationship (see The Willy-Nicky Correspondence) with his cousin-in-law Tsar Nicholas II of Russia was sufficient to prevent war between the two powers. At a private meeting at Björkö in 1905, William concluded an agreement with his cousin which amounted to a treaty of alliance, without first consulting with Bülow. A similar situation confronted Tsar Nicholas on his return to St. Petersburg, and the treaty was, as a result, a dead letter. But William believed that Bülow had betrayed him, and this contributed to the growing sense of dissatisfaction he felt towards the man he hoped would be his foremost servant. In broadly similar terms to the "personal diplomacy" at Björkö, his attempts to avoid war with Russia by an exchange of telegrams with Nicholas II in the last days before the outbreak of the First World War came unstuck due to the reality of European power politics. His attempts to woo Russia were also seriously out of step with existing German commitments to Austria-Hungary. In a chivalrous fidelity to the Austro-German alliance, William informed the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph in 1889 that "the day of Austro-Hungarian mobilisation, for whatever cause, will be the day of German mobilisation too". Given that Austrian mobilisation for war would most likely be against Russia, a policy of alliance with both powers was obviously impossible.

The Moroccan Crisis

In some cases, William II's diplomatic "blunders" were often part of a more wide-reaching policy emanating from the German governing elite. One such action sparked the Moroccan Crisis of 1906, when William was persuaded (largely against his wishes) to make a spectacular visit to Tangier, in Morocco. William's presence was seen as an assertion of German interests in Morocco and in a speech he even made certain remarks in favour of Moroccan independence. This led to friction with France, which had expanding colonial interests in Morocco, and led to the Algeciras Conference, which served largely to further isolate Germany in Europe.

Daily Telegraph affair

Perhaps William's most damaging personal blunder in the arena of foreign policy had a far greater impact in Germany than internationally. The Daily Telegraph Affair of 1908 stemmed from the publication of some of William's opinions in edited form in the British daily newspaper of that name. William saw it as an opportunity to promote his views and ideas on Anglo-German friendship, but instead, due to his emotional outbursts during the course of the interview, William ended up further alienating not only the British people, but also the French, Russians, and Japanese all in one fell swoop by implying, inter alia, that the Germans cared nothing for the British; that the French and Russians had attempted to instigate Germany to intervene in the Second Boer War; and that the German naval buildup was targeted against the Japanese, not Britain. (One memorable quote from the interview is "You English are mad, mad, mad as March hares.") The effect in Germany was quite massive, with serious calls for his abdication being mentioned in the press. Quite understandably, William kept a very low profile for many months after the Daily Telegraph fiasco, and later exacted his revenge by enforcing the resignation of Prince Bülow, who had abandoned the Emperor to public criticism by publicly accepting some responsibility for not having edited the transcript of the interview before its publication.

The Daily Telegraph crisis had deeply wounded William's previously unimpaired self-confidence, so much so that he soon suffered a severe bout of depression from which he never really recovered (photographs of William in the post-1908 period show a man with far more haggard features and greying hair), and he in fact lost much of the influence he had previously exercised in terms of both domestic and foreign policy.

Naval expansion

Nothing William II did in the international arena was of more influence than his decision to pursue a policy of massive naval construction.

A powerful navy was William's pet project. He had inherited from his mother a love of the British Royal Navy (the world's largest), and once confided to his uncle Edward VII that his dream was to have a "fleet of my own some day", like the British. William's frustration over his fleet's poor showing at the Fleet Review at his grandmother Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee celebrations, combined with his inability to exert German influence in South Africa following the dispatch of the Kruger telegram led to William taking definitive steps towards the construction of a fleet to rival that of his British cousins. William was fortunate to be able to call on the services of the dynamic naval officer Alfred von Tirpitz, whom he appointed to the head of the Reich Naval Office in 1897.

The new admiral had conceived of what came to be known as the "Risk theory" or the Tirpitz Plan, by which Germany could force Britain to accede to German demands in the international arena through the threat posed by a powerful battlefleet concentrated in the North Sea. Tirpitz enjoyed William's full support in his advocacy of successive naval bills of 1897 and 1900, by which the German navy was built up to contend with that of the United Kingdom. Naval expansion under the Fleet Acts eventually led to severe financial strains in Germany by 1914, as by 1906 William had committed his navy to construction of the much larger, more expensive Dreadnought type of battleship.

World War I

The Sarajevo crisis

William was a close friend of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and he was deeply shocked by his assassination on June 28, 1914. William offered to support Austria-Hungary in crushing the secret organization that had plotted the slaying, and even sanctioned the use of force by Austria against the perceived source of the movement - Serbia. He wanted to remain in Berlin until the crisis was resolved, but his courtiers persuaded him instead to go on his annual cruise of the North Sea on July 6, 1914. It was perhaps realised that William's presence would be more of a hindrance to those elements in the government who wished to use the crisis to increase German prestige, even at the risk of general war - something of which William, for all his bluster, was extremely apprehensive.

William made erratic attempts to stay on top of the crisis via telegram, and when the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was delivered to Serbia, he hurried back to Berlin. He reached Berlin on July 28th, read a copy of the Serbian reply, and wrote on it:

"A brilliant solution--and in barely 48 hours! This is more than could have been expected. A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every pretext for war falls to the ground, and [the Ambassador] Giesl had better have stayed quietly at Belgrade. On this document, I should never have given orders for mobilization."

Unknown to the Emperor, Austro-Hungarian ministers and generals had already convinced the 84-year-old Francis Joseph of Austria to sign a declaration of war against Serbia.

July 30-31, 1914

On the night of July 30-31, when handed a document stating that Russia would not cancel its mobilization, William wrote a lengthy commentary containing the startling observations:

"For I no longer have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves--knowing that our treaty obligations compel us to support Austria--to use the Austro-Serb conflict as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us. ... Our dilemma over keeping faith with the old and honorable Emperor has been exploited to create a situation which gives England the excuse she has been seeking to annihilate us with a spurious appearance of justice on the pretext that she is helping France and maintaining the well-known Balance of Power in Europe, i.e. playing off all European States for her own benefit against us." [Michael Balfour, "The Kaiser and his Times," Houghton Mifflin (1964) pp. 350-51]

When it had became clear that the United Kingdom would enter the war if Germany attacked France through Belgium, the panic-stricken William attempted to switch the main attack against Russia. When Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) told him that this was impossible, William said: "Your uncle would have given me a different answer." [Emil Ludwig, "Wilhelm Hohenzollern: The Last of the Kaisers," G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York (1927) p. 453]

The Great War

It is difficult to argue that William actively sought to unleash the First World War. Though he had ambitions for the German Empire to be a world power, it was never William's intention to conjure a large-scale conflict to achieve such ends. As soon as his better judgment dictated that a world war was imminent, he made strenuous efforts to preserve the peace (such as the "Willy and Nicky" correspondence mentioned earlier, and his optimistic interpretation of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum that Austro-Hungarian troops should go no further than Belgrade, thus limiting the conflict). But by then it was far too late, for the eager military officials of Germany and the German Foreign Office were successful in persuading him to sign the mobilisation order and initiate the Schlieffen Plan. The contemporary British reference to the First World War as "the Kaiser's War" in the same way that the Second was "Hitler's War" is now seen as unfounded (and even somewhat unfair) in its suggestion that William was personally responsible for unleashing the conflict. Nevertheless, his own love of the culture and trappings of militarism and push to endorse the German military establishment and industry (most notably the Krupp corporation), which was the key support which enabled his dynasty to rule helped push his empire into an armaments race with competing European powers. Similarly, though on signing the mobilisation order, William is reported as having said "You will regret this, gentlemen", he had encouraged Austria to pursue a hard line with Serbia, was an enthusiastic supporter of the subsequent German actions during the war and revelled in the title of "Supreme War Lord".

The "Shadow-kaiser"

The role of ultimate arbiter of wartime national affairs proved too heavy a burden for William to sustain. As the war progressed, his influence receded and inevitably his lack of ability in military matters led to an ever-increasing reliance upon his generals, so much that after 1916 the Empire had effectively become a military dictatorship under the control of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. Increasingly cut-off from reality and the political decision-making process, William vacillated between defeatism and dreams of victory, depending upon the fortunes of "his" armies. He remained a useful figurehead, and he toured the lines and munitions plants, awarded medals and gave encouraging speeches.

Nevertheless, William still retained the ultimate authority in matters of political appointment, and it was only after his consent had been gained that major changes to the high command could be effected. William was in favour of the dismissal of Helmuth von Moltke the Younger in 1915 and his replacement by Erich von Falkenhayn. Similarly, William was instrumental in the policy of inactivity adopted by the High Seas Fleet after the Battle of Jutland in 1916. Likewise, it was largely owing to his sense of grievance at having been pushed into the shadows that William attempted to take a leading role in the crisis of 1918. At least in the end he realised the necessity of capitulation and did not insist that the German nation should bleed to death for a dying cause.

Abdication and flight

William was at the Imperial Army headquarters in Spa, Belgium, when the uprisings in Berlin and other centres occurred in late 1918. Mutiny among the ranks of his beloved Kaiserliche Marine, the Imperial Navy, profoundly shocked him. After the outbreak of the German Revolution, William could not make up his mind whether or not to abdicate. Up to that point, he was confident that even if he were obliged to vacate the Imperial German throne, he would still retain the Prussian kingship. The unreality of this claim was revealed when, for the sake of preserving some form of government in the face of anarchy, William's abdication both as Emperor of the German Empire and King of Prussia was abruptly announced by the Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, on November 9, 1918. (Prince Max himself was forced to resign later the same day, when it became clear that only Friedrich Ebert, leader of the SPD could effectively exert control).

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William´s former car, with its new Dutch owners, the Schunck family

William consented to the abdication only after Ludendorff's replacement, General William Groener, had informed him that the officers and men of the army would march back in good order under Paul von Hindenburg's command, but would certainly not fight for William's throne on the home front. The monarchy's last and strongest support had been broken, and finally even Hindenburg, himself a lifelong royalist, was obliged (with some embarrassment) to advise the Emperor to give up the crown.

The following day, the now former German Emperor William II crossed the border by train and went into exile in the Netherlands, which had remained neutral throughout the war. Upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles in early 1919, Article 227 expressly provided for the prosecution of William "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties", but Queen Wilhelmina refused to extradite him, despite appeals from the Allies. The erstwhile emperor first settled in Amerongen, and then was subsequently provided with a small castle in the municipality of Doorn, which was to be his home for the remainder of his life. From this residence, Huis Doorn, William absolved his officers and servants of their oath of loyalty to him; however he himself never formally relinquished his titles, and hoped to return to Germany in the future.

October 1918 Telegrams

The telegrams that were exchanged between the General Headquarters of the Imperial High Command, Berlin, and President Wilson are discussed in Ferdinand Czernin's "Versailles, 1919," G.P. Putnam's & Sons (1964).

The following telegram was sent through the Swiss government and arrived in Washington, D.C. on October 5, 1918 [p. 6]:

"The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis of peace negotiations, the Program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918.

In order to avoid further bloodshed the German Government requests to bring about the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

Max, Prince of Baden, Imperial Chancellor"

In the subsequent two exchanges, Wilson's allusions "failed to convey the idea that the Kaiser's abdication was an essential condition for peace. The leading statesmen of the Reich were not yet ready to contemplate such a monstrous possibility." [p.7]

The third German telegram was sent on October 20. Wilson's reply on October 23 contained the following:

"If the Government of the United States must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid." [Emil Ludwig, Wilhelm Hohenzollern, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York (1927), p. 489]

According to Czernin [p. 9]:

"... Prince Hohenlohe, serving as councilor in the German Legation in Berne, Switzerland, cabled the German Foreign Office that 'a confidential informant has informed me that the conclusion of the Wilson note of October 23 refers to nothing less than the abdication of the Kaiser as the only way to a peace which is more or less tolerable.'"

The abdication of William was necessitated by the popular perceptions that had been created by the Entente propaganda against him, which had been picked and further refined when the U.S. declared war in April 1917.

A much bigger obstacle, which contributed to the five-week delay in the signing of the armistice and to the resulting social deterioration in Europe, was the fact that the Entente Powers had no desire to accept the Fourteen Points and Wilson's subsequent promises. As Czernin points out [p. 23]:

"The Allied statesmen were faced with a problem: so far they had considered the 'fourteen commandments' as a piece of clever and effective American propaganda, designed primarily to undermine the fighting spirit of the Central Powers, and to bolster the morale of the lesser Allies. Now, suddenly, the whole peace structure was supposed to be built up on that set of 'vague principles,' most of which seemed to them thoroughly unrealistic, and some of which, if they were to be seriously applied, were simply unacceptable."

Life in exile

In 1922 William published the first volume of his memoirs, a slim volume in which he revealed a remarkable memory. He asserted he did not initiate the Great War, and defended his conduct throughout his reign. For the remaining twenty years of his life, the emperor became a country squire and regularly entertained guests. During this period, he regained an admiration of Britain and his first reported desire upon entering exile was for "a cup of good English tea". No longer hiring a court barber, and desiring to disguise his features, William grew a beard and allowed his famous moustache to droop.

The former emperor had several hobbies. He spent a lot of time chopping wood, a hobby he began upon his arrival at Doorn. He deforested a significant part of his estate, the land only now beginning to recover. William continued archaeology, a hobby he had acquired during his vacations in Corfu. He also hunted. When bored, he sketched plans for grand buildings and battleships, although experts in construction saw his ideas as grandiose and impractical.

In the early 1930s, William hoped the ascension of the National Socialist German Workers Party would stimulate interest in reviving the monarchy. His second wife, Hermine, petitioned the Nazi government on her husband's behalf. On the contrary, Adolf Hitler felt William II had contributed to Germany's humiliating loss in the First World War. In addition, Hitler's desire for power prevented William’s restoration. Though he hosted Hermann Göring at Doorn on many occasions, William distrusted Hitler, though he admired Hitler's success in the opening months of the Second World War. To this note, he sent a congratulatory telegram when Paris fell. Nevertheless, after the Nazi conquest of the Netherlands in 1940, William retired completely from public life.

Death

William II died of pulmonary embolism in Doorn, Netherlands on June 5, 1941 with German soldiers at the gates of his estate. Hitler, however, was reportedly angry that the former monarch had an honor guard of German troops and nearly fired the general who ordered them there when he found out. He was buried in a mausoleum in the grounds of Huis Doorn, which has since become a place of pilgrimage for German monarchists, though there is concern at its growing popularity with adherents of the extreme right. Hitler hoped to bring William's body back to Berlin for a state funeral, which Hitler could use for propaganda purposes, demonstrating to Germans the direct succession of the Third Reich from the old Kaiserreich. William's wishes of never returning to Germany until the restoration of the monarchy were respected, and the Nazi occupation authorities granted a small military funeral, the mourners at which included the hero of the First World War August von Mackensen, along with a few other military advisors. William's request that the swastika and other Nazi regalia not be displayed at the final rites was ignored however.

To this day, small but enthusiastic numbers of German monarchists gather at Huis Doorn every year on the anniversary of his death to pay their homage to the last German Emperor.

Marriages and issue

William and his first wife Augusta Viktoria

William and his first wife, Princess Augusta Viktoria of Schleswig-Holstein, were married on February 27, 1881. They had seven children:

• Crown Prince Wilhelm (1882-1951).
• Prince Eitel Friedrich (1883-1942)
• Prince Adalbert (1884-1948)
  • Stillborn (1915-1915)
  • Princess Victoria Marina (1917-1981)
  • Prince William Victor (1919-1989)
    • Princess Marie Louise (b.1945)
    • Prince Adelbert (b.1948)
      • Alexander (b.1984)
      • Christian (b.1986)
      • Philipp (b.1986)
• Prince August Wilhelm (1887-1949)
  • Prince Alexander Ferdinand (1912-1985)
    • Stephan Alexander (1939-1993)
      • Stephanie (b.1966)
• Prince Oskar (1888-1958)
  • Prince Oskar (1915-1939)
  • Prince Burchard (1917-1988)
  • Princess Herzeleide-Ina-Marie (1918-1989)
  • Prince William-Karl (b.1922)
    • Princess Donata-Viktoria (b.1952)
    • Prince William-Karl (b.1955)
    • Prince Oskar (b.1959)
      • Prince Oskar (b.1993)
      • Princess Wilhelmine (b.1995)
      • Prince Albert (b.1998)
• Prince Joachim (1890-1920)
  • Prince Karl Franz Joseph (1916-1975)
    • Prince Franz Wilhelm (b.1943), married Maria Vladimirovna, titular Empress of Russia.
      • Prince George William (b.1981)
    • Prince Friedrich Christian (1943-1943)
    • Prince Franz Friedrich (b.1944)
      • Christine (b.1968)
    • Alexandra (b.1960)
    • Desiree (b.1961)
• Princess Viktoria Luise (1892-1980)

Known affectionately as "Dona", Augusta was a close and constant companion to William throughout his life, and her death on April 11, 1921 was a devastating blow. It also came less than a year after their son, Joachim, had committed suicide, unable to accept his lot after the abdication of his father, the failure of his own marriage to Marie-Auguste of Anhalt, and the heavy depression felt after his service in the Great War.

The following January, William received a birthday greeting from a son of Prince Johann Georg of Schönaich-Carolath. He invited the boy and his mother, Princess Hermine, daughter of Prince Henry XXII of Reuss, to Doorn. William found her very attractive, and greatly enjoyed her company. By early 1922, he was determined to marry her and the couple was eventually wed on November 9, 1922 despite grumblings from William's monarchist supporters and the objections of his children. Hermine's daughter, Henriette, eventually married Joachim's son, Karl Franz Josef, on October 5, 1940 (William's step-daughter and grandson respectively), though they divorced in 1946. Hermine remained a constant companion to the ageing emperor until his death.

Alleged extramarital affairs

Prior to his marriage, William had fallen in love with his cousin, Elisabeth of Hesse and by Rhine, daughter of his aunt Alice, and even wrote her a series of love poems. Elizabeth was initially intrigued, but soon found him to be intolerable, always demanding that she be constantly at his side. During the Great War, he continually tried to aid Elizabeth in an escape from Russia, but she refused to leave her adopted country and stayed there until she was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1918. Although she rejected his hand in marriage, as an old man, he confessed that he never forgot her.

William was implicated in some degree in the scandal over his aide and great friend, Philip Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, which revealed homosexual activities (then illegal under German law) within William's inner circle (the Harden-Eulenburg Affair). Bismarck, among others, suggested that there was an inappropriate relationship between William and Eulenburg. There is no conclusive evidence to prove that the Emperor and Eulenburg's relationship went beyond friendship.

Notable facts and common misconceptions

File:WilhelmIIx.jpg

William II, German Emperor

• William, the first grandchild of Queen Victoria, was at his maternal grandmother's deathbed, holding her in his arms as she passed away. For this, he won some lasting affection from the British public which was unfortunately snuffed out in 1914.
• William owned a vast collection of uniforms and costumes. He wore different ones for each occasion, often 4 or more a day. This habit made people joke about it, saying that when eating plum pudding the emperor would dress as a British Admiral (an honorary rank he had been awarded by his grandmother in 1889).
• William had his summer palace in Stuttgart. When in residence, he held a parade every Sunday at noon. In full military dress, the Emperor, his officers and cavalry, marched up and down the main street; the townsfolk being encouraged to attend.
• The Emperor loved all things Norwegian. He often spent his summer holidays on his yacht, cruising Norway's coast. When the city of Ålesund was demolished by a great fire in 1904, he oversaw and partially financed its restoration in Jugendstil architecture.
• He had a yacht called the Meteor, which was outpaced in a regatta at Kiel in 1900 by the famous mining entrepreneur Whitaker Wright.
• Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the young Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands visited William II who boasted to the child-Queen that "my guards are seven feet tall and yours are only shoulder high to them." Wilhelmina smiled politely and replied: "Quite true, Your Majesty, your guards are seven feet tall. But when we open our dikes, the water is ten feet deep!" After the armistice ending the Great War, William had to swallow his pride and seek Wilhelmina's aid in the Netherlands, this time as a political exile.
• William paid for a marble sarcophagus for the Muslim hero Saladin. Although it is in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, next to the old tomb, Saladin's remains are not interred in it, but lie in the original wooden coffin in which he was interred.
• Following the fall of Paris to the Nazis in 1940, William sent a telegram to Hitler congratulating him on capturing Paris with his (i.e. William's) troops, much to the annoyance of Hitler.
• William enjoyed the themes of the music of Richard Wagner, and although his patronage of the composer and his Bayreuth Festival never approached the fanatical levels of King Ludwig II of Bavaria or later of Hitler, the horn of the German Emperor's first automobile played Donner's "Heda! Heda! Hedo!" motive from Das Rheingold. William himself thought that Wagner's music made "too much noise".
• Through Queen Victoria, William was a first cousin to many of the crowned heads of Europe with whom he went to war, most notably George V of the United Kingdom and Nicholas II (through his consort, the Empress Alexandra). All three spoke English fluently and called each other Georgie, Willy and Nicky respectively.
• Upon hearing that his cousin George V had changed the name of the British royal house to Windsor, he remarked that he planned to see Shakespeare's play "The Merry Wives of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha".
• Prior to the outbreak of hostilities of WWI, William hosted Theodore Roosevelt in a review of the German army on parade. Roosevelt is purported to have said to the future adversary, "My God, if I had an army like that, I could rule the world!"
• William II ranks at No. 130 on the Unsere Besten list of greatest Germans.

Titles and styles

• His Royal Highness Prince William of Prussia (1859-1888)
• His Imperial and Royal Highness The German Crown Prince, Crown Prince of Prussia (1888)
• His Imperial and Royal Majesty The German Emperor, King of Prussia (1888-1941)

Full title as German Emperor

His Imperial and Royal Majesty William the Second, by the Grace of God, German Emperor and King of Prussia, Margrave of Brandenburg, Burgrave of Nuremburg, Count of Hohenzollern, Duke of Silesia and of the County of Glatz, Grand Duke of the Lower Rhine and of Posnania, Duke in Saxony, of Engern, of Westphalia, of Pomerania and of Lunenburg, Duke of Schleswig, of Holstein and of Krossen, Duke of Magdeburg, of Brene, of Guelderland and of Jülich, Cleves and Berg, Duke of the Wends and the Kassubes, of Lauenburg and of Mecklenburg, Landgrave of Hesse and in Thuringia, Margrave of Upper and Lower Lusatia, Prince of Orange, of Rugen, of East Friesland, of Paderborn and of Pyrmont, Prince of Halberstadt, of Münster, of Minden, of Osnabrück, of Hildersheim, of Verdun, of Kammin, of Fulda, of Nassau and of Moess, Princely Count of Henneberg, Count of the Mark, of Ravensburg, of Hohenstein, of Tecklenburg and of Lingen, Count of Mansfield, of Sigmaringen and of Veringen, Lord of Frankfort, etc. [1]

Literature

Despite the continuing debate over the precise nature of his impact upon history, William has been the focus of many biographies, of which the first (by Emil Ludwig) is still one of the most accessible.

• Ludwig, Emil. "Wilhelm Hohenzollern: The Last of the Kaisers", G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1927 (translated by Ethel Colburn Mayne). (1970 edition, Ames Press). ISBN 0-404-04067-5.
• Röhl, John C. G.. "The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany", trans. Terence F. Cole, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. ISBN 0-521-40223-9.

Further reading

• Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964.
• E. F. Benson, The Kaiser and English Relations, London: Longmans, Green, 1936.
• Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Prince and Emperor, 1859-1900, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
• Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Emperor and Exile, 1900-1941, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
• Isabel V. Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888-1918, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
• Thomas A. Kohut, Wilhelm II and the Germans: A Study in Leadership, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
• Giles Macdonogh, The Last Kaiser: William the Impetuous, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001.
• Annika Mombauer & Wilhelm Deist (eds), The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
• Alan Palmer, The Kaiser: Warlord of the Second Reich, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1978.
• James Retallack, Germany in the Age of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
• John C. G. Röhl & Nicholaus Sombart (eds), Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations - the Corfu Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982 (reprinted 2005).
• John C. G. Röhl, Young Wilhelm: The Kaiser's Early Life, 1859-1888, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 (Volume I of Röhl's massive new biography).
• John C. G. Röhl, The Kaiser's Personal Monarchy, 1888-1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 (Volume II of Röhl's masive new biography).
• John Van der Kiste, Kaiser Wilhelm II: Germany's Last Emperor, Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999.
• Tyler Whittle, The Last Kaiser: A Biography of William II, Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, London: Heinemann, 1977.
• Wilhelm II, My Memoirs: 1878-1918, London: Cassell & Co., 1922.
• Alkan, Necmettin. Die deutsche Weltpolitik und die Konkurrenz der Maechte um das osmanische Erbe. Die deutsch-osmanischen Beziehungen in der deutschen Presse 1890-1909, Lit Verglag, Münster 2003.
• Robert K. Massie (1991). Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War. New York: Random House, ISBN 0-394-52833-6.

External links

• Biography of Wilhelm II